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Abstract 
 
Focusing on a selection of musical works from within three genres – 
symphony, string quartet, and the piano repertoire – I argue that the experience of 
music from the late 20th and early 21st centuries must be understood in terms of its 
mediation by the continued presence of the past, not simply through reference to 
past musical formal materials, but also to the history of experience as musically 
mediated. Following this logic, I explore a discursive strategy based around 
philosophical tensions central to the aesthetics of post-Enlightenment musical 
experience – in particular, the dialectics of nature and culture, and of mind and 
body. This allows me to interweave closely strands of musicological and 
philosophical thought, exploring and developing the latter as they have been taken 
into, exhibited, and played with in a range of late modernist works. I focus on 
works that draw attention to their historical situatedness, music by Wolfgang 
Rihm, Helmut Lachenmann, Giya Kancheli, Valentin Silvestrov, Alfred Schnittke, 
Thomas Adès, Morton Feldman, and Jukka Tiensuu. I draw on, though outline 
the need to take forward, Theodor Adorno’s understanding of the historical 
qualities of musical material, yet also foster an understanding of musical 
experience situated between past and present without recourse to explicitly 
postmodern quotation or “intertextuality”, something I implicitly critique. 
Through illustrating points of affinity and convergence between musical works 
and experiential issues, I pull together seemingly disparate methodological 
approaches. These include musical semiotics, Critical Theory, embodied 
phenomenology, and psychoanalytic theory. 
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Theoretical Introductions 
 
 
 
Meaning is history that has migrated into music. 
 
– Theodor Adorno, Sound Figures1 
 
Experience of the present is always mediated by the past. But the processes of 
mediation are not self-evident: musical artefacts from the past (quotations, instruments, 
pedagogical practices) might be held at arm’s length as objects of contemplation; 
historically significant forms, genres, and even the characteristic styles of past composers, 
might be alluded to; or the past might not even be audibly made present, rather providing 
a hidden frame as a necessary condition through which the present may be intelligible at all. 
It is this mediation of experience that is the core focus of this study, as it is explored 
critically in art music of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This is demonstrated in a 
range of musical works, in a diverse number of ways, in works by Alfred Schnittke, Giya 
Kancheli, Valentin Silvestrov, Wolfgang Rihm, Helmut Lachenmann, Jukka Tiensuu, 
Thomas Adès, and Morton Feldman. And, whilst these composers (or, more accurately, 
the works of theirs focussed on here) cannot be said to share some single determining 
quality, they do share, in the manner of family resemblances, points of overlap. Whilst 
differences in the outward (sonic) appearances of their works cannot be ignored, these 
should not conceal significant points of contact in their critical approaches to the 
experience of the present as this relates to the past – to deeper questions of mediation – 
and the historicity of categories mediative of experience (mind and body, for example) as 
these have been (and still are) “performed” musically.  
It is not just difference and diversity that characterise treatments of the 
relationships between past and present in the works of these composers. I focus on 
musical works from the mid-1970s onwards, a time in which, despite a great variety of 
compositional approaches, there were moves toward more direct modes of expression.2 As 
                                                
1 ADORNO, THEODOR 1999: Sound Figures (trans. Rodney Livingstone), Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 160 
2 METZER, DAVID 2009: Musical Modernism at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 15. This turn towards past expressive models in the 1970s and 80s is also discussed in 
WILLIAMS, ALASTAIR 2010: ‘Postlude: Helmut Lachenmann, Wolfgang Rihm, and the Austro-German 
Tradition’ in Contemporary Music: Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives (ed. Max Paddison & Irène 
Deliège), Farnham: Ashgate 
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David Metzer points out, this directness of expression is difficult to define – it is ‘a broad 
concept that resists encapsulation’ – however it is something that is perceived as 
immediate.3 It is through this apparent immediacy that I hope to highlight the implicit – 
rather than only explicit (for example, quotational) – role that the past plays in its 
mediation of the present. Furthermore, in these works, to various degrees and through 
divergent strategies, we hear “critical”, modernist reactions to the interpenetration of past 
and present. Past musical material is drawn on as a source of significance, whilst at the 
same time the significance of these materials in the present goes beyond their past usage. 
Hence this move is “dialectical” in that the past is both preserved and simultaneously 
surpassed in the present. 
The selection of composers and works focussed on in this study might at first 
seem to be very particular. In this sense, I should not give the impression that this study is 
a cross-section, a representational map, of musical modernism as it has been since the 
mid-1970s. What it is, though, is a set of suggestions for ways to start going about 
mapping this terrain. I make the case that the conditions that mediate experience, and 
historicity, should be favoured as this map’s legend. Through taking this perspective, and 
in my focusing on some less “mainstream” composers (i.e. Silvestrov and Tiensuu, in 
conjunction with a focus on Schnittke and Rihm), I also show how new points of 
connection can be opened up between established modernist centres, and its repertory’s 
peripheries. Below, I discuss these issues further, as well as their relationships to the 
methodological viewpoints that I draw on. 
This study comes at a time of resurgent interest in questions surrounding 
modernism. Debate concerning music of this period has suggested that postmodernism 
has been problematised by the ‘obstinacy of modernism’4, that modernism has not been 
killed-off and superseded by something ‘post-’. The question has recently been explored 
by David Metzer5, Alastair Williams6, Eduardo De La Fuente7, in a volume of essays edited 
by Björn Heile8, and another by Irène Deliège & Max Paddison9. In philosophy and literary 
                                                
3 METZER 2009: 16 
4 METZER 2009: 1 
5 METZER 2009 
6 WILLIAMS, ALASTAIR 1997: New Music and the Claims of Modernity, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Company and WILLIAMS, ALASTAIR 2004: ‘Ageing of the New: The Museum of Musical Modernism’ in 
Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music (ed. Nicholas Cook & Anthony Pople), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
7 DE LA FUENTE, EDUARDO 2011: Twentieth Century Music and the Question of Modernity, New York: 
Routledge 
8 HEILE, BJÖRN (ed.) 2009: The Modernist Legacy: Essays on New Music, Farnham: Ashgate 
9 DELIÈGE, IRÈNE & PADDISON, MAX (ed.) 2010: Contemporary Music: Theoretical and Philosophical 
Perspectives, Farnham: Ashgate 
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studies, this view can be seen in the recent work of Fredric Jameson10 and Majorie 
Perloff 11 . Furthermore, Metzer and Williams, despite differing aesthetic and 
methodological concerns, both stress that the modern/postmodern distinction in music is 
far from being a clear, exclusive dichotomy. 
However, whilst the idea that modernism draws upon past styles and formal 
fragments is well-established, a study focussing on the actual processes by which present 
material bears traces of the past has been strangely lacking. Modernism has been 
understood as a process of ‘deviation’ from established forms – Adorno went so far as to 
suggest that ‘new music... is absolute deviance. As such it poses the problem that it can 
scarcely be comprehended truthfully without some relation to the thing from which it 
deviates’12. Indeed, studies of connections between past and present have been explicit, for 
example focusing on quotations and uses of past forms13. In contrast, I suggest that it is 
not only “the musical material” that is important (in terms of reference and intertext), but 
also that, due to the pervasiveness of the past in shaping the present, inherent “within” 
this material are philosophical concerns. Formal (textual) materials always conceal within 
them inherited philosophical-historical legacies.  
This last phrase – inherited philosophical-historical legacies – returns us to the 
central topic of investigation, musical experience. Musical experience – and the 
conceptualisation of experience – is shaped by categories of thought and feeling (like mind 
and body, and culture and nature) that are themselves articulated musically. A focus on the 
mediation of experience in/by this music thus means attending to the dialectical processes 
whereby the philosophical categories by which experience has been historically mediated musically are both 
attended to and developed. These are “legacies” – “where we come from” – yet they do not 
simply determine our present or future capacities for musical and aesthetic experiences. 
This dialectical mind-set means focussing not only on the conceptualisation of experience 
but also on music’s oft-cited ability to slip between concepts, and hence the inherent 
failure involved in any attempted conceptualisation of musical experience. This is explored 
in Part II, which pursues potentially productive directions for understanding the dialectics 
of concept and experience, identity and non-identity. 
The multiplicity of reactions and relationships to the past charted by recent musics 
precludes singular, linear interpretations. Instead, I investigate constellations of musical 
                                                
10 JAMESON, FREDRIC 2003: ‘The End of Temporality’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 29, No. 4 (pp. 695-718) 
11 PERLOFF, MAJORIE 2002: 21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics, Oxford: Blackwell 
12 ADORNO, THEODOR 2002: ‘Difficulties’ [orig. 1964, 1966] in Essays on Music (ed. Leppert, Richard, 
trans. Gillespie, S.H.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 671 
13 METZER, DAVID 2003: Quotation and Cultural Meaning in Twentieth-Century Music, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, and STRAUS, JOSEPH N. 1990: Remaking the Past: Musical Modernism and the Influence of the 
Tonal Tradition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
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works and interconnected philosophical-historical themes, always overlapping the 
boundaries of one another. Rather than taking one composer or “school” as my object of 
focus, I opt instead to tease-out intersecting reactions to the implicit historicity of musical 
material in a patchwork of composers’ works. This can be read as an attempt to reflect 
listening and thought under late modernity: as an always-plural act. This is to do so, 
however, whilst suggesting that these multiple threads find common points of contact. 
There may be many reactions to this philosophical and historical condition but, even 
without synthesis between them, even without these critical directions running side by side, 
it is possible to find moments at which these different threads are knotted together. “The 
body” in music – the historicity of the body’s roles in music and its construction in music 
– provides one point of such conceptual knotting together, a tying together of apparently 
diverse critical threads. In Part III, I discuss inherited musical mediations of the body and 
the body’s immanent musical development in piano works by Lachenmann, Schnittke, and 
Adès. In addition, through outlining (in chapter 3) how philosophical-historical ideas 
operate in partial complicity with one another – how notions of culture and nature relate 
to those of mind and body, with both being constructed and connected immanently within 
music – it is shown that the project that I am developing here, which might appear 
manifestly as highly diverse, in fact conceals a latent core of inner consistencies (that are, 
nonetheless, expressed multiply). 14  Discussing these works together emphasises a 
constellation of philosophical ideas mediative of experience. 
How does the “critical” dimension of these works develop and/or follow on from 
the criticality of earlier modernisms? The critical and conscious use of past forms could be 
said to be a defining feature of modernism – a strategy seen famously in Beethoven’s Late 
music, for example. Here, a fragmentation of stylistic conventions occurs, with these 
conventions being the origin by which difference and divergence are developed. As 
Lawrence Kramer puts it, ‘the problem of modernity is not that signification ceases to 
function, but that it ceases to be fixed and assured, so that nothing can be read without 
irony, or at least the possibility of irony.’15 This legacy continues, though a little differently, 
in our more recent modernism. Whilst in Beethoven’s critical music it is possible to speak 
of a critical reaction to conventions, in our late(r) modernism it is harder to locate these 
hermeneutic jumping off points, the conventional (normative) conditions by which critical 
reactions may be differentially conceived. Notions of normative styles and centres are now 
                                                
14 The reasons for which I selected the works/composers under discussion would not exclude other 
possibilities (some of Ligeti’s or Sciarrino’s works could be included, for instance). The works that are 
discussed – placed in constellation – help to illustrate wider issues about critical music in the late 20th- and 
early 21st-centuries without effacing the differences between them. 
15 KRAMER, LAWRENCE 2011: Interpreting Music, Berkeley: University of California Press, 231 
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themselves suspect; ‘nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore’ (as Adorno famously 
proclaimed at the very opening of his posthumously published Aesthetic Theory16). As the 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman puts it, late modernity (for him ‘liquid modernity’) proceeds 
under conditions typified by ‘the unclarity of norms – anomie’17. He quotes Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guatarri, who summarise this condition as follows: 
 
We no longer believe in the myth of the existence of fragments that, like 
pieces of an antique statue, are merely waiting for the last one to be turned up, 
so that they may all be glued back together to create a unity that is precisely 
the same as the original unity. We no longer believe in a primordial totality 
that once existed, or in a final totality that awaits us at some future date.18 
 
Conventions are no longer given regulative conditions. In many ways, “the convention” is 
now itself a historical category, something markedly of the past. 
Despite a late 20th-century suspicion over any consistent normativities (something 
also expressed in postmodernists’ ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’19), I would like to 
suggest that hermeneutic centres may still be evoked, but this is, in the most part, done so 
provisionally – grasped by aspects of works, and experiences enabled through them, and 
then released. The universalities of earlier modernisms – the sublime transcendence of 
Beethoven’s modernism, the new compositional languages pursued under Viennese 
modernism, and the autonomous quality of post-war parametric compositions – are 
eschewed in place of provisionally exploring centres, musical objects, and musico-
historical practices in all their particularities (be these musical, social, or historical). This, in 
accordance with the scepticism of any given normativity, is foregrounded in a diverse 
number of critical approaches. Schnittke multiplies centres “polystylistically”, to give a 
ready example. In addition, the field of conventions to be provisionally explored itself 
becomes expanded so as to now encompass not only “purely musical” (formal) 
conventions but also the conventions of practice beyond the formal (for example, 
instrumental practice, as in much of Lachenmann’s music). This, I argue below, accords 
with a sensitivity to the materiality of past conventions as these mediate the present.  
However, we must keep in mind that a clear, chronologically exacting division 
between “later” and “earlier” modernisms – between late 20th- and early 21st-century works 
                                                
16 ADORNO, THEODOR 1997 [orig. 1970]: Aesthetic Theory (ed. Gretel Adorno & Rolf Tiedemann, trans. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor), London: The Athlone Press, 1 
17 BAUMAN, ZYGMUNT 2012: Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 20-21 
18 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari cited in BAUMAN 2012: 21 
19 LYOTARD, JEAN-FRANÇOIS 1984 [orig. 1979]: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (trans. 
George Bennington and Brian Massumi), Manchester: Manchester University Press, xxiv 
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and earlier ones – is problematic. “Both” negotiate modernity’s multiple problematics at 
any given synchronic moment, as many dimensions contribute to an image of 
“modernism” at a given time. (Hence the scare quotes on “both” – “later” and “earlier” 
stages are not truly distinct.) But, diachronically, each of these constituent dimensions 
(advances in instrumental technique, new treatments of temporality, and so on) also 
develops in their own right. Put another way, the constituent threads that make up 
“modernism” do not shift from “earlier” to “later” at the same time. We are not simply 
handed a new bundle of threads with modernist music of the late 20th- and early 21st-
centuries. The move towards the modernist character of the works explored here, the 
developments from that which preceded them, is one consisting of many overlapping 
tendencies, each of which develops both independently and with regard to many others. 
Considered in isolation, new sensitivities to the social and pedagogical particularities of 
instrumental practices might be considered as a tendency that develops “independently” 
from other factors, and hence as a diachronic object of study. Another dimension might 
be the changing relationships found between present compositional practices and the 
historical canon of great works. However, a more accurate (and necessarily more complex 
image) is advanced when these threads are also taken together. In the case of these 
examples, this means paying critical attention to instrumental practices, in a way that takes 
into account these practices as they are historically established through the instrumental 
repertoire, the canon of works. This is not confuse one dimension with any other, or in 
general to let one dissolve into its others, but rather to maintain a dialectic between the 
relative autonomy of one thread and its interpenetration by multiple others. As a result of 
this multidimensionality is that there is no individual factor that determines some singular 
condition common to all the works, composers, and ideas that make up this study. There 
are instead multiple points of contact and shifting intersections between many strands of 
musical, historical, and philosophical thought, some of which make links back to earlier 
modernist experiences, though these are now intersected by other dimensions that 
contribute to uniquely late modernist formulations of musical experience and relationships 
with the past. Paradoxically, this very lack of any common single determining quality is the 
shared quality of these works, that without some stable determining feature external to 
them (e.g. standardised conventions, normativity) these works demand that we enter into 
playful constellations within them. 
The positioning of such provisional centres in these musical works is itself 
suggestive of the role of past-present relations. We may ask why and how one is 
positioned over another and, following this, how philosophical-historical significances are 
brought to differential and divergent aspects of a work in relation to these provisional 
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centres. To pre-empt discussions found in the ensuing chapters, two examples of how 
“centres” are evoked can be briefly cited. Past musical materials – treated as “objects” 
within the work’s discourse (as outlined in chapter 2 and developed in 3 and 4) – may help 
to articulate such centres or provide centres around which other materials may be 
articulated. Or, as explored in the first chapter, the canon of Western art music, whilst still 
operative in mediating the philosophical-historical significance of “musical works”, may 
become a centre related to in new ways; Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 is to the canonic 
monumental symphonies of the past as ruins are to historical architectural monuments. 
Indeed, these two tendencies also bear traces of a specifically late modern sensitivity, in the 
former, to the materiality of objects and, in the latter, to the experience of space. 
I explore a handful of works from late 20th- and early 21st-century symphonic, 
string quartet, and piano repertoires as they are productive in highlighting different musical 
and philosophical-historical themes: the dialectics of culture and nature as foregrounded in 
two late 20th-century symphonies; the role (and articulation) of subjectivity in a range of 
string quartets; and, dances as referenced by or sedimented into the language of recent 
piano music (the Waltz, the Mazurka), as highlighting questions of embodied experience in 
music. This is neither to claim that recent piano music never encompasses dialectical issues 
of culture and nature nor that symphonies do not embrace somatic issues. It is rather to 
reflect that dances and symphonies (and indeed, pianos, string quartet writing, and so on) 
have particular legacies and associations that “prejudice” (in the Gadamerian sense20) 
modes of interpretation or, at least, our first experiential points of reference. These places 
are hence not only where these issues reside (bodily issues in dance forms, dialectical 
concerns in the symphony); they are, however, nodal points through which particular 
philosophical-historical legacies might, through the precedents set by these musical forms’ 
pasts, be foregrounded.  
Another point of distinction should also be made. This is not to suggest that 
inquiries into the philosophical and historical significances of, for example, dance forms 
are limited to questions of embodiment, and into those of the symphony to specific modes 
of dialectical process (the culture/nature dialectic as mediated musically). To note that 
philosophical-historical legacies are operative does not limit the boundaries of experience 
and interpretation to play within them. The historicity of these legacies, by contrast, can be 
seen to provide ready frames of reference that – immanently critiqued within – may 
sublate towards something beyond simple historical and interpretative determinism 
(beyond “dances are ultimately bodily, and only bodily”). Indeed, through drawing on 
                                                
20 WARNKE, GEORGIA 1987: Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press: 75-78 
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various interdisciplinary critical literatures (chapter 3) I argue that, what may at first seem 
distinct historical-philosophical domains of meaning (nature and culture, body and mind, 
and so on) in fact function in complicity and correspondence with each other. This 
enables dialogues between issues raised in what could have been, previously and 
erroneously, regarded as separable musical and philosophical domains. Fluidity and 
slippage – core aspects of (the) experience (of music) – take us beyond the rigidity of the 
limits of those philosophical and historical legacies that are foregrounded. Indeed, the 
fluidity found in dimensions of these musical works – a fluidity which nonetheless relies 
dialectically on the rigidity of boundaries that enables articulation of these works and their 
constituent discourses (see chapter 4) – grants them an exemplary status as sites in which 
relationships within musical, philosophical, and historical thought might be modified, 
transgressed and/or negated. Put another way, the characteristic “decentring” that can be 
observed in much late 20th- and early 21st-century art music asks of us that our 
interpretative approach similarly reflects the fluidity with which centres of meaning are 
alluded to, passed over, and brought into new relation. 
Constellations 
This projects falls into three main parts. Each explores one aspect of relationships 
between past and present. Each also builds upon the findings of the last whilst additionally 
contributing to the multiple threads that run throughout the project as a whole. 
Responding to different aspects of musical experience means drawing upon a range of 
philosophical and methodological perspectives. For instance, in discussing issues of 
“discourse” and subjectivity I borrow from poststructuralism and psychoanalytic theory, 
and from phenomenology in approaching questions of embodiment. I argue that this 
crossing over of disciplinary and methodological boundaries elucidates this music’s critical 
capacity as a mode of thought facilitating the transgression of reified boundaries. This 
same characteristic positions these works as sites in which, for example, discourse and 
embodiment might be brought together anew or be shown to act complicitly, challenging 
the idea that these things can be conceived apart from one another. 
Part I is principally centred around the dialectics of culture and nature as taken 
immanently into inherited musical materials, and two symphonic reactions to these 
legacies – firstly, in Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 (1980-82) and, secondly, in Giya 
Kancheli’s Fifth Symphony (1976). Between these two case studies, there is a brief 
“Interlude”, in which I explore a notion of musical “objects” that, I argue, aids critical 
investigations into musical experience, particularly with regard to these objects’ mediation 
by (and of) the past. This responds both to specific treatments of musical materials in the 
15 
works that I explore and to the increasing interest in ‘objects’ in musicology’s sister 
disciplines. 
Drawing on longstanding links between the aesthetics of music and of architecture, 
I argue that experiencing Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 parallels a dimension of the 
experience of the ruins of past monuments. I take as my theoretical starting point Georg 
Simmel’s analysis of architectural ruins.21 Simmel claimed that the aesthetic significance of 
ruins stemmed from their embodying a breakdown in the dialectic of culture and nature, 
or that of human spirit and of nature’s laws. I suggest that, in exploring musical material’s 
mediative shaping of the concepts of culture and nature, Silvestrov’s symphony performs a 
parallel reformulation of Simmel’s dialectic of culture and nature. Furthermore, through 
outlining how “musical space” – principally in its articulation as musical structure – relates 
to architectural space conceptually, I illustrate that this symphony executes the ruination of 
inherited symphonic architectures, of monumental symphonies of the past. The work thus 
becomes seen as a “ruin-symphony”, something complementing Silvestrov’s own notion 
of his Fifth as “post-symphony”22. The symphony is posited in relation to the symphonic 
monuments of the past, as well as in relation to the “inscribed” meanings of these 
monuments’ materials, as these have been passed down through the canon of Western art 
music. Symphonic monuments fall into ruin under the locus of Silvestrov’s symphony, 
leading to new and significant experiences of this symphony and the monumental 
symphonic repertoire. 
Having investigated the “objects” of contemporary musical experience in a short 
theoretical interlude, I turn towards Kancheli’s Fifth Symphony. I propose the theorising 
of discursive objects of focus within musical works as holding potential for a critical 
hermeneutic outlook, whereby moments in musical discourses foreground, and perform, 
latent qualities of larger philosophical-historical contexts. I explore how such objects may 
take on wider relevance, before affirming my stated position that such ties to history do 
not determine objects’ significances – that despite their historicity these objects still retain a 
virtual quality of fluidity. This forms the basis for discussing distance and nostalgia in the 
symphony. Specifically, these qualities come through in the treatment of a solo 
harpsichord’s musical material as an object that is both held close, identified as an image 
of (child-like) innocence, and made distant, as a hazy object of nostalgia. 
                                                
21 As formulated in SIMMEL, GEORG 1959: ‘The Ruin’ [orig. 1911] (trans David Kettler) in Georg Simmel, 
1858-1918: A Collection of Essays, With Translations and a Bibliography (ed. Kurt H. Wolff), Columbus: The 
Ohio State University Press 
22 Silvestrov cited in SAVENKO, SVETLANA 1998: ‘Valentin Silvestrov’s Lyrical Universe’ in Underground 
Music from the Former USSR (ed. Valeria Tsenova), Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 75 
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Having explored in Part I the role of philosophical-historical legacies of nature and 
culture, and Silvestrov and Kancheli’s immanent musical treatments thereof, I move 
towards exploring other categories central to the mediation of musical experience – 
principally the dialectics of mind (Part II) and body (Part III). In Part II, I focus upon the 
string quartet as a genre in which notions of subjectivity have historically been 
foregrounded.  In the first chapter, I explore how music has historically performed non-
conceptual modes of self-knowing, self-understanding, and articulations of Self and Other. 
These legacies I outline before considering discursive constructions of subjectivity in 
recent quartets, and composers’ confrontations of these immanent legacies. This is 
achieved principally through a critical reading of Julia Kristeva’s notion of the thetic, the 
organisational and articulatory threshold at which discourse, and the fixity of the subject, is 
constructed/breaks down. Leading from Kristeva’s assessment of the thetic as having a 
dual character – as ‘rupture and/or boundary’23 – I explore two works through which 
discourse and subjectivity are organised around these principles. Firstly, I explore how in 
Wolfgang Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10 (1993/97) large-scale (“macroscopic”) 
“intertextual” objects rupture both into and from the discourse, affirming its threshold. In 
the second sense, that of ‘boundary’, I outline how microscopic details of texture and pitch 
help to constitute discourse, chiefly through a case study of Jukka Tiensuu’s (1990) Arsenic 
and Old Lace (for microtonally tuned harpsichord and string quartet). In Tiensuu’s work the 
string quartet acts both to bound and then outwardly expand discursive materials charted 
by the harpsichord. These analyses, through the lens of Kristeva’s thetic, help also to 
supplement my already established concept of “objects” in discourse – specifically, it helps 
show how objects are posited and positioned in these recent works. 
This enables me to analyse how musical notions of subjective selfhood are focused 
on in aspects of Alfred Schnittke’s String Quartet No. 4 (1989). This is placed in the 
philosophical-historical context of selfhood, as an idea (or a practice) that has been 
articulated musically (as is often illustrated with regard to the ‘Heroic’ works of Beethoven, 
and in the relationship between Beethoven’s music and Hegel’s philosophy24). As I 
illustrate, in the second movement of Schnittke’s quartet, figures of musical closure, as 
metonymic symbols of musical and subjective self-coherence, are taken as a discursive 
starting point, as images of an objectified self. Contradictions within this symbolic 
presentation of selfhood are then opened up dialectically. In so doing, a critical exploration 
                                                
23 KRISTEVA, JULIA 1984 [orig. 1974]: Revolution in Poetic Language (trans. Margaret Waller), New York: 
Columbia University Press, 43 
24 See SCHMALFELDT, JANET 2011: In the Process of Becoming: Analytic and Philosophical Perspectives on Form in 
Early Nineteenth-Century Music, Oxford: Oxford University Press, or BURNHAM, SCOTT 1995: Beethoven 
Hero, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
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of self-understanding – of its processes, reifications, and paradoxes – is performed 
musically. 
In chapter 5, I develop a psychoanalytic mode of exploring past-present relations 
in the musical mind.25 Responding to Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 1 (1974, revised 
1990), I propose the bringing together of musical analysis with dream analysis from the 
psychoanalytic tradition. Positioning semiotics as the theoretical meeting point between 
the analysis of music and of dream, I discuss how “residues” of the musical past are taken 
into this quartet and invested with new meanings and significances in the present. I also 
carefully outline how a critical, psychoanalytically-inclined approach may avoid merely 
analysing the “composer behind the work”. I argue that a psychoanalytically-disposed 
reading of musical semiotics caters for the modernist context of Silvestrov’s music – 
where established musical meaning/expression is problematised. The concepts of 
displacement and condensation – the undercurrents to the dynamics of dreaming – hold 
analytic potential in musical contexts. Specifically, they may help us to explore how 
musical materials become experienced as freshly significant in their present immediacy, 
something nonetheless mediated by the musical past. 
This is put in the context of the historicity of desiring in/through music, as the 
dream-like processes of the critical work (like the dream itself) draw on both knowing and 
desiring. Firstly, I outline how the mediation of desire has been taken into inherited 
musical materials. I outline musicological characterisations of desire and also ways in 
which desire has, as such, been sublimated within musical materials. I suggest that recent 
modernist music’s problematisation (or reformulation) of the discursive frameworks 
within which desire operates may be best understood through an appeal to psychoanalytic 
thinking, one that values memories and traces of past desires – inscribed within musical 
materials – as these shape present experience, without determining experience through the 
codifiable reification of these materials. This is illustrated through revisiting the quartets 
discussed in Part II in their dimensions of desiring. 
Having outlined the historicity of desire as inscribed into musical language, I 
explore an alternative strategy as heard in Feldman’s String Quartet No. 2 (1983): the 
negating of the musical articulation of desire. This I put in the context of Fredric 
Jameson’s essay on the postmodern ‘End of Temporality’26, suggesting that Feldman 
                                                
25 This appeal to psychoanalytic theory responds to and builds upon recent research into musical structure 
and psychoanalysis – for example, REICHARDT, SARAH 2008: Composing the Modern Subject: Four String 
Quartets by Dmitri Shostakovich, Aldershot: Ashgate. However, my approach differs markedly from 
Reichardt’s Lacanian framework in that I put the dialectical interrelationship of past and present at the 
centre of my study, rather than psychoanalytic schemata. 
26 JAMESON 2003 
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confronts this philosophical-historical situation through inverting late-capitalism’s 
reduction of experience to the moment. Experience, instead, looks outwards from the 
moment. 
The web of relationships between inherited notions of the body, technology, and 
pedagogy forms the core discussion of Part III. In chapter 7, the piano is considered as an 
object of history passed down, an object with pedagogical and technological conventions 
that gives it a particular relationship to the body. I show how Helmut Lachenmann’s 
Serynade (1998-2000) explores and modifies these pedagogical and technological aspects. 
As such, the somatic dimension of the past-present dialectic is brought under scrutiny. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment is called upon in theorising the 
body’s role in pedagogy and its relationship with the piano as technology27, and in 
enhancing Shklovksian interpretations of Lachenmann’s music.28 
Historically resonant musical mediations of the body in piano music remain the 
focus in the last chapter. Two dances are the objects of investigation. Through considering 
the historicity of the waltz in musical constructions of the body – as mediating particular 
modes of bodily self-comportment – the waltz from Schnittke’s Piano Quintet (1972-76) is 
seen as a musically immanent exploration of issues surrounding the body. Having laid out 
the connections between dance forms, the body, and the philosophical-historical issues 
entangled with them, aspects of Thomas Adès’s Mazurkas, op. 27 (2009) are analysed in 
their indebtedness to this dance form as shaped specifically through the piano music of 
Fryderyk Chopin, in which the dance form is removed from its literally danced function. 
This sectional construction represents a move from the general to the particular to 
the general again: in orchestral music, from the dialectics of nature and culture, and the 
absolute monumentalism of the symphony, to provisional, discursively constituted objects 
of experience; from these particularised objects to their places in the structures and forms 
in string quartets, insofar as they articulate subjective concerns embroiled in these 
processes; and, finally, from these discursive structures back to issues of the natural 
immediacy with which we seem to experience music – as something visceral, going beyond 
categories of the mind and so felt by the body. Therefore, this approach will be seen to 
arch around, seeming to return to where it began, but in this elliptical movement 
modifying the basic categories through which the discussion arose, ultimately how the 
                                                
27 MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE 2002 [orig. 1945]: The Phenomenology of Perception (trans. Colin Smith), 
London: Routledge 
28 For example, FELLER, ROSS 2002: ‘Resistant Strains of Postmodernism: The Music of Helmut 
Lachenmann and Brian Ferneyhough’ in Postmodern Music/Postmodern Thought (eds. Judy Lochhead & 
Joseph Auner), New York: Routledge 
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experience of this music through relationships between past and present might be critically 
interpreted. 
This processual movement – naturalism and monumentalism, to psychical object, 
to bodily experience – engages with, at a basic level, two sets of binaries key to aesthetics 
after the Enlightenment: firstly, that between mind (psychical objects) and body (the 
visceral dimension of musical experience), and secondly, the opposition between culture 
and nature. What is meant here by ‘nature’ is the naturalisation of processes of mediation, as 
well as the idea that there is some realm or dimension of experience which is 
transcendental, elementary, amorphous, and ahistorical and, as such, outside of mediation 
(to be discussed in Part I). Culture, in contrast with the idea of nature, can be seen as 
something historical and defined – it is a structuration of thought and action. This is 
something that will be shown to be borne-out in the musical discourses of individual 
works. Following this, a second binary emerges, that between nature (apparently ahistorical 
objectivity beyond thought) and culture (discourse, structure, and definition). These 
concepts – mind and body, and culture and nature – will be shown to be in constant 
interaction, as we move through our constellation of musicological and philosophical 
themes. Through this elliptical argumentative structure I attempt to escape the 
concretisation of thought or an exact systematisation of musical meaning. This accords 
with Jameson’s definition of ‘theory’ when he suggests ‘that theory is to be grasped as the 
perpetual and impossible attempt to dereify the language of thought, and to preempt all 
the systems and ideologies which inevitably result from the establishment of this or that 
fixed terminology’29. 
This movement from the discussions of nature and culture in symphonies towards 
the particularisms of piano music also alludes to something else – how these repertories 
have been historically thought and talked about. This can be conceived of as the relation 
between Part and Whole. The symphony – given its scale, range of material, and weight of 
sound – has tended to be characterised as touching something sublime, total, even 
Absolute (at least under its Romantic conception). We scarcely need reminding of Gustav 
Mahler’s comment that ‘the symphony must be like the world. It must be all embracing’30, 
a comment suggesting a totalising tendency. In this conception of the symphony the Part 
(the composition or experience of the individual work) tended towards the mimesis of the 
Whole (the world, all reality, the Absolute). The symphony functions as a starting point for 
our discussion of the immanent historicity of contemporary music; to write a symphony in 
                                                
29 JAMESON, FREDRIC 2010: Valences of the Dialectic, London: Verso, 9 
30 Mahler cited in DE LA GRANGE, HENRY-LOUIS 1999: Gustav Mahler: Triumph and Disillusion (1904-1907), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 753 
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the late 20th-century begs an inescapable relation to the totalising tendency of this genre’s 
past.31  
As noted above, ‘the piano’ will be discussed in Part III. It is approached as both a 
physical object and an inherited set of interrelationships (between the instrument, the 
instrumentalist, its repertoire, and as a medium of expression). In contrast to the 
symphony, the Piano’s repertoire can be characterised as a soloistic, even individualistic, 
medium, as focused around a particular rather than the expression of a universal.32 
However, this particularism will be shown to rely on wider cultural practices, such as a 
naturalised pedagogy and canon of works. One can see relationships of part and whole in 
the development of this discussion, of particular and universal, running in contrary 
directions: the universalism of the symphony is focused down through a particularism of 
historical and philosophical contingency, whilst, going the other way, the particularism of 
the soloistic piano is expanded out across the realm of intersubjective, collectively 
inhabited practices and knowledge. This is not to say that the piano is now the expression 
of the universal, or the symphony of the particular. Neither symphonic music nor piano 
music exclude issues of ‘the Whole’ (intersubjective knowledge, historically inherited ideas 
of the transcendent) or issues of ‘the Part’ (particularism, a given historical circumstance). 
But the symphony is generally situated in the context of the former and the piano in that 
of the latter (for instance, in focussing on the ‘individualism’ of the solo performer). 
Hence, following my argumentative manoeuvre of coming to reverse the frameworks by 
which musical works are themselves understood, the works focussed on are seen to 
immanently critique the means by which they have philosophical-historically been 
conceptualised. 
This music draws upon – or even confronts – a wide set of issues that are inscribed 
into its inherited past materials. My aim is to show how these are brought into and played-
out in this repertoire. Furthermore, I suggest that in thinking about these processes, we 
may better come to understand how these features mediate the experience of this music. 
                                                
31 It should be noted that Mahler’s comment appeared in the context of a debate with Sibelius, with the 
latter arguing that the symphony should – in contrast with Mahler’s position – tend towards self-coherent 
formalism. Whilst this means an ‘absolutism’ or ‘totalising tendency’ in symphonic writing is not a given 
(there are other ways, following Sibelius for example, to write symphonies), in the works on which I 
focus (principally Silvestrov and Kancheli’s), formalism is eschewed in place of worldly materials, 
historical connections, and culturally evocative allusions. Furthermore, beyond the (broadly defined) 
“post-Romantic” works focused on here, one should note that a very different reaction to the aesthetic 
legacies of the Symphony can be found in the first half of the 20th century – Stravinsky’s reaction to this 
legacy was to revert to a pre-Romantic model, to circumvent totalising Romantic notions altogether 
through an appeal to Neo-Classicism. 
32 This stems perhaps from the piano’s historically domestic setting, with symphonic music in contrast 
being received collectively, almost ritually. The piano of course also has a tradition of individualism 
through improvisation and virtuosity. 
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To point out that the mind and the body play a role in mediating experience is simple 
enough. Illustrating how the dialectics of mind and body are inherited and immanently 
critiqued in this problematising (and problematic) repertoire is something quite different. 
Present experience thus puts itself forward as a fluid site where theory may be 
modified – where, in the confrontation with the new and unknown, what is known may 
come to change. As much as an appeal to semiotics or psychoanalysis may tell us 
something about our primary object of study – past-present relations in the experience of 
late 20th- and early 21st-century art music – so too can this music tell us something about 
the inner lives of these theoretical apparitions. Whilst the various theoretical and 
philosophical ideas drawn upon may find themselves institutionally divided from the 
musicological tradition, they may still strike chords within musical praxes, suggesting that 
the artificial walls set-up between theories and praxes, erected in the institutional divisions 
of labour, are in fact thinner than they may at first seem. Musical resonances are heard to 
pass through them. Indeed, this draws upon Theodor Adorno’s notion that music is a 
form of “conceptless cognition”33 – here this cognition’s fluidity is visible in its ability to 
cross reified boundaries articulated at conceptual, institutional and methodological levels. 
This is why experience is so central to past-present relations; knowledge and 
understanding are never static, but always shifting, channelled within institutional(ised) 
guidelines yet never reducible to determination by them. 
Alongside this idea that music may be seen as reflexive, and may cross that liminal 
space found between institutional and theoretical divides, comes a critical conception of 
musicology. This is a musicology that posits music as a transgressive medium that, in its 
ability to cross theoretical divides via its “unspeakable” dimension, pushes at the 
boundaries of that which is conceptualisable. It is therefore my hope that not only will 
new aspects and connections be uncovered in the music discussed, but also in Theory, and 
in the manner of our own questioning. 
Contemporary Music(ologic)al Dialectics 
The “spirit of the law” is often appealed to over the letter of the law itself. I make 
an analogous appeal to Adornian thinking, to the ways in which I go about selecting works 
and composers for discussion, and to conceptions of modernism. Rather than taking 
modernism as a set of signifiers or demonstrable conditions – as laws to be recognisably 
worked within, or transgressed, by the composers in question – I take it, in an avant-
gardist sense, as a point of beginning. It is taken as something embracing a self-reflexive 
                                                
33 Adorno cited in PADDISON, MAX 1991: ‘The Language-Character of Music: Some Motifs in Adorno’ in 
Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Vol. 116, No. 2 (pp. 267-279), 278 
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spirit that pushes against the boundaries of reification and of codification in signifiers or 
demonstrable conditions (the “letter of the law”). This is not to say, however, that this 
pushing forwards means forgetting that modernism has its hallmarks and characteristic 
qualities; just as the spirit of the law does not forget the law itself.  
This appeal to the “spirit” of modernism is reflected in my choice of repertoire. 
Instead of taking only established, canonic, modernist composers or works as the objects 
of study – the music of Lachenmann, Boulez, Rihm, Ligeti, Nono, or Berio, for instance – 
I choose to focus on some works and composers that are less “mainstream”, whilst 
nonetheless critical in their approaches to historicity and experience. In chapter 4, for 
example, I discuss issues of subjectivity and musical discourse in a work from a less-well-
known composer (Tiensuu), right beside a work from a better-known one (Rihm). This 
helps each work to draw out features from the other, as well as allowing both to 
contribute to a necessarily plural image of the treatment of subjectivities and discourses in 
modernist musical works. This, it is hoped, avoids merely delineating a new law, a new, 
singular conception of what constitutes recent modernism. Put another way, late 
modernist music’s multifarious nature is highlighted as a source of its forward-pushing 
spirit – that it eludes a singular conception – which also fuels new ways of thinking about 
it.  This accords with the self-reflexive spirit of modernism, that it can (attempt to) 
undermine, or at least disturb, reification, including the potential reification of its own 
conceptualisation. Reacting to this idea, I have chosen works for inclusion in this project 
that elucidate certain formulations of musical and philosophical issues pertinent to the 
historicity of experience. These issues cut across the various works, so that, taken together, 
they make visible new points of affinity (without, at the same time, synthesising so that 
these works’ differences are effaced). Indeed, these issues traverse wider questions 
surrounding modernist music from the late 20th century onward. Through my choice of 
repertoire I hope to contribute to modernism’s forward-pushing spirit, and to reflect late 
modernism’s multifarious character, whilst always also counterbalancing these goals with 
reference to the more law-like dimensions that give it its distinct personality. 
My selection of particular works for discussion also can be seen in part as a 
strategic move, as a means for making this contribution. Ways in which one might receive 
and understand modernism, in light of Silvestrov’s and Tiensuu’s music, have not yet 
crystallised, as they have with more “established” modernist composers; nor have ways in 
which we might understand these composers’ works, in so far as we can, on “their own” 
terms. To have focused on Boulez’s music, to entertain a counterexample, would have 
necessitated a very different project. As much as Boulez is established, there are 
established ways of receiving and understanding his music, his thought, and the character 
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of his modernism. Whilst this concretisation of knowledge is helpful in granting us better 
ways of understanding these things, the law-like quality of this concretisation poses 
problems if we are appealing to the spirit of the law. Musicological discourses concerning 
some of the composers that I focus on have not yet undergone a comparable ossification. 
They provide fertile grounds for new contributions to discourses on modernism. They 
also allow us to revisit afresh more established qualities of modernism, and to remember 
that whilst the law is important – that concretised discourses on modernism and its 
established proponents are valuable – with this law also comes modernism’s critical spirit.  
This outlook also applies to the ways that I draw on philosophical and 
interpretative perspectives. Theodor Adorno’s writings have been significant in shaping 
dialectical thinking in the English speaking musicological world – especially conceptions of 
modernism34. In due course I will repeatedly draw on Adornian ideas. However, there is an 
institutional tension within Adorno scholarship that must be confronted, one that is 
evoked through engaging with the musical works that concern me here. This regards what 
is often characterised as the “dialectical” nature of Adorno’s thought. As Fredric Jameson 
notes in his Valences of the Dialectic there is something inherently problematic about seeing 
dialectics as a mode of thinking35. For him, the strength of dialectical thinking is not that it 
becomes a system; instead it highlights that systematisation regards a finite set of 
possibilities and is always unable to fully grasp the objects of thought and the thoughts 
themselves. Adorno seems to concur with this point, suggesting that, following Hegel, 
dialectics is not ‘a particular philosophical standpoint, but the sustained attempt to follow 
the movement of the object under discussion and to help it find expression’36. On this 
statement of Adorno’s a further point can be made, that of the connection between 
dialectical philosophy and musical expression. This description accords almost directly 
with my characterisation of how many recent musical discourses function: they work 
around some object of investigation through exploring potential expressive directions and 
its immanent contradictions.  
If we are to understand his contributions to thinking, care must be taken not to 
ossify Adorno-influenced dialectics into an undialectical method – an Adornian system of 
dialectics. This is because Adorno’s writings – as suggested by Jameson’s comments on 
Theory in general (see above) – attempt constantly to undercut their own fixity and the 
reification of thought. Recent studies on Adorno (notably Apparitions: New Perspectives on 
                                                
34 An excellent overview of Adorno’s work can be found in PADDISON, MAX 1997: Adorno’s Aesthetics of 
Music, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
35 JAMESON 2010: 13 
36 ADORNO 1999: 145 
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Adorno and Twentieth-Century Music) have reminded us of this fact,37 breathing new life and 
perspectives into the “established” ways in which Adorno’s thinking is conceived.38 
Reflecting on this, we could say that there is an inherent tension in the idea of an 
established Adorno scholarship; that between (1) the letter-of-the-law-like need to 
understand, set-out, and explicate Adorno’s ideas and their interrelationships, and (2) 
following the spirit of critical thought through problematising the systematisation and 
reification of thought. As Jameson points out, however, the constant undercutting and 
dereification of language is ‘easier said than done’39. 
The spirit of Adorno’s work seems to suggest a constant need to cut through the 
solidity of its own knowledge, to find renewal and life only in its confrontation with new and 
difficult musics, rather than yet again be suggested as an (admittedly enigmatic) key for the 
interpretation of a few composers’ works predominantly located in the first half of the last 
century. Whilst new things are yet to be said about Adorno and Schoenberg, and even 
Adorno and Late Beethoven, to repeatedly designate the receptions of these musics as 
“Adornian” is problematic in its undialectical freezing of an Adornian essence. It even 
establishes, as a kind of repetitive-performative act, Critical Theory as a specialism.40  
Asserting Theory as specialism confines it to a certain methodological and 
institutional role – as “radical” alternative. In accepting its place as specialism – as 
something exotic and outside the norm of “standard” thought to which it is supposedly 
opposed – established Critical Theory neutralises its own critical power. It accepts a 
position of alterity rather than constantly reacting to and undercutting hegemonic and 
dominant modes of thought. Thus, whilst I will draw greatly upon Adorno’s thinking 
throughout, it should be underlined from the very start that this by no means constitutes 
an “Adornian method”. To the contrary, Theory and the music will find themselves to be 
ever changing in the eyes of one another. Indeed, there is an inherent paradox in 
undialectically setting out dialectical thinking as a kind of thinking. To put dialectics in a 
box – labelled “Herein lies the dialectical (open at your own risk)” – is to neutralise it, to 
                                                
37 As Berthold Hoeckner puts it in the preface to Apparations, the essays that make up the book are ‘torn 
between defusing Adorno’s explosive potential and rekindling it’ (HOECKNER, BERTHOLD 2006: ‘Preface: 
On Apparition’ in Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth-Century Music (ed. Berthold 
Hoeckner), Oxon: Routledge, xii) 
38 In his Theory of the Avant-Garde, Peter Bürger argued that the avant-garde’s radicalism became 
institutionalised, and hence later become the subject of further critical artistic reactions (what he called 
the “neo-avant-garde”) – BÜRGER, PETER 1984 [orig. 1974]: Theory of the Avant-Garde (trans. Michael 
Shaw), Manchester: Manchester University Press. The question could be asked if Adornian radicalism now 
requires a maneouver analogous to that found between the neo-avant-garde and the avant-garde – one of 
reaction and/or distanciation. 
39 JAMESON 2010: 37 (footnote) 
40 And this specialism is something often listed as a commodity on universities’/departments’ websites. 
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say that it is tool which may be called upon in order to enact some conceptual function, 
rather than as an awareness of the inherent problematic of reducing all to the 
conceptualisable, of the impossibility of finding everything and everythought a place in 
which to sit beside one another with neither tension nor contradiction. Musicological 
discourse of this nature is an expression of what Julia Kristeva has more generally 
characterised as ‘academic discourse’, established institutionalised thinking which 
‘possesses an extraordinary ability to absorb, digest, and neutralize all of the key, radical, or 
dramatic moments of thought’41. 
Jameson suggests that ‘the dialectic proceeds by standing outside a specific 
thought… in order to show that the alleged conclusions in fact harbor the workings of 
unstable categorical oppositions’42. This means for instance, to take an example already 
discussed above, exploring the paradoxical historicity of immediacy. The dialectic moves 
by taking on and exploring interrelated contradictions in what were considered to be 
preeminent dualities: 
 
This deconcealment of the antinomies at the root of practical and theoretical 
dilemmas can serve as a powerful instrument of ideological analysis (as in 
deconstruction), but it should not be confused with that more dynamic and 
productive act of setting the antinomy itself in motion, that is to say, revealing 
it to have in reality been the form of a contradiction: for it is the unmasking 
of antinomy as contradiction which constitutes truly dialectical thinking as 
such.43 
 
This means that, as I argue in Part II, the work/world, interior/exterior, text/context 
divide may not simply, through deconstructive method, be shown to be problematic, but 
may become understood as a contradictory and tensional source for the evocation of 
significant aesthetic experiences through critical musics. Rather than doing away with contradictions, 
these musics – and philosophies – may induce their motion. 
I outline these dialectical, methodological issues in-so-far as they are pertinent to 
the dialectic interpenetration of past and present in the works explored below. As 
illustrated, Adorno’s philosophical legacy is something that must be engaged with, but 
taken beyond itself, into the difficult territory of the unknown. This is contrasted with the 
instrumental use of Adorno’s oeuvre as functioning as “alterity”, as some kind of 
institutional specialism, though one which is paradoxically used again and again as the 
                                                
41 KRISTEVA, JULIA 1982: ‘Psychoanalysis and the Polis’ (trans. Margaret Waller) in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 9, 
No. 1 (pp. 77-92), 77 
42 JAMESON 2010: 26 
43 JAMESON 2010: 43 
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enigmatic key to the music of Schoenberg and Beethoven; of ‘identifying points on a 
stable map of the always already known’44. This is something I address practically in part 
through my choice to focus on some composers and works outside of the “mainstream” 
of modernist musicological discourses on music – works by Silvestrov and Tiensuu, for 
instance. This means that this “aesthetics of music” must not be regarded as the aesthetics 
of this music – not a systematisable philosophy of music – but an entering into play with 
ideas and expressions brought into motion, problematised, yet rarely synthesised, and 
experienced in the moments of an ever-changing present. 
 
                                                
44 Here I borrow a phrase which has been used to summarise the frustration of Brian Massumi, who sees 
similar institutional paradoxes in the work of critical theorists who do not push at the unknown gaps in 
knowledge, but rather walk safe and well-trodden grounds (see HEMMINGS, CLARE 2005: ‘Invoking 
Affect: Cultural theory and the Ontological Turn’ in Cultural Studies, Vol. 19, No. 5 (pp. 548-567), 554) 
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I) Material Past, Material Passed: the Symphony 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for 
itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it 
becomes an experience that changes the person who experiences it. 
 
– Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method45 
 
Music is world-disclosive: the world itself can take on new aspects 
because of it, and an adequate approach to music must be able to 
respond to this. 
 
–  Andrew Bowie, Music, Philosophy, and Modernity46 
 
                                                
45 GADAMER, HANS-GEORG 1989  [orig. 1960]: Truth and Method (trans. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall), New York: Crossroad, 102 
46 BOWIE, ANDREW 2007: Music, Philosophy, and Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27 
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1. Symphonic Architecture, Monumental Ruins, 
Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 
 
 
It is the site of life from which life has departed. 
 
– Georg Simmel47 
 
The object of philosophical criticism is to show that the function of 
artistic form is as follows: to make historical content, such as provides 
the basis of every important work of art, into a philosophical truth. 
This transformation of material content into truth content makes the 
decrease in effectiveness, whereby the attraction of earlier charms 
diminishes decade by decade, into the basis for a rebirth, in which all 
ephemeral beauty is completely stripped off, and the work stands as a 
ruin. 
 
 – Walter Benjamin48 
 
The Symphony, as genre, is often a site of monumentality in art music, in two 
interrelated dimensions. Firstly, with its gigantic formal architecture and associations with 
an ungraspable sublime (particularly after Beethoven) it is said to go beyond the 
experience of the individual, towards the collective, and even so far as the Absolute. This 
is connected with monumentality in a second, distinct sense: the Symphony – in 
constructing and performing values and associations – is a monument of art music. It is a 
(secular) space, an institution, and a public meeting place inscribed with cultural values. 
Not only is this true for the genre as a whole, but for individual works, whose enduring 
place is assured via canon formation – Beethoven’s Fifth as a monument to Heroic self-
determination, a place at which this past legacy might be collectively remembered and also 
presently reaffirmed. Yet this second dimension – symphony as monument – does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that such monumental works enact the blind worship of 
ideological principles; monuments might still be self-critically contemplative. With the 
canonisation of masterworks also comes certain ways of conceiving of them, yet they can 
still transcend this reification. Monuments, both architectural and musical, help us to 
remember, transmit, and discipline values passed down from the past. 
                                                
47 SIMMEL 1959: 265 
48 BENJAMIN, WALTER 2003 [orig. 1963]: The Origin of the German Tragic Drama (trans. John Osborne), 
London: Verso, 182 
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Valentin Silvestrov described his Symphony No. 5 (1982) as a “post-symphony”.49 
This symphony is monumental but not unproblematically so. I will suggest that his 
symphony, as “post-” to the genre as a whole50, elicits experience and creates meaning 
analogously to similar experiential processes in facing the ruins of great former 
monuments. Therefore, his “post-” is neither a rejection nor a “comment on” the 
symphonic tradition, but instead a remembering of what was, particularly of the former 
ways of living values through music and experiencing wider implications of (philosophical) 
meaning. Silvestrov’s musical language in this single-movement symphony evokes traces of 
the past, particularly of a late-Romantic soundworld, and of past symphonic structures. As 
I will argue, this is done in part through attending to inherited notions of symphonic-
structural space. Questions of temporality, as temporality relates to the articulation and 
transgression of normative space, also play their part: frequent metric changes occur, as 
well as fluctuations of tempo (fuller examples later). As Levon Hakobian puts it, in the 
Fifth Symphony Silvestrov provides us a ‘game of infinitesimal details that make the 
texture more diversified’.51 Whilst retaining a sense of monumentality, the orchestration 
nonetheless, in the manner of some of Mahler’s works, ‘approach[es] chamber-music 
procedures’ (to borrow a phrase from Adorno on Mahler52). There is a frequent splitting 
of orchestral sections and a passing and colouration of melodic lines. The fragmented, 
expressionistic character at the opening of the Silvestrov’s Fifth Symphony leads to a 
sweeping melody in the first violins at fig. 10 in the score (bar 73, Ex. 1). Two harps 
accompany this, contributing to a texture reminiscent of the Adagietto from Mahler’s Fifth 
Symphony, to a melody that, in repeatedly reaching upward before descending, is itself 
evocative of the opening theme from the last movement of Mahler’s Ninth. 
Despite the late 20th-century context of Silvestrov’s symphony, its ruinous 
dimensions resonate with aspects of a still-present Romantic imagining of the ruin.53 This 
aesthetic legacy remains pertinent to Silvestrov’s neo-Romanticism, and indeed comes 
through also in the theoretical accounts (principally, Georg Simmel’s) that I draw upon in 
                                                
49 Silvestrov cited in SAVENKO 1998: 75 
50 Peter Schmelz notes that the theme of “ending” is one of Silvestrov’s preoccupations. His Third 
Symphony (1966), for example, ‘carried the subtitle “Eschatophony” [Eskhatofoniya]’.  SCHMELZ, PETER J. 
2007: ‘What Was “Shostakovich,” and What Came Next?’ in The Journal of Musicology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (pp. 
297-338), 329-330. Paul Griffiths writes of the Fifth that it ‘seems to begin where a slow movement by 
Bruckner, Tchaikovsky or Mahler might have ended, and then to go on ending’. GRIFFITHS, PAUL 2006: A 
Concise History of Western Music, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 312. 
51 HAKOBIAN, LEVON 1998: Music of the Soviet Age 1917-1987, Stockholm: Melos Music Literature, 311 
52 ADORNO, THEODOR 1996 [orig. 1960]: Mahler: a Musical Physiognomy (trans. Edmund Jethcott), 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 53 
53 Makarius, looking at architecture and representational art, goes even further, suggesting that the 
modern-day imagining of the ruin is closely indebted to its 18th-century conception (MAKARIUS, MICHEL 
2004: Ruins (trans. David Radzinowicz), Paris: Fammarion, 7-8). 
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exploring the significance of and processes behind this ruin-symphony.  Charles Rosen 
suggests that the Romantic concept of the fragment ‘is clearly influenced by the 
contemporary taste for ruins’.54 However, as Michel Makarius writes of architecture, the 
‘ruin conjures up absence. And yet in the same breath one might say that the presence of a 
ruin creates a world with colors, atmosphere, and ghosts of its own, tearing itself off the 
past like a page ripped from a calendar. Hence the ruin is more than a fragment.’55  But 
this still-present legacy, whilst highly relevant, does not determine the limits of the ruin-
aesthetic or bound the particularities of ruination in Silvestrov’s work. The link that Rosen 
identified, that between the fragment and the ruin, is called upon. However, it is not only 
through the presentation of musical fragments that the ruin is evoked. Fragments of 
former objects are evoked but, crucially, the processes of ruination play a role too – ‘ruins 
are processes as much as objects’ 56  – something that can be principally heard in a 
foregrounding of the dialectics of nature and culture that are embodied within these, as 
well as in the construction and ruination of the musical space.  
Furthermore, in the modernist sense, I argue that the work explores a critical 
sensitivity to history and memory, and to the institutional dimension of art. Regarding history 
and memory, the symphony, as a genre or idea, is taken as a space of memory, one where 
older modes of its habitation, through which expression was situated, are now abandoned. 
The treatment of the spatial dimension (explored in detail below) is also highly 
particularised historically, defining the treatment of the ruin away from a purely Romantic 
conception and towards one of the late 20th century. Institutionally, as “post-symphony”, 
the work sits in critical relation to the roles played by the symphony as canonic form, as an 
institutionalised site of Western art music.  
                                                
54 ROSEN, CHARLES 1995: The Romantic Generation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 92 
55 MAKARIUS 2004: 147 
56 SCHÖNLE, ANDREAS 2011: Architecture of Oblivion: Ruins and Historical Consciousness in Modern Russia, 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 8 
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Ex. 1, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, bars 70-79 (continued on the next page) 
 
© M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
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© M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved.
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Andreas Huyssen has suggested that the ruin is something immanent to the 
character of modernity. For Huyssen, to speak of the ‘authentic ruin’ is not to talk about 
its ontological essence but ‘as a significant conceptual and architectural constellation that 
points to moments of decay, falling apart, and ruination already present in the beginning 
of modernity in the eighteenth century.’57 Georg Simmel’s perspective on the ruin is also 
highly relevant here (I discuss his perspective on ruins more fully below). He saw the ruin 
as a provocative reminder of the immanence of the decay of things, as apart from any 
externally imposed forces. He wrote that, ‘the ruin strikes us so often as tragic – but not as 
sad – because here is not something senselessly coming from outside but rather the 
realization of a tendency inherent in the deepest layer of existence of the destroyed’.58 
Hence, I am not merely applying ruin aesthetics to music. Instead, I am exploring the idea 
that the ruinous stems from deeper historical-philosophical conditions, conditions shared 
by monumental music and architecture, and hence that this may be brought to the fore in 
conceptual points of contact between the two arts. 
Before exploring the post-symphonic, “ruined” characteristics of Silvestrov’s 
symphony, I start by outlining more fully how the ‘The Symphony’ has been conceived of 
historically as a monumental genre. This centres on two philosophical-historical pillars: 
firstly, that music’s internal structure has been, and can still be, conceived of in spatial, and 
even architectural. terms; and, secondly, that ‘The Symphony’, in “extramusical” terms (as 
genre, as institution) has a monumental status. These legacies’ evocation and ultimate 
decay in Silvestrov’s symphony enable a hearing of this work as a ruin of The Symphony 
as monument. This means outlining the music’s conception as monument (both in its 
internal “spatial” structure and its external, institutional characterisation) before showing 
how such monuments are inscribed with values that go beyond the musical, here 
transgressed or negated in the processes of ruination. This provides the foundation for the 
analysis that follows, in which some key passages from Silvestrov’s Symphony are 
examined. 
Music as Monument 
Silvestrov’s work is a ruin or, rather, it elicits aesthetic experiences in processes 
analogous to those elicited by ruins. However, the adoption of this view requires a 
historical-philosophical foundation: an examination of musical monuments, which 
themselves have close relationships to the canon, in which Silvestrov’s work appears as a 
                                                
57 HUYSSEN, ANDREAS 2006: ‘Nostalgia for Ruins’ in Grey Room, Vol. 2 (pp. 6-21), 9  
58 SIMMEL 1959: 263 
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ruin. Studies of the musical canon cite examples of musical monuments, notably Johann 
Nicolas Forkel’s 1802 biography of J.S. Bach, including his call for public performances of 
Bach’s works, something which would, in Forkel’s words, “raise a worthy monument to 
German art”59. Alexander Rehding, in his recent Music and Monumentality, also notes the 
complete Bach edition, launched in 1850 by the Liepzig Bach Gesellschaft to mark the 
Bach centenary, as a musical and national monument.60   
However, these are not the types of monuments that I focus on here. Instead, I 
explore points of philosophical and historical significance as they have drifted into, and are 
performatively constituted by, musical works. In preparation for my latter argument 
concerning ruins, the foundation I lay here comprises of two central points: first, that 
music might itself be considered a monument (as well as drawing on “monumentality” in 
achieving this status), and that this is exemplified in the canon of musical works; and, 
second, that canonic musical works and monuments both serve to discipline concepts 
mediative of experience. It is after laying this groundwork that Silvestrov’s symphony 
might be understood as a ruin of musical monuments as these have been canonically 
constituted, as well as the significance of this process in terms of ruination of the inscribed 
values by which experience is mediated. 
Monuments, writes Marita Sturken, ‘have been constructed throughout history to 
signify a sense of permanence.’61 This is one of their central features: their highlighting of 
something past as somehow relevant to the present, and their ability to make us remember, 
in a certain way, events or values – indeed to help select what is worth collectively 
remembering. Since Alois Riegl’s highly influential 1928 essay on ‘The Modern Cult of 
Monuments’62, it has been the historical dimension that has been key to thinking about 
monuments. Riegl’s argument was that, in contrast with monuments that were 
intentionally constructed, some monuments garnered monumental status over time: ‘the 
traditional, intentional monument could be distinguished from the historical monument, 
which acquired its monumental status specifically through the passage of time.’63 
                                                
59 Forkel cited in GOEHR, LYDIA 2007 [orig. 2002]: The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: an Essay in the 
Philosophy of Music (Revised Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 205. See also REHDING 2009: 19 
60 REHDING, ALEXANDER 2009: Music and Monumentality: Commemoration and Wonderment in Nineteenth-
Century Germany, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 144 
61 STURKEN, MARITA [online]: ]: ‘Monuments – Historical Overview’ in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics 
(ed. Michael Kelly). Oxford Art Online. [website: http://0-
www.oxfordartonline.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/subscriber/article/opr/t234/e0362, accessed: 
September 4th, 2012] 
62 RIEGL, ALOIS 1982: ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin’ [orig. 1928] (trans. 
Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo) in Oppositions, No. 25 (pp. 21-51) 
63 STURKEN [online] summarising Riegl. This is related also to what Riegl called the “age-value” of 
monuments, that is, their traces of age and decay. This conflicts with “newness value”, the keeping of the 
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This is highly relevant to a musical context and to the enduring influence of some 
musical works as monuments to values and ideas beyond the “purely musical”. As 
Rehding points out, Riegl denied that musical works could be monuments.64 However, I 
concur with Rehding’s argument that Riegl’s thoughts on the monument do have a direct 
bearing on music.65 What the monument and the musical work-concept share, as Sturken 
puts it above, in reference to the former, is a reaching for a ‘sense of permanence’. In 
musical terms, we call this supposedly permanent66 (imaginary museum67) collection of 
musical works ‘The Canon’. With the ontological change and emergence of the work-
concept around 1800, ‘a musical work became something which, because of its special 
transcendental nature, could be repeated without becoming out-dated’68. As Giles Hooper 
has argued, despite postmodern assertions to the contrary, a canon of classics is still 
operative within the world of art music. He notes that, ‘an analysis of research interests, 
undergraduate taught modules and research grant recipients across the Anglo-American 
sector would most likely reveal that the “hegemony” of Western “high-art” canonic 
repertoire remains rather more resilient in practice than reports of its imminent or actual 
collapse tend to suggest in theory’.69 
In the crystallisation of their permanence, musical works, like monuments, serve to 
embody values, helping us to preserve and practice them. Philip Bohlman suggests that, 
due to complicities between ideologies and musical canons musical works are ‘the 
manifestations of political and ideological principles, such as greatness, genius, importance 
                                                                                                                                         
old as pristine (as pursued by those who wished to preserve the old). See REHDING 2009: 155. In a 
musical context, it is perhaps fitting that someone key in bringing newness value to old forms and styles – 
Igor Stravinsky – spoke famously of one of the monuments of the Western canon, Beethoven’s Grosse Fuge, 
as “contemporary forever” (cited in KERMAN, JOSEPH 1994: ‘Beethoven Quartet Audiences: Actual, 
Potential, Ideal’ in The Beethoven Quartet Companion (ed. Robert Winter & Robert Martin), Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 21). 
64 RIEGL 1982: 21 
65 REHDING 2009: 155. However, I differ from his approach in my focuses explicitly on the role of the 
canon. In addition, as will become apparent, employing architectural thinking immanently to the 
processes of musical form allows me to explore the processes within music insofar as these pertain to 
symphonic music’s status as monument – crucially, monuments falling into ruin. 
66 Of course, this sense of permanence does not mean that canons do not change. 
67 GOEHR 2007 
68 ERAUW, WILLEM 1998: ‘Canon Formation:  Some More Reflections on Lydia Goehr's Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works’ in Acta Musicologica, Vol. 70, Fasc. 2 (pp. 109-115), 109. It is also 
noteworthy, following my citation of Beethoven’s Fifth as an exemplar of a musical monument, that 
Erauw suggests that ‘the paradigmatic example of these immortal works of music were Beethoven’s 
symphonies, which now form the nucleaus of the canon of classical music’ (ERAUW 1998: 109) 
69 HOOPER, GILES 2006: The Discourse of Musicology, Aldershot: Ashgate, 26 
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to a social group or class of society, etc.’.70 Monumental works, which present this in giant 
proportions, have this in common with monuments, which are, as Sturken writes, 
 
a form of pedagogy; they instruct on historical values, persons, and events, 
designating those that should be passed on, returned to, and learned from. 
Some monuments speak the language of celebration, while others indicate 
codes of nobility, valor, sacrifice, and heroism. Monuments can serve a 
variety of purposes—as tombs for the dead, signs of triumph, honor, or 
hatred, and as memorials.71 
 
Potentially, with the ruination of the musical work and the decay of the structures by 
which musical monument(ality) is constructed, also comes a reformulation of the values, 
and philosophical-historical legacies mediative of musical experience, that these things 
embodied. However, as this is something pertinent to this study as a whole, before 
illustrating this more fully it would first be valuable to outline how, as exemplified in 
canonic works, music carries within it the “extramusical”, with regard to past-present 
relations and experience. This I label “inscription”. 
Inscription 
Musical monuments are perhaps places that make most visible that musical works 
– even absolute and autonomous musical works – are sites of value. Of course, the 
comportment of the extramusical in music – or rather, music’s performative enacting of things 
that go beyond what is explicitly designated as “musical” (sociality, philosophy, ideology, history…) – is 
not limited to musical monuments. However, this is one place in which this might be 
foregrounded, and hence a place in which reactive critique is made audible. Inscription 
would be an adequate metaphor for this process; cultural, philosophical, economic, 
somatic values, beyond the “purely musical”, are written into inherited musical materials, 
and into the faculties by which music is conceived and discussed in an “extra-musical” 
world.  
Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory that, ‘[h]istory is the content of artworks. To 
analyze artworks means no less than to become conscious of the history immanently 
sedimented in them.’ 72  “Inscription” has clear similarities to Adorno’s concept of 
‘sedimentation’; that musical material, music’s form, is always ‘pre-formed’73. However, 
                                                
70 BOHLMAN, PHILIP 1992: ‘Epilogue: Musics and Canons’ in Disciplining Music: Musicology and its Canons 
(ed. Katherine Bergeron and Philip Bohlman), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 201 
71 STURKEN [online] 
72 ADORNO 1997: 85 
73 PADDISON 1997: 93 and 149 
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whilst Adorno’s concept captures the epochal accruing of history (“the extramusical”) into 
music, inscription relies on the always-problematic presence of contemporary subjectivities, 
differently understood from Adorno’s concept. By “problematic” I mean that a dialectic of 
two extremes occurs: on one side of this dialectic we see that inscriptions might be “read” 
by the subject, mediating for the subject its world, granting the subject of which it is 
mediative “terms” for the articulation of experience (musical mediations of mind and body, 
and the relationships between the two, for example). To give a historical example, piano 
music in the 19th century mediated bourgeois modes of being in the world, of domesticity 
and education.74 However, on the other side of this dialectic, the inscription might not be 
read but rather the materiality of its form made apparent to the subject. For example, in the 
piano music of Helmut Lachenmann, through processes of distanciation, the piano might 
itself become visible as a material object, contrasting with its earlier role as a transparent 
medium through which subjective concerns were, and musical expression was, mediated. 
This example forms the basis of chapter 7. In the second conception it is an object that is 
displayed and contemplated.75 
This historical role of mediation also underlines another development from 
Adorno’s ‘sedimentation’. In addition to the sedimentation of past historical modes of 
subjectivity into musical material, the concept of inscription underlines the still-present 
mediation of subjectivity by music. There is a dialectic at play between the limits of “for 
the subject” and “to the subject” that were given in the piano example above. Whilst 
musical material is inscribed with historicity (in Adorno’s terms, it is ‘pre-formed’), 
because it is always philosophically and social productive it also inscribes the subject. This is to 
take lessons from Adorno’s thinking, but in a post-Foucauldian era, and one after Judith 
Butler’s ‘performativity’76, in which the social world of objects and practices disciplines 
subjectivity (and disciplines it as recognisable in certain objects and practices). This 
productive bidirectionality of subject and object is not captured by Adorno’s concept, yet 
it nonetheless finds it kernel in Adorno’s valuable concept of sedimentation.  
“Inscription”, as an image, confers a tangibility onto music’s ephemeral material. 
This material becomes material in the sense of being threaded within the materiality of 
culture, into its relationships with technology, political economies, and our own bodies, 
                                                
74 See LEPPERT, RICHARD 1992: ‘Sexual Identity, Death, and the Family Piano’ in 19th-Century Music, Vol. 
16, No. 2 (pp. 105-128), 122 
75 This duality is echoed in the Heideggerian distinction between an object as ‘ready-to-hand’ (the hammer 
that is used) and ‘present-at-hand’ (the hammer that is regarded in its “objectness”, perhaps because it is 
broken or its use is disrupted). 
76 BUTLER, JUDITH 1988: ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory’ in Theatre Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4 (pp. 519-531) 
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which may come to be understood through music. Music’s materials are so in two senses: 
firstly, they affectivily mediate our experience of the material conditions of existence (most 
perceptibly, in our own bodies); and, secondly, they may themselves be conceived in terms 
of a materiality that extends from, and feeds into, wider experiences of the world (for 
instance, spatial conceptions of form, or in delineating the ‘objects’ of musical 
experience).77 
Through using the term “inscription” I do not wish to suggest that this is a 
question of authorial intention – of hidden meanings implanted compositionally into 
modernist music. Generally speaking, it is not the case that composers choose to write 
explicit philosophical content into their music, encoding articulated conceptual thoughts 
into the text (“script”) of the work. It is also not the case that it is then the role of the 
listener, musical analyst, or philosopher to decode the “real” meaning of what has been 
“inscribed”. This would be closer to an old-fashioned hermeneutics than what I am 
advocating. Instead, my point is that, to continue the metaphor, there is never a “blank 
slate” on which the composer may write. The materials handled by composers are always 
already marked by past musical and social functions, bygone (meta)narratives and 
associations, and the aging of these through the passing of time. Structures of knowledge 
mediate experience, and an “excavation of the present” – within inherited sites of 
knowledge and experience (musical works, musical language) – allows us to critically assess 
the structures and conditions of contemporary musical experience.78 
Music’s relationship with the body provides an exceptional example: in dance 
forms of the past (and indeed of the popular present too) one can readily see the 
structuration of bodies by which one’s own body is experienced as well as this body’s 
social relations to the bodies of others. These forms structure time and space, as well as 
class and custom. These things are not only inscribed “within” the music, but the music 
inscribes these values into their encultured listener, into the very manner in which they 
dance, move, relate to one another and to themselves. Technology provides another ready 
example of inscription, where musical instruments are sites of memory implicitly written 
                                                
77 The materiality of inscription seems particularly apposite for examining musical meaning in a time 
obsessed with both meaning and materiality. Critical inquiry must be sensitive to this materialism, but 
with this sensitivity not unreflectively falling prey to it. Yet again, to fail to see musical material’s 
contemporary setting, to fail to cast it in a material light, is to cast it as negative relation to materiality – 
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maintained. In other words, it is only through thinking materially – through pushing this mode of thought 
to its limit – that a framework of materiality can be shown to be lacking. 
78 On this, see Daniel Chua’s brief sketch of the archaeology of knowledge on the subject of absolute 
music, in the preface to CHUA, DANIEL 1999: Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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into it. Viewed in this light, notions of how instruments “should” be played, expression 
elicited from them – as well as questions concerning their relationships with and 
affiliations to players’ bodies – take on particular historical and aesthetic resonances 
(focused on in Part III). Even notions of self and society are written into musical material. 
The “Heroic” dialectical becoming of some of Beethoven’s works is a central example.79 
The symphony in the 19th century was a space for an imagined reconciling of the dialectic 
between subject and state, ‘of reconciling personal autonomy with social order’.80 Notions 
of subjectivity – and the historical-philosophical conditions by which musical experiences 
are mediated (in categories including “the body”, “the mind”, “self and other”, “space”, 
and “time”) – are written into, passed-down, and related to in recent critical art musics.  
As I argue below, in Silvestrov’s symphony, this appears in terms of the structuring 
of symphonic space, as well as in the dialectics of nature and culture as these are musically 
articulated. In his work, these become subject to immanent modification through a “ruin 
aesthetic” that draws both on issues of space, and on the dialectics of nature and culture. 
It is this work that is now discussed. 
SILVESTROV’S “RUIN-SYMPHONY” 
Music – (Architectural) Space – Ruins 
Musical works have historically performed – that is, brought to life and enabled us 
to habituate – values that go beyond the musical. I have suggested this above through the 
related images of monuments and inscription. The relationship of some late twentieth-century 
music to the past is one in which our distance from the past, and from the former ways of 
living through music, is brought to the fore. This, I suggest, reverberates with the 
processes behind the aesthetics of ruins. Following the epigram from Simmel at the 
opening of this chapter, I would suggest that in these works, in these terms, we see (hear) 
past ways of living through music as remote and now departed. Crucially, though, this 
does not mean that expression and meaning is lost, just as, in the ruin, the departing of 
previous inhabitants and crumbling of architectural forms does not make these forms 
meaningless in the present. Ruination is a process that may instead lead to new and 
                                                
79 See BURNHAM 1995 for a classic characterisation, SCHMALFELDT 2011 for a more recent discussion. 
80 BONDS, MARK EVAN 2006: Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 63. This legacy of finding personal-social harmony through musical harmony 
still lives on; Edward W. Said, a close supporter from the outset of Daniel Barenboim’s East-West Divan 
orchestra, suggested recently that contrapuntal music ‘could be a model for post-imperialist thought, 
because it allowed for the coexistence of different voices without coercing a synthesis between them’ 
(E.W. Said summarised by BECKLES WILLSON, RACHEL 2009: ‘The Parallax Worlds of the West-Eastern 
Divan Orchestra’ in Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Vol. 134, No. 2 (pp. 319-347), 320). 
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significant aesthetic possibilities, new relationships to the material that stands as ruin. 
Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 – as “post-symphony”, as “ruin-symphony” – is one such 
work in which this aesthetic of ruination is operative. 
‘In its common usage, “ruins” are often enchanted, desolate spaces, large-scale 
monumental structures abandoned and grown over. Ruins provide a quintessential image 
of what has vanished from the past and has long decayed’, Ann Laura Stoler writes in 
summarising how ruins are generally conceived.81 Silvestrov’s ruin-symphony achieves its 
particular character firstly through the ruination of the large-scale monumental symphonic 
structures, which themselves allude to inscribed traces and degradations of their former 
selves. Drawing on architectural thinking, this conceptualisation is possible because of 
long-standing philosophical and historical links found between concepts of musical 
structure and (architectural) space. Having argued this, I go on to show that ruination 
(following Georg Simmel’s influential model) revolves around a specific relationship 
between nature and culture. Lastly, I note that this works through a dialectic of what is 
absent and what is present – present both in terms of what is physically “present” or 
absent, and also being experienced in the temporal “present” as this relates to the past. 
Thinking of music in spatial, even explicitly architectural, terms is a longstanding 
conceptual framework in the western art music tradition.82 This I will quickly outline as a 
starting point for thinking through monumental space, because it is only through 
understanding monumental spaces that their ruination, and the significance of this, can be 
appreciated. Put another way, identifying features leading to this kind of monumental 
thinking will allow us to assess their decay, modification, and ruination in musical works 
that are monuments. Spatiality’s relationship with temporality is important here (given that 
music is an explicitly temporal art), as it is also later, though very differently, in theories of 
ruin.  
Three tropes of musical “space” will recur throughout the remaining discussion, 
each pertaining to an element or elements from Silvestrov’s symphony. The first is the 
structuring of music as conceived in spatial terms.83 Hegel drew connections between music and 
                                                
81 STOLER, ANN LAURA 2008: ‘Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination’ in Cultural 
Anthropology, Vol. 23, Issue 2 (pp. 191-219), 194 
82 Bonds locates this tendency as becoming widespread in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. 
See BONDS, MARK EVAN 2010: ‘The Spatial Representation of Musical Form’ in The Journal of Musicology, 
Vol. 27, No. 3 (pp. 265-303), 268. 
83 Architecture’s connection with music is deep-seated and shapes how we think and talk about music. 
Intellectual disciplines, musicology included, find sustenance in one another. As Eleanor Selfridge-Field 
puts it, ‘studies of musical form (e.g., arch) and formal devices (e.g., bridges) are metaphorically 
indebted to architecture, even as studies of timbre (“instrumental color” and the more generic “sound 
color”) are metaphorically indebted to painting’. See SELFRIDGE-FIELD, ELEANOR 1990: ‘Reflections on 
Technology and Musicology’ in Acta Musicological, Vol. 62, Fasc. 2/3 (pp. 302-314), 302. 
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architecture in regard to structure, proportion, and balance.84 In his Philosophy of Fine Art, 
he identified a shared dialectic of the natural and human as immanent to architecture and 
to music, a dialectic which also plays its role in Simmel’s conception of ruins, as examined 
below: 
 
…music may be … compared with architecture, which does not accept its 
forms from what is actually presented, but as the creation of human invention, 
in order to inform them, partly according to the laws of gravity, and in part 
according to the rules of symmetry and harmonious coordination. Music does 
the same thing in its own sphere, in so far as it from one point of view 
follows the harmonious laws of tone which depend on qualitative relations 
independently of the expression of emotion, and in another aspect of it, in 
the recurrence of time and rhythm no less than in the further development of 
the tones themselves, in many respects is subject to the forms of regularity 
and symmetry.85 
 
Johann Mattheson used architectural imagery to articulate the structuring of music, in 
suggesting that a composer properly orders “all the sections and elements in the melody, 
or in an entire musical work, almost in the manner in which one arranges a building and 
sketches out a draft or an outline, a ground-plan, in order to show where, for example, a 
hall, a room, chamber, etc.”.86 These connections between music and architecture, and the 
interrelationships between time and space, are complemented by the widespread Romantic 
notion of architecture as “frozen music”.87 Furthermore, spatial and temporal models 
often work in conjunction, drawing on one another. As Bonds puts it, ‘Form is both a 
[temporal] process and a [spatial] structure, and accounts of form routinely acknowledge 
this dual nature’.88 
In both the ruin and the ruin-symphony previous architectural and musical 
functions are visible/audible yet are decayed, their inscribed significances being degraded. 
This can be seen in Silvestrov’s deploying of materials. Legacies of symphonic, formal 
space are evoked. Svetlana Savenko’s observation that ‘one can easily discern in his 
                                                
84 HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH 1920: The Philosophy of Fine Art (trans F.P.B. Osmaston), Vol. III, 
London: Bells and Sons, 346-347 
85 HEGEL 1920: 346 
86 Mattheson cited in BONDS 2010: 268-269 
87 See BONDS 2010: 269 and MENIN, SARAH 1996: ‘Spatial Soundings: Aalto and Sibelius’ in Musical 
Semiotics in Growth (ed. Eero Tarasti), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 372. The origin of this 
famous phrase has been attributed to various writers, including Schelling, Novalis, and Goethe.  
88 BONDS 2010: 266. Note that this process/structure model echoes the generative/conformational model 
of musical form found in Bonds’s earlier Wordless Rhetoric (BONDS, MARK EVAN 1991: Wordless Rhetoric: 
Musical Form and the Metaphor of the Oration, Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
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symphony the contours of sonata form’89 is of importance here, as these ‘contours’ can be 
seen as more of a tendency rather than as an affirmed/affirming structuring of normative 
musical space (and, by extension, temporality too 90 ). However, points of structural 
reference are not taken as concrete boundaries so much as evocations defined by 
semipermeability. Notably, the appearance of melodic material in the strings at bar 727 (fig. 
87, Ex. 2), which was outlined originally (albeit in a slightly different form) at bar 73 (fig. 
10, Ex. 1), can be heard as a moment of sonata-like recapitulatory return. However, this is 
a return that is announced dramatically rather than emerging teleologically, as the result of 
an unproblematic tonal framework. This markedly “subjective” material returns, but 
through neither triumph nor overcoming. Past archetypes show through, though without 
the concurrent inhabiting of these spaces as they were. This characteristic problematisation 
of structure is explored more fully below. 
 
Ex. 2, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, returning melody, first violins, bar 727 (fig. 87) 
 
© M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
As well as at the level of structure, this historicity of material can also be observed 
– as decayed trace – at the micro-level, at the level of tropes or topics that are situated 
within the spaces of Silvestrov’s decaying symphonic structures, as heard in the present. 
Fragments of allusive materials enter, return, and dissipate. This can be heard, for example, 
in moments of “subjective” intervention, when markedly soloistic, often melodic, material 
enters that bears traces of past ways of “doing” musical subjectivity (a prime example of 
what Adorno calls ‘sedimentation’). An entry of the first clarinet, starting at the upbeat to 
bar 612, provides an excellent example. Here, Mozartian embellishments appear in 
descending phrases reminiscent of classical cadential approaches, but which never resolve 
in terms of classical syntax. These return again and again, interspersed with smudged 
dissonant clusters in the strings, which modify themselves in response to the soloist, but 
never achieve consonance with it. Indeed, these interactions make up a significant portion 
of the work, about one hundred bars, from bars 607 (fig. 75) to approximately bar 700. In 
                                                
89 SAVENKO 1998: 76 
90 Savenko goes on to note that, despite sonata form being evoked, and despite sonata form being a 
processually driven form, temporal development is eschewed in the name of stasis. See SAVENKO 1998: 
76 
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addition, a performance note instructs that the soloist ‘should sound as if from afar, now 
approaching, now moving away (with careful observance of dynamic nuances)’, further 
distancing the embellished material from being situated unproblematically within the 
musical space. As such, traces of past subjectivities show through the musical material, but 
their inscription – what is philosophical-historically “written into” this material – is 
degraded, “written over”. This takes a literal form where orchestral timbres appear in 
superimposition over the clear articulation of individually expressive, soloistic moments, 
and a figurative one where the deploying of subjective materials as fragmented suggests 
they cannot be heard as the expression of a synthesised subjective whole.  
 
Ex. 3, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, first clarinet’s solo line, bars 611-615  
 
© M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
A trace of a Romantic functioning of instrumentation, as an articulation of 
subjectivity within the musical space, is called on at bar 703. This is the point in the work 
when the melodic material that appeared in the strings (mentioned above, originally found 
at bar 73) returns for its “recapitulation”. This return is pre-empted by the entry of 
fragments of this melody by a solo violin, this material being explored across far-reaching 
leaps upward in a high tessitura. This recalls a Romantically idiomatic use of a solo violin, 
acting first as an expression of individuated agency, one whose material is then taken into 
the orchestral texture wholesale. This subsumption of the soloist’s material occurs 
principally at bar 727, and is confirmed in being echoed by soloistic entries in the brass 
from 743 onwards. 91  Inscribed into the symphony’s orchestration are philosophical-
historical legacies going beyond the immediate, yet dialectically entangled with it. It is in 
both the drawing upon these inherited habitations of the musical space, and in their 
transgression, that the ruination of symphonic architecture becomes audible. The ruin 
aesthetic that stems dually from alluded-to-but-never-fully-present structures, and 
reference to past ways in which these structures were inhabited, becomes clearer in the 
musically immanent, dialectic treatment of culture and nature that is inscribed into them.  
                                                
91 This instrumental treatment recalls Luciano Berio’s words, that the violin ‘has an imposing legacy, and 
for this reason, whichever way it is played, it expresses that history and heritage’ (BERIO 2006: 27). 
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Spirit and Gravity 
Georg Simmel’s 1911 essay, ‘The Ruin’, is a far-reaching and, as Huyssen has 
pointed out92, overtly Romantic analysis of what makes ruins evocative: ruins play between 
the categories of man and nature, foregrounding the return of the one into the other.93 
However, I suggest that, even if we do not fully accept this formulation, Simmel’s analysis 
is highly relevant to the ruin aesthetics of Silvestrov’s Symphony. This is a symphony in 
which we not only find reference to past cultural forms – to the human – but also to the 
natural, something most readily recognisable in the appearance of symbols of the natural 
(via pastoral-allusive topical devices such as drones and horn calls) and in some “non-
musical” techniques (like audible breath sounds produced by some of the winds and brass). 
Simmel discusses architectural ruins specifically, but – given my outlining above of music’s 
spatial dimensions – I hope that it is clear that some of his reflections on the aesthetics of 
ruins are applicable to a discussion of Silvestrov’s musical work. 
Simmel saw architecture as a dialectical art drawing together man and nature. It 
was, for him, a counterbalancing of the ‘will of the spirit’ and ‘the necessity of nature’, ‘in 
which the soul in its upward striving and nature in its gravity are held in balance’.94 This, he 
claimed, distinguished it from the other arts, in which natural laws are ‘made dumbly 
submissive’ to the human side – composition, invention – the result of which, if achieved 
correctly, would absorb and hide the natural within it.95 Architecture, in contrast with the 
other arts (Simmel cites poetry, painting, and music), uses nature’s laws to win over and 
determine itself, leading to ‘the most sublime victory of the spirit over nature’.96 
This is potentially also the case in musical contexts: what of Wagner’s Tristan und 
Isolde? Its opening motif provides surely the most prototypical image of the will of the 
spirit reaching upwards, a rise in tension against the force of gravity, a desiring for 
resolution, and hence a victory of the spirit over nature, one which dialectically draws on 
the laws of Reality, beyond mere representation, in achieving this goal.97 The prelude to 
Rheingold, built over a monumental E-flat overtone series, provides another excellent 
example of the upward striving of the spirit as determining itself both over and through 
nature. It seems a Romantic aesthetic of music may not be so far from Simmel’s 
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94 SIMMEL 1959: 259 
95 SIMMEL 1959: 259 
96 SIMMEL 1959: 259 
97 Schopenhauer’s philosophy and its impact upon Wagner rightly springs to mind here. 
45 
architectural Romanticism, and may be helpful in coming to terms with Silvestrov’s 
“neoromanticism”.98 
For Simmel, nature connoted an inescapable gravity – a return to the earth – as 
opposed to the upward spirit of the will: ‘What has led the building upward is human will’, 
whereas what gives the ruin ‘its present appearance is the brute, downward dragging, 
corroding, crumbling power of nature.’99 The upward and the downward are terms with 
immediate musical resonances, although it would be mistaken to map this relationship in 
directly musically terms, where “up is spirit” and “down is gravity”. The connection with 
the Romanticism of Wagner’s age has already been cited as an example. Another is 
provided by the musical thought of Paul Hindemith, for whom tonal pitch space – for him, 
tonality explicitly – “is a natural force, like gravity”.100 It is a law to be respected by 
composers, just as the ‘carpenter would not think of disregarding the natural properties of 
his wood and putting it together any old way without regard to its grain”.101 These words 
supplement, albeit in an explicitly musical context, Simmel’s reasoning behind his awe of 
architecture: that nature is overcome only through a dialectic that draws on its laws with 
nature’s other, higher culture, as its end. Importantly, these references do not mean that I 
advocate an acceptance of Hindemith or Wagner’s musical or Simmel or Hegel’s 
philosophical accounts of nature. Rather, it is to highlight that the traditions of music and 
philosophy draw on each other, and that issues of nature and culture have been taken 
immanently into musical material. Music and architecture’s dialectics of gravity and spirit – 
and these relations of culture and nature to processes of monumentality and ruination – 
may be found to be evocative of aesthetic significance in one another.  
The neo-Romantic character of Silvestrov’s melodic material carries with it 
potential associations of the will of the spirit; other materials, drones, horn calls, and 
breath-like phrasing, inscriptions of the natural. I will illustrate that the gravity of nature in 
particular – as Simmel’s ‘brute, downward dragging, corroding, crumbling power’ (see 
above) – has a part to play in bringing ruination to those expressive structures built up 
through the dialectical constructions of spirit and nature that are immanent to both music 
and architecture. 
 
 
 
                                                
98 Silvestrov has himself referred to his music with this term (see SAVENKO 1998: 70). 
99 SIMMEL 1959: 261 
100 Hindemith cited in WHITESELL, LLOYD 2004: ‘Twentieth-Century Tonality, or Breaking Up is Hard to 
Do’ in The Pleasure of Modern Music (ed. Arved Ashby), Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 107 
101 Hindemith cited in WHITESELL 2004: 108 
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Ex. 4, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, figs. 10-12 (upbeat to bar 73-88), reduction 
 
 
The melody that appears in the strings from fig. 10 (bar 73), onwards is, as has 
been discussed above, thematic material of expressive and structural importance, 
appearing later in something akin to a moment of recapitulation (Ex. 4 shows a reduction 
of the passage from fig. 10 onwards). It revolves around a series of small descents and 
greater leaps upwards, a continual rise towards an apex. Once this is achieved (bar 85) 
cluster material almost immediately intervenes into the texture (bar 86, fig. 12) and, as an 
apparent result of this, fragments of the melody material appear across the orchestra (and 
are no longer limited to the strings). A tritone movement in the bass (A to E-flat), 
dissonant to the third-related sequential movement established so far, parallels this 
interjection, and affirms its otherness. The melody then returns (bar 94) but without the 
impassioned strength it had before. 
This rising movement – especially when considered as dramatically “at odds” with 
another force (the cluster material’s intervention) – can be understood as drawing on a 
late-Romantic musical palette, and alluding to a soundworld evoking a notion of “spirit”. 
It is a focal (vocal?) point, an image of a subjective, expressive voice.102 The string writing, 
and the harps’ accompanimental figures too, evoke, in the manner of the Adagietto from 
Mahler’s Fifth, the ‘presentation of an overtly “authentic” voice’103. But a dialectic is at 
work here: the melody also emphasises the “naturalness” of this expression; growing and 
overcoming gravity through balance, proportion, and structuring through sequence.104 
However, despite these potentially “natural” qualities, melodic materials’ spirited, 
expressive qualities are foregrounded – especially that of the prominent melody from 
figure 10 onwards, given its character of continually reaching upwards. The laws of nature 
                                                
102 Julian Johnson’s concept of “voice”, as subjective presence in music, is relevant here. See JOHNSON, 
JULIAN 2009: Mahler’s Voices: Expression and Irony in the Songs and Symphonies, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3-17. Furthermore, as I go on to discuss (in chapter 3), the identification of such moments or 
materials of “subjective presence” is an experiential act itself located in and reliant upon a larger web of 
philosophical-historically inherited ideas. 
103 JOHNSON 2009: 115 
104 Recall Hegel’s words quoted at length above, on both music and architecture as calling on the dialectics 
of nature – both on its gravitational and stabilising effects, and on its laws of proportion and balance. 
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– of a nature that, it must be remembered, is culturally mediated – enable an expressive 
subject to speak through and over it. 
This dialectic of spirit and nature inverts as the movement ends.  Rather than 
affirmation, we hear negation, comparable to that which Adorno proposed as occurring at 
the end of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony.105 More precisely, in terms of ruination, and in a 
manner akin to Simmel’s dialectics of ruin, nature’s gravity reclaims the symphonic 
architecture built above and through it. This can be seen in three complementary 
processes. Firstly, sonic imagery calls upon symbols of the natural, or traces thereof, as 
taken within the musical language. This first dimension is the most readily perceptible. 
Crucially, immanent structural processes supplement these semantics of the natural, 
themselves situated within the symphonic space. A second process is hence at play. This 
concerns a large-scale collapse in the structural background. Lastly, a descent via a series of 
fifth motives (themselves evocative of horn calls which allude to the natural/the pastoral) 
brings together the semantic surface’s first device and the musical structure’s second, 
reconfirming both. These three dimensions together act towards a dual character of the 
ending’s material: as both imagistically representing and processually embodying the 
ruination of symphonic architecture. 
This first semantic dimension draws on elements introduced earlier in the work, 
now brought together, elements complicit in foregrounding temporal stasis. Importantly, 
an ahistorical, atemporal character is often considered a hallmark of musical constructions 
of nature, evoking a kind of mythic time that goes beyond that which might be humanly 
experienced. As Julian Johnson puts it, 
 
Nature music, in its apparent self-containment and avoidance of linear 
motion, seems to suspend time. In this it seems to offer an analogy for our 
experience of spaciousness in which there is little or no movement. Space 
without perceived directed movement appears timeless. 106 
 
Elements of this “eternal time” are present at the opening of the work, as well at its close, 
suggesting an idea of nature and timelessness that continues beyond human activity and 
expression as it occurs within the work. This strategy – essentially a positing of culture and 
humans’ relation to nature or the “beyond human” – has its own musical-historical legacy, 
finding precedents in works like Charles Ives’s Central Park in the Dark, which opens and 
closes with material connoting eternal timelessness. Material tropes of timelessness also 
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106 JOHNSON, JULIAN 1999: Webern and the Transformation of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 232 
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enter intermittently throughout the work and often coexist simultaneously with other 
materials. Most prominently, pauses in melodic phrasing, in which phrases stand still, 
“outside” of time, become particularly prominent in a passage starting at figure 34, but are 
not limited to this section.107 
 
Ex. 5, Silvestrov, Symphony No. 5: first harp, bar 300 
 
© M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
Stasis is explored in Silvestrov’s symphony, which, as suggested above, may 
highlight the spatial dimension of musical experience. Indeed, the lack of development 
generally heard in the work has led Savenko to call this a ‘static composition’.108 This can 
be heard prominently in the passage from figs. 34-44, in which static bars of “inserts” – 
filled with sustained pitches in the strings and downward flourishes in the first harp (Ex. 5) 
– prolong moments that are unfolding temporally.  
                                                
107 Moments like this have led Savenko to comment that the ‘natural and the cultivated in this symphony 
are not confronted at all but closely blended, with one growing out of the other and dissolving in it. The 
unity of two fundamental principles, former often conflicting, carries a profound philosophical message: 
two facets of the resplendent being appearing as if for the last time in the resigned tension of a parting’. 
SAVENKO 1998: 75 
108 SAVENKO 1998: 75-76 
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Ex. 6, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5: chromatic saturation in the strings (only the strings 
shown), bars 802-805 
 
© M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
The second of the three musical tropes of space is important here: the 
foregrounding of the spatial through the apparent cessation of the temporal. Indeed, this 
second conceptualisation has a distinctly modernist, twentieth-century flavour, as 
encapsulated in Adorno’s famous essay ‘On Some Relationships Between Music and 
Painting’109. The dialectic of time and space was also of importance here, and at the very 
                                                
109 ADORNO, THEODOR 1995 [orig. 1965]: ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting’ (trans. 
Susan Gillespie) in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 1 (pp. 66-79) 
50 
opening of his essay Adorno summarises this dialectic through one of his characteristic 
paradoxes:  
 
The self-evident, that music is a temporal art, that it unfolds in time, means, 
in the dual sense, that time is not self-evident for it, that it has time as its 
problem. It must create temporal relationships as among its constituent parts, 
justify their temporal relationships, synthesize them through time.110 
 
Adorno suggests that in some music time is conceived spatially, in an acute sense, 
where time remains as time but becomes something conceived as organised in a painterly 
fashion. It is ‘planned, disposed of, organized from the top down as a whole, as only visual 
surfaces once where’.111 Adorno says of this music that it is typified in music that is, ‘as 
people like to say nowadays, composed of “blocks”.’112 Prominent musical examples would 
include some of Igor Stravinsky and Morton Feldman’s works which connote being static, 
rather than temporal becoming.113 Indeed, as Johnson suggests, ‘[p]erhaps the single most 
important difference between the music of the twentieth century and the music that 
preceded it is its different construction of musical time.’ 114 He goes on to underline that 
this changing conception of time may also modify our relation with space: ‘with that 
different construction of musical time often comes a heightened sense of the spatial.’115 
This stasis becomes exceptional towards the end of the symphony. Echoes of the 
past appear in traces of past symphonic spaces throughout the symphony as a whole, but it 
is in the closing passages that stasis, and a collapse of spirit into nature, becomes 
foregrounded. Alongside temporal stasis in the form of “inserts”, one hears harmonic 
stasis. This is achieved, firstly, in terms of a suspension of harmonic movement and, 
secondly, through the chromatic saturation of the pitch space; a focus on the amorphous 
over the articulated. This fall into suspended temporality is rhetorically confirmed by 
downwards sweeping gestures carried across the strings, triggered at bars 797 (fig. 94) and 
bar 802 (see Ex. 6). This is supplemented by a rhetorical device bringing with it 
associations of the natural: the sounds of wind and brass players blowing air (without 
producing pitch) through their instruments (for example, in bars 810-812). These features 
come together to mediate a construction of nature – although, given the use of timbre and 
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6, below. 
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clusters, a distinctly modernist nature – that then itself decays into silence. Through stasis, 
space is highlighted. Indeed, this stasis highlights a specifically modern space, one in which 
inherited symphonic structurings of musical space are brought into ruin. 
 
Ex. 7, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, Figs. 90-92 (upbeat to bar 758-777), reduction  
 
 
A large-scale structural descent precedes this final array of sonic imagery; the 
gravity of nature drags downwards before it is made audibly present on the semantic 
surface. From fig. 90 onwards we hear the returning melody characterised by descent. Its 
leaps upward do not contradict this – they are octave displacements which descend again, 
thus reconfirming downwards motion. As can be seen from the reduction (Ex. 7), this line 
in the violins and violas revolves around an A-flat/G-sharp centre. This is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, it stabilises the descent, giving it a centre of “gravitational pull”. 
Secondly, the relation of the bass to the instants at which the A-flat/G-sharp centre is 
momentarily set upon is important, as it suggests a harmonic coherence to this extended 
passage which is itself constitutive of a descent, a huge structural exhalation. This can be 
observed in the semitone movement embedded in the line of those instruments given the 
role of the bass, the double basses and the cellos (players 8-10): E-flat, at fig. 90; D-natural, 
in the bass below the G-sharp just before fig. 91; and, finally, D-flat, beneath the high A-
flat preceding fig. 92.  It should also be noted that this bass line is related to that heard 
originally supporting the melody at fig. 10, but now that movement by minor-thirds in the 
bass is favoured over that of major-thirds as before (these collections are shown bracketed 
in the background diagrams). 
 
Ex. 8, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, bar 772 to end, reduction 
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Arriving at fig. 92, the ear is led by a descent at a surface rather than the 
background level. A series of fifths, so important to the rising contour of the original 
melody at fig. 10 (Ex. 1), becomes the basis of a sequence of motifs that fall away. The 
instrumentation of these is spread across the orchestra, and is generally doubled in the 
strings, as illustrated in Ex. 8. Indeed, the rising fifth motif is pre-echoed earlier in the 
movement, prominently in the cor anglais and first clarinet at bar 346. Despite the 
foregrounding of the fifth motif’s descent, harmonic processes play a role too, with this 
movement being echoed at a larger level in the bass: a D-flat moves to an F-sharp, and 
then a C-natural to an F-natural, which brings the symphony to a close.  
However, this should not be seen as a moment of resolution, instead it further 
illustrates the ruination of symphonic architecture at work in the symphony, its process of 
self-negation. The long-range bass movement D-flat (C-sharp) to F-sharp, whilst 
reminiscent of a large-scale structural resolution, does not affirm any real closure. This is 
surprising as this contradicts F-sharp major’s earlier establishment as a centre with strong 
tonal tendencies. Indeed, an extended passage appears (from fig. 20 onwards) that, for the 
most part, appears in this key. A key signature even appears for the first time, of six sharps. 
However, at the end of the movement, this return to material reminiscent of F-sharp is 
quickly undercut by the re-emergence of cluster material. In addition, a movement by a 
fifth in the bass – C-natural to F-natural – mirrors the D-flat (C-sharp) to F-sharp 
movement but a semitone “out”. This large-scale gesture is also submerged in a 
chromatically saturated texture and, furthermore, is unmoored from the string’s material 
still connotative of F-sharp that sits above it. Both “cadences” show through, but lose 
their functionality, written over as palimpsests of structures of closure. And, as has already 
been outlined above, the material that envelops this problematic articulation of the musical 
space connotes imagery of a myriad, natural timelessness.  
Georg Simmel insisted that, for the ruin to be evocative, enough must remain of 
the original form for there to be a visible relation between spirit and nature – forms 
endangered by the dialectic of spirit and nature must still remain perceptible. In his 
architectural terms he wrote that, for this reason, the ‘stumps of the pillars of the Forum 
Romanum are simply ugly and nothing else, while a pillar crumbled – say, halfway down – 
can generate a maximum of charm’116. In Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 one can hear an 
audible equivalent to the visibility of the architectural ruin. The connection is even 
stronger than this: many of the same aesthetic processes are at work in both, with music 
and architecture sharing both historically established points of contact as well as immanent 
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dialectics of culture and nature. Sonic imagery of the natural, growing over inscribed 
symphonic structures, alongside the gravitational collapse of these same structures, 
confirms Silvestrov’s work as “ruin-symphony”. 
Past as Absent/Present 
Alongside these immanent musical (“interior”) features can be added another 
dimension of ruination (concerning “exteriority”), this work’s relationship to others, as 
“post” to “The Symphony”. I spoke of this at the opening as the work’s “institutional” 
dimension. However, this relationship first requires the conception of the work as some 
kind of object to which exterior relation might be posited (i.e., to other works, to the 
canon). This brings us to the last of the three spatial conceptualisations of music. Mark 
Evan Bonds has recently outlined this third spatial idea in detail: that of the grasping of music – 
“the work itself” – as outside of time. Stepping outside of time – abstracting – allows the work 
to be considered as a work rather than a fleeting series of sonic temporal moments.117 The 
work is posited, positioned, as an object. This enables us to ask what the relation of this 
symphony is as an object set against, beside, or complementary to the practice of “The 
Symphony” as it has been established historically and philosophically through the canon.  
Some illumination of this dimension of Silvestrov’s “post-symphony” comes from 
the composer’s words on another one of his “post-” forms, the postlude:  
 
 [The] “Postlude” is conceived of as the act of gathering resonances, as it 
were – or else as the form which supposes the existence of some text which, 
without being included into the given text, is in some way connected with it. 
Thus, the form is open – though not, as would be more usual, at the end, but 
at the beginning.118  
 
The form of the postlude, in other words, suggests a relation to something outside of itself, 
with the absence of this thing from the work itself being one of its defining characteristics. 
This same thinking, I suggest, impacts not only the postlude but the post-symphony, with 
the reverberation of the musical canon filling the symphonic space whilst not being made 
present as such. Silvestrov said that his Fifth Symphony was “something not so much 
beginning, as responding to something already uttered” 119 . Past forms – like the 
“cadences” at the end of the work – are remembered within the space, but are not 
(unproblematically) operative in articulating the musical space of the work. At the same 
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time, of course, elements from the past are drawn on in articulating the musical space, but 
the boundaries of these are often transgressed. ‘In the ruin’, as Walter Benjamin famously 
put it, ‘history has physically merged into the setting. And in this guise history does not 
assume the form of the process of eternal life so much as that of irresitable decay’.120 In 
this symphony, musical materials are grown over, sitting in that liminal space between 
being and not, although always carrying in them traces of their pasts.  
 
Ex. 9, Silvestrov: Symphony No. 5, bars 479-483, beginning of the piano's solo material 
 
This is observable both in the temporal flow, moment to moment, and in the 
structuring of symphonic space at a larger, abstracted level. At the local level, historically 
allusive fragments appear. The “Mozartian” embellishments found in the clarinet’s solo 
starting at bar 612 (as discussed above) provides one example of this at its smallest level. 
This moment suggests the potential presence of classical expression, but a problematic one 
owing to the absence of a complicit classical syntax unpinning this – a failure to structure 
the musical space, for this expressive figure, such as it should be. A more sustained 
episode of the “problematic” presence of expression appears in a passage revolving 
around fragments of melody in the solo piano, starting at bar 479 (Ex. 9). In addition to 
being marked lontano, a performance instruction accompanies the piano part at this point –  
‘Piano: very gentle and delicately, as if from afar’ – something immediately suggesting 
questions of presence and absence in a very literal sense. The background to this solo is 
relatively scarce and static. Clusters appear in the strings, breath sounds in the winds and 
brass, and fragments of previously heard harmonic colours in the pitched percussion. The 
piano’s phrases appear homeless amongst the orchestral textures, which themselves 
intercede and discolour the piano’s line through dissonance, or sit beside it oblivious of it. 
The resonance at the end of the piano’s final melodic fragment (which begins on the 
upbeat to bar 494) is followed by these three orchestral materials heard simultaneously; a 
kind of dissonant reverberation as all that remains of it in a now empty (static) space (fig. 
64).  
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This dialectic of presence and absence also appears at the level of structure. As 
already observed, principles of sonata form are recalled but not enacted. This dialectic also 
arises in Silvestrov’s repeated evasion of clear objects of experiential focus. In particular, a 
swirling (often descending) figure is present throughout much of the work. It is given 
particular prominence in the first harp from fig. 34 onwards, as cited in Ex. 5. However, it 
appears in a constellation of multiple variants, without an archetypical identity – recalling 
Adorno’s view on Mahler that he conceived of ‘theme as gestalt’121. Its presence is never 
affirmed and as such it avoids being arrested through immediate experience. It is given an 
aura of being out of reach; ‘Aura, from the Hebrew word for light, was defined by 
Benjamin as an experience of distance, a mist of nostalgia that does not allow for 
possession of the object of desire’.122 This distance is a quality echoed in many other 
materials; many of the melodies in the work appear and dissipate such as to never 
guarantee their ontological firmness.123  
Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 performs a ruination of structured symphonic spaces. 
This principally comes through a specific treatment of the dialectics of nature and culture 
as has been inscribed into inherited musical materials. As such, I have illustrated that 
Simmel’s dialectics of culture and nature, insofar as these have a role to play in the 
aesthetics of ruins, are also pertinent to the aesthetics of this symphony. This aesthetic of 
ruination is also enabled through longstanding conceptual links shared between 
conceptions of music and architecture. With this ruination inscriptions are modified 
through decay and transgression.  
This symphony is itself monumental – drawing on the Romantic symphonic 
tradition – whilst at same time the ruination of symphonic monuments of the past is made 
audible. But, this ruination, based in decay, does not sanction a view that the traditions on 
which it draws are somehow negated, no longer relevant, or concealed in an inaccessible 
past. Rather, the ruin is reminiscent of the permanent transience of these objects of 
experience – or, as Svetlana Boym puts it, the ‘ruin is not merely something that reminds 
us of the past; it is also a reminder of the future, when our present becomes history’124. 
This is not the end of a legacy – or even a comment on the “end of history” – but rather 
an immanently musical reconfiguration of the entangled dialectics of culture and nature, 
the spatial and the temporal, and past, present, and future. 
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2. Interlude: Contemporary Musical Discourse 
and the “Objects” of Experience 
 
 
 
 
– Arman, Fagot de clarinettes (1976)125 
 
 
If time is the medium that, as flowing, seems to resist every reification, 
nevertheless music’s temporality is the very aspect through which it 
actually congeals into something that survives independently – an 
object, a thing, so to speak. 
 
– Theodor Adorno, 
‘On the Relationship Between Music and Painting’126 
 
In music from the late 20th century onwards, one often hears a critical investigation 
of distinct “musical objects”, objects on which critical focus may be brought to bear or from 
which – and from their entanglement with temporal unfolding – significant aesthetic 
experiences are elicited. As in the contemporary plastic arts of this period, we are often 
confronted with something, or some constellation of objects. This begs us to ask, “what is 
this before us?” This comes through in multiple, interrelated dimensions: a destabilising of 
the historicity of the work-concept as reified object, an attending to objectified historical 
materials within musical works, or to the literal instrumental objects that facilitate musical 
performance (and extramusical performativities), to give just three examples. But these are 
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all also a concentrating on these objects as they have historically mediated musical 
experience, and a negotiation of these relationships as entailed in the present. 
To this end, I hope to formulate the term object as a useful category for coming to 
terms with the experiencing of late 20th- and early 21st-century critical musics. This word 
carries much weight already, resonating with phenomenology (the object of perception), 
critiques of commodity exchange (objectification), German Idealism (subject-object), 
psychoanalytic theories (“love object”), and many other perspectives besides. It also exists, 
informally at least, in the musicological parlance when talking about how a composer 
handles a certain musical idea of the musical material. The term “object” is occasionally 
used in discussions of (20th- and early 21st-century) music, often informally. For instance, 
Alastair Williams writes that  
 
music may allude to subjectivities and meanings by referencing particular 
“objects.” Such objects may include the sound worlds brought into music by 
the sampler, while film music provides a vocabulary of established semiotic 
associations. A convention linking triadic horn themes with heroic 
subjectivity, for example, extends from the Austro-German symphonic 
tradition to the film scores of John Williams.127  
 
Brian Ferneyhough contemplates, in his thicket-like writing style, the role in composition 
of ‘objects considered as free-floatingly mobile structural radicals possessing the potential 
to unfold and reproduce themselves in independently meaningful linear trajectories’128. 
Luciano Berio, in his Norton Lectures129, made reference to ‘[t]he embittered, jostling 
expressive “objects” that populate Mahler’s world’130. Indeed, this very informality – that 
the concept lacks the need for stable formalisation – is telling as to how deep-rooted “the 
object” is as a conceptual device. My suggestion is that musical objects may be taken 
seriously as material elements dialectically related to the situations constitutive of them and 
are themselves mediative of musical experiences affected through them. They therefore 
may come to help us focus upon questions of historicity and mediation in this music. 
This conceptualisation of these objects becomes important in so far as it helps 
articulate a distinct relationship between part and whole in musical works of the era in 
question – that is, the ways in which an object might sit in a larger context. How, for 
example, objectified moments of historical musical material are articulated within a musical 
                                                
127 WILLIAMS, ALASTAIR 1999: ‘Adorno and the Semantics of Modernism’ in Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 
37, No. 2 (pp. 29-50), 39 
128 FERNEYHOUGH, BRIAN 1995: Collected Writings (ed. James Boros and Richard Toop, foreword by 
Jonathan Harvey), Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 34-35 
129 published as BERIO 2006 
130 BERIO 2006: 39 
58 
work, and what impact this has on its significance.131 Following this, it also becomes 
valuable as a basic concept (one developed in later chapters) that enables a focus on 
individual moments – on objects of musical and experiential focus – as these themselves 
are inscribed with historical and philosophical content, acting as nodal points around 
which multifarious experiential issues coalesce. In addition, the relative positioning of 
these objects – how discourse is organised – bespeaks significances beyond mere formal 
relations; the significance of an objectified “Otherness” is defined differentially with 
and/or against the articulation of Self, for example. My attending to this ‘object-like’ 
treatment of musical materials is by extension to suggest that this treatment becomes a 
significant dimension by which aesthetic experiences are elicited in music of the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries (even whilst kernels of these ‘object-like’ processes might be found 
in earlier musics). 
Thus, “the object” is not merely an explanatory tool – a conceptual filter through 
which music is understood – rather, it comes to be through the music. This is something 
dependent both on history (on what are prejudiced to be points of focus in art music – as 
articulated through pitch relationships, dramatic oppositions, and so on) and on the 
immediate, local context of the work being experienced (how the work focuses upon 
historical material for us, eliciting new meanings from past materials, or articulates 
identities through affinities and differences intramusically). The object can thus be 
anything expressing identity, anything that has a provisional divisibility from, and gives 
shape to, the continuum of subjective experience. (I focus upon the processes by which 
this division takes place in Part II, through developing Julia Kristeva’s concept of the 
thetic.) Intramusical examples of objects, in addition to more “literal” objects like musical 
instruments, would range from pitch identities, motifs, to quotations, musical phrases, and 
beyond. These are examples with readily divisible identities and, as I will argue, this quasi-
linguistic dimension within music is not itself neutral to philosophical critique. Expression 
and meaning are invested in these objects, or, rather, a concept of the object helps to 
articulate concepts of expression and meaning. I have referred to this dimension as their 
inscription, a bidirectional process that also inscribes subjectivity.  
Objects are what we talk about when we talk about music and those things that we 
argue we should be talking about in music. They are strategic points that are both material 
and abstract, built, attacked, and defended in struggles for meaning. To this end, before 
going on to consider musical objects in detail, it is first useful to briefly outline some 
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already established notions of objects, which may be in part drawn upon, developed, 
and/or critiqued.132  
It is notable that there was a move towards focus on the material, and on objects 
generally, in scholarly work contemporary to the music focused on in this study. As Sherry 
Turkle puts it, from the 1980s onwards there developed ‘an increasing commitment to the 
study of the concrete in a range of scholarly communities’133. Arjun Appadurai’s The Social 
Life of Things134 was particularly influential in anthropology and beyond. More recently, as 
Pels, Hetherington, and Vandenberghe have pointed out, objects have come 
 
back in strength in contemporary social theory. Whether in the shape of 
commodities, machines, communication, technologies, foodstuffs, artworks, 
urban spaces, or risk phenomena in a thoroughly socialized nature, a new 
world of materialities and objectivities has emerged with an urgency which 
has turned them into new sites of perplexity and controversy.135 
 
Whilst I do not draw on specific cultural-theoretical work on objects in this chapter136, it 
should be said that my study reverberates sympathetically with issues of reification and 
objecthood in other, non-musicological disciplinary arenas. 
In musical aesthetics and philosophy, notions of ontology are particularly 
significant in prejudicing notions of musical objects. In the ontological usage of the word 
(as found prominently in analytic philosophical aesthetics), the musical object – the musical 
object, in its singular usage – is the result (or ideal) of attempts to define what a musical 
work, what music in general, or what the object of musical experience is (‘what exactly is a 
work of music?’137). Indeed, as Matthew Butterfield notes, following Lydia Goehr, the 
‘musical object’ is often tied in closely with notions of the musical ‘work-concept’138, with 
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its longstanding connotations of permanence.  Patricia Carpenter’s formulation of ‘The 
Musical Object’, in a 1967 article of the same name, mirrors some of these distinctly 
ontological qualities. She contrasts ‘objects’ and ‘processes’. A musical “piece” (i.e. a work 
of music) is, for her, the principal manifestation of a musical object. She gives a fugue as 
an example of an “object”; it is experienced from moment-to-moment but is nonetheless 
‘intended for contemplation by someone who is removed and listening, someone who 
grasps more far-reaching relations of structure in his confrontation of the piece as a 
whole’139. In contrast, in ‘process’ we cannot grasp a whole. Carpenter cites John Cage’s 
music by example.140  Hers is an “object” construed through structural listening141, derived 
from part-whole relationships, as abstracted, defining the ‘organism’142 that is the “piece” 
as a whole. Form is crucial for Carpenter’s object. Indeed, she starts by taking, ‘[i]n the 
narrow sense, […the concept of] “a piece” to represent a particular way of conceiving 
musical form, which has been characteristic in the mainstream of the modern Western 
tradition’143. This part-whole, formal outlook allows her to extend the notion of “objects” 
to include smaller formal units, within pieces. She provides melody as a prime example – 
‘A melody is an object in the sense of pure form (it can be moved from place to place 
within the pitch-space, and yet remain constantly itself)’144. This formal perspective makes 
the ontological basis of her position explicit when she writes that ‘the condition for Art [i.e. 
a work of art] is the articulation of form through a specific medium… a form imposed 
upon the substance from without by its maker, whose mark the object bears’ 145 . 
Carpenter’s suggestion that objects might exist within works is a valuable one that I pursue; 
however, I do so in a musical context that is often defined by fragmentation, and by the 
eschewing of part-whole, formal relationships, at least as these are defined by Carpenter. 
As will become apparent, my “object” differs greatly from Carpenter’s, as well as 
ontological inquiries that attempt to grasp essentially fixed qualities of “musical objects” 
“beyond” the realm of experience. Mine is a conceptualisation of musical objects that 
                                                                                                                                         
Nevertheless, the outlook and method in this insightful article differs from my own, with my focus being 
on historicity (and philosophical identity). 
139 CARPENTER, PATRICIA 1967: ‘The Musical Object’ in Current Musicology, No. 5, (pp. 56-87), 58 
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Music and Reason in Western Society, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 148). 
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allows me to suggest that it is often the immediacy of these musical objects’ “objecthood” 
that spurs contemplation or critical elaboration. This contrasts with the objects of 
ontological and structural listening perspectives, where contemplation is the means to 
abstract objects from the immediacy of experience. 
Another “musical object” has been outlined by Judy Lochhead who, following a 
phenomenological method, evades the ahistoricism of some ontologically-inclined 
concepts of “objects” – as beyond experience, and beyond history – by suggesting that the 
musical object changes in line with attention. She writes that  
 
by the term musical object I simply mean some “thing” of a sounding musical 
instance, which may become the focus of experience. This sense of “object” 
is based in principles of phenomenological philosophy that hold that “things” 
arise as a result of intentional acts within experience.146 
 
I welcome the transience of her object – that the object may rise up and then disappear, 
mediated by perception, rather than exist ahistorically – but think what also need be 
considered are aspects of objects’ fixity as these are rooted in history and ideology. 
Phenomenological flux may be welcomed, but only when dialectically counterbalanced 
with an understanding that objects also have closed and fixed characteristics, with reified 
and discernible limits. 147  As Lochhead puts it above, ‘“things” may arise… within 
experience’ (although I reject her caveat that this is ‘the result of intentional acts’). The 
question I confront is: on what basis does the bounding of these objects – their reified 
delineation148 – stem from logics derived from still-significant historical and philosophical 
categories of mediation (for instance, the still-influential, often evoked, yet also often 
problematised, “work-concept”)?  
I argue that ‘musical objects’ have both an immediate givenness, some apparently 
concrete and fixed existence, whilst also opening up to “dynamic” possibilities. (Indeed, 
this “givenness” is false in the sense that its apparent immediacy is the result of 
mediation.) This position stands in contrast with, say, Carpenter’s object, and, as we will 
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see, Lawrence Kramer’s object, where fixity and dynamism (openness, potentiality, 
“virtuality”) are separated out into dual typologies. For Carpenter, this is a separation of 
“object” (form, Wholeness, e.g. a Sonata) and “process” (formlessness, non-integration, 
e.g. Cage’s chance pieces). As I discuss below, for Kramer, this is one of “object” and 
“thing” 149. In both Carpenter’s and Kramer’s formulations, the broadly “dynamic” aspects 
of musical experience are taken as concepts external to “the object”. In contrast, in recent 
critical musics we are often faced with objects that, in a dialectical sense, incorporate 
elements of fixity and dynamism, perhaps by both stemming from the past yet also 
pursuing new ways of becoming significant in the present. The “object” becomes the 
foregrounded element of experience, what we are faced with, and in which we see (hear) 
both fixity and dynamism, closedness and openness. I start addressing this dialectical 
concern below in my critique of Kramer’s recent essay on musical objects and musical 
“things”, an essay which itself takes its theoretical impetus from the above-cited move, 
across disciplines, to reconsider the status of objects and materialities.150 
Sound(ing)-objects 
In the experience of recent critical music we are often confronted with some 
sound(ing)-object or constellation of objects. The character of these is problematic given 
their eschewing of stabilising interpretative frames as givens, doubly so: the characters of 
the objects themselves are not givens, nor are these objects’ (discursive) relationships to 
one another. This tends towards the literal in the case of the “sounding object”: in a use of 
a musical instrument that denies the “naturalised” methods of sound production and 
hearing. Its expressive character, located through the object, is no longer a given, nor are 
the relationships between this object and its others (i.e., other instruments of the ensemble, 
the repertoire and pedagogy which forms part of the identity of the instrument). Through 
a focus on the media of music making, rather than the communication of expression 
through them, the materiality and historicity of the sounding-objects are foregrounded as 
points of critical intrigue themselves. 
This tends towards the figurative (which is by no-means less significant 
experientially than the literal) in cases of “sound-objects” within works; for example, 
quotations of material sitting outside of their stylistic frames, invoking a sound-world but 
betraying the relationships of form and syntax in which this material would “naturally” 
find its place (Alfred Schnittke’s polystylism provides many examples of this strategy). At 
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this point it should become clear that there are explicit differences between my “objects” 
and Pierre Schaeffer’s musical objects151, as well as between my concept and the “objects” 
of Carpenter and Lochhead discussed above. In contrast with Schaeffer’s objects I stress 
the objects’ materiality and historicity, as well as that they are produced/producing – that 
they may suggest a certain mode of subjectivity objectified in musical material, and may, 
contrarily, articulate and define aspects of subjectivity, in addition to the relationships 
between subjectivity and the world around it. As experience is articulated both through 
and with reference to them, objects’ problematic status – and critical attention to them – 
simultaneously concerns the subject. Importantly, this is not to say that in art musics prior 
to those focused on here experience is never problematised, nor that objects of experience 
are never treated critically. It is rather to point out that this is often underlined in late 20th- 
and early 21st-century “critical” musics. In addition, this is to recognise that what objects 
are considered to be, how they are experienced musically, and the ways in which they 
relate to worlds and subjectivities changes over time. 
So what are these objects? I would suggest that, at risk of explicitly limiting this 
concept, it is problematic to ask what they are without reference to the processes the 
constitute them. The answer to this question is reliant on the changing conditions in the 
mutually mediating relationship found between subject and object, not only on “the object 
itself”. Sound(ing) objects are never a given and there are always some elements brought 
to the forefront of experience and some that recede into the background. Nonetheless, 
they do exert some provisional existence – some dimension of fixity – in that they arise 
through musical discourses, articulate these discourses, and in that we are able to discourse 
(musicologically) about them. However, as a point of departure this encapsulation is 
appropriate: Objects are elements on which experience focuses, through which experience is articulated, 
and from which interpretation may begin. And, as present experience, and its objects, finds itself 
as a product of its relations – for example, as mediated by history, and inherited 
philosophical and material legacies – a dialectic of past and present plays a crucial role. A 
study of objects, and a study of the aesthetics of musical experience, is a study of relations 
rather than of an inherent essence of either. This will be seen to be a particularly important 
point regarding distinctions between discourse (or music’s language-like dimensions152) and 
that outside discourse (or the “pre-linguistic”), divisions that are not themselves neutral in 
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their complicity with particular political-philosophical perspectives. Most notably this 
becomes key in the mapping of the discursive/pre-discursive distinction to matrixes 
including concepts of culture/nature, mind/body, action/passivity, and 
masculinity/femininity. Discourse is not self-evident. What we privilege in the musical 
discourse, and what is foregrounded by the discourse, coincides with the privileging of 
other ideas that are “extramusical”. 
The critical perspective I am developing here is not only concerned with the 
objects themselves (as there is no essential “themselves”) – they are not merely 
provisionally articulated elements of discourse – but also with the mediative philosophical-
historical conditions by which the object is experienced (as being/coming into being and 
in being significant). This opens the objects up beyond the finitude of their provisional 
existence, something that comes through in questions such as: is the object a metonymy 
(or synecdochic fragment) of past musical styles? Is it markedly “cultural” as opposed to, 
or superimposed on, a backdrop of the “natural”? Is it an object of nostalgia? Is it 
productive of a certain image of a subject with which it is in dialectic? Objects go beyond 
themselves, tying in with and drawing significances from wider philosophical-historical 
concerns (more on this in the next chapter). 
In this sense, objects make visible (or “actual”) hidden potentials within the 
philosophical-historical conditions in which they exist. However, the object is not simply 
an exemplar or token of the “objective” conditions from which they arise; something 
comparable to the fact that in psychoanalytic discourse objects attended to consciously are 
not merely reproductions of underlying unconscious processes yet are still related to them. 
The sounding object of the piano is not only constituted through the objective processes 
of its production – as defined by its raw materials and divisions of labour that produced it 
– but serves cultural purposes for, and is invested with meanings and significances by, 
subjectivities always in mediative relation to it. A sound-object that connotes “Otherness” 
(e.g. a “foreign” stylistic fragment within a musical work) arises not only from a specific 
set of material conditions, but enables the experiencing subject to articulate its own 
psychical fears concerning its own Selfhood determinately against an Other. 
This can be put in the terms of a dialectic of part (object) and whole (objective 
conditions), something alluded to already. However, given that the part does not 
exemplarily reproduce “part of” the whole this occurs in service of some always implicit 
third term – that of subjectivity experiencing this dialectic of part and whole. So, whilst 
not denying the dialectic of part and whole, it should nonetheless be supplemented with 
the caveat that subjectivity is implicit as a third term to this dialectic. If the object makes 
visible hidden potentials of the objective conditions, if it arises from and through these 
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objective conditions, this is always as related to subjectivity, with which it is in dialectic. 
Hence, the object – in its provisional existence – can be seen as a provisional meeting 
point between objective conditions and an experiencing subject. Heuristically, this can be 
imagined as a triangulation of relations between the contextual frame, the provisional 
“text” of experience, and that which is understood as experiencing. 
This inscription of music with significances and histories is related to, yet different 
from, Adorno’s conception of artwork as monad, where artworks are autonomous yet also 
‘derive their material from the “outside world” of functional empirical reality’.153 Three key 
differences must be underlined. Firstly, rather than focusing on “the work” as a whole, I 
focus on the transience of the objects of experience. As Adorno argues, musical works 
take in the “outside world”. This, I suggest, is not only a characteristic of the work as a 
whole; its constituent elements do this also. Connected with this idea, the object is seen as 
a provisional sign, symbol, image, (or commodity,) one produced materially, historically, 
and ideologically.154 The object is grounded in conceptions of a world “as it (objectively) 
is”, just as this world is performed – manifested – in objectifications. Indeed, this is a 
process foregrounded in the object-like treatment of musical materials in many late 20th- 
and early 21st-century critical works. 
Secondly, connected with this, starting with the object at the centre of the 
investigation leads to the potential for a semiotic interpreting of a musical work, as a text: 
objects, in being shown to arise from objective conditions, are shown to take on meaning. 
But this is a semiology altered from its normal functioning: objects are relationally rather 
than representatively connected with the world – they relate to but do not represent or 
reproduce it (as signifiers of a signified). Whilst meanings are rooted philosophically-
historically, they are also mobile – that is, they hold the potential for transformation.  
Thirdly, and most fundamentally, Adorno’s thinking is founded on a subject-object 
dialectic. Whilst I explore the experience of this music dialectically, I also take a 
“discursive” approach, and in this sense posit three terms in constant play: the textuality of 
the object of focus, its (historical and immanently musical) contextual framing, and an 
experiencing subject. The object becomes a meeting point between both subjectivity and 
its world, mediating between the two as a materialisation in which both are partially and 
provisionally negotiated. As such, it is also accorded status as a potential site for immanent 
musical critique of subjectivity and its world, as well as the interrelation between the two. 
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154 Lawrence Kramer has described certain moments of music as ‘hermeneutic windows’, i.e. they are 
focal points by which we enter an understanding of musical works, where interpretation begins (see 
KRAMER 2011: 68-69). My concept of object is similar in this respect, but differs in its foundations being 
based on material-philosophical histories (i.e. in the setting in which the object can be said to exist). 
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Confronting the object, in its mediation of the other two, entails also a confronting of 
subject and world. 
Critiquing Musical “Thing Theory” 
This question of how we conceive of musical meaning, and of how we approach 
musical ‘objects’, has most recently been taken up by Lawrence Kramer. He formulates 
this issue as a question of ontology. I will outline his position on the subject, which, as I 
hope to show, fails to acknowledge that musical objects are inherently dialectical and that 
they suggest existence only through their interrelationships with one another and through 
the heterogeneous processes of performativity. My position will be set out in 
contradistinction to his. In addition, this discussion will allow me to illustrate why I have 
decided to construct my study of the musical aesthetics of late 20th- and early 21st-century 
art music around the central issue of past-present relations. 
In his essay ‘Things’ in Interpreting Music Kramer approaches music’s ontology from 
recent developments in philosophy (Bill Brown’s ‘Thing Theory’ 155 ). In effect, he 
introduces a new category – that of ‘thing’ – to distinguish his conception of music from 
thinking about music and musical entities as ‘objects’. For Kramer, objects are fixed and hold 
onto stable meanings, and things are open and indeterminate; ‘objects exemplify categories; 
things acquire histories.’156 
This distinction between ‘thing’ and ‘object’ – defining the issue as one of ontology 
or typology – is the central problem with Kramer’s framework. To characterise this as an 
ontological question, rather than attending to the processes by which aesthetic experiences 
are elicited, is to shut down the very open-endedness which Kramer claims he wants to 
pursue. In much critical music, and in much other music besides, we hear a dialectical 
problematisation of the object/thing’s own ontology, in which we cannot distinguish 
distinct qualities of fixity (Kramer’s “object”) from openness (his “thing”). This is most 
clear in what can be labelled this music’s “self-reflexive” aspect. This quality stems from 
the problematic moment of our confrontation (“what is this before us?”) by music that 
creates moments of significance, is evocative of meaning, yet that also, at the same time, 
makes us unsure of what “it is”. Put another way, here we are aware that it (the object of 
experience, “the music”) – whatever this “it” is – is doing something. However, at the 
same time, this process of “doing” – which relies on something, some object to “do the 
doing” – disturbs the stable conditions and qualities by which that “thing/object” might 
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come to be known, that which is “doing the doing”. This critique will be explored a little 
further, and in doing so also reflect on what this means for past-present relations. 
Firstly, there is a problem in distinguishing object from thing.  Kramer claims that, in 
contrast to the fixity of the object, ‘things are open-ended, semi-animate, intimate forms 
that become what they are as we become what we are. Their consistency is neither 
objective nor subjective but an unstable blend of both.’157 However, a clear distinction 
cannot be made between these terms. Objects, whilst they suggest reified boundaries, 
might also suggest an exceeding of these boundaries. Musical objects – be they quotations, 
entities of musical structure, or even works themselves – are significant and meaningful in 
their openness to wider affinities and differences with other objects and histories. This is 
observed in their opposition to, synthesis of, or investment with certain programmatic or 
cultural values, for example. They take on wider significance than their own hermetic, 
bounded worlds in order to create meaning. Whilst they derive from what is known, from 
the world of established ‘objectivity’, they may go beyond this to create new meanings and 
experiences, with our experience of them not being reducible to objective fact. Note that, 
importantly, I am not arguing (following Kramer) that music is in fact an ‘object’ as 
opposed to a ‘thing’. Rather I hope to illustrate that the very act of trying to distinguish 
object from thing is problematic – the object contains openness and closedness, with the 
relationship between the two being dialectical rather one of ontological exclusivity 
between that which is open and that closed. 
Take for example something that would no-doubt, under the terms of (Kramer’s 
interpretation of) ‘Thing Theory’, be considered an “object”: the piano. I choose this 
example partially because I will go on to explore the contemporary piano in Part III. I also 
choose this example as it seems, at first, to have a clearly finite being, given its physical 
dimensions as an object. The piano can be viewed as stemming from objective tradition, a 
tradition which (simply put) shaped us in learning how to play, write for, and hear the 
piano. But this set of relations is neither fixed nor the totality of the piano’s available 
meaning. Instead, its significance comes about in the presentness of performativity, in the 
fact that established notions of what the piano “is”, and pianistic expression “is”, may 
change in the performance of new works and in new interpretations of the old. So, the 
distinction is not one between the ontologies of “object” and “thing”, but the dialectic of 
closedness of objectivity and openness inherent as potential that is held within the object 
itself. There is an important methodological lesson to be learnt from this, and this is why 
the method suggested here is, in some ways, anti-methodological. I will not suggest that 
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musical meaning can be reduced to a typology of relationships with a past which is ‘out 
there’ and somehow separate from the present (“quotation”, “allusion”, “aversion to the 
past”…) but instead opt to explore the ways in which past and present interpenetrate one 
another. 
Secondly, Kramer’s formulation of object and thing, and music’s relation to them, is over-
generalised – it does not acknowledge the role of history and the aesthetic lineage of ideas 
passed-down in material in the characterisation of ‘music’. I am in agreement with Kramer 
that musical entities are ‘liminal forms between the animate and the inanimate’ and that 
‘the technical terms that name them are always, only, and necessarily provisional, however 
much normative value of many widely applied terms may encourage us to forget the 
fact.’158 However, Kramer’s ‘music’ seems to be a catch-all term. I want to suggest that it is 
more fruitful to understand music in the sense of something emerging from particular 
aesthetic traditions. In the case of this study, it is to investigate music since the mid-1970s 
as related to the traditions and objectivities of Western art music, and as engaging with 
longstanding metaphysical motifs: the dialectics of autonomy, of culture and nature, and of 
mind and body, for example. The investigation of what constitutes the inanimate and 
animate in music – the concrete and the virtual if you will – must be seen as a process set 
in motion in relation to the histories from which the entities of investigation spring. To fail 
to do this either ends in making transcendent the virtual, open dimension of musical 
objects/things (as something above culture and removed from it) or the stifling of its 
processual movement (through reduction to a static, ahistorical notion of what music is). 
Thirdly, musical objects are more than their fixity. I concur with Kramer that objects tend 
towards reification. However, this is not their only dimension. If this were so then the 
“objective” world from which objects are brought forth would be reduced simply to a 
synchronic set of object-formulations to be deployed and modified at the will of an 
autonomous subject – a kind of supermarket one can walk in to of musical entities, 
choosing which to acquire and make use of – rather than a realm that is mediative of the 
interrelationships of object and subject. 
A subsidiary point can be briefly made here, one that follows on from my second 
critical point as much as the third: Historical situation is effaced by Kramer’s analysis in 
terms of ontology, in respect to the modes by which reification occurs of his objects in 
question – specifically, the situation of late-capitalism. It could very well be argued that 
this situation has changed the way in which we think about and experience objects (with 
the most obvious example of this being seen in the processes of commodification). Not 
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only does this historical situation unconsciously shape how we conceive of entities and 
their interrelationships, it also is something consciously reacted against in certain 
contemporary works. Think of Helmut Lachenmann’s Accanto (1975-76) for example 
(scored for solo clarinet, orchestra, and tape), in which a tape recording of Mozart’s 
Clarinet Concerto breaks through the acoustic orchestral material, suggesting a meditation 
on the Concerto not as sublime work of art, but as an object in the sense of being a reified 
commodity; ‘Basically, [Lachenmann] destroyed it [Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto] in the way 
in which we destroy it every day – i.e. he turned it into a fetish, a lifeless object and a fossil. 
Precisely, he made a ‘Mozart-thing’ out of it’159. The Concerto’s conscious presentation as 
dead, static object is what gives it meaning in this context, rather than closing down its 
meaning. Philosophical-historical circumstance, over Kramer’s ontological certainty, is 
what allows Lachenmann to reflect upon Mozart’s Concerto as commodity-object.160 
Lastly, and leading on from this, it would fruitful to see the play of objects as an exploration 
of heterogeneous relationships – and the gaps in these relationships – instead of reducing play to 
a duality of ontologically distinct entities, of ‘object’ and ‘thing’. Again, I share with 
Kramer a question that needs to be asked of music – ‘What if music were best conceived, 
not as an ideal object, but as a worldly thing?’161. I concur that music is best considered as 
a ‘worldly thing’ rather than as something singularly transcendental and God-given. 
However this worldliness cannot be illustrated at the cost of circumscribing particular 
musical features as either ontologically open things or closed objects. To formulate a 
thing/object as ‘being’ a certain thing/object without reference to the relationships that 
surround, penetrate, and frame it is to make it autonomous in its being, and beyond the 
mediative conditions through which any meaning is made possible, or which could be 
problematised by the instability of the thing/object. To settle the ontology of the 
thing/object as something beyond relations is to autonomise their being. It is to fail to 
acknowledge the multifaceted nature inherent in the object; that, for example, it may take 
on multiple meanings, associations, and resonances (beyond the objectively codifiable) 
through exploring new relationships with other objects in contact with it. It is also to 
cover over the gaps in these relationships – observed in language, in jokes and Freudian 
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slips, for example – that suggest that there may be something that is not captured in the 
unified symbolic level of the codifiable. To reduce music to either ‘thing’ (open) or ‘object’ 
(closed) posits meaning as a case of ‘either/or’, instead of an exploration of a dialectical 
relationship between two positions and the gaps between these positions that they fail to 
arrest in total. 
Critical reflection has allowed me in this interlude to develop the musical, 
philosophical motif of “objects”. These objects supplement already established 
musicological, aesthetic, and philosophical ideas (for example, “found objects”). Given my 
following of a broadly “discursive” method, they can also be said to bear some similarity 
with the ‘topics’162 and ‘tropes’163 of musical-semiotic approaches. However, the “topical” 
quality of these objects should not be thought of only in semantic or semiotic terms. They 
could instead, in respect to this difference, be compared to the topoi as explored by the 
rhetoricians of the ancient Classical world, in which topics stood not simply as points of 
semantic allusion, but as a placing in memory – an arranging of things such that aspects of 
the past could be recalled, and drawn upon, in the present.164 Considered in this way, 
inherited musical language becomes both a repository and an enlivening of social, 
historical, and philosophical memories. This enables immanent critiques to be located 
through this same material, something that in many musical works from the late 20th 
century onwards can be conceived through this historicity’s “object-like” treatment.
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3. Legacies of Proximity and Distance in Kancheli’s 
Symphony No. 5 
 
 
Ex. 10, Kancheli: Symphony No. 5, opening harpsichord melody 
 
© G. Schirmer Inc. 1982 
 
Giya Kancheli’s Symphony No. 5 (1976) is a work that circulates around a distinct 
musical object – a key point of focus in terms of shaping experience, a moment of identity, 
one inscribed with historical resonances – opening with a harpsichord melody, cut short 
by an accented orchestral tutti. This provides a case-in-point as to how the treatment of an 
object within the musical discourse relates to, and draws and impacts upon, philosophical-
historical significances that go beyond the apparent immediacy of the object “itself”. 
Around and through the object, multiple aspects mediative of experience coalesce – in the 
ways, for example, that the object is foregrounded over and against the discursive, 
historical, and contextual frameworks that supply its status as an object.   
Kancheli’s Symphony No. 5 is, like Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5, a single 
movement work. It also evokes musically mediated constructions of nature and culture, 
often drawing on a pseudo-tonal palette in doing so. The harpsichord material recurs, 
often fragmented, throughout the symphony, returning at its very end. Its quietly insistent 
tone contrasts strongly with accented tutti material that often cuts it short. This tutti 
material becomes an important thematic element its own right, with later triple-forte 
extended passages deriving from it. The extreme contrasts of texture means that 
expressive, even pointillistic, moments sit beside monumental, violent stabbing gestures in 
what the philosopher Dylan Trigg has characterised as Kancheli’s music’s ‘struggle of 
silence and violence’165 – the abrasion of extremes between which there is little middle 
ground. In his Fifth Symphony, Kancheli provides a soundworld of sudden contrasts, 
veering between expressive moments of quiet contemplation, ferocious stabbing gestures, 
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and churning, continuous semiquavers in the strings and winds (performed in octaves), 
often supported by colossal walls of sound arising from the brass and percussion. 
It is the role of the harpsichord in this constellation of events that I focus on here. 
Given that, as I explored in the previous chapter, objects provide spaces through which 
subject and world might be seen to be mediated, the treatment of the object may also be 
seen to help structure the relationships within both subject and world, and between them 
too. This interwoven set of concerns, when posed as a central question becomes: What is 
the treatment – indeed, what is the process of becoming – of the objects of focus in the 
discourse of this symphony, and how do these mediate/how are these mediated by the 
inherited philosophical-historical legacies to which they relate and which they perform? 
A simple singular answer cannot be given to this necessarily complex question; 
more fruitful is a putting into motion of the dialectical tensions within it. In practical terms, 
this means, firstly, looking into how the object of experience is foregrounded (here, principally the 
opening harpsichord material) and on what philosophical-historical bases this is reliant. How is the 
object then treated in relation to other materials? This leads to a second step that makes 
explicit the relationship of subjectivity to this object, asking: is a large distance, a close 
proximity, or a mix of the two, put between subject and object? Furthermore, given the 
distance/proximity between subject and object, how does the treatment of the object – 
with regard to other materials – impact upon subjectivity? As material connotative of past 
(sedimented) subjectivities – being explicitly of the past, yet still present – the opening 
harpsichord melody evokes these dialectical questions of distance and objectified 
subjectivity. This concludes with a discussion of nostalgia. Much of Kancheli’s music is 
nostalgic – ‘In almost every symphony by Kancheli, there is some “nostalgia leitmotif”.’ 166 
However, I argue that, in his Fifth, nostalgia is evoked as this leads on from an idea of 
distance, and the location of the object as simultaneously near and far, positioned both as 
a place of home and longing – ‘Nostalgia (from nostos – return home, and algia – 
longing).’167  
An Object in Constellation 
I take as a starting point for my analysis the harpsichord melody that opens the 
symphony as an object of focus (Ex. 10). A dialectic between the discursive (immanent, 
introversive, textural) framing and the inherited philosophical-historical (exterior, 
extroversive, contextual) inscriptions of this object performatively constitutes it as such, 
and gives it its particular identity. 
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Questions concerning the discursive frame, insofar as this gives objects identity, 
are focused upon extensively in Part II. However, I will briefly prefigure this later 
discussion by saying that objects’ identities are firmed up through their articulation in the 
discourse: through objects’ differences and affinities with other material, through 
repetition, deviation, and so on. It is in this articulation of the boundaries of objects that 
the distinction between (framed) object and framing setting, and between object and 
subject – the identity of each as related to its others – can be said to be determinable. 
 
Ex. 11, Kancheli: Symphony No. 5, first tutti gesture, bar 3 (winds only) 
 
© G. Schirmer Inc. 1982 
 
The discursive context of Kancheli’s harpsichord materials articulates it as an 
object with identity; it is set apart from the orchestra’s tutti outbursts, which occupy 
different spaces in terms of pitch content, tone, and gesture. This contrast – this 
articulation of differing identities – is hardened as the harpsichord material attempts 
multiple returns only to be cut short again and again (see bar three, Ex. 11, one bar before 
fig. 1, and one bar before fig. 2). The divisibility of these materials is rhetorically 
underlined. Besides this main object of focus at the opening, the harpsichord material, and 
the tutti material, a third “state” is outlined – smudged pseudo-tonal harmonies. Putting 
aside, for now at least, the issue of how the musical discourse articulates this object, I will 
restrict my comments on discursive framing to these seemingly basic characteristics. 
However, it will become apparent below that, even at this seemingly basic level of 
description of the music, once the inscribed presence of the past in the present is 
considered, the significance of this simple outline rapidly unfurls. 
Objects, as I have argued in the preceding chapter, are inscribed with significances 
and relationships which go beyond themselves, yet are formative in giving rise to their 
apparent immediacy (that they are “pre-given” to us). The harpsichord that opens 
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Kancheli’s symphony provides an exceptional example of this; it is both an (instrumental) 
sounding object and a (musically immanent) sound-object. The harpsichord – the material 
instrument, its ephemeral canon, what it “stands for” – bears a history, coming to both 
embody and connote certain values168: Reason (later, Sensibility under the Empfindsamer 
Stil), virtuosity (individualism), intimacy (through its habitualised chamber setting), and – 
now – a potential articulation of nostalgia.169 Just as “objective” values (Reason, Justice, 
Freedom, and so on) may be abstracted from objects, so objects help concretise the 
abstract, making it tangible. Thus, in shaping objects within the musical discourse, 
philosophical-historical legacies are inherently engaged (with) performatively. 
In objects we hear artifice. By this, I mean that – as heard in the case of the 
harpsichord material – objects’ “cultural” dimension is often underlined such that they 
appear above or foregrounded over the “natural” background. As focal (vocal) points, they 
may appear as materials of craft, subjectivity, and agency, shaped by human hands and 
human minds. However, their very perception as objects is telling of a particular 
phenomenological framework that is primed as such to comprehend the world through its 
objects. The very notion of what constitutes the “objects” to be perceived, and their mode 
of perception, is contingent on philosophical-historical contexts. Put another way, this 
supposedly simple act is not value free or neutral of philosophical and ideological concerns. 
In outlining the connection of the object in/of discourse with a constellation of 
philosophical-historical legacies, it is hoped that the groundwork is also laid for the 
discussion of mind, body, and the experience of critical art music that form the core of the 
later chapters. 
In Kancheli’s Symphony No. 5, these issues can be best conceived as coalescing 
around the themes of “nature” and “culture”. The status of harpsichord-material-as-object 
– put simply – as something markedly cultural, is contrasted and finds significance in 
relation to a background of material connotative of the natural. Ex. 12 provides one 
example of this. Here, the harpsichord’s opening gesture appears above the single pitch of 
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the first horn, before near-static pseudo-tonal material in the woodwinds emerges from 
the background. This I describe as “coalescence” in that the nature-culture dialectic is 
operative in making connection to and drawing significance from other related 
philosophical-historical ideas in situ around it. In our thinking about nature and culture – 
and in their articulation in this symphony – significance is also drawn from related ideas. 
To this end, I will illustrate how engaging with the dialectics of nature and culture 
advances a discussion as to the role of the harpsichord-material-as-object in Kancheli’s 
Symphony, insofar as this object draws upon, and modifies, other philosophical-historical 
legacies that go beyond musical constructions of nature and culture. 
 
Ex. 12, Kancheli: Symphony No. 5, bars 4-6 
 
© G. Schirmer Inc. 1982 
 
It has become almost axiomatic that the nature-culture binary is a central trope in 
constructions of the Western minds and subjectivities (and indeed in their own self-
conceptions). In the writings of many we are shown ‘how we passed from a state of nature 
76 
to become beings with language and culture’.170 Nature, as we already saw in chapter 1, was 
often conceived of as a pre-existent state – an origin, a static expanse of timelessness. On 
this background, or from this background, the cultural would appear. 
These relations of nature and culture also served to support and interplay with 
other, related concepts, ideas with which they are bound-up or “cooked”, to borrow a 
term from Robin James. This metaphor of the “cooked” connotes that conceptual 
categories (for James, categories of cultural identity) ‘always exist in combination’.171 Exploring 
this metaphor, James writes that: ‘When we taste a cookie, we note the presence and 
interplay of what were formally separate ingredients… We can only taste these ingredients 
together, in their mutually-constitutive interplay’, and also that, ‘You can’t, however, 
unbake a cookie’.172 By extension, concepts of nature and culture cannot exist in a pure 
state outside of other conceptual categories with which they are coincident in the world. 
(Judith Butler touches on this same issue when she discusses the politics of oppression; 
‘listing the varieties of oppression [that exist in society]… assumes their discrete, sequential 
coexistence along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergences within the social 
field’173.) This can be translated into aesthetic/musical terms: musicological debates that 
surround, as well as music that plays with, materials within the sphere designated “culture-
nature” always already slip into wider issues (and questions of power) that are entangled, 
bound-up, coincident, convergent, or “cooked” within these conceptions of culture and 
nature.174 
Playing with the nature and culture distinction – and Kancheli’s harpsichord has a 
crucial role in mediating this play – simultaneously draws on and helps to perform other 
categories of thought and feeling. My focus above on how objects are 
perceived/conceived in subjective experience implies that the structure of the nature-
culture conceptualisation may be interrelated with the conceptualisation of subjectivity 
itself. Put another way, if the object helps articulate subjectivity in some respect, the 
relation between this object and its mutually constitutive context may help articulate the 
                                                
170 MACCORMACK, CAROL & STRATHERN, MARILYN 1980: ‘Nature, Culture and Gender: a Critique’ in 
Nature, Culture and Gender (eds. Carol MacCormack & Marilyn Strathern), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1. Here, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s thought was being described as token of this kind of 
thinking. 
171 JAMES, ROBIN 2010: The Conjectural Body: Gender, Race, and the Philosophy of Music, New York: Lexington 
Books, 21, emphasis in original. See 19-22 for a discussion of ‘“cooked” coincidence’.  
172 JAMES 2010: 21 
173 BUTLER, JUDITH 2007: Gender Trouble, London: Routledge, 19, my emphasis 
174 As Elizabeth Tolbert has pointed out, binaries such as nature and culture, and many others related to it, 
were crystallised in an Enlightenment movement attempting to locate “man”; e.g. as defined apart from 
nature, non-Western ‘Others’, femininity, and so on (see TOLBERT, ELIZABETH 2002: ‘Untying the 
Music/Language Knot’ in Music, Sensation, and Sensuality (ed. Linda Phyllis Austern), London: Routledge, 
especially 79). 
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relation between subjectivity and some mutually constitutive Other (without reproducing 
this structure homologically). Specifically, the nature-culture divide may help to externalise and 
affirm some perceived or imagined divide “interior” to subjectivity – principally, the split between, 
firstly, the timeless and primal nature of the Unconscious and, secondly, the activity of 
consciousness.175 Hence, the phenomenology of the object performs not only conceptual 
relations between nature and culture, but can also be seen to impact inherently upon 
relationships to and within conceptions of subjectivity. In addition, this may draw on 
philosophical-historical legacies – the existence of past ways of doing so as traces, both 
conceptual and material, in the present – as does a harpsichord material connoting 
particular historical and philosophical resonances.  
As primarily “cultural”, sound-objects may help articulate a notion of active agency 
over and above the passivity of a natural(ised) backdrop that recedes out of view. The 
“found object” – a conceptual mainstay of philosophical aesthetics – is an extreme case in 
point, as is quotation in general. This is something David Metzer underlines in his 
Quotation and Cultural Meaning in Twentieth-Century Music, in concluding that ‘over the course 
of the century, the modes and scope of quotation may have changed but one thing 
remained the same: its role as a cultural agent.’176 The harpsichord material – practicing 
cultural agency – is, in the most part, set apart from the drones, pseudo-tonal passages, 
and expansive and gigantic tuttis that make up much of the rest of the movement. This 
object, heard as inscribed with a legacy of subjectivity, contrasts with and enters into this 
larger world. In purely discursive (structural) terms, the harpsichord material is constituted 
as a musical object through affirming its difference from other materials. However, this 
engages with inherited philosophical-historical legacies: it is privileged as such as it is 
something graspable and of the human world, unlike the pseudo-tonal harmonies and 
static drones that suggest permeable boundaries and a character of natural timelessness, 
which themselves drift in and out of perceptibility, or the tutti material connotative of an 
unknowable monumentality going beyond the graspable.177 This object is a cultural agent 
                                                
175 Conceived in psychoanalytic (post-Freudian) terms this could be conceived of as a “projection” of some 
aspect of the mental structure outwards into the world. However, my point is that this conceptualisation 
of mental structuring does not exist “prior to” its externalisation. This conceptualisation is ‘a doing’ that 
might not be said to ‘preexist the deed’, constituted performatively (to borrow a phrase from Judith 
Butler). The concept of nature, like culture, helps articulate subjective concerns, especially in social 
products in which such knowledge is both produced and reconfirmed. 
176 METZER 2003: 217, my emphasis. Of course, quotation and found objects are also used in ways hidden 
from view – for example, in determining the backdrop structure of music works – but this is not my focus 
here as such occasions do not give rise to immediately perceivable phenomenological objects of focus as I 
discuss them. 
177 The latter group of materials suggests a monumentality of the type explored by Alexander Rehding 
(2009) in his Music and Monumentality. 
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of individuality, intimacy, and, as I explore below, nostalgia, set within, and on the 
background of, a larger sonic world. 
A stimulating comparison can be made between Kancheli’s study of singular 
objects with music that overwhelms the listener through its sheer plurality of materials as 
heard in Alfred Schnittke’s Symphony No. 3 (1981). In the second movement in particular 
– a movement that Gavin Dixon has interpreted in terms of a Bakhtinian carnival178 – it is 
notable that a clear stating of material allusive of a musical subject(ivity) is enunciated, as 
in Kancheli’s Symphony, by a solo keyboardist, this time a pianist. The theme, which is 
outlined at the opening of the movement in the violins, is prototypically Mozartian.179 Its 
soloistic statement appears at the very end of the movement where, in a nature-culture 
positioning comparable to Kancheli’s, it status as markedly cultural object is foregrounded 
above a background of inarticulate “naturalistic” material in the strings.180 
The activity of subjectivity is set within a larger frame, “hidden” in that it provides 
the naturalised staging of the discourse. Adorno’s concept of “second nature” is highly 
relevant here as, taking it further, it may be suggested that objects of discourse relate to 
(though they are themselves differentiated from) the naturalised “objective” backdrop of 
reality as it “simply is”, considered (or imagined) “outside of” mediation. This critically 
reflects a still-active trope in post-Enlightenment thought, the protonarrative of man (or 
society) appearing from and through, though differentiating himself over, nature. 
MacCormack & Strathern outline what could be called the “common sense” European 
attitude as follows: ‘Our European ideas about nature and culture are fundamentally about 
our origins and evolution. The “natural” is that which is innate in our primate heritage and 
the “cultural” is that which is arbitrary and artificial.’ 181  Julian Johnson summarises 
Adorno’s second nature as follows, citing the naturalisation of the tonal idiom in Western 
music’s history as an exceptional example: 
 
‘“Second nature” is, quite simply, a socially constructed image of reality 
passed off as if it were natural and timeless rather than cultural and 
thoroughly historical. Music presents a powerful example of this process 
because in most cases it is not the object of critical thought. The degree to 
which the language of tonal music is internalised as “natural” is swiftly 
                                                
178 DIXON, GAVIN THOMAS 2007: Polystylism as Dialogue: A Bakhtinian Interpretation of Schnittke’s Symphonies 
3, 4, and His Concerto Grosso No.4/Symphony No.5, PhD diss., Goldsmiths College, University of London 
179 Whilst this is not a quotation from Mozart’s music, Dixon (2007: 94) cites Kirsten Peterson’s 
illustration of the close similarities between this theme and the first subject of Mozart’s A Major Piano 
Concerto K. 414. 
180 Dixon reads this as a carnivalesque celebration of ‘death and rebirth’ (DIXON 2007: 101) 
181 MACCORMACK & STRATHERN 1980: 6 
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demonstrated by considering the popular response to atonal music: common 
epithets are “chaotic”, “irrational”, and “unnatural” or “inhuman”.182 
 
‘The second nature of the tonal system is an illusion originating in history’, Adorno argues 
in his Philosophy of New Music, underlining the historically contingent aspect of tonality as a 
supposedly natural phenomenon.183 
Tonality as a “natural” gravitational centre or background, as illustrated in the 
chapter on Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5, still provides a point of semantic and 
philosophical meaning for some composers in the late twentieth century. In Kancheli’s 
symphony this legacy is again drawn upon. Expressive pseudo-tonal textures, static 
“timeless” drones, and resonances connotative of a quiet transcendence, help provide the 
frame, in which a cultural, tangible, worldly object – the harpsichord material – is set.184 
Their quiet, subtle entries bring them in and out of focus, as if always present, yet not 
always audible, failing to articulate their own clear discursive boundaries as if emerging 
from some other “pre-discursive” sphere. 
In a passage from figs. 14 to 21, Kancheli reminds us how easily the cultural might 
collapse back into the natural. After an intensely violent passage exploring the tutti 
material outlined at the opening (see Ex. 11), we hear an almost regressive withdrawal into 
material connotative of naturalistic purity (I discuss this concept of purity, and its link with 
innocence and nostalgia, below). At fig. 14, at this moment towards the middle of the 
work, instead of an increase in dramatic and developmental tension, tension is suspended 
to the point that discursive identities begin to dissolve into one another. We are returned 
to the space of a timeless, eternal continuum. The pseudo-tonal material, and the 
harpsichord’s material, cross over and mix into one another. The harpsichord material is 
fragmented, whilst the “smudged” pseudo-tonal harmonies make an appearance, with 
both being shared across the sparse orchestral texture. Neither is affirmed as a point of 
focus. The subject’s articulate, discursive, cultural object is dissolved into a timeless (“pre-
discursive”) world of the natural. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
182 JOHNSON 1999: 229 
183 ADORNO, THEODOR 2006 [orig. 1949]: Philosophy of New Music (trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor), 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 13 
184 Of course, the harpsichord material is tonal and “unproblematic” in itself, and thus, in this dimension, 
also employs a naturalised, unproblematised notion of subjectivity. This naturalisation of a particular 
image of “the cultural” helps to firm-up an idea of “nature” too, to which it stands in opposition. 
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Ex. 13, Kancheli: Symphony No. 5, mixing of discursive identities, three bars after fig. 14 
 
© G. Schirmer Inc. 1982 
 
This not only functions to position an object (the harpsichord material) in a larger, 
“natural” world in which it is set, but also helps to articulate dimensions supposedly 
interior to subjectivity, performing this musically.185 I will illustrate here that in facing 
legacies of a world “exterior” to the subject – of nature and culture – as sedimented into 
musical material, Kancheli also evokes aspects of a world “interior” to subjectivity. The 
timelessness of the Unconscious – which is “not ordered temporally” as Freud put it186 – 
here coincides with articulation of the “natural” material. Indeed, the Unconscious’s 
unmediated state, “prior to” conscious articulation, coincides with the imagined, 
unmediated quality of nature – the animal prior to the human, the natural to the cultural.187 
Both the Unconscious and Nature are unknowable wholes that cannot be grasped directly 
or entirely. It is pertinent to mention here that the Unconscious is not a concept without 
                                                
185 This follows on from my argument in the ‘Interlude’ section that the dialectic of text and context, 
object and “objective” conditions, always encompasses a third term, broadly regarded as subjective 
processes or an experiencing subject. 
186 Freud cited in SANDLER, JOSEPH et al. (DARE, CHRISTOPHER & DREHER, ANNA URSULU, & HOLDER, 
ALEX) 2005: Freud’s Models of the Mind: an Introduction, London: H. Karnac (Books) Ltd., 80 
187 As part of this apparent immediacy, the Unconscious appeals to a notion of ‘Psychic reality’, in which 
‘abstract symbols are not recognized as abstract but are treated as if they represented concrete reality’, 
SANDLER (et al.) 2005: 80. The natural is conceived of as what is “really” real, speaking free from 
mediation and abstraction. 
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its own intellectual history. Regarding the Freudian Unconscious, it can be noted that 
Freud’s admiration of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is well documented (for instance, the 
influence of Schopenhauer’s Will on Freud’s id).188 It is therefore unsurprising that theories 
of the mind cannot be taken apart from theories of the world, and that philosophies of 
both may find expressions of aesthetic coincidence in music (and the arts more widely), 
domains in which mind, world, and the relationship between the two are explored and 
articulated. 
As alluded to already, the object as phenomenologically focal is object as vocal – 
able to foreground and enunciate cultural and subjective agency and visibility (audibility) 
over and through a naturalised staging that may itself pull in and out of focus. This is 
entangled with one final set of conceptual distinctions important to our discussion: nature 
and culture – and the object’s place in this framework – as this relates to language and its 
“pre-discursive” other. Specifically, this regards subjectivity, and its object of perception, 
as comprehended through a dominant cultural context of logocentrism – that is, the 
centrality of the language, enunciation, and articulation in identifying and making sense of 
experience. Following feminist and poststructuralist critiques of language, it is argued that 
a subjectivity articulated linguistically is a particular conception of subjectivity serving 
particular unspoken ends: language is aligned with mind and culture, constituting through 
mutual relation, and positing an inherent dominance over, these things’ Others (i.e., the 
body, and nature).189 As Butler puts it, 
 
In the philosophical tradition that begins with Plato and continues through 
Descartes, Husserl, and Sartre, the ontological distinction between the soul 
(consciousness, mind) and the body invariably supports relations of political 
and psychic subordination and hierarchy.190 
 
Elizabeth Tolbert cites a range of logocentric discourses in which language is privileged 
over (a feminised) music – where music is positioned as ‘the subordinate term in 
oppositions such as culture/nature, human/animal, mind/body, or reason/emotion’191 – 
for example, in the work of Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Lacanian perspectives in 
which music is relegated to a (pre-Oedipal) somatic realm, one undifferentiated before its 
                                                
188 See GUPTA, R.K. 1975: ‘Freud and Schopenhauer’ in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, No. 4 (pp. 
721-728) 
189 As Tolbert puts it: ‘Logocentric concepts of music… uphold the hegemony of language, at least in 
part, by maintaining the hegemony of musics that disavow their emotional and sensual qualities.’ 
(TOLBERT 2002: 78)  
190 BUTLER 2007: 17 As Butler underlines, the mind-body distinction serves to articulate a coincident 
dominance of a “universal” masculinity over a gendered femininity. 
191 TOLBERT 2002: 77 
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entrance into ‘The Symbolic’.192 Importantly, this same structure of privileging exists 
within musical perception (rather than just of music per se); the pseudo-linguistic within 
music is often privileged over those characteristics designated as “pre-discursive” or “pre-
linguistic”, in terms of what constitutes the articulation of agency, significance, and 
meaning.193 
The nature-culture distinction also naturalises – posits as universal (yet hidden) – a 
certain type of subjectivity, a “mindful”, active, conscious, speaking (linguistic) subject 
performed and comprehended musically. 194 Indeed, the very act of dividing the world into 
subjective and objective elements itself draws on particular philosophical and ideological 
ideas. This not to say that this distinction has “no basis in reality”, just that reality cannot 
be said to exist independently of experience mediated through these terms. This is 
important for our discussion of objects and experience as it suggests that experience 
through objects – in their discursive (cultural, linguistic, etc.) dimension – is not 
phenomenologically given but is itself contingent on various interrelated philosophical-
historical legacies. These are legacies which cannot be removed from this apparently 
simple act of perception, but which may be brought into dialectic, play, and modified in 
experiences of “critical” musics. This is something that I will now explore by turning 
toward specific passages from Kancheli’s symphony. 
Proximity 
One dimension of the double act of experiencing objects/experiencing through 
objects is that subjectivity, to varying degrees, is drawn into proximity with its object of 
perception or articulated as apart, or distant, from it (for example, through evocations of 
longing). This is a dialectical question of subject and object as they mediate one another. 
To confront this issue is to ask how “internal” subjective processes and “external” 
processes of the “objective” world (for instance, those of the nature-culture distinction) 
coincide in Kancheli’s symphony, and how these speak to, and draw on, legacies of 
subjectivity and its relation to the world. To say that object and subject are in proximity is 
                                                
192 TOLBERT 2002: 77. John Shepherd and Peter Wicke summarise this: ‘In its nascent state music can… 
stand for the “nothingness and being” taken by poststructuralists to be characteristic of the subject before 
entry into language’ (SHEPHERD, JOHN & WICKE, PETER 1997: Music and Cultural Theory, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 21). It should be noted that, in Part II, I critically assess the potential of poststructuralist 
thinking in going beyond this problematic conception of music, as a means to understand the problematic 
discourses of late 20th- and early 21th-century art musics. 
193 Further examples of the designation of the “pre-linguistic” and (pseudo-)“linguistic”, physicality and 
abstraction, within music are provided by Karen Painter, who focuses on the role of timbre in this 
determination, and the ultimate attribution of value to timbre on these bases. See PAINTER, KAREN 1995: 
‘The Sensuality of Timbre: Responses to Mahler and Modernity at the “Fin de Siècle”’ in Nineteenth-
Century Music, Vol. 18, No. 3 (pp. 236-256). 
194 This is what Derrida and others after him have termed “phallogocentrism”. 
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not to say that they are identical or interchangeable. It is rather to posit the object as 
merely provisional in articulating (always incompletely) processes of/for the subject, and 
as a meeting point between the interiority of subjectivity and the exteriority of the world. 
Proximity can also be distinguished from synthesis, in which subject and object sublate 
into something higher through their Others. To this end, I will now focus on how 
proximity and distance play out in Kancheli’s symphony, and their entanglement with 
questions of subjectivity as this itself is located through the musically immanent dialectics 
of culture and nature (and other coincident ideas, as explored above).   
My discussion of a proximity, a closeness, and an identification of subjectivity with its object is 
borne of a well-established idea, at least at the level of the musical work as a whole – that 
subjectivity identifies itself with aspects of the musical work in its status as an object. This 
comes to the fore, historically, in the autonomous work that performs (self-coherence and 
self-determination) as a surrogate of/for the subject. The (post-)Enlightenment subject 
was developed through a manoeuvre of identification with its musical object, something 
Susan McClary has articulated with regard to the Classical sonata: 
 
Over the course of a [Sonata] movement, we witness – as in the 
contemporaneous Bildungsroman – the narrative formation of an autonomous 
musical self as it ventures into other terrains, strengthens its innate resources 
through motivic development, and finally consolidates the secure identity that 
confirms the viability of the centered subject.195 
 
The external object (the work) could be experienced as a model for an ideal, internalised 
autonomy. Others have explored this idea too. Notably Scott Burnham writes of this 
phenomenon in Beethoven’s “Heroic” music196. Kevin Korsyn, borrowing terms from 
Terry Eagleton, notes that music may act via a “cryptosubjectivity”, insofar as the aesthetic 
of unity in musical works ‘become[s] a “surrogate discourse” in which our hopes for the 
autonomy and freedom of the individual [are] surreptitiously transferred to the aesthetic 
object.’197 ‘Modern musical subjectivity’, Lawrence Kramer writes, ‘arises in a process of 
address and reply in which music acts as the ideal or authoritative subject in whose place I 
                                                
195 MCCLARY, SUSAN 2000: Conventional Wisdom: The Content of Musical Form, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 102 
196 BURNHAM 1995: 66 
197 KORSYN, KEVIN 2001: ‘Beyond Privileged Contexts’ in Rethinking Music (ed. Nicholas Cook & Mark 
Everist), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 60 
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come to be, whose subjective character I reenact as my own.’198 What these writers all have 
in common, and what I draw from them musicologically, is that they establish ways of 
speaking about music that transverse a clear subject/object divide. The object, the musical 
work, may act for the subject. Again, this is not to say that they are identical or without 
boundaries, just to say that their boundaries are semipermeable. (The inheritance of 
notions of subjectivity and selfhood are of primary focus in Part II.) 
Holding the object close – identifying with aspects of it – enables, for the subject, 
a living of those ephemeral values that the object embodies. Objects – be these musical 
works and/or, as I have advocated, inscribed elements of their discourses – make material 
the immaterial. A close proximity between the subject and its object allows the subject to 
live objective values through these values’ vehicle of comportment. Autonomy, Sensibility, 
and Freedom (to give just a few examples) become lived through music. It is in Kancheli’s 
harpsichord-material-as-object’s dual character, as both markedly of the past yet still 
present, that this idea is critically engaged with in his Symphony No. 5. 
Before examining how this plays out in Kancheli’s symphony in particular, it is 
fruitful to formulate a general framework by which closeness between subject and object 
might be understood. The psychoanalytic concept of identification is useful here. This 
concept entails that the subject identifies not only with the object, but also with aspects 
perceived to be of it, and with the relationships found within it and in which it is 
embedded. 199  As noted above, music has the power to traverse clear subject-object 
relations in its moment of experience – a dimension that can readily be related to 
identification, with identification operating across these boundaries also. Identification is a 
process which Elin Diamond has characterised as a ‘pure act – an unconscious doing that 
only afterwards can be described  and understood’.200 Whilst mediated, and later capable of 
being rationalised, its operation moment-to-moment relies on a perceived immediacy of 
relation between subject and object. Furthermore, I suggested above that objects’ 
constitution through discourse articulated both aspects of a world “exterior” to the subject 
(principally, relationships between culture and nature) as well as relationships between 
(unconscious and conscious) elements that designated as “interior” to the subject. The 
                                                
198 The essay ‘Subjectivity’ in KRAMER 2011: 48. Portions of this chapter were published in an earlier 
form (2002) as ‘Subjectivity Rampant! Music, Hermeneutics, and History’ in The Cultural Study of Music 
(eds. Martin Clayton, Trevor Herbert, and Richard Middleton), New York: Routledge 
199 I take my formulation of identification in the most part from Freud and from Joseph Sandler’s 
commentaries on Freud and post-Freudian thinking – in particular from Sandler (et al.) 2005 and Sandler, 
Joseph & Perlow, Meir 1987: ‘Internalization and Externalization’ in Projection, Identification, Projective 
Identification (ed. Joseph Sandler), Madison: International Universities Press, Madison: International 
Universities Press. Of course, it should be said that I am not orthodoxly applying this formulation. 
200 DIAMOND 1993: 86 
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concept of identification, which centres on this very point of crossover between “exterior” 
and “interior” worlds, is valuable in framing complicities and interrelationships between 
object and subject. 
My aim here is to couch this process in ideological and social(ising), rather than 
personal, terms. When I suggest that subjectivity finds itself in objects, and in their 
discursive constitution, I do not mean that single individuals choose objects in discourse 
to articulate their own psychological functions. This can be contrasted with, for example, 
Benedict Taylor’s psychoanalytic response to Samuel Barber’s Knoxville: Summer of 1915. 
Whilst Taylor does privilege cultural memory and cultural history over personal memory 
and personal history, he also suggests that, in engaging with Barber’s work (which deals 
with themes of childhood and loss), listeners may map ‘their own childhood, loss, or 
unfulfilled wishes onto the piece.’201 I do not want to dispute the validity of such a claim, 
but merely want to stress that my focus is different. It is not my aim here to psychoanalyse 
the audience, just as it is also not to read into composers’ authorial intentions 
“psychobiographically”.202 
Through identification, subjectivity – or, at least, explicitly “subjective” content as 
now objectified – is aligned with particular objects in the discourse.203 Following the 
psychoanalytic idea that the ego may enact a self-representation, subjectivity becomes 
represented as an object, a process that parallels the representation of objects in the mind 
(although this is not the only role subjectivity plays in experience). Joseph Sandler and 
Meir Perlow summarise this idea very effectively. They write that in such contexts, ‘“self” 
is analogous to “object,” and “self-representation” parallels the mental representation of 
the object.’ 204 In discursive terms, the subject is given, in this reified dimension at least, a 
visibility in the discourse, and a viability in undergoing processes undergone by its object of 
identification.205 
In Kancheli’s Symphony, this identification of an image of subjectivity with its 
object appears explicitly in a passage leading up to fig. 7. Furthermore, the making visible 
of processes of subjective “interiority” expresses coincidence with philosophical-historical 
processes of the “exterior” world; specifically, the identificatory act of making proximate 
                                                
201 TAYLOR 2008: 220 
202 I discuss the problems with “psychobiography” in greater depth in Part II. 
203 This is potentially at its clearest when there are specific protagonists, as for example in opera, that are 
aligned with specific musical materials. This has been explored by Richard Rusbridger, a musician and 
psychoanalyst, in, for example, his paper on ‘Projective Identification in Othello and Verdi’s Otello’ 
(delivered on 30 March 2012 at the Tavistock Centre as part of a lecture series on ‘Meaning and 
Mindedness: Encounters Between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’). However, my concern here is 
instrumental music – music without explicit protagonists.  
204 SANDLER & PERLOW 1987: 1 
205 For an overview of the development of this concept in Freud’s writing, see DIAMOND 1993 
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subject and its object finds expression in a movement from tropes of nature to those of 
culture.  
A primary, “natural” state is evoked through the repeated resurfacing of the 
pseudo-tonal material that, as noted above, connotes timelessness, transcendence, and 
unmediated expression (as shown in Ex. 14). The tonal idiom, as a paradigm of the 
naturalisation of a certain mode of expression, as an example of Adorno’s “second nature” 
in action, implies the ‘apparently unmediated presence’206 of expression within this aspect 
of the musical discourse in particular. As well as employing a pseudo-tonal framework, 
“the natural” is also alluded to – as a presence “prior to” culture, language, and order – 
through stasis, drones, and in an appeal to a “pre-linguistic” realm. The lack of any clearly 
articulated musical syntax emphasises this “pre-linguistic” status; entries overlap and 
pitches are held onto over the boundaries of chordal identities. 
 
Ex. 14, Kancheli: Symphony No. 5, three bars before fig. 5 
 
G. Schirmer Inc. 1982 
                                                
206 To borrow a phrase from ECHARD 2006b: 81  
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Notably, this ideological-philosophical proto-narrative (the move from nature to 
culture) is echoed in terms of the development of identification: in a move from primary to 
secondary modes of identification. In the music, this move from nature to culture is echoed 
in the move from one kind of identification to the next. The music constitutes, and is 
constituted by, both a world and subjectivity, with which it is entangled. Sandler and 
Perlow write that primary identification, in representational terms, 
 
could be said to relate to the state which exists before a firm boundary 
between self and object (or self- and object representations) has been 
established… In relation to pathology, the state of primary identification has 
been described as a regressive one in which “de-differentiation” of self and 
object occurs and so-called “ego boundaries” (“self-boundaries”) have been 
lost or put out of action.207 
The directness of expression of the “natural” material, as well as the fact that it plunges 
the subject into a soundworld where distinct identities are dissolved, means that a subject-
object distinction is not articulated. This dissolving of these boundaries – that expression 
is located in a raw, natural world of immediacy, of “pre-linguistic” continuity – is resonant 
with a primary mode of identification.  This perception of immediate expression is made 
possible, and, at the same time, performs the distinction of, this aspect of musical 
experience as “prior to” or “outside of” its cultural, linguistic, mediated, and explicitly 
“historical” dimensions. 
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Ex. 15, Kancheli: Symphony No. 5, reintroduction of harpsichord melody (at fig. 6) 
 
© G. Schirmer Inc. 1982 
 
Once this natural “ground” has been set by the pseudo-tonal materials, fragments 
of the harpsichord material begin to re-enter (Ex. 15). Subjective expression moves from 
an identification with the natural, something “prior to” the articulation of subjectivity as 
explicitly objectified (as in the harpsichord material), to being located in a distinct object. 
This latter move towards a cultural, objectified image of the subject is aligned with a move 
to a different kind of identification, secondary identification. 
Sandler and Perlow write that secondary identification  
 
is probably the most common meaning of the term identification. During this 
process the representational boundary between self and object is not lost [as 
in primary identification], but the subject embodies in the self-representation 
attributes of the object, real or fantasised.208 
 
Secondary identification can be observed with the reintroduction of a distinct object 
through which subjectivity is articulated and aspects of it represented. In this sense, at the 
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same time as proximity, the object here is defined by some degree of Otherness, “not-
Selfness”. (I explore concepts of Self and Other – and the musical philosophical-historical 
legacies thereof – in Part II.) This object is something tangible, something “cultural” – the 
harpsichord material – and one which articulates its own boundaries and thus also those of 
a subject identifying with it. Here the subject is spoken and made visible (is focal/vocal), 
unlike the dissolution of boundaries as in the “natural” directness of the earlier pseudo-
tonal material. Subjectivity is at this point, through proximity to an object of focus, given a 
hard edge, a boundary. 209  This is an entry of subjectivity prepared for by material 
connotative of nature, which preceded it.  
The articulation of dimensions interior and exterior to subjectivity – through acts 
of identification that transgress clear boundaries of subject and object in proximity with 
one another – constitute and are constituted by coincident concepts; in particular, those of 
the relations between nature and culture as these echo aspects perceived to be “within” 
subjectivity itself. Elements of musical works, and constructions of subjectivities therein, 
may be identified with in ways that go beyond the individual – for example, slipping into 
more “social” phenomena like idealised constructions of the post-Enlightenment mind, of 
masculinity and femininity, culture and nature, and so on.210  Put another way, these 
cultural constructions – as performed and conceived musically, a phenomenon of the 
“exterior” world – help articulate and organise a world of subjective interiority. 
Distance  
I have argued so far that the nature-culture dialectic, taken immanently within 
musical material as an inscribed philosophical-musical legacy, constitutes, and is 
constituted by, coincident dialectics of subjectivity. That is, “interior” dimensions of 
subjectivity are shaped by, and find expression in, the characteristics of an “exterior” 
musical world. However, something more supplements this relationship. In addition to the 
proximity of subjectivity and the object of/through which it perceives, the interrelated 
legacies of distance and nostalgia can be observed. Whilst an object of perception may be 
seen as a vehicle of/for subjectivity, it may simultaneously be experienced as deriving from 
a distant past to which return is impossible. Indeed, both the harpsichord and the 
“naturalistic” pseudo-tonal materials, whilst immediately expressive (and identifiable with, 
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in their different ways), allude to bygone, naturalised expressions that reach beyond the 
knowable present to “a past” that is ungraspable – mythic, even – a timeless past of 
nostalgia. Nostalgia, I argue, functions through the very complication of near and far; a 
nostalgic object is something that may be identified with yet also admired as a trace of a 
distant past to which return is impossible.211 
This notion of distance sits in constellation with many “distances”. Robert Hatten 
points out that critical distance is an established aesthetic trope: ‘critical distance… [a] critical 
reflection by the listener (or composer) on the artwork.’212 Connected with this, Brechtian 
theatre explored “distanciation”, an “alienation effect”, “Verfremdungseffekt”, whereby 
‘the actor of the character prevented the complete transformation of an actor into the role, 
creating instead a portrayal that included both emotional empathy and analytical 
distance.’213 In addition, Freud recognised that painful memories are repeated at a distance; 
actions in the present often repeat, in disguised and distanced forms, repressed memories 
of the past.214 
Whilst these distances may play a role here, in Kancheli’s symphony distance and 
nostalgia can be seen to have roots in Romantic aesthetics in particular. As Berthold 
Hoeckner has shown, distance was an important trope in Romantic music making.215 He 
explicates this with particular reference to the writings of Novalis and Jean Paul. Hoeckner 
summarises three examples of distance given by Novalis, for whom distance was central to 
the Romantic perspective: ‘spatial distance in landscape, temporal distance in recollection 
of the past, and personal distance in separation from the distant beloved.’216 For Novalis, 
distance was fundamental to the Romantic perspective itself; “in the distance everything 
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becomes… romantic”, he wrote.217 For Jean Paul, it is was fading into the distance – a 
return to distant silence and inner sounding – that was Romantic:  
 
The Romantic is beauty without limit, or beautiful infinity, just as there is a 
sublime infinity… It is more than an analogy to call the Romantic the 
undulating hum of a vibrating string or bell, whose sound waves fade away 
into ever greater distances and finally are lost in ourselves, and which, 
although outwardly silent, still sound within. In the same way moonlight is 
both image and instance of the Romantic.218 
 
Whilst Hoeckner discusses Romantic distance and Schumann’s music, distance seems to 
be a trope that still holds currency for the later Romantics. For Wagner, the power of 
myth was both a universal and stemmed from the temporal distance of mythic origins.219 
In a symphonic context, Mahler’s Sixth Symphony fades into the distance (before the final 
strike), recalling Jean Paul’s struck bell and, in the first Nachtmusick of the Seventh 
Symphony, Novalis’s spatial distance – horns call across the mountains, and distant 
cowbells can be heard.  
These features indicate that evocations of distance may be mediated within music. 
Distant ideas of silence, transcendence, and mythic natural origins still figure in more 
recent music, like Kancheli’s. This is something recognised by Chiara Bertoglio in her 
discussion of another of Kancheli’s works, his song cycle Exil (1994), in which he makes 
use of a distant, ‘almost mythical past’, meditating on textual material that is a 
‘contemplation from afar of a now impossible faith’, something lost to a previous epoch.220 
Schnittke’s Symphony No. 3 again provides a notable point of comparison 
regarding Kancheli’s engaging with aesthetic legacies. Kancheli’s treatment of distance can 
be contrasted with that in Schnittke’s symphony, a symphony that explicitly explores the 
traditions, history, and inherited legacies of Austro-German symphonic writing.221 The 
opening material of the symphony, which expands outwards an upward motif based on 
the overtone series, is a clear evocation of “the natural”. (Taruskin famously described this 
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opening as ‘like Wagner’s Rheingold prelude cubed and cubed again’222.) The evocation of a 
natural timelessness, and the (Austro-German musical223) world’s emergence therefrom, 
draws on established tropes by which images of distant origins are constructed musically. 
However, Schnittke’s relationship to immanent legacies of distance in music is different 
from Kancheli’s. Not only does Schnittke draw on musical characterisations of distance 
and mythic origins but, at the same time, he does so self-consciously, distancing the 
musical language through which distance is constructed. Distance is “doubled”. In 
explicitly playing with aspects of Austro-German music making, Schnittke’s 
characterisation of distant origins – of a nature “prior to” culture – underlines the 
historicity of the alleged ahistoricality of such constructions of nature. The treatment of 
distance is different in Kancheli’s music. This is something that comes through in what 
Trigg cited above dubbed the ‘struggle of silence and violence’ inherent within Kancheli’s 
music. This struggle emphasises the irreconcilability of the pseudo-tonal, naturalistic 
material and the ferocious tutti outbursts. But it also asserts the contrast between the 
transcendent, mythic aspects of the former and the sheer violent presence of the latter. In 
this music of extremes, an unbridgeable distance appears between the two. 
I concur with Ivan Moody’s observation that whilst ‘the harpsichord returns 
periodically throughout the piece, and in fact is chosen to finish it, it is difficult to 
conclude that one kind of music here triumphs over another’224. However, this should be 
followed with supplementary questions: What does this mean for subjectivity, for which 
the drama of struggle and triumph have often been conceived as central to its affirmation, 
and for which the harpsichord material may be markedly identified with? In presentation 
through distant extremes, bearing little mark of temporally developing dialectic, 
subjectivity does not emerge through struggle, as prototypically stated symphonically in 
Beethoven’s Heroic works; reappearance or repetition characterises the entries of the 
harpsichord. Taking the place of subjective unfolding – the musical temporalising of 
entangled aspects of subjective experience (desire, the cultural, embodiment, and so on) – 
is a reified image of subjectivity, of a “time stopped”. 
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Complicating Proximity and Distance – Nostalgia 
This concept of “time stopped” moves the discussion from distance to nostalgia, 
making visible a point of connection between the two, forged Romantically. Indeed, in 
Svetlana Boym’s terms, Kancheli’s nostalgia is distinctly Romantic. She writes that the 
 
object of romantic nostalgia must be beyond the present space of experience, 
somewhere in the twilight of the past or on the island of utopia where time 
happily stopped, as on an antique clock.225 
 
The antique clock – time happily stopped – is a wonderful image of/for the nostalgic. 
Rather than finding its use across time, it is locked into one given, past time. Yet it also 
bears a trace of its previous function as marking time passing. The musical material played 
on Kancheli’s harpsichord, analogously, does not unfold across time; it is rather locked 
into a past time, and an anachronistic image of subjectivity. Despite this, it bears a trace of 
this previous being, its previous function, being inscribed with associations. Instead of the 
material instrumentally articulating the subject within temporal unfolding, we are referred 
to a past subjectivity inhabiting a time outside of temporal unfolding. The harpsichord no 
longer marks, measures, and colours subjective temporal experience, instead articulating a 
single, nostalgic image thereof. 
Distance – this time a reflective, critical distance – may operate in conjunction with 
this nostalgic act. 226  Without unfolding in time, objects like the antique clock and 
harpsichord bear traces of their previous functions without enacting these temporally. The 
inability to adapt to or adopt an ever-changing present distances them and affords new 
experiential relations with them. Trigg has gone so far as to suggest that the failure of 
previous instrumentalities/productive functions of things – as this critiques a singular, 
rational “progress” – forms the basis of a critical nostalgia, particularly in its contemporary, 
post-industrial form. For him, a rusting factory that no longer produces objects materially 
may become a space of recollection, nostalgia, and contestation of the myth of rational 
“progress”. 227 I suggest that a harpsichord that no longer unproblematically produces the 
subject symbolically may likewise do the same. In the act of distant repetition – in the 
                                                
225 BOYM 2001: 13 
226 Boym’s conception of nostalgia is highly valuable in making an explicit distinction between what she 
calls restorative nostalgia – which aims for return (e.g. to an earlier Golden Age, or some nationalist or 
ethnic origin, etc.) – and reflective nostalgia that ‘cherishes shattered fragments of memory’. As she puts it, 
‘[the latter] reveals that longing and critical thinking are not opposed to one another, as affective 
memories do not absolve one from compassion, judgement, or critical reflection’ (BOYM 2001: 49). 
227 TRIGG 2006: 218-221, 212, and 132 
94 
abnegation of a (Heroic) dialectical becoming – it becomes a nostalgic object of critical 
reflection. 
Nostalgia is not identical to repetition, however, having been better described as 
drawing on “repetition that mourns the inauthenticity of all repetition.”228 The object of 
nostalgia – the harpsichord, the clock, their particular temporalities of experience and the 
lost worlds for which they stand in-part – cannot be truly uncovered or reacquired as they 
had been known. Given distance, ‘the object of desire is not only out of reach but also 
vague’.229 This elusive haziness positions the nostalgic object as a potential nodal point by 
which slippage between many related – that is, “cooked” or coincident – lost ideals might 
occur. Key tropes of nostalgia – examples include the ‘notion of a Golden Age and a 
subsequent Fall, the story of the Homecoming, and the Pastoral’230 – may find coextensive 
expressions musically. Immanent musical characterisations of the natural (and the pastoral), 
for example, may be seen to be instrumental in helping to construct nostalgia for distant, 
mythic origins, or some past situation inhabited by a (no-longer innocent) subject. 
Turning away from Kancheli’s music for a moment, an exceptional example of 
such coincidences is provided in another symphony, that of the Russian-Tatar composer 
Sofia Gubaidulina. In her Symphony in 12 movements, Stimmen... Verstummen... (1986) an 
untroubled D-major chord returns many times. Not only does its re-emergence suggest its 
“pure” existence beyond the other active, dramatic materials of the symphony (which tend 
towards the dissonant), in its stasis it also connotes a state of mythic timelessness.231 
Furthermore, as tonal touchstone it functions as a naturalised, naturalistic background on 
which human activity takes place, as well as a place of refuge to which the troubled may 
return.232 
Returning to Kancheli’s music, we see that fragments of that by which subjectivity 
found a markedly “cultural” articulation (i.e. the harpsichord material) may facilitate critical 
reflection on/through these materials as a nostalgic cultural object. Musically immanent 
characterisations of culture, nature, and their relationship to one another, may help define 
the subject, its world, and the terms of its nostalgic longing. Furthermore, as traces of a 
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former world always on the edge of audibility/visibility, these nostalgic materials become 
potential loci for coincident and simultaneously imagined values, investments, and a purity 
of ideals held to exist “beyond” immediate perceptibility or representation. 
Common to this nostalgic “beyond” is the trope of a purity or innocence now lost. 
The childlike simplicity of the harpsichord material attests to this purity, contrasting 
strongly with the violent impositions, the corruptive forces, that cut it short. Indeed, the 
themes of loss and innocence appear to be recurring motifs in Kancheli’s compositional 
output. Consider, for example, his Sweet Sadness, for boys’ choir, two boy soloists, and 
orchestra (1985), a work in which Kancheli intended for the “voices of children to remind 
us of the voices of angels we have never heard.” 233 Here the association of innocence and 
childhood stem directly from this work’s dedication – “The piece is dedicated to the 
memory of children killed in World War II.”234 Furthermore, as David Metzer has pointed 
out (in focusing on some of the works of Charles Ives), conceptions of nostalgia and 
extinct innocence intermingle with themes of distance; ‘Children almost always populate 
the distant past, not the near present’.235 
I suggest that, as with Sweet Sadness, the nostalgia of the harpsichord melody in the 
Symphony No. 5 is also tied in with its dedication, this time to the memory of Kancheli’s 
parents. Whilst I am not advocating that the work should be read purely in terms of 
biography – read in terms of Kancheli’s personal history and childhood experiences – this 
dedication opens the work up to interpretations friendly to the culturally established tropes 
of childlike innocence, and might supplement our more wide-reaching philosophical-
historical perspective. As is often the case with nostalgia, here the personal and the cultural 
intermingle. Benedict Taylor has written of this in the context of Samuel Barber’s music, 
noting that Barber’s Knoxville: the Summer of 1915 ‘is both personal and national, at once a 
private memorial to Barber’s own childhood and a collective monument to the age it 
attempts to preserve.’236 The harpsichord can similarly be heard doubly as a nostalgic 
expression of childlike innocence and also, in its historicity, as the image of philosophical-
historically bygone subjectivity. 
In Kancheli’s Fifth Symphony, we return repeatedly to this image of subjective 
purity – to this fixed image that fails to develop, become experientially reappraised, or 
follow new, processual directions. Nostalgia – which, as Trigg points out, ‘structurally 
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depends on an image of the past that is fixed in the present’237 – functions through a 
particular mode of drawing on the past by which to experience or make sense of the 
present. This fixity functions as a point of continuity, through which in returning one ‘may 
be able to replenish a sense of self’238. 
However, given that, as discussed above, repetition is not identical to nostalgia, 
this return is not a “sincere” return. Whilst particular musical material may bear traces of 
past subjectivities, their repetition does not guarantee a genuine reinhabiting of those 
subjective spaces; whilst the return to a childhood house may remind us that nostalgia is, 
as Gaston Bachelard put it, “physically inscribed in us”239, a return to this space does not 
mean a return to and reliving of the habits and experiences that once were. Comparably to 
the Freudian “compulsion to repeat”,240 previous models of behaviour reoccur but, in so 
doing, fail to adapt to present needs and circumstances and to develop from what was. 
Importantly, there is no contradiction between the “proximity” explored above, and this 
nostalgic distance; one may still identify with images of the past, objects taken to be from 
the past, or with the ideal of a now-departed purity, even if these are distant. Indeed, 
comparing Kancheli’s symphony again with Schnittke’s Symphony No. 3, it should be 
noted that in Schnittke’s “doubling” of distance – in distancing the musical language by 
which distance is immanently constructed – Schnittke’s distance, unlike Kancheli’s, is not 
one of nostalgia. In contrast with Kancheli’s music, in Schnittke’s symphony distance and 
proximity are not entangled with one another. 
Ivan Moody, in passing, calls the repeated melody “neo-classical”.241 However, 
what this description misses is its nostalgic function. With reference only to its outward 
appearance, this characterisation smoothes over the experiential differences of this melody 
to other neo-classical musics. As in (for instance) Stravinsky’s Oedipus Rex, an image of a 
past subjectivity is frozen in the music. However, an important difference arises. Whilst 
the former used classical forms as the basis for balance and order – tropes of universals242 
– Kancheli’s is highly particularised; he marks the past out as a recollection that is always 
fragmentary and incomplete. ‘[I]nstead of aspiring for the universal and the progressive 
[the nostalgic] looks backward and yearns for the particular’243; what is pursued is not so 
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much an inevitable return to the purity of the past, but a celebration of its loss – the very 
inability of return. 
This melody that opens the work – as an object of focus – is given identity 
through both its discursive, textual treatment (its repetition, and contrast with other 
materials) and with reference to philosophical-historical, contextual legacies. Indeed, as I 
have argued, its status as an object of experience inherently brings into play legacies of 
philosophy and history, legacies that coalesce in constellation around it. These are 
themselves entangled with an inherited dialectics of culture and nature. 
Furthermore, as a moment articulating identity, it may become also a moment of 
subjective identification. This process has been shown to coincide with philosophical-
historical ideas. Specifically, the framed articulation of a proximate subject-object, as 
appearing from and through a “pre-discursive” framework, coincides with “the cultural” 
emerging from “the natural”. Characterisations of nature, taken immanently into musical 
material, express the concerns of subjectivity, not only of the subject’s place in and against 
nature (or a world) exterior to it, but also of the Unconscious and “unmediated” aspects 
interior to the subject itself.  
In addition to the role of proximity, the harpsichord melody suggests a quality of 
distance; its repetition makes this more so, and so do its continued efforts to play out 
before being cut short. Time does not pass for it; temporality is neither marked nor shaped 
by it. This complication of proximity and distance constitutes the basis of a nostalgic 
musical experience. Here, past and present find relation in the image of a subject passed and 
in the persistent presence of its object. 
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II) Music in Mind, Mind in Music: 
the String Quartet 
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
The separation of society and psyche is false consciousness; it 
perpetuates conceptually the split between the living subject and the 
objectivity that governs the subjects and yet derives from them. 
 
– Theodor Adorno, ‘Sociology and Psychology’244 
 
Music, because it intersects with ideologies and experiences of race, 
class, gender, and sexuality, is a technology of the self – that is, it 
educates our desires, physiological and psychical.  
 
– Robin James, The Conjectural Body245 
 
Modern musical transcendentalism [starting with Beethoven] no longer 
dwarfs the human subject, standing somewhere outside and above it, 
like so many earlier Western transcendentalisms. Instead it is now 
lodged deep within the recesses of the psyche, there to lurk as an 
unreachable, uncanny, but always almost-broached form of knowledge. 
 
– Gary Tomlinson, ‘Finding Ground to Stand On’246  
 
Signifying systems alone allow us to deduce that the subject is a fixed 
point. 
 
– Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language247 
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INTRODUCING THE MUSICAL MIND 
 
The string quartet, as a genre and institution, is often conceived of as a space for 
articulating the subjective. Many have identified it as a vehicle of intimacy, a markedly 
‘subjective’ trope. Take for instance three different contributors to the same recent essay 
collection: Robin Stowell writes that the quartet affords composers a vehicle for (among 
other things) ‘the most intimate compositional thought’248; Christina Bashford that, as a 
genre, ‘[in the 20th century] the quartet retained its hold over composers as a repository of 
their most intimate thoughts and close working-out’249; and, Kenneth Gloag, ‘that many 
twentieth-century composers from many different cultural backgrounds and stylistic 
positions looked to the genre as a context suitable for their most intimate thoughts’.250 
Another essay collection, focusing specifically on twentieth-century quartets, is even 
entitled Intimate Voices.251 I do not contest that the quartet enables musical explorations of 
intimacy. Instead, I suggest that this characteristic reminds us that the quartet (still) allows 
for articulating markedly subjective concerns, and that this is an articulation of 
subjectivities based on, though not limited to, historically sedimented ways of doing so. 
The quartet genre, perhaps more readily than others, resonates with legacies of inherited, 
discoursed/discoursing subjects. 
The interrelated ideas of subject, self, and mind – conceptual slippage often occurs 
between these terms – are generally positioned in contrast with objects, others, and bodies. 
Recent interest in the musical mind has blossomed in the cognitive and psychological 
sciences252. Valuable as scientific perspectives are, modernist critical music, as with critical 
art and the avant-garde more generally, in these arts’ “self-reflexive” dimension, disturb 
the established categories by which they themselves are experienced and/or contemplated, 
ideas of mind and body as these have been sedimented into musical language and practices. 
I will now briefly outline how the musical mind can be understood in semiotic terms, 
whilst noting what this means for the experience of late 20th- and early 21st-century critical 
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works – works that explore subjectivity, minds, and selves as historical and philosophical 
products, and which themselves are historically and philosophically productive. This “self-
reflexive” perspective – in which musical works both articulate subjectivity, and enable 
reflection on subjectivity – contrasts with a scientific conception of the musical mind. 
Semiotics of the Musical Mind 
Scholarly interest in the role of semiotic and linguistic processes in musical 
experience has burgeoned over the last twenty-five years or so253. This approach takes the 
mind’s conceptualisation of music as structured, in some dimension at least, through 
symbols and structures akin to (aspects of) those in found in spoken language. Probably 
one of the most influential books in this revolution was George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, in which the authors argued that metaphors play a deep 
role in the comprehension of the world – essentially that the human mind is wired via 
linguistic structures based around metaphor.254 As such, cognitive psychology, semiotics, 
and linguistics were drawn together. These metaphorical mappings were taken up in 
musical contexts in developments like Michael Spitzer’s Metaphor and Musical Thought255 and 
Lawrence Zbikowski’s Conceptualizing Music256. It was argued that, similar to other domains 
of human experience, musical experience is permeated by deep-seated metaphors and 
assumptions based in “extramusical” socio-historical circumstances – the point being that 
these dimensions are never purely “extramusical” in that they are built into our 
comprehension of the music. These were schemes that went beyond what was 
immediately presented on a semantic surface level of music, seeing the present as mediated 
by past collective habits. Habits such as “musical style”, for example, or certain 
conceptions of language as this related to embodiment, would provide inherited schemes 
by which experience of musical events was mediated – like UP IS MORE (“this sequence 
RISES in pitch and tension”). 
My effort here is not to negate the valuable insights suggested by cognitive-
psychological influenced musicological work but to augment them, doing so through 
accounting for the liminal elements that stand outside of representation and which make 
positive ‘mappings’ unstable (mappings such as: UP IS MORE, where RISE IN PITCH maps to 
INCREASE IN TENSION). Socio-historical circumstances are key in making possible musical 
                                                
253 See ECHARD, WILLIAM 1999 [online]: ‘Musical Semiotics in the 1990s: The state of the art’ [website: 
http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/semiotics/srb/musisem.html, accessed 15th November, 2012] 
254 LAKOFF, GEORGE & JOHNSON, MARK 1981: Metaphors We Live By, Chicago: Chicago University Press 
255 SPITZER, MICHAEL 2003: Metaphor and Musical Thought, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
256 ZBIKOWSKI, LAWRENCE 2002: Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis, New York: 
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experience, even if one is never reducible to the other; a present (experience) to its past 
(conditioning) or vice versa. It is this irreducibility that is my concern here, something that 
goes beyond affirming the ‘mapping’ of terms. The mapping of terms becomes 
problematic in recent critical musics, especially in that which is, in the modernist sense, 
sensitive to self-reflexivity – aware as to both its place in history (relation to the past) and 
to the materiality of the medium by which meaning is constructed and communicated in 
the present. Mappings are very much concerned with identity (in the philosophical use of 
the word). Such mappings help to align the object perceived and the manner by which it is 
perceived (and hence object and subject). However, this critical music explores the 
transgression of positive positional mappings through undermining the mapping of stable 
identities (and hence, flowing through non-identity). 
Musical ‘play’ suggests a way around this problem, as play draws on established 
meanings whilst eliciting something new from them. Musical play – as Kofi Agawu257, 
Raymond Monelle258, Robert Hatten259, and others have illustrated – can be understood 
semiotically; put simply, musical symbols take on meanings, associations, and significances 
which can later be drawn upon and/or undermined. To give one example, in his musical-
semiotics investigations, Agawu focused predominantly upon music of the Classical260 and 
Romantic261 eras. Developing the early topic theory work pursued by Leonard Ratner262, 
Agawu explored the pseudo-representational aspects within absolute music through the 
idea of conventionalised ‘topics’ that brought associations and meanings from outside 
works into them. These conventionalised associations were learnt and recognised (not 
necessarily consciously) by those within the art music world. Put in explicitly semiotic 
terms, it would be said that musical signifiers – like the drones of a pastoral topic, for 
example – became recognisable as carriers of extramusical meaning; links were forged 
between signifiers and signifieds within conventionalised stylistic contexts. These signifiers 
could then be brought into and combined within a given work, suggesting connotations 
and associations beyond the formal qualities of the work in question. 
A “playful” semiotics might provide a starting point for the recent critical music’s 
playing with conventionalised signifiers. However, something must be added where, in the 
spirit of criticality, this music problematisises the semiotic conditions by which it itself 
comes to be understood. Indeed, as I suggested in the introduction, the convention might 
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itself come to be seen as a historical category, as well as being a hermeneutic framing 
device for the understanding and experience of musical events. This “problematic” is 
evident at three levels – levels which necessarily cannot be fully disentangled from one 
another if they are to be understood together as a semiotic process constituting musical 
experience and meaning: (1.) the breakdown of the signifier, that the topics and tropes of 
earlier eras are drawn upon, though in modified, fragmentary, or originally combinatorial 
forms; (2.) the instability of the signified, that the links by which signifiers and signifieds 
are connected – how the former are understood or affectively experienced – are broken; 
and (3.) the contemporary relation of signifiers to one another, that signifiers – finding 
themselves in a decentred context – may suggest gaps or potentially original connections 
between them.263 
It is in exploring these gaps within materials, and in the transgression of 
established relationships between materials, that critical musical works subvert (whilst also 
drawing upon) the required stability that forms the basis of semiotic processes. Below, I 
suggest that this is in some ways akin to processes exemplified in dreaming, to the 
destabilisation and recombination of traces of memory that take on new significance in the 
present. This move also springs from accounting for a contemporary subject that is plural 
and contradictory; the dream attends to multiple tensions within the Unconscious at any 
given time. 
Insights from Psychoanalytic Theory? 
Insight into the meaningfulness of critical music can be drawn from psychoanalytic 
thinking that is open to the fluid dimensions of meaning and self-reflexion. As I will argue, 
the non-identical component of dialectical thought may be taken as an (always absent) 
index of gaps in the processes of codification and signification that are crucial to critical 
music. The role non-identicality has in desiring process, one aspect of this, also enters this 
constellation. Julia Kristeva’s work is drawn on in helping to formulate these ideas, her 
work being particularly pertinent in that it brings together Hegel’s non-identity and 
psychoanalytic notions of desire. Lastly, psychoanalytic thinking is productive in enabling 
the object of experience to be regarded as articulating some function for subjectivity whilst, 
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at the same time, also shaping concepts of subjectivity. However, my appeal to Kristeva’s 
work is far from orthodox; it is itself “playful”.264 
As Kristeva points out, Freud’s writings have the advantage of both looking to 
meaning as created through interpretational connections whilst, simultaneously, 
questioning the subjective and theoretical stability of the foundations upon which 
interpretation takes place265. This self-reflexive, processual quality can be contrasted with a 
postmodern interpretation of fragments and symbols of the past: instead of seeing the 
meaningfulness of moments in the work as deriving from being in an intertextual network – a 
set of distinct discourses engaging and rubbing up against one another – this is to see 
subjectivity as always becoming multiply (arising from multifarious conflicts), never fully 
stable in its being, and incapable of fully discharging the tensions arising from its shaky 
foundations in the psychical energies and social contradictions exerted on and through it. 
In theoretically approaching these qualities of multiplicity and process, as well as the place 
of the past in the present in the experience of critical modernist works, I draw on 
psychoanalytic concepts as epitomised in processes of dreaming.  
The idea of the dream has been related to music before. The idea of the dream can 
be seen, for example, where it is referred to as some kind of untapped refuge to save the 
“subjective” dimension of musical experience from the perceived “objectivity” of scholarly 
methods. Michael P. Steinberg, for example, in writing about Gustav Mahler, claims that 
Mahler’s ‘false cadences work like dream structures, disappearing as they seem about to 
resolve’266, without illustrating how this is achieved or how the music analogously relates to 
dream-structures. Here, the dream is reduced to a whimsical symbol rather than physical 
process; it becomes a signifier of the unreachable outside of process or explanation, rather 
than being a concept that can tell us something new about the inner workings of the music 
(and of the mind). By contrast, I want to focus on something different: the structural 
processes by which dreams create meaning and are experienced meaningfully insofar as these 
processes can tell us something about recent critical works.  
Processes in dreaming tell us about waking life, just as music might tell us about 
social and psychic life outside of it. Both do so in ways that are – similarly – transmuted 
from the day-to-day “outside” of dreams and music. To this end, I move to show how 
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subjective concerns are embroiled in musical processes. This is to position an experiencing 
subjectivity in the music, just as it is in dream or phantasy, and also to extend semiotic 
accounts of music to music that problematises the conditions by which musical meaning, 
and expressive significance, arise.  
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4. Knowing Through Contemporary Music 
 
ARTICULATING (SUBJECTIVITY) IN THE QUARTET 
Discourse: Ruptures & Boundaries 
The problematic dialectics of contemporary subjectivities play out in a range of late 
20th- and 21st-century string quartets – here they find their articulation. It should be 
immediately acknowledged that the word “articulation” has linguistic overtones. 
Articulation concerns syntax and a clarity of ideas. But the articulation of subjectivity in 
music is more than articulately “getting the point across”, rhetorically presenting subject-
formation or a thing’s identity and communicating it effectively. In contrast, it becomes 
visible through musical process – the process is constitutive of it (but not identical to it).  
As it has recently been shown, to draw an impassable line between language and 
music is highly problematic. Elizabeth Tolbert, for example, has highlighted that the 
music-language divide often conceals deep-seated ideological concerns – notably, positing 
language as assertive and masculine and music as passive and feminine, with a 
reaffirmation of the dominance of the one over the other267. For this reason, my discussion 
of the articulation of subjectivity in music should not be confused with an argument that 
music is a language. Indeed, my point here is exactly that any binary division between 
music and language is mistaken. 
I am going to develop the notion of “articulation” borrowing (for the most part) 
from the Bulgarian-French poststructuralist theorist Julia Kristeva. The reason for 
choosing her theoretical apparatus will become evident as my argument unfolds, but relies 
on the necessary (though not sufficient) condition of seeing music as discourse268. In 
choosing Kristeva’s work to develop the idea of “articulation” I should pre-empt criticism 
here by saying that Kristeva has herself been accused of essentialising binaries echoing the 
language-music dualism – in particular, the masculine as identity and the feminine as non-
identity269. My reading of Kristeva bears this critique in mind. In fact, it is for this reason 
that I will not focus on the element of Kristeva’s writing most often taken up by 
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musicologists, the concept of chora – chora being maternally ordered (drive) energies 
outside of affirmed/affirming symbolic being270. The “essence” of music – what sets it 
apart from language – is again seen, problematically, in this “feminine” dimension. 
(However, it also must be recognised that subject formation, and articulation, occurs 
within the context of dominant thought modes, including patriarchy.) It is also worth 
noting that Kristeva’s reliance on and development of both Hegel’s and Freud’s thinking 
makes her work highly relevant to the theoretical position that has been fostered so far, 
especially in terms of highlighting what post-Hegelian philosophy can tell us about (what I 
will characterise as) post-Beethovenian-Hegelian musical subjectivities. 
What challenges do the string quartets I am to discuss present in terms of 
theorising (1.) “articulation” in musical discourse and (2.) the “articulation of subjectivity” 
in music? In unproblematised terms, articulation works in the most part around syntax and 
formal relations. In the most basic musical terms these relationships are organised through 
rhythm (and hyperrhythm), formal structures, stylistic paradigms, scale and pitch 
relationships, orchestration and timbre, changes in register, and so on. This may be 
obvious, but recognising this fact serves to highlight a situation in recent critical music, in 
which these parameters are still operative whilst, at the same time, their individual 
significances and relationships to one another have been transformed. It follows that the 
question that needs asking is one of how this music creates syntax and formal relationships 
in relation to inherited materials from the past, and what this suggests about the 
articulation of contemporary subjectivities.  
Kristeva, in her theorisation of modern poetry, described this kind of affirmed 
division of components in discourse – that elements arise in discourse and take part in its 
structural organisation – as thetic.271 However, Kristeva’s thetic should not be seen simply 
as something occurring only within discourse – subjectivity is bound up with this process 
and is observed through discourse. If “musical language” can be seen as having an 
articulatory role (given that music is not a language), the thetic may have much to tell us 
about how subjectivity is articulated within music; firstly, how identities within discourse 
form, and secondly, at the same time, how this process of separation and understanding is 
constituted by and constitutive of subjectivity. Furthermore, music – always at the 
boundary, threatening to rupture conceptions of “language” as taken apart from it – is 
exceptionally placed to be understood in light of the thetic, and indeed to disturb and 
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modify it. Critical music is perhaps particularly well placed to underline this dialectic, when 
it pushes and pulls between past and present, often simultaneously traversing organisation 
and disorganisation. 
In thetic articulation there is an inseparable relation between subject and object, 
such that whilst the latter can never encapsulate the former it does organise it discursively, 
positioning each in relation to the other. This is consciousness in so far as it is syntactically 
and discursively organised, thetic in that ‘it simultaneously posits the thesis (position) of 
both Being and ego.’272 This means that whilst subjectivity is not reducible to the objects 
around which it positions and organises itself, a discourse understood as developing 
processually should be thought as not simply as a recombination of objects apart from 
subjectivity, but as a shifting of positions, with a processual subjectivity mutually wrapped-
up in this. The thetic ‘constitutes the subject without being reduced to this process 
precisely because it is the threshold of language’273. 
The thetic is, as Juliana De Nooy puts it, a ‘paradoxically constructive disruption’274 
of the continuum of experience. In being divided, ordered, and understood, the fluidity of 
experience is given hard edges; contrarily, it is also the means by which subjectivity can be 
recognised as experiencing, that subjectivity can be talked about insofar as it is tied to and 
lives through graspable objects. Kristeva characterises the thetic dually as ‘rupture and/or 
boundary’275. It is the ‘boundary’ at which both subjectivity and discourse are given form, 
insofar as they mutually mediate one another. It is as articulatory boundary, as organiser, as 
‘constructive disruption’, and as mutual relation between subjectivity and objects of 
discourse, that the thetic becomes a valuable concept in exploring critical music’s 
relationship with subjectivity. This understanding of the thetic allows for a syntactic 
understanding of modernist musical discourses without the need for a codified normative 
syntax (whilst it still alludes to past musical syntax in that it is part of a larger discourse 
giving meaning to a work in the present). 
I discuss the thetic as ‘rupture and/or boundary’ as this dual character allows for 
something more than speaking only of the articulation of/in discourse – it is to underline 
the articulation of subjectivity that is bound up in thetic processes. This is summed up by 
Kristeva when she said of spoken language that 
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all enunciation, whether of word or of a sentence, is thetic. It requires an 
identification; in other words, the subject must separate from and through his 
image, from and through his objects.276 
 
Kristeva’s mention of ‘identification’ here should be read psychoanalytically: subjectivity 
finds shape through the world around it and in self-objectification as means to observe 
itself. But, I want to multiply this reading (for reasons that will become apparent). As well 
as seeing ‘identification’ psychoanalytically, it can be read philosophically, following on 
from Hegel – to see identification as related closely to the concept of ‘identity’277. Such a 
reading allows us to see the ‘identification’ of elements of musical discourse as an 
affirming philosophical identity through musical discourse. Therefore, this is not simply an 
‘identifying’ of important structural elements (upon which a structural analysis could then 
be based), nor simply a Freudian identification (a process of internalisation) of these 
elements from the music into the mind (as explored in chapter 3), but goes a step further, 
to a stage through which subjectivity is itself affirmed in relation to the affirmation of the 
objects of discourse (with which it is embroiled through process). 
Macroscopic Ruptures 
I begin by investigating a work that revolves around rupture, one that is 
paradoxically constructive, Wolfgang Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10 (1993/1997). In 
addition to any immediate findings, this analysing of rupture will also serve to lay the 
groundwork for a better understanding of musical objects with regard to their 
embeddedness within wider constellations of meaning; their rupturing into a discourse 
may be telling of both how they are conceived and the significance they may have, but also 
that this significance may be modified in the moment of rupture. The crucial factor in the 
idea of rupture as constructive is that, in something seemingly “coming from outside” – 
breaking into the discourse – its nature as discourse is contrarily affirmed; “breaking into” 
requires a boundary or level of discursive consistency in the first place, which is thereby 
crossed over and/or negated. This is rupture as a constitutive principle akin to De Nooy’s 
(above cited) characterisation of the thetic as ‘a paradoxically constructive disruption’. 
Importantly, Kristeva stresses the organisational principles of the thetic – it is, for 
example, the place where oppositions begin to be mapped out. This is central to 
constructive disruption in my first example, Rihm’s Quartet No. 10.  This quartet, its 
second movement in particular, is organised around rupture. Two musical objects become 
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the foci of the second movement of Rihm’s Quartet. Both of these suggest themselves as 
possible “found objects”. Rihm always ‘imprints a core identity on any [historically 
allusive] material he encounters’, writes Alastair Williams278, and this rings true in his Tenth 
Quartet. The first found object alludes to heteronomous materials through quoting a 
nursery rhyme (Taler, Taler, musst wandern, von der einen Hand zur andern). A historically 
established musical topic – specifically, the soundworld of the hurdy-gurdy – is also 
evoked timbrally in this first object. Crucially, these materials enter in such a way as to 
rupture over the edge of the musical discourse established thus far. They enter “from 
outside” as points around which discursive constructions may coalesce. However, at the 
same time, these entries also allow for the retrospective reappraisal of material heard so far, 
so as to be heard through these objects – as if these objects always existed as potential in 
the earlier materials. Slippage and fluidity between discursive elements, and between 
history and autonomous processes, play a role, in addition to that of articulation 
(divisibility, segmentation of elements). 
 
Ex. 16 Rihm: String Quartet No. 10, opening of the third movement 
 
10. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett, © Copyright 1997 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/UE 31144 
 
I focus on the second movement not only as it underlines these questions of 
discourse and subjectivity in a late 20th-century work but also as this movement constitutes 
the body of the Tenth Quartet. Of the quartet’s three movements, the outer ones are slow 
and stand in balance with one another around this central movement: the first (subtitled 
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‘Vorform’) acts as a short introduction of 36 bars, about three minutes of music, the third 
(‘Strophe’) is 35 bars of understated music (Ex. 16), whereas the central movement of 363 
bars is where pyrotechnic discursive dramatics, and questions of historicity, are marked as 
the basis of the music’s discursive playfulness. 
Rihm: String Quartet No. 10 
In the most part the materials that make up the second movement can be seen to 
exert or contrast two tendencies. The first brings forward timbre and discontinuity of 
pitch content – it is accented and mechanistic – and the second suggests linearity, being 
defined by a connectivity of pitch (and timbre, as the bowing here is ordinary). These 
often find themselves in superimposition. 
 
Ex. 17, Rihm: String Quartet No. 10, (i i )  Bat tag l ia/Fol l ia ,  bars 40-45 
 
10. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett, © Copyright 1997 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/UE 31144 
 
The former tendency can be effectively described as a  “sound state”, at least early 
on in the movement. By this I mean a perceptible overriding articulatory principle is 
lacking – there is a little horizontal motion forwards and an entangling of lines vertically 
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(voices consistently cross over, blurring the distinction between them). The visceral, 
mechanistic material employs col legno battuto saltando bowing (the wood of the bow is 
bounced back and forth from string to string) marked ‘s f f fz sempre’. From the very 
beginning of the movement, a dislocated texture is created, one defined by a series of 
accented strikes. It is only later that this state finds articulation, at points of constructive 
rupture. This state of discontinuity contrasts with the occasional fragments of linear 
material in which a connectivity of pitch, rather than stop-starting timbre, is central. A 
prominent instance of this occurs in the violins from bar 42 onwards (Ex. 17). Here, 
“sound state” material continues in the viola and cello parts. 
These two contrasting materials should not be seen as absolute entities – there is 
no paradigmatic example set out by which deviations may be defined. These contrasts 
should instead be seen as two tendencies: one being a state of timbre and discontinuity, 
the other fragments focusing on pitch and linearity. This is not to say that the timbre 
material does not draw on aspects of pitch, or that the pitch material does not on aspects 
of timbre. Both do, and, as I hope to illustrate, it is in these points of connection that a 
dialectic is opened up between the two tendencies, one brought to the fore through the 
media of the two found objects that rupture the discourse: firstly, the children’s song (the 
“hurdy-gurdy material”), and secondly, the famous melody/model of La Follia. 
The nursery rhyme episode begins at bar 255 (Ex. 18). It is articulated clearly, 
intoned by the cello after the rhetorical “full stop” of two marcato unison pitches in all four 
instruments (played at the same octave), in bar 254. This material imposes sudden 
rhythmic regularity and, rather than discrete accented events as before, we hear a 
connectivity of line and a shaping into melodic phrases – a syntactic hierarchy. The cello’s 
first four bars fall clearly into two two-bar phrases, of which smaller components are then 
echoed into the first violin (from the upbeat to bar 259) in which we hear a sequence 
evoking a return to the “tonic” of the episode (G, A, F, G, E, F, D, C). Articulation then 
disintegrates before returning f f f  in all four instruments (bar 267) in a “consequent” phrase 
to the original intonation as “antecedent” (and thus, syntax is suggested at a higher level). 
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Ex. 18, Rihm: String Quartet No. 10, ( i i )  Bat tag l ia/Fol l ia ,  bars 253-268 
 
10. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett, © Copyright 1997 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/UE 31144 
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Phrase groups in this passage are summarised in Ex. 19. For clarity, much has been 
omitted from this diagram. I have selected for inclusion only those groupings that are 
foregrounded as organised/organisational. Indeed, what is not included often coincides 
with aspects of the phrasing that I have included – suggesting a deeper syntactical scheme 
(echoed by my “higher level” groupings). At points of breakdown, however, (shown by 
the arrows of continuation) it is notable that the foregrounded material (which had an 
organisational role) recedes into an emerging texture characterised by a proliferation of 
material and articulatory degradation; single instruments lose their identities as they 
increasingly cross into the range of and confuse the rhythmic/pitch content of the others. 
Black-headed arrows at the end of lines suggest that they continue in a similar but 
degrading manner, and recede from the foreground. The black-headed arrows at the 
beginning of the second system indicate the continuation/degradation of material 
following the cello’s second large group. 
 
Ex. 19, Rihm: String Quartet No. 10 (i i), phrase analysis bars 255-269 
 
It should be said that whilst a hierarchy is evoked it is not followed 
unproblematically. The phrase analysis diagram shows these rhythmic/phrase groupings 
and their relation to groupings at higher levels. It also indicates moments of continuation 
or degradation (shown as black-headed arrows), when groupings begin to break down and 
phrases continue beyond the syntax established thus far. (The white-headed arrow on the 
top group indicates the largest phrase group continuing over onto the next system). Put 
another way, the black-headed arrows show moments when the beginning of a new 
grouping is articulated but its ending is not, and hence is indeterminate. This often 
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coincides with a breakdown in the articulation of pitch identities. This can be seen to 
happen at the end of the first violin’s material in bar 259-264, where the established 
descending sequence (from G to C, mentioned above) begins to “degrade” – consecutive 
minor 2nds are introduced. In addition, this breakdown aligns with a thickening of the pitch 
space in all four instruments’ parts and their increased crossing into one another’s ranges 
(i.e. a loss of their own articulatory identities). With the degradation/continuation of the 
phrase from around 269 onwards also comes a breakdown in pitch identity. Thus, a 
hierarchical syntax is repeatedly drawn upon as an articulatory principle but is always 
unstable, collapsing. This is crystallised in the re-entry of the last phrase of second-highest 
structural level (at bar 267); it re-enters through a rupturing reassertion of syntactic 
organisation after the continuation/degradation of the phrase preceding it – organisation 
is reimposed. 
A dual nature is apparent in moments of organised/organising rupture, and this 
duality’s limits are evocative of philosophical legacies inscribed into the musical materials. 
Firstly, the rupture can be heard as extraneous, that is as coming from outside. An object 
ruptures into the discourse established thus far. I have given this first dimension some 
attention already – but I want now to outline this process in more detail. Secondly, rupture 
can be seen as emergent: previously held as potential in earlier material, later a rupturing 
moment issues forth from within. Put differently, the object leads on from, but ultimately 
ruptures and differentiates itself from, that which came before. I will argue below that this 
dialectic of rupture as extraneous and emergent draws immanently upon wider 
philosophical-historical ideas – principally, it resonates sympathetically with the dialectic of 
autonomy (the artwork) and heteronomy (the “extramusical” history that 
surrounds/penetrates the artwork). 
Extraneous rupture is achieved through the imposition of difference – a sudden 
turning to material evocative of regularity and hierarchy. This is affirmed through a 
“break” in the texture immediately preceding this material’s entry (bar 254). A hierarchy of 
pitch, in addition to that of rhythm/phrase, is also evoked, with the cello’s material in 
particular pulling towards a C-major tonality (contrasting with the atonal material heard so 
far). 
The idea of material entering from “outside” is not particular to contemporary art 
music, of course. It has been identified in Mahler’s symphonies for example, be this in 
terms of connoting extraterritorial otherworldliness279  or the ‘rupture’ of a work by 
something external to it. The latter case is epitomised in Adorno’s comment on the First 
                                                
279 See JOHNSON, JULIAN 2005: ‘Mahler and the Idea of Nature’ in Perspectives on Gustav Mahler (ed. Jeremy 
Barham), Aldershot: Ashgate, 28 
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Symphony, that ‘rupture originates from beyond the music’s intrinsic movement, 
intervening from outside’280. Importantly, the hurdy-gurdy, of which this material is 
evocative (as illustrated below), is itself an established trope of the alien and is, as such, 
latent with potential to perform extraterritorial functions. To mention Mahler again, it is 
worthy of comment that Vera Micznik highlights his use of 
 
a hurdy-gurdy or barrel-organ type of music, which at least since Schubert’s 
Der Leiermann, is conventionally associated with a semantic world of alienation, 
of strangeness, or even of desolation or emptiness.281 
 
The evocation of hurdy-gurdy performance in Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10 draws on this 
legacy. Furthermore, as connotative of the pastoral, the hurdy-gurdy-like rendition of the 
nursery rhyme draws parallels between the raw pastoral world and the rawness of 
childhood. At the same time, one hears a move from the natural (the immediacy of the 
sound-state at the movement’s opening) to the cultural (historically-allusive material) – an 
unstructured, timbral texture that later forms into something organised/organising. This 
coincidence of terms draws on another aesthetically significant legacy: positing a 
relationship between ontogeny (from the pre-linguistic to the singing (speaking) child, the 
“rawness” of childhood before adulthood) and phylogeny (from the undifferentiated to 
the structured, the “rawness” of nature before culture). However, through marking these 
materials as externalised, this legacy is observed from a distance.  
Counterbalancing extraneous rupture coming from outside, the rupturing-
organising moment can also be heard as emerging from within the work. It is prefigured in 
earlier materials, retrospectively understood to hold what comes later as previously held, 
latent potential. Fragments of linear material, played with ordinary bowing, are heard 
throughout much of the earlier section of the movement, often being foregrounded over 
the battuto material that surrounds them – in the viola from bar 74-76 (which returns at bar 
126) or later in the cello from bar 225 onwards (a fragment repeated from bar 244), for 
example. Both these examples also include grace notes formed by stacks of 5ths and slowly 
drawn-out single pitches, connotative of the grace notes, 5ths, and drawn-out drones often 
associated with the hurdy-gurdy trope (think of Schubert’s last Winterreise song again, the 
opening in particular).  
 
                                                
280 ADORNO 1996: 5 
281 MICZNIK, VERA 2001: ‘Music and Narrative Revisited: Degrees of Narrativity in Beethoven and 
Mahler’ in Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Vol. 126 (pp. 193-249), 232 
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Ex. 20, Rihm: String Quartet No. 10 (i i), bars 74-76 
 
10. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett, © Copyright 1997 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/UE 31144 
 
Timbre, in addition to pitch and established semantic associations, has a role to 
play in the emergent dimension of rupture. Methodologically speaking, this is to ascribe 
timbre an organisational and articulatory role, to make it a feature with its own 
connections to history and the historicity of subjectivity, rather than reduce it to a realm of 
“chora” or some “pre-linguistic” realm. The extensive use of the battuto saltando bowing, 
found throughout the majority of the movement, takes on a new role in articulating the 
timbral identity of the nursery rhyme material. Specifically, it is reinterpreted as alluding to 
the rhythmic “buzzing” sound that can be produced by a hurdy-gurdy (by quickly turning 
the crank so as to cause the bridge of the trompette drone to audibly vibrate against the 
instrument’s soundboard282). As a result, what were immediate and visceral before – the 
dislocated battuto attacks – take on historical resonances. This timbral relocation combines 
with other elements prefigured earlier in the movement (pitch, semantic allusions, and so 
on), so as to enable a moment of rupture that emerges from the latent potential of these 
materials, yet one, which in its ability to organise these elements differently, is also 
differentiated from them. 
These extraneous and emergent aspects of rupture operate in light of one another. 
It is also important to note that this entanglement coincides with interrelated dialectical 
conceptions of musical material: firstly, with the dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy 
and, secondly, with that of nature and culture. The emergent aspect tends towards a 
notion of autonomy, whereby the generative (“autopoetic”) processes within the material 
organically spawn a breakthrough of something new. The latter, extraneous dimension tends 
                                                
282 BAINES, FRANCIS & BOWLES, EDMUND A. & GREEN, ROBERT A. [online]: ‘Hurdy-gurdy’ in Grove Music 
Online. Oxford Music Online, [website: 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/13583, accessed 14th March, 
2012] 
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towards the other sides of these dialectics, whereby, through the imposition of heteronomous 
material, markedly cultural tropes are underlined (in particular, the pseudo-linguistic, 
historical, quotational status of the children’s tune). This connects with the idea of 
“coincidences” between, for example, dualities in different cultural domains, as explored in 
chapter 3. This is not to say that the autonomous side is identical to generative-organic 
processes connotative of “the natural” (that “autonomous = natural”), nor is this to posit 
that the heteronomous side is identical to pseudo-linguistic or quotational characteristics 
connotative of “the cultural” (that “heteronomous” = cultural”). Rather than to make 
such universal claims, it is to point out that provisional points of contact are drawn 
between or elicited through these characteristics via the reconfiguration of elements (and 
their correspondences/differences) of a (thetic) network in light of one another. These are 
concepts and relations constituted by and constitutive of experiencing this particular work 
of music.  
This also goes for the rupture of a second material into/from the quartet, the 
twisted appearance of a famous melody, La Follia. Having outlined the first instance of 
rupture in detail, I will now briefly outline this second one, with a view to supplementing 
the discussion of articulation, and its connection with ‘constructive disruption’. This 
material appears most prominently from bar 304 onwards, in the viola and the cello. 
Whilst a duality appears again, between emergent relationships and extraneous assertion, 
the appearance of La Follia tends towards the emergent. This occurs near the end of the 
movement. It is pre-echoed by earlier motivic and rhythm fragments – fragments which 
only later are retrospectively confirmed to “belong” to this La Follia as a guiding model. 
This later moment of recognition, when the La Follia is seized perceptually as a concrete 
object, enables previous fragments to coalesce around it. It is, as such, a rupturing point of 
organisation. This is a musical material whose emergent character can be heard through an 
act of retrospective reinterpretation, whereby this concrete moment may later be heard as 
potential held within these earlier fragmentary ones. 
An episode exemplifying fragmented pre-echoes appears at around bar 40. Here, 
prominence is given to a motivic cell that appears throughout much of the movement: a 
given pitch that moves up a whole-tone and then down a minor 3rd. Played with and 
combined with other materials early on (such in this episode), it is later given structural 
significance in helping to articulate the beginning of La Follia’s material proper. (The role 
of such “microscopic” materials in constituting the boundaries of the discourse – 
remember the thetic’s dual character, as rupture and/or boundary – is focussed on in the next 
section.) As can be observed in the first viola in bars 304-305, this cell beckons La Follia’s 
later entry (the pitches D, E, C-sharp). It is a distinctive cell, one giving the material a 
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discernible discursive identity, and one that is mirrored and confirmed as key to the 
identity of this material in the third phrase of La Follia (bars 308-309, pitches F, G, E).  
Looking back to the episode that began from about bar 40 (Ex. 17, above), it can 
be noted that this cell appears in various forms (often detached from its syntactic place in 
La Follia proper, as it appears later). To take a few pitches from the second violin’s line by 
way of illustrating this: in bar 40 one hears first D, E, C-sharp, then an inversion of these 
intervals (D, C-natural, E), and next a cell related closely to these (G, B-flat, A). The first 
violin prominently endorses this cell an octave above a bar later with the pitches F, G, E. 
These moments lead into a passage of high, sustained pitches in the first and second 
violins. Indeed, the second violin plays the pitches of almost the entire La Follia melody 
(centred on C-sharp rather than D-natural as later), from the last quaver of bar 42 onwards. 
However, its identity as La Follia – as an object of focus – is betrayed: it diverges from the 
rhythmic pattern that contributes to giving this famous material its identity, it is not 
supported as “La Follia melody” by the other instruments, it is embedded within the 
texture rather than audibly organising it, and it is broken off before completion. It exists 
“within” the material as latent potential to later become emergently manifest. 
Larger sections of distorted La Follia-like material appear before and after the 
point when this melody ruptures the surface (bar 304 onwards). These are sections that, in 
reappearing after La Follia model proper, are retrospectively reheard afresh, as variations on 
or deviations from it. For example, the dislocated material that appears in bars 277-281 is 
identical (note-for-note) with four bars after the La Follia episode (bars 313-316). However, 
given that the second set of four bars follow the episode immediately, the likeness of La 
Follia to this dislocated material is underlined through proximity. Because the dislocated 
material is repeated after La Follia model, it is now heard to echo the organisational 
principles that also underpin this model. This new coherence is supported by the addition 
of a bar preceding the four that re-occur (i.e. those starting at bar 312). This bar 
emphasises the beginning of – the articulation of – the “variation” on the melody, of 
which the four bars are an integral part. It is notable also that La Follia is associated with 
improvised variations on its basic model. This historical legacy perhaps predisposes the 
hearing of the “variation” episode as such. These bars are not highlighted explicitly as part 
of a variation until this point; this is a becoming of variation through the reinterpretation of 
earlier material within a new discursive context, a context ordered around an 
organised/organising moment of rupture.283 
                                                
283 This chimes with Janet Schmalfeldt’s characterisation of becoming as encompassing reinterpretation. See 
SCHMALFELDT 2011, especially p. 9. 
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Ex. 21, Rihm: String Quartet No. 10 (i i), foregrounded “La Fol l ia”  material – viola and 
cello, bars 304-312 
 
10. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett, © Copyright 1997 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/UE 31144 
 
Alongside these (dominantly) “emergent” characteristics, the La Follia material also 
suggests a dimension of extraneous rupture. It enters in juxtaposition with, and hence as 
differentiated from, other musical materials. The occasion of its foregrounded entry (in the 
viola and cello from bar 304, see Ex. 21), for example, appears simultaneously beside 
material dissimilar and unsupportive of it in the two violins. Thus, whilst this entry helps 
to organise a crucial aspect of the discourse at this point, it is still somewhat separated 
from the temporal flow established thus far. It is only later – in the “variation” from bar 
312 onwards (Ex. 22) – that it organises all four voices towards a single coherent end. As 
extraneous it also enters as a found object following the conclusion of an instantiation of 
the nursery rhyme material in the viola. As such, they are objects set differentially beside 
one another. It is important that the very status of the La Follia material as quotation – as 
found object – lends it the significance of being a cultural “intertext” – that is, of being 
something which is markedly historical, existing “outside” of the work “prior to” entering 
into it or being commented on by it. 
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Ex. 22, Rihm: String Quartet No. 10 (ii.), bars 311-315 
 
10. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett, © Copyright 1997 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/UE 31144 
 
I have outlined two tendencies in conceptualising and articulating rupture: the first 
emerges autonomously from the work, rupturing it from “inside”; the second concerns the 
rupture of extraneous materials into the work ‘as if from outside’ (to cite Adorno’s phrase 
again284). These two tendencies of rupture are in dialectic; discourse requires an imposed 
divisibility into elements (heteronomy) but these elements are also produced through the 
discourse itself (autonomy). This can be conceived of as a dialectic of the pre-existence of 
being and a self-determination through becoming. (As I argue below, categories of being and 
becoming are still important to the experience of the recent modernist quartets and to the 
inscription of these works with notions of subjectivity as related to the philosophical-
historical concepts of being and becoming.) Objects that come from “outside the work” 
rely on the idea that they exist prior to the work, an “ontological steadiness” if you like. 
However, they are of course also given definition – articulated – through their mediation 
in the work, their constitution through its discourse. In Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10 an 
articulation of discourse is achieved, in one dimension at least, through an act of rupture 
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of organising/organised materials (extraneously) into and (emergently) from the processual flow 
of the work. This comes forth in moments of rupture centred on large-scale elements of 
material, which imply their own object-like consistency, and thus a character of stability 
around which more processually inclined material may coalesce (and, as such, become seen 
to be organised). 
 Organised/organising rupture plays an important role in terms of the 
philosophical-historical legacies inscribed into those materials that rupture. As I go on to 
argue below, in Alfred Schnittke’s String Quartet No. 4 (1989) this centres around a 
moment of rupture that calls on notions of subjectivity as articulated musically – 
principally in the treatment of moments of “cadential closure” as these indexically connote 
the self-determination of autonomous music and an autonomous self.  This discussion of 
rupture has also laid a foundation for my later exploration of “extraterritorial” material as 
it “enters” the discourse of Valentin Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 1 (1974/1990), 
becoming structurally significant.  
Before these developments, however, I should again highlight the dual nature of 
the thetic, as rupture and/or boundary. Discursive boundaries are set up and organised 
through ‘constructive disruption’ yet, at the same time, the character of these boundaries is 
affirmed/negated through their rupturing (rupture calls attention to the quality and 
location of the boundary). My discussion of the thetic has rupture at a macroscopic level, 
focussing on the role of large-scale musical elements – objects – in the discourse, as found 
in Rihm’s quartet. This I will now supplement by discussing the macroscopic’s dialectical 
counterpart: how boundaries are set up at a “microscopic” level, constituting a discourse 
which might then come to be ruptured. 
Microscopic Boundaries 
The counterpart of the rupture discussed above is boundary. Whilst rupture is not 
exclusively found at a macroscopic level, it is readily visible there – at moments of large-
scale intertextural intervention. Whilst this is intrinsically related to boundaries at a 
macroscopic level, I will explore the articulation of discursive boundaries as this happens 
at a “microscopic” level – where discourse is given its shape and becomes comprehensible 
as a discourse. This is to explore the concept of a foundational degree of textual autonomy, 
something which may be transgressed by, or brought into dialectic with, the 
heteronomous (and often intertextual) character of rupture. 
The concept of “autonomy” of course has an intellectual history of its own. Whilst 
I will not go into the detailed discussion about this here, it should be said that the idea of a 
“boundary” suggests a boundary “of” something, within the bounds of which textual 
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relationships are set up or held in constellation with one another. This connects with many 
pre-established analytic and aesthetic concepts – to cite a few examples: analytic concepts 
like Kofi Agawu’s ‘introversive semiosis’ 285  and Mark Evan Bond’s notion of the 
‘generative’ process of form286; aesthetic ones such as Romantic legacies of organicism, 
modernist notions of structural self-determination (notably, Adorno’s musique informelle)287. 
However, what concerns us is the level of consistency at which a discourse, or discourses, may 
be said to operate. This is something provisionally organised through the work. 
“Discourse”, however, is not identical to the concept “work”. A work may or may 
not be aligned with a notion of discourse. Where it is, where the work can be idealised as a 
unified discourse, it is something – here, the work is an object – that the listener may 
“enter into”. Its beginning – its “opening” – grants us access to its immanence. When it 
ends – importantly, when it ends such that all is well (e.g. through synthesis) – the work 
“closes”. Works and discourses may also not be coincident, being multiply, fragmentally, or 
even negatively discursive. A level of consistency is not a sufficient condition of an 
artwork. However, the very notion of autonomy, as tied in with consistency, suggests that 
nonetheless this textuality is a pertinent and significant category in the mediation of 
experience through/by/of the artwork. The mutual constitution of musical discourses by 
boundaries, and boundaries through discourses, is itself inherently related, though not 
identical, to handed-down philosophical-historical notions of the autonomy of musical 
works. 
In this sense, autonomy begets heteronomy; inscribed into its practice are wider 
concerns and complexities mediative of experience. However, in the cases of both 
autonomy and heteronomy, which both play a role simultaneously, we find ourselves 
focusing on one side or the other of the text’s “boundary”. We are either “inside” or 
“outside” of it: thinking either intratextually (about links within a work’s discourse) or 
intertextually (moving between or across discourses). These boundaries are, as such, things 
constructed both from “within” the work and from “outside” of it. And, as suggested 
above, in this very notion of the “within” is an appeal to legacies already “outside”. 
A ready example of “levels of consistency” is provided by Helmut Lachenmann’s 
String Quartet No. 1, Gran Torso (1971/76/88)288. The preface to the score outlines the 
relevant extended techniques for interpreting it. The score combines elements of staff and 
graphic notations, as well as a host of special symbols. Eight different types of extended 
                                                
285 AGAWU 1991, chapter 3: ‘Introversive Semiosis: The Beginning-Middle-End Paradigm’. 
286 BONDS 1991: 14 
287 ADORNO, THEODOR 1992 [orig. 1963]: ‘Vers une Musique Informelle’ [orig. 1960] in Quasi una 
Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music (trans. Rodney Livingstone), London: Verso Classics 
288 The score is published Breitkopf & Härtel (Wiesbaden). 
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pizzicato are outlined: pizzicato of harmonics, pizzicato with fingernails, Bartók pizzicato 
with completely choked strings, pizzicato by pulling the string with the tension-screw end 
of the bow, pressing the tension-screw down onto the string from above, striking the 
screw on the wood of the fingerboard, pizzicato with the left hand, and a last type of 
pizzicato that produces a distinct form of glissando289. This conception of “pizzicato”, as 
with many features in much of Lachenmann’s music, helps to produce a framework of 
consistency within which structural relationships – affinities, overlaps, and differences – 
are produced. Employing diverse but interrelated forms of pizzicato enables for new 
interrelationships to be drawn between materials, or aspects to be brought out from one 
another. Put differently, categories of composition are reorganised and brought into new 
arrangements.  As Lachenmann himself put it, this compositional strategy enables him to 
conceive of “graded scales” of sound, which, for example, “consist… of qualitative jumps 
that make a pizzicato to an arco and a pianissimo to a fortissimo.”290 This relates to, and 
develops on from, more “traditional” composition parameters (rhythm, pitch, and so on) 
and established compositional resources (instrumental techniques). 291  Heteronomous 
materials, with their own historical significances, are drawn on in the articulation of an 
autonomous work, a work that produces from this heteronomy the discursive 
consistencies that grant its autonomy.292 Furthermore, a level of consistency that is set up – 
suggesting something autonomous, with its own boundaries – that might then come to be 
ruptured by something extraneous to it. In the case of Rihm’s quartet this occurred when 
the “sound-state” heard at the beginning of the movement was ruptured by two found 
objects. This issue of what is considered outside/inside, bounded/ruptured, is important 
to subsequent discussions of other works below; Schnittke’s String Quartet No. 4 and 
                                                
289 In this last type, which Lachenmann calls pizzicato fluido, the string is plucked by the left hand whilst the 
bow’s tension-screw (or sometimes the wood of the bow) is slid along the string. David Alberman 
compares the resulting sound with a Hawaiian guitar or a pedal slide guitar. (ALBERMAN, DAVID 2005: 
‘Abnormal Playing Techniques in the String Quartets of Helmut Lachenmann’ in Contemporary Music 
Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (pp. 39-51), 46. 
290 Lachenmann cited in HOCKINGS, ELKE 1995: ‘Helmut Lachenmann’s Concept of Rejection’ in Tempo, 
No. 193 (pp. 4-10 + 12-14), 12 
291 In Lachenmann’s particular case these dimensions of consistency – these “graded scales” of sound – 
show traces of the serial parametric thinking of the 1950s and 60s. 
292 The idea that the (critical, Modernist) work creates its own boundary finds its most polemical 
expression in Adorno’s writing, in a passage in which he laments polystylistic approaches: ‘The diversity 
in the Schoenberg school, extending from Schoenberg, Berg, and Webern through the second generation 
and down to the responsible serial composers of the present, appears more securely established than the 
chaotic variety of music festival composers, who simultaneously embody historically diverse positions and 
whose syncretism merely perpetuates the stylistic confusions of the nineteenth century which these days 
are such an easy target for derision. Variety exists only in unity not as an agglomeration of “styles”; what is 
true of each composition applies with equal force to the relationships between compositions. The 
expansive gesture that embraces everything and finds good everywhere belongs in the realm of assiduous 
information collecting, not that of critical consciousness.’ ADORNO 1999: 151-152, my emphasis. 
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Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 1 are both works that, though through different strategies, 
create discursive boundaries before rupturing them. 
This issue should be put in historical context. Naturalised frameworks of 
consistency from earlier musical eras – notably, tonal idioms – provided the normative 
organisational principles by which musical material found its place and became significant. 
A simple example can be given: the consistency provided by the tonal frameworks of 
much eighteenth- and early-nineteenth century music enabled the opposition of major and 
minor keys to be felt as a source of experiential significance. Furthermore, the “second 
nature” of this framework meant that anything falling outside of it, or critical play with it, 
could be recognised as derivation from this norm (consider, for example, the tonally 
ambiguous opening of Beethoven’s String Quartet in F major, Op. 135, experientially 
pertinent in that it both draws on and deviates from the codified openings and cadential 
formulae of the time). The “second nature” of tonality (as paradigmatic example of 
something wider) provides a framework of consistency within which elements of discourses 
may be experienced as “being” or “having identity”.   
In musical works self-reflexive of naturalised frameworks, however, this 
problematisation of frames makes it difficult to pin-down being/identity, stabilities 
generally seen to be constituted as “framed” within the consistency of the frame. 
Investigating that the principles by which boundaries of discourses are constituted – as 
these are related implicitly to notions of subjectivity, to past ways of articulating works and 
discourses – is hence a fundamental issue to studies of recent critical musical discourses. 
These boundaries provide a self-constituting framework within which being and identity 
come to be articulated – their “relative autonomy”293. Hence, even without naturalised 
frameworks, “boundaries” can be said to be evoked in contemporary musical discourses. 
These are boundaries within/outside which elements may be said to belong/be out of 
place. Indeed, these naturalised frameworks, whilst not enacted, may still be made 
reference to as fragments and still-present traces. 
Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10 provides examples of this. Consistencies of material 
provide the boundaries within which elements “have” identity and “are” experientially 
significant. The col legno battuto saltando is one element constitutive of/constituted by a 
framework within which textual affinities and differences play out. Furthermore, in terms 
of the inside/out distinction, this processual material also sets out a discursive boundary 
into which (as I have argued above) other, markedly heteronomous (intertextual) materials 
may rupture. This constellation of issues – concerning discourse, frameworks of 
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consistency, autonomy/heteronomy, and so on – may have implications for a wide variety 
of recent critical musical works. However, in focusing on a single work in more detail – 
Arsenic and Old Lace (1990) by Jukka Tiensuu (b. 1948) – it should become apparent that 
these issues (and the way they interrelate) express particular tendencies and characteristics 
in specific works.  
Tiensuu: Arsenic and Old Lace 
 
The Finnish composer Jukka Tiensuu294 has experience in free improvisation and 
has led courses on baroque harpsichord performance. These experiences bear their mark 
on Arsenic and Old Lace, with its improvisatory tone and allusions to the historical sound 
world of the harpsichord. Whilst my discussion of Tiensuu’s music concerns boundaries 
and ruptures in musical discourses (i.e. within musical works), my discussion of Tiensuu’s 
music itself can be seen as an attempt to expand the “boundaries” of the critical discourses 
that surround modernist music. This composer is in many ways unfamiliar to (at least 
English-speaking) musicological discourses (when compared to Schnittke, Rihm, and 
Adès). However, this “marginality”, I hope, will help to disturb preconceptions of an 
institutionalised repertoire of critical, modernist musical works – leading to new 
imaginative and critical possibilities. 
 
Ex. 23, Tiensuu: Arsen i c  and Old Lace ,  opening 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
 
In Arsenic and Old Lace, a single movement work for microtonally tuned 
harpsichord and string quartet, the quartet acts to both bound and then expand outwards 
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[website: 
http://www.fimic.fi/fimic/fimic.nsf/WCIP/Tiensuu,%20Jukka?opendocument&cat=contemporary_-
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discursive materials charted by the harpsichord. This proliferation of articulatory 
boundaries does not, however, suggest a singular “Whole” – rather, many multiple 
directions. These proliferations in the present also relate dialectically to the past. The 
quartet, instead of determining its own boundaries, follows and plays off the harpsichord. 
The harpsichordist, in this soloistic role, is reminiscently placed in an analogous position 
to a chamber concerto soloist, a former context that is, however, distorted and presented 
in miniature; only a string quartet accompanies the harpsichord, an accompaniment that is 
itself, in discursive terms, at risk of sheering away from that of principle focus. 
Before exploring this in greater detail, let me first outline general points of 
historicity regarding the musical material of the work, both those of structure and on its 
(semantic) surface. At a structural level, “uncanny” moments of historical reference are 
rhetorically encompassed within (the boundaries of) the discourse. Tonal reminiscences 
are heard, though contorted through a tuning of the harpsichord based on perfect 
intervals.295 (In the score, diamond-headed notes indicate playing on the upper manual.) 
This is underlined from the start of the harpsichord’s entry (bar 8, see Ex. 23), which 
expands the boundary of well-tempered pitch whilst at the same time transgressing it. 
Indeed, the “B-flats/A-sharps” played here become of structural significance later – 
alluded to as a “pitch centre” which is nonetheless hazy itself. In addition to these points 
                                                
295 Tiensuu writes in the preface to the score: ‘Starting with the lower manual and tuning the A to the A 
used by the string quartet, one should then proceed to tune the other strings as indicated below. The 4’ 
stop on the lower manual is tuned to octave with the 8’ (as usual). All octaves within a stop are perfect. 
As a result both manuals have identical tuning but the upper manual (8’) sounds 41 cents (ca. 1/5-tone) 
lower than the lower manual.’ The diagram below, reproduced from the score, outlines the manner of 
tuning the manuals. 
 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
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of historical reminiscence at the structural large-scale, smaller-scale allusions are made: 
moments reminiscent of historically-passed (Baroque-like) musical rhetoric are audible 
under the surface – the progression of three chords at the very opening, for example – but 
not unproblematically so. The first four motives in the harpsichord part (bars 8-16) clearly 
suggest a hierarchical phrase structure (of two phrases, opening and closing, themselves 
constructed from two motives, preceded by an opening “cadence” in the strings in bars 1-
7). 
 
Ex. 24, Tiensuu: Arsen i c  and Old Lace , harpsichord, bars 326-327 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
 
Alongside these uncanny “structural” points of reference, historical allusions are 
made on the surface. This is epitomised in a passage of sweeping arpeggio-like figures 
(starting approximately at bar 325, see Ex. 24) in which – drawing on the repertoire 
associated with the harpsichord – one hears a fantasia- or toccata-like line sketched out. 
Turn figures are similarly deployed (e.g., bars 57-58). However, these references are never 
explicit, instead being worked into the fabric of the discourse. They do no rupturing 
from/into it, as was heard in the case of Wolfgang Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10. Indeed, 
the word “reference” might be inappropriate, connoting that moments of historicity are 
enunciated as focal points of the discourse. A better term would perhaps be “relation”; 
inscribed within the harpsichord’s use is the history of its operation – its repertoire, 
associations, conceptions of subjectivities of which it is productive, its pedagogy296 – 
elements that are related to one another, and dimensions which may again be embraced in 
new musics. As Tiensuu himself puts it, ‘Music is not so much about notes as about the 
mutual relationships between ideas. True, sound has proved to be an unparalleled medium 
for expressing these relations.’297 
Exploring these relationships leads to a proliferation of discursive terms, and an 
expansion of the discourse (of its “boundaries”, what is encompassed within it) from 
within. Often the quartet’s material expands outward the course charted by the 
                                                
296 These issues, as they explored in Lachenmann’s Serynade for solo piano, constitute the central object of 
investigation in chapter 7. 
297 Jukka Tiensuu in interview with NIEMINEN, RISTO 2007 [online]: ‘Notes from the Borderland – an 
interview with Tiensuu’ (trans. Susan Sinisalo) in Finnish Music Quarterly Magazine, Issue 3 [website: 
http://www.fmq.fi/articles/ar_2007_3_rn.html, accessed 8th March, 2012] 
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harpsichord. The harpsichord, as a centre of focus (as focal/vocal), articulates many of the 
central materials from which this proliferation proceeds. This is especially evident at a 
miniature, microscopic level, where single motives of the harpsichord are shadowed by the 
quartet, as derivations from provisional discursive moments. Inaccurate attempts by the 
quartet to qualify what was said by the harpsichord lead to an expansion of terms 
encompassed by the discourse, but nevertheless leaves its organising/organised 
articulatory core – in most part, the harpsichord material – intact. 
 
Ex. 25, Tiensuu: Arsen i c  and Old Lace , bars 20-29 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
 
A “proliferation of terms” is in abundance near the beginning of the work, 
functioning to set up (organised/organising) discursive relationships, where discursive 
boundaries, and hierarchies between harpsichord and quartet, are drawn out. See, for 
example, the harpsichord’s material in bar 23 (Ex. 25), imitated inexactly by the first violin 
in bar 24. This violin line then slides downwards, before a further derivation (bar 27). 
Sliding to a B above the treble clef, this pitch is then taken back by the harpsichord, which 
rearticulates divisible pitch steps (and a momentary centre), in the face of the slip-sliding 
continuum of the violin’s portamento. In addition to these textual proliferations in the 
score, the inherent difficulty of the string players’ attempts to accommodate for the 
harpsichord’s microtonal tuning suggests that a level of inexactitude is written into the 
music’s performance. Similar instances of imitation and proliferation can be heard near the 
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opening – at bars 29-30, 34-35, or at bar 48, for instance. The motivic materials 
instantiated by the harpsichord, and often imitated by the quartet, plot concrete discursive 
shapes, as opposed to, and proliferating into, the multiplicity of colourations, derivations, 
and continuations explored by the strings.  
Proliferations of discursive elements also occur within the quartet’s material, and 
the harpsichord’s, as distinct from one another. The “staggering” moment in the strings in 
bar 10, for instance (Ex. 23), coming after an exact repetition of the first chord, can clearly 
be heard as a derivation of the second chord of the opening pizzicato material. And, at 
other times, the articulatory centre – the harpsichord material – itself proliferates. 
Decorative materials inscribed with associations of the harpsichord’s “conventional” 
repertoire – turn figures, mordents – are themselves expanded into the musical material 
proper (see bars 57-60, Ex. 26).298  
 
Ex. 26, Tiensuu: Arsen i c  and Old Lace , bars 57-60, harpsichord (turn figures bracketed) 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
 
Inherent to these proliferations – with these boundaries of the musical palette 
constantly extending – comes a dialectical notion of discourse: the improvisatory “self-
generation” of discursive materials suggests the autonomy of the harpsichord’s music; 
however, in becoming multiply, autonomy becomes heteronomy. (Whilst very different 
from the music Adorno had in mind, this seems to accord with Adorno’s dictum that 
‘[v]ariety exists only in unity’.299) This comes to the fore in a section in which the quartet is 
“locked in” to the harpsichord’s material (starting midway through bar 86); the 
harpsichord’s pitches and rhythms are simultaneously spread throughout quartet. The 
quartet doubles the harpsichord’s material and then continues it, becoming self-sufficient 
(e.g. bars 93-96, 163-169 even more so). “Depth” is given to the harpsichord’s central line 
through timbral colouring in the strings, the use of pizzicato and harmonics. 
 
                                                
298 Of course, Tiensuu is by no means the first or only composer to “compose out” and expand the 
boundaries of musical materials so as to encompass and develop material previously held as “decorative”  – 
the turn figure at the opening of the last movement of Mahler’s Ninth Symphony becomes a fundamental 
basis of the movement, to give one example. 
299 ADORNO 1999: 152. The source of this quotation is cited at length in a footnote above. 
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Ex. 27, Tiensuu: Arsen i c  and Old Lace , harpsichord re-entry, bars 167-171 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
 
A similar passage returns (with a section of the string’s material repeated exactly – 
compare the strings’ parts in bars 86-101 and 159-174). This second time, pitches have 
been deducted from the harpsichord’s part, which, nonetheless, remain in the quartet’s 
material just as played before. This results in pointillistic material in the harpsichord part, 
given direction and unified through connective fragments in the quartet. The quartet, for 
the first time, becomes a central force of articulation. This new centrality of the quartet is 
echoed through the harpsichord’s complete withdrawal for a few bars (for longer than in 
the corresponding passage found earlier). Indeed, when it re-enters, it could be said to “re-
enter” in the sense of coming back into an unfolding discourse. In expressing its own 
discursive consistency it moves towards self-sufficiency. (Whilst this “entry” is related to a 
notion of rupture, this does not approach the forcefulness of the gesture of “entry”, of 
rupture, of extraneous material into/from Rihm’s Tenth Quartet.) In addition, whilst the 
string material appears identically as before, the harpsichord fails to remain exactly “locked 
in” as in the previous, corresponding passage. Pitches are picked out from the strings’ 
texture, but inexactly in terms of their rhythmic placement – compare the pitches and the 
rhythms of the harpsichord’s triplet figure and strings material in bar 169 (Ex. 27), for 
example. 
A lengthy passage in which discourse proliferates to a point of a breakdown of the 
discourse’s consistency (bars 175 to 225) follows. In the first section of this passage (bars 
175-193), an increasingly chromatic and densely voiced part grows from the pointillistic 
and fragmentary texture of the harpsichord’s part. The string textures increasingly thicken, 
the duration of many pitches increases. Articulation then breaks down even further. After 
a few bars without the harpsichord, it returns (bar 200) with tremolos and then hefty 
cluster chords. Discursive stability is further undermined through slip-sliding materials in 
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the strings that seem to go outside of the framework of pitch identities outlined thus far 
(see the quartet’s material, bars 200-220). 
 
Ex. 28, Tiensuu:  Arsen i c  and Old Lace , bars 224-232 
 
© Jukka Tiensuu & Finnish Music Information Centre, 1990. Reproduced by permission. 
 
As this slip-sliding moves downwards it slows, ultimately settling on a single pitch 
(bar 221), a B-flat (at first with microtonal inflections, and then without (225)). The end of 
this contraction onto B-flat can be seen in Ex. 28. This provides a return, in terms of pitch 
at least, to gravitational centre of B-flat. It may be recalled that the harpsichord 
prominently and microtonally intoned this same pitch at the very opening of the work. 
Indeed, here this same pitch prepares the frame for the harpsichord’s re-entry, this time 
for a cadenza (which is not given in the score).300 This pitch centre is important as, 
following Tiensuu’s direction at the opening of the score, this cadenza is ‘(a free 
improvisation) on B?’. Instead of an affirmative tutti, after the cadenza discourse is 
“rebuilt” slowly, but incompletely. (He also writes: ‘The cadenza should finish with thirds 
D-F/D-F?	 (with possible microtonal variations) and preferably overlap (ad lib.) with the 
entrance of the violins in bars 227-228’.) The pitch B-flat, and then D, F and F-sharp, 
form a core out of which the music expands, employing traces of earlier proliferations in 
doing so. 
The role the cadenza plays is central in highlighting past-present relations – 
specifically, these relations regarding discursive boundaries in this work. The cadenza is 
included as a historically prescient mode of “proliferation” of discursive terms and an 
                                                
300 Tiensuu’s own performance, including his rendition of the cadenza, can be heard on the CD: ‘From 
Scandinavia – Arditti Quartet Vol. 28’, Naïve Sa (MO782141). Released December, 2008. 
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expanding of the boundaries of discourse, a central characteristic in Arsenic and Old Lace. 
Indeed, the whole work, even before the cadenza, takes an “improvisatory” tone. 
Dialectically, this is something retrospectively affirmed with reference to an explicitly 
improvisatory cadenza. The autonomy of the work finds itself based in the heteronomy of 
history, as well as, through proliferating multiplicities, begetting heteronomy of the present. 
The cadenza – historically a structural prolongation in which the soloist explores virtuosic 
superfluities  – is relocated as a central (if necessarily multiple) core of the discourse. Like 
the turn figures, expanded out on the surface, the cadenza is heard as a mode of expanding 
outwards, one retrospectively imbuing the entire work’s material with this sense. The 
boundaries of, and ruptures to, musical works’ constituent discourses are thus constructed 
both with reference to processes within the works and in an appeal to histories “external” 
to the works – a dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy.  
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THE LEGACY OF THE SELF IN SCHNITTKE’S STRING 
QUARTET NO. 4 (SECOND MOVEMENT) 
 
String Quartets provide a space for the exploration, articulation, and even the 
performative ‘doing’, of subjectivity; ‘[t]he music calls me to rehearse the subjectivity it 
performs, and commonly I do’, as Lawrence Kramer puts it301. Kenneth Gloag argues that, 
in the twentieth century, ‘the string quartet continued to provide a generic framework 
which reflected the inherited traditions and conventions as accumulated through history 
and stylistic developments of the genre, even if in some cases it was only to construct a 
point for new departure’.302 Taking this suggestion in mind, I propose that in Alfred 
Schnittke’s String Quartet No. 4 (1989) one of these points of departure is the historicity 
of the subject and of subjective understanding of the self. This is a quality that is evocated 
both semantically, through allusion to (“heteronomous”) historical musical materials, as 
well as through connections that develop within the work (“autonomously”). 
Richard Taruskin writes that, in Schnittke’s music, ‘the pot frequently boils over in 
violent extremes of dissonance: tone clusters (a Schnittke specialty), dense polytonal 
counterpoint (often in the form of close canons), “verticalized” melodies whereby the 
notes of a tune are sounded simultaneously as a chord’303.  The Fourth Quartet bears all 
these stylistic hallmarks. It also accords with Schnittke’s move, in the last decade of his life, 
towards ‘less frequently [relying] on quotation; stylistic pluralism is still present, but 
manifest by way of allusion rather than literal borrowing.’304 Indeed, this typifies the 
dialectic of historical allusion and self-determined development, of heteronomy and 
autonomy, cited above. 
Kramer discusses Schnittke’s Third Quartet (1983) in his Interpreting Music. Similarly 
to my focus on the Fourth, Kramer focuses on the use of past signifiers in problematic, 
“modern” context. ‘The piece’, he states, ‘is above all a study of when, if, and whether a – 
musical – message from the past can arrive safely in the present.’ 305 In the context of the 
Third Quartet, these messages take the form of explicit quotations. They are even labelled 
in the score (Ex. 29). These are textual fragments now distanced from their historical 
contexts; ‘these distanced forms of meaning [the quoted materials, as these allude to wider 
associations] are like phantoms or specters. Initially, at least, the citations that recall them 
                                                
301 KRAMER 2011: 48 
302 GLOAG 2003: 288. 
303 TARUSKIN 1997: 101 
304 DURRANI, AAMINAH 2005: Chorale and Canon in Alfred Schnittke’s Fourth String Quartet, PhD Diss., 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 150 
305 KRAMER 2011: 232. The essay in which Kramer makes these remarks is entitled simply ‘Modern’. 
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are empty husks betokening a historical condition that renders the meanings, perhaps any 
meanings, no longer accessible except as cancelled’306. Whilst this is similar to processes of 
“distancing” that occur in the Fourth, there are also important differences, due to the 
dialectic of heteronomy and autonomy that arises in Schnittke’s late music (this is explored 
in more detail below). In this way I draw on Kramer’s discussion of the Third but take it 
further. 
 
Ex. 29, Schnittke: String Quartet No. 3, opening 
 
3. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1984 by Universal Edition A.G., Wien/PH522 
 
The Fourth Quartet consists of five movements, the first three of which are played 
without a break. The first movement acts as a kind of slow introduction to the second. 
There is a focus on glissandi and textures are bare, gradually changing, and chromatic, 
sometimes with microtonal fluctuations. The Allegro second movement juxtaposes material 
heard in embryonic forms in the first. A central point of focus is a recurring entry of 
material marked with historical connotations – a stylistic breakthrough that interjects into 
the flow of the movement. This stylistic intervention bears an acute relationship with 
                                                
306 KRAMER 2011: 234 
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historically established mediations of the self in music. Hence, much of the following 
discussion focuses on this “intervention” and its relationship to other materials in the 
quartet. The third movement mirrors the Lento of the first, but is infused with some of the 
Allegro’s features. The fourth is quick, and leads into a final Lento, which echoes the mood 
of the first. A feature that occurs across these movements, that gives the discourse a 
“boundary” through consistency (although this is at the same time “ruptured”307), in one 
dimension at least, is a gesture of movement up and down between semitones.308 This 
becomes a central feature of the musical discourse (an object of focus), which I explore 
below. It is a feature that arises from autonomous processes yet gives form to an object 
inscribed with heteronomous associations (that concern subjective selfhood, as these have 
been historically articulated in music). 
I start by briefly outlining notions of selfhood as they relate to Schnittke’s Quartet. 
The understanding of a coherent, centred self, and its relationship with musical closure, is 
of importance here. An examination of the objectification of self – as a symbol, as an 
object of understanding – and Schnittke’s musically discursive treatment of it, follows. 
Last, I note how this objectification is reacted to in the Fourth Quartet, how new lines of 
connection and mediation are drawn from and through it. 
Understanding the Music(al Self) 
Selfhood is a site of ideology, of materiality, and of identity. As such it is also a 
point of contestation, one at which something is at stake in these terms. It has become a 
concept of musicological interest in recent years. Susan McClary writes of how, in the 
Classical sonata, through internal synthesis of contradictory materials, the ideal of an 
autonomous and centred self was negotiated musically.309 Mark Evan Bonds (following 
Scott Burnham) writes similarly of the music of Beethoven (and his enduring influence) 
that, ‘[i]n the unfolding of a central musical idea, in the close integration of contrasting 
gestures, and in a trajectory that traces a path from struggle to triumph, we hear what 
                                                
307 Even at a “microscopic” level (as I use the term in the section on Tiensuu’s Arsenic and Old Lace, above) 
discursive boundaries are tested. The twelve semitones, for instance, which form the basic framework of 
consistency in/by which Schnittke develops his material (i.e., transforms and transposes motives), are 
sometimes transgressed in favour of quartertones and glissandi. As Aaminah Durrani puts it: ‘In the 
Fourth Quartet, Schnittke’s microtonic passages intensify the semitone and introduce into the texture an 
element of harmonic uncertainty; microtones are not components of scalar structures’ (DURRANI 2005: 
46). Note that in chapter 5 I further explore the twelve semitones, and established chromatic scale steps, 
as they permit historically inherited frameworks of consistency – as they provide “boundaries” – through 
which musical discourses are often articulated in recent music. 
308 In examining processes “within” the musical discourse, I draw on Aaminah Durrani’s (2005) analysis of 
the work. She employs Set Theory in her analysis. My aim, however, is to draw on her findings so as to 
illustrate wider philosophical-historical ideas. 
309 MCCLARY 2000: 102 
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amounts to an idealized progression of life itself’310. Most recently, Daniel Chua has 
written of the articulation of self through the concept of ‘iPodic selves’.311 Despite the 
differences between the music focused upon, and what they consider as being at stake, 
what these authors have in common is a taking of selfhood as something that is articulated 
musically in order to be experienced. Indeed, in Part I, it was shown that elements of 
musical material might provide points suggestive of proximities between subject and 
object, acting so as to enable subjective identification with these materials (and, 
furthermore, the inscribed legacies and philosophical-historical ideas with which these 
materials are coincident). Our worlds and our Selves are mediated and understood 
musically. 
Commenters have often characterised Schnittke’s music as displaying 
polystylistic312 or polyglossic313 tendencies. Building on this, I suggest that collisions of 
differing musical styles make visible collisions of past selves, past ways of being musically 
in the world.314 Hence, Schnittke’s music does not merely juxtapose musical genres, forms, 
and materials, but worlds with worlds, and selves with selves. His String Quartet No. 4 
provides a case in point. 
One moment of stylistic intervention (and historical allusion) stands out in 
particular, speaking to the historicity of the articulation of subjectivity and (self) 
understanding as these are sedimented musically. This returns, in slightly adapted forms, as 
a position around which much of the rest of the movement’s materials revolve. The first 
entry of the material occurs towards the opening of the second movement (Ex. 30, fig. 
2) 315 . This returning figure suggests unity in a sound world of otherwise complex 
polyphony and, contrary to the music preceding it, strongly articulates a cohesive 
discursive identity.316 It can be grasped on to, a sturdy, floating object of focus in the 
otherwise continuous and stormy polyphonic sea in which subjectivity is set adrift. This 
                                                
310 BONDS 2006: 57 
311 CHUA, DANIEL 2011: ‘Listening to the Self: The Shawshank Redemption and the Technology of Music’ 
in 19th-Century Music, Vol. 34, No. 3 (pp. 341-355), 355. See also CHUA, DANIEL 2010: ‘Listening to the 
Other: A Counter-Cultural Ear in iPodic Times’ in Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Vol. 135, 
Supplement 1 (pp. 103-108). 
312 IVASHKIN 1996: 88. See also SCHNITTKE, ALFRED 2002a: ‘Polystylistic Tendencies in Modern Music’ 
[orig. c. 1971] in A Schnittke Reader (ed. Alexander Ivashkin), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, and 
Richard Taruskin’s essay, ‘After Everything’ (in TARUSKIN 1997). 
313 DIXON 2007 
314 I explore a social, rather than personal, concept of style, thus contrasting with Naomi Cumming’s 
writings on selfhood and style. See CUMMINGS, NAOMI 2000: The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and 
Signification, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 10. 
315 Note that there seems to be a B-flat missing in the score in the cello’s line in the second bar of fig. 2. 
316 This is not to say polyphony and unity are exclusive phenomena in general (a polyphonic work, like a 
fugue, can suggest a larger unity). It is instead to suggest that an opposition of these things is presented in 
the discourse of this work, as particular means by which expressive and dramatic results are produced. 
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object articulates a discursive identity, situated amongst other polyphonic materials that 
often undermine distinctive, centred identities. The latter (polyphonic) materials, set in 
contrast with these objects, arise from close canons and contrapuntal lines that regularly 
trespass into the other players’ registers. As Aaminah Durrani summarises, ‘traditional 
canons of the common practice period are typically composed so that the lines are heard 
as independent entities.’317 However, ‘[Schnittke’s] canons, like Ligeti’s micropolyphony, 
create – by virtue of their brevity, short durations between entrances, or uniform rhythmic 
patterns – a texture continuously in motion.’318 
 
Ex. 30, Schnittke: String Quartet No. 4 ( i i ) , five bars before Fig. 2 
 
4. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1989 by Universal Edition A.G. Wien/PH 532 
 
This object, standing in bold contrast with other materials (yet also arising from 
them, as I illustrate below), speaks to legacies of the self directly, reminiscent of 
mannerisms of musical concordance – of synthesis and resolution – as heard in earlier art 
musics. It is a reference point for understanding, one readily heard thanks to the material’s 
markedness both immanently to the work (as formally unprepared juxtaposition) and 
                                                
317 DURRANI 2005: 56 
318 DURRANI 2005: 80. Durrani also notes that Schnittke was familiar with Ligeti’s micropolyphony; 
‘Schnittke wrote an analysis of Ligeti’s Lontano during the 1970s’ (DURRANI 2005: 58). 
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historically (because, as I show below, it is a moment reminiscent of past discourses of 
musical selves at odds with what is around it).319 However, it does not provide synthesis or 
resolution, rather acting as a symbol of a unity, of integration of subject and object. 
It would at this point be wise to examine the concept of “understanding” itself, 
something central to any “self-understanding”. This concept has its own historical-
philosophical legacy. I will start by outlining the concept of understanding – in particular 
as a notion after Hegel320 – before exploring how this shapes the dialectics of experiencing 
musical form, expression, and meaning in moments from the second movement. Drawing 
on stable understanding, I argue that Schnittke then goes on to problematise it – not so as 
to obscure the music’s meaning – but, paradoxically, to form the basis by which musical 
moments are meaningful. So, whilst I consider my outlook to be discursive (i.e. through 
taking the music as a discourse), I do not take an unproblematically semiotic line (one in 
which messages are sent from sender to receiver via objectified semiotic codes).321 In 
contrast to the sender-receiver model, “understanding”, as it is pursued here, is very much 
entangled with an on-going experience in the present, mediated by the past. 
I principally follow a Hegelian inspired notion of subjectivity and understanding – 
heterodox contemporary subjectivities do exist, after all – due to the impact still left on 
experiencing and thinking about music by what Janet Schmalfeldt calls the ‘Beethoven-
Hegelian tradition’.322 This is a dialectical conception of experience tied in closely with the 
well-established perspective that Beethoven’s ‘Heroic’ works offer up the articulation of a 
particular kind of self in music; that is, that the substance of Beethoven’s music, like 
Hegel’s self, emerges through the process of becoming rather than simply being. Gary 
Tomlinson, commenting on Scott Burnham’s now classic Beethoven Hero, notes that 
 
the processes of integral teleological development constructed into this music 
were assimilated to a modern model of subjectivity just then taking shape. 
The music came to concretise an elite European self just as it wished itself to 
be. Thus the music’s sense of self-sufficiency answered to the post-
Enlightenment ideology of individual freedom and self determination.323  
 
                                                
319 For a discussion of markedness see HATTEN, ROBERT 1994: Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, 
Correlation, and Interpretation, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
320 The theoretical framework of my discussion is primarily structured around Fredric Jameson’s recent 
work on Hegelian ‘understanding’ as found in his Valences of the Dialectic (JAMESON 2010). 
321 See, for example, TARASTI, EERO 2009: ‘Understanding, Misunderstanding, and Self-Understanding’ 
in Le Sens Langagier du Musical: Sémiosis et Hermenéia actes du 1er symposium d'Aix-en-Provence (eds. Bernard 
Vecchione & Christian Hauer), Paris: Institut d’Esthétique des Arts et Technologies.  
322 SCHMALFELDT 2011: 23 
323 ‘Finding Ground to Stand On’ in TOMLINSON 2007: 184  
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This is a synthesised self in which subject and object express unification through musical 
works. ‘The influence of the Beethoven-Hegelian tradition remains very much part of our 
musicological heritage’, writes Schmalfeldt in her discussion of the writings of A.B. Marx, 
E.T.A Hoffman, and others.324 The self – and this point concerns conceptions of selfhood 
beyond a Beethoven-Hegelian self – has historically been something conceived of as centred, with 
boundaries, a unitary ideal. It is this legacy of self and subjectivity that I will argue that 
Schnittke takes as an important yet historically distant point of reference. 
What Carl Dahlhaus has called the ‘overpowering legacy of Beethoven’ 325  is 
important here too. He writes that, not  
 
until the modern music of our century was the history of the string quartet, 
which virtually seeped away in the nineteenth century, resumed in 
representative bodies of works by Schönberg, Bartók, and Hindemith. And in 
spite of the radically new musical idiom, or perhaps under its protection, 
these works unmistakably took Beethoven as their starting point.326  
 
For Schnittke, even if we are to say that in his musical language he draws on the 
developments of Schoenberg (twelve-tone writing), Bartók (juxtaposition of pan-tonal 
materials), or even Shostakovich, this Beethovenian legacy still resonates. Furthermore, 
Beethoven’s music provides a prototypical way in which the understanding of music is 
significant:  
 
The thought that music can be destined to be “understood” had probably 
arisen a few decades earlier [than Beethoven’s Late, “difficult” works], around 
1800; but only in connection with the reception of Beethoven did it have a 
significant impact on music history – significance which then grew steadily 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.327 
 
Schnittke’s facing of these legacies principally concerns the connections between 
the self-sufficiency of musical forms and the self-sufficiency of the self, with musical 
closure being perhaps the most visible point of contact between both.  Closure is 
important to a centred subject, in giving form to its self-sufficiency. Cadential figures have 
a crucial role in achieving this, whether this is in accomplishing Classical balance in the 
eighteenth century, or in bringing completion to the synthesis of musical developmental 
processes in the nineteenth century. A question might be asked here: why, given that in the 
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Third Quartet Schnittke explicitly quotes a cadential figure (from Orlando di Lasso’s Stabat 
Mater), should we focus on allusions to such figures in the Fourth? The answer is twofold. 
Firstly, this quotation in the Third alludes to a figure of pre-Classical closure, a figure that 
has very different functions and resonances than the closure alluded to in the Fourth. 
Secondly, and more importantly, in the Fourth the figure arises through a dialectic of 
autonomy and heteronomy, rather than appearing as an explicit quotation. The Fourth’s 
allusion appeals to both “extraneous” and “emergent” rupture. It thus engages with wider, 
philosophically resonant issues of the development and determination of musical works 
and musical selves. 
Notably audible in codas and codettas, repeating cadences provide clear structural 
markers of closure. They rhetorically confirm the synthesis of a work’s resolution and the 
viability of the form as an affirmatory ideal of subjectivity. In Beethoven-Hegelian terms, 
the legacy of closure is closely related (though by no means identical) to the legacy of the 
self. In Beethoven’s music, the coda’s cementing of the work’s processually driven 
unification ‘contributes to the perception of the closed and self-consuming work’, the 
completion of a self-generated process.328 The coda to Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 
provides what is perhaps the most famous (and overstated) example of this. Gigantic in 
size, the coda triumphantly resolves not only the movement of which it is part, but the 
symphony as a whole.  
Schnittke’s stylistic intervention is a figure of historically established closure, 
though one acting outside of both its historical time and the temporal flow of the 
immediate musical context. This connection with the past is doubly achieved. Firstly, this 
is accomplished through its taking on a clear form: to take its original statement by way of 
example (fig. 2, Ex. 30), through establishing a firm homophony, falling into regular 
phrasing, and anchoring itself around a pitch centre. All these features demonstrate ready 
contrast with the shifting polyphonic textures that appear before and after it (an 
arrangement that is later complicated). Secondly, this is achieved through this figure’s 
rhetorical likenesses with previous paradigms of closure.  
This second quality – allusion – can be illustrated with reference to figures of 
closure found in Beethoven’s codas. As seen in the coda of the Fifth Symphony, the 
reiteration of a motion between tonic and dominant affirms a pitch centre, with repetitive 
cadential figures, through localised surface movement, affirming the finality of tonal 
immobility. In a comparable recurring gesture, Schnittke’s stylistic intervention affirms a 
static, steady position, oscillating between two chords, with the top voice semitonally 
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moving back and forth as akin to a leading note repeatedly finding its tonic. These chords 
themselves recall tonality, without providing it. They make connections within the work, 
to tonal triads already introduced as ‘independent elements throughout the Quartet’329, as 
well as to a history “outside” of it. For example, in the first two bars of both figs. 2 and 6 
(Exs. 30 and 32), forgiving the ‘grace notes’ – the quavers and crotchets in the first bars of 
each – A major and B-flat minor chords are spelt out.330  
 
Ex. 31, Beethoven: Egmont  Overture, bb. 293-296 
 
Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel (1862 edition) 
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Mazel described the harmonic phenomenon of ‘common mediants’ (for example between B major and C 
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Ex. 32, Schnittke: String Quartet No. 4 ( i i ) , five bars before fig. 6 
 
4. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1989 by Universal Edition A.G. Wien/PH 532 
 
The rhetorical scheme of Schnittke’s material supplements this; Schnittke plays 
with a figurative paradigm of closing. Whilst I do not wish to suggest a direct connection, 
a paradigmatic example of such a figure can be observed in Beethoven’s Egmont 
Overture.331 The Overture provides an illustrative token of this type of closing figure. 
(Oscillating repeated cadential figures of closing can also be heard in many other works, 
his Third and Fifth symphonies, for example.) Indeed, there can be observed an 
immediate gestural affinity between the climactic moment of the return to the tonic in 
Beethoven’s Overture (Ex. 31) and the stylistic intervention as seen in the Schnittke 
quartet (Exs. 30 and 32), which, as I have noted above, also alludes to the circling around 
of a central, if problematic, tonal identity (A or B-flat). What is also of importance here is 
the rhythmic organisation of Beethoven’s figure (bars 295-296) – an emphatically held 
chord, followed by shorter (quaver) movement up and down – and Schnittke’s echoing of 
this rhetorical paradigm. 
As I note above, Schnittke’s oscillating figure – which makes heteronomous, 
historical connections, as well seemingly rupturing “into” the discourse – also arises 
“emergently” from within the work. Step-wise semitonal figures appear throughout all the 
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movements, though they formulate into this emphatic rhetorical figure in the second. 
Durrani labels this material the ‘Rhythmic Theme’, which is defined by ‘oscillating 
semitones driven by pounding rhythms’.332 I concur with Durrani’s analysis, that the 
‘semitone oscillation, double stops, and homorhythmic texture introduced in m. 37 [in the 
first movement] grow to become a principal motive in the second movement of the 
Quartet.’ 333  This is also pre-figured in the viola’s microtonal oscillation in the first 
movement, from bars 29-35. The principal figure of the second movement – as an object 
– thus develops, “becoming” rather than rupturing only from “outside” (something which 
distinguishes its character from the quotation of di Lasso’s cadential figure in the Third 
Quartet). In becoming as such, in articulating a discernable identity, they become ‘clearly 
recognizable objects, they serve as points of arrival within the movement’334. However – 
and this point takes us towards aesthetic concerns beyond the valuable analytic 
observations made by Durrani – this object, its restatement, is not only “formally” 
significant. These restatements are a formal concern, but this “formal character” also holds 
relationships with the historicity of form; form is inscribed with extra-formal functions that 
pertain to subjectivity. Schnittke makes connection with the past, to a figure of closure 
recalling, through associative proximity with it, the determination of a synthesised 
subjectivity. This is a metonymic relationship because, even if such figures of closure 
cannot be said to represent a coherent self (i.e. metaphorically), they may still be taken as 
symbolic indices of it (related to it, found beside it). The past here gives value to the 
present, if only in an objectified, partial form. 
So what of understanding after Hegel, and of the musical self in particular after 
Beethoven? The philosopher Fredric Jameson writes that understanding is based in ‘the 
law of non-contradiction.’335 This means that understanding requires the division of one’s 
world into separable elements – for example: self and other, or into a series of divisible 
objects, concepts, and ideas. Jameson continues: ‘…[it] is what Hegel called Verstand… 
and what Marx called reification’. 336  Understanding tends towards order, concrete 
knowledge, and systematisation, rationalisation and conceptualisation. In addition, as 
Jameson’s reference to Karl Marx may remind us, reification (and, by extension, 
understanding) is not a neutral process, but may find itself complicit or reconciled with 
dominant logics. Hence, understanding is not guided merely by naïve perception – it is not 
a phenomenological given – but by historical, material, and ideological forces. Indeed, this 
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understanding of the world through music is closely related to self-understanding – 
imagining the world encompasses a situating of the self in relation to that world.  
In order to understand the self – to order it, and to have knowledge of it – 
subjectivity must be objectified.337 As Julia Kristeva put it above, ‘the subject must separate 
from and through his image, from and through his objects.’338 Subjectivity is articulated 
through objects, be this in the assigning of meaning to physical objects, linguistic concepts, 
musical works, and so on. It becomes visible through them. Objectification of the subject 
allows for an act of identification of subject with object (as explored in chapter 3), and so 
the object may act for the subject, with the internalised self taking strength from the world 
outside. Furthermore, thinking of the understanding of selfhood in terms of subject-object 
relations allows for explicit links to be drawn between contemporary subjectivities and 
their relationships with earlier subjectivities, principally that of the Beethoven-Hegelian 
tradition. It also permits for, as will be seen later, a gauging of shifts in the level of 
discourse between subject and object, when comparing such relations in earlier and more 
contemporary musics.  
At an extreme, in capturing subjectivity in objects, selfhood is frozen in place – reified. 
This is where a paradox arises, a contradiction of selfhood in music that Schnittke 
capitalises upon. In freezing subjective processes into images and objects, the continuous, 
slipperiness of experience that characterises subjective experience in general, and the 
experience of music in particular, is lost. Through objectification, the subjective dimension 
of selfhood is alienated from itself. The material of the stylistic intervention acts similarly. 
Nominating itself as a moment that may act to visibly articulate an image of subjective 
selfhood, it simultaneously betrays this through eschewing the expressivity required of it. 
Consequently, a dialectical chasm opens between subjectivity’s objectification in historical 
musical material, and the inability of this same material to be constitutive of subjective 
experience – the fact that any construction of subjectivity is itself alienating. 
As noted above, whilst emerging from properties of material already introduced 
(centrally, movement via semitones), this material also seems to intrude into the work 
from “outside”. This can be put in thetic terms: stepping across – “rupturing” – the edge 
of the discourse (but, in so doing, affirming its boundary at the same time). Whilst these 
entries, in their reified historical character, suggest a means of understanding, their 
intrusion into the flow of the musical discourse potentially highlights the “inauthentic” 
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character of this understanding. That is, as they are so fixed, they become evacuated of 
their expressive content, and ‘in its zeal severs the bonds between subject and object’.339 
This dialectical gulf is echoed in discursive terms. Rather than subject and object 
synthesising in the ‘ideal’ Beethoven-Hegelian manner, subject-object synthesis is merely 
presented as another object of focus of the discourse. The material, reminiscent of a 
repeatedly cadential, unifying figure, fails to bring closure, and fails to unify. Synthesis is 
represented as a symbol, divided from the temporal and processual dimension that 
facilitates the basis of its former character. It is merely asserted: being, rather than 
becoming, dead, rather than dynamically lived. In its objectified character, it is not the 
figure of an expressive subject being worked-through in the present, but the disfigurement 
of a past self. The subject is divided from this object, no longer proximally close to it (as it 
was in the former synthesis). Despite this, the former, ideal synthetic self is remembered, 
even if this dialectical process is no-longer inhabited. This I call a shift in the level of discourse, 
one by which on-going dialectical process is recalled, but not processually. It is objectified 
as a metonymic symbol of its former self. 
‘Meaningful music is not necessarily expressive’, a dictum from Adorno, rings true 
for this material.340 These chords are not expressive but they are meaningful, in that they 
refer to the idea of subjective expression whilst pointing to the fact that they fail in 
providing it. In fact, their very evacuation of expression in the present – their 
estrangement from it as an idea of a bygone historical past – is what makes them 
meaningful. Like the first entry, the entries that immediately follow it remain fixed and 
expressionless, as arbitrary symbols of expression. Their significance arises from this 
paradoxical, dual status. Crucially, whilst this chordal material is historically connotative of 
an expressive figure, it fails to provide the expression that this figure seems to promise. As 
a result, this objectified symbol of subjectivity may no longer to be identified as a vehicle of 
subjective expression, and is no longer to be identified with by a subject striving for 
expression. The notion of constructing and understanding selfhood through 
objectification is looked on, and heard, sceptically. 
The quartet is historically primed as a space for engaging with concerns of 
selfhood, a concept whose own self-sufficiency has been intertwined with issues of 
musical closure. Schnittke engages with this tradition through attending to figures of 
closure as symbolic, metonymic markers of a certain kind of selfhood. In doing this, these 
figures are removed from their imagined processual contexts that allowed them to bring 
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about closure to discourses, and are instead treated as objects of discourse. This is not 
simply an objectification by Schnittke, but rather a critical engagement with the 
paradoxical idea that the subjective interiority of the self finds articulation in exterior 
objects; selfhood is always, to some degree, made possible through objectification. The 
next question, then, becomes one of how these objects function in the present discourse 
of the String Quartet No. 4 so as to modify, react to, and play with legacies of selfhood 
inscribed immanently into musical materials inherited from the past. 
Contradiction – Repression – Opposition 
In his discussion of understanding, Jameson develops his characterisation of it (as 
‘the law of non-contradiction’, quoted above) through showing that contradictions are not 
overcome but are instead repressed. 
 
We may here therefore in some virtually proto-Freudian movement avant le 
lettre identify a repression of contradiction as one of the driving impulses of 
Verstand, along with the displacement of the contradiction onto the positing 
of some single stable determination or quality.341 
 
Jameson’s account of understanding can help us come to terms with Schnittke’s distant 
treatment of symbols of subjectivity and selfhood; in particular, the requirements that 
contradictions are not faced, not overcome, but are instead repressed. Jameson’s statement 
can be read in discursive terms: through understanding, experience is divided up; instead 
of instabilities existing within the continuum of experience, differences are seen to exist 
between separable elements of that experience, or between isolatable concepts.  
Potentially the clearest case of this new, ‘understood’ stability is that of oppositions, 
in which the heterogeneity of experience becomes understood as a case of ‘either/or’. Two 
stable positions are set up, with the instability of experience understood through reference 
to them. Hence, in general terms, the world and the self are understood with reference to 
the cultural and natural, the masculine and the feminine, the historical and the immediate, 
and so on. ‘[K]nowledge, to establish itself, will proceed through a supplementary reversal 
of meaning, by repressing meaning’s heterogeneity and by ordering it into concepts or 
structures based on the divided unity of the subject’, Kristeva claims in Revolution in Poetic 
Language.342 Oppositions facilitate understanding, an understanding not only of the world 
but also of a self in relation to that world, or defined oppositionally against an ‘Other’. In 
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this respect, Schnittke’s treatment of the objectified symbols of self – as these correspond 
or oppose other musical materials – becomes of great importance to how understanding is 
constructed in the discourse.  
Schnittke sets up various oppositions in the second movement of the quartet: the 
stylistic intervention, connotative of tonally cadential mannerisms, opposes chromatic 
saturation (see the bars preceding fig. 2, in which we are plunged from one into the 
contrasting other); the historically resonant (the intervention) opposes bodily, criss-
crossing polyphony, characterised by gestural immediacy (see the bars preceding fig. 6, Ex. 
32); and, the tangible (the cadential figure, as a comparatively stable object of experience), 
opposes the amorphic character of the fluctuating atonal lines that surround it. This 
supplements oppositions explored throughout all five movements (for example, triads as 
historical elements, as these oppose chromatic textures). These binaries correlate to some 
degree:343 chords suggesting tonally cadential mannerisms (even if they are not literally 
tonal or functional) can be understood as historical and tangible; their atonal ‘other’ is cast 
as bodily and amorphic, even intangible.344 
The articulation of difference within the discourse of the second movement, 
principally in terms of these sets of contrasts, echoes deep-seated conceptual oppositions 
between the historical and the immediate, the amorphic and the tangible, and so on, with 
these materials performatively playing out these philosophical-historical ideas and so 
enabling a starting point for the discourse’s understanding. Indeed, these ideas are engaged 
with in such a way as to give form to this object of the discourse. The immediate context 
of the markedly historical figure allows for its reification – its understanding – as opposite, 
or as counterposition, to much of the rest of the material which makes up the movement. 
This material is a raft of symbolic meaning, one given shape through its tangible historical 
resonance. It is a recognisable object foregrounded in the context of otherwise ever-
changing material. In light of understanding, materials are positioned differentially with the 
musical movement pushing and pulling between divisible positions. Indeed, and 
paradoxically, differential positioning also enables understanding, and for correlations to 
be made with larger significances ‘outside’ of the music (the cultural and the natural, the 
historical and the immediate, and so on).  
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(Notably, this opposition is retained, but inverted, in the final movement. Towards 
the very end of the work, a cluster (C, C-sharp, D, and D-sharp/E-flat) enters (at fig. 24, 
movement five) “from outside”, triple-forte. What this gestural, amorphic entity enters 
“into” is not a polyphonic storm like that of the second movement. Instead, it is a foreign 
object that disturbs a reflective and historically evocative pseudo-tonal chorale; the 
immediate enters the historical. This triggers the return of the twelve-tone row that 
opened the first movement, microtonal fluctuations, and a final fade into nothingness.) 
The self is identified symbolically with figures of (self) closure. This contrasts with 
the Beethovenian Heroic self, which is not defined differentially but rather through the 
work in its entirety. Self-sufficiency, self-creation, self-determination are its ideals; ‘one 
does not hear a world order against which a hero defines himself – one hears only the hero, 
the self, fighting against its own element’, Burnham writes.345 In Schnittke’s quartet, due to 
the shift in the level of discourse, the determination of self is not something done – 
something to be worked out through synthesis – but rather something uncovered as alien, 
as an objectified self, an object of understanding. As with ‘either/or’ it is defined 
differentially against what is outside it, the ‘not-self’ (other). 
Seeing (the signification of) selfhood as an object goes hand-in-hand with self-
understanding – ‘I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an 
object,’ Jacques Lacan famously said.346 In giving the signification of self a discursive 
position, selfhood is given an image that sets it apart from the subjective flow of time. 
This contrasts strongly with the Beethoven-Hegelian self, a dialectic of temporal becoming 
par excellence. However, given that Schnittke engages with figures of closing, as 
metonymic of self, another dialectical contradiction emerges: closing requires temporal 
processes as a fundamental basis of its function. 
To say that closure comes at the end seems tautological; it is the result of a process, 
after all. However, Schnittke’s figures of closure intersperse this movement. This is not to 
say that Schnittke was the first to take cadences outside of their function of finality. It has 
been noted that, in Classical music, ‘cadence formations became so standardized that they 
could be used, for rhetorical effect, even in positions other than endings’347. An excellent 
example of this is provided at the very opening of Haydn’s String Quartet in C op. 74, No. 
1. Schnittke can be seen as drawing on this tradition, but he also goes much further, 
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something that can be illustrated through comparison. Such cadences in Haydn’s quartets 
are formal dissonances, playing with the expectations of how temporality is musically 
structured within the framework of Classical conventions. Those in Schnittke’s quartet are 
stylistically and historically, rather than formally, out of place. They no longer perform 
their previous closing function. Rather, they are objectified as markedly “historical” 
through contrast with other musical materials. Whilst their use is rhetorical, a quality 
shared with Haydn’s playful use of cadential rhetoric, their dissonance with time is with 
the time of history. 
Subjectivity grasped merely through understanding is a kind of nondialectical 
Being, ‘a reified thought which must reify itself in order to grasp its reified objects’348. 
Understanding thus reifies subjectivity itself so that it may become a thing to be perceived. 
Indeed, understanding’s inability to capture the continuum of experience – the slipperiness 
of subjectivity – is symptomatic of subjectivity’s self-alienation. This recognition of 
alienation is important as it suggests that objectification is always incomplete in 
objectifying subjectivity.  
As Philip Kain notes, the estrangement of the objectified, external world – its 
apparent independence outside of ourselves – can be overcome through recognising its 
alien character:  
  
Because alienation is an objectification – because the alienation of individuals 
constructs the monarch, the state, or God – this very same alienation can also 
allow us eventually to recognize the estranged reality as our own creation, our 
own selves objectified, our own alienation, and thus alienation can allow us to 
see through, and thus overcome, the estrangement.349 
 
Hence, in a dialectical manoeuvre of inversion, this closing through objectification might 
open the way for immanent critical reactions to these existential conditions, beginning 
from the inherent paradoxes of objectification held therein, a process partaken of through 
dialectical reaction. 
Dialectic as Reaction 
This process may only take place in light of reification. Firstly, there is no “pure” 
language that is outside of mediation by understanding. Secondly, as Jameson notes, 
dialectics are reactive to understanding. As he puts it: ‘[dialectics] is parasitic on Verstand 
itself, on the externalized thinking of a material world of objects, for its own operation of 
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correction and subversion, of negation and critique’350. So, Schnittke’s musical dialectic is 
not a presentation of the “opposite” of the reified, but instead a playing with the 
incompleteness of the object of understanding, and looking at it in terms of its 
incompleteness351. This means that whilst at first, through an expositionary strategy, 
Schnittke presents the chordal material as a reified, if alien, entity, he later constructs the 
music as reactive to this. 
Importantly, his musical dialectic does not provide synthesis. Instead, it attends to 
the unlocking of potential connections and affectivities in the materials, without affirming 
a new, higher understanding through achieving synthesis. His dialectic therefore is one of 
heteronomy over synthesis and multiplication over unification, where understanding is not 
satisfied through realising a unitary, teleological “Whole.” 
As Jameson notes, a particular treatment of mediation is a central function of 
understanding: ‘It may be said that… the primary vice of Understanding consists in its 
effacement of mediation’.352 This follows the Hegelian idea that “in the very act of 
mediation the mediation itself vanishes”353. After the differential positioning of materials – 
an expositionary tactic – Schnittke moves towards exploring the inherent tensions between 
these positions, the possibilities of affects repressed through their understanding. In 
reaction to the expositionary, differentially understood discourse, the focus later moves to 
one of audibly exploring the mediation of musical ideas by one another. In other words, 
there is a movement from overstating the restrictions of positions, of their divisibility, to 
transgressing the semi-permeability of positional boundaries.  
The scepticism with which Schnittke treats reified material in the Fourth Quartet 
can be thought of as a repositioning of subjectivity in relation to mediation, or at least, a 
marking of the alienating effect of reification in the mediation of subjectivity. In dialectical, 
musically developmental terms, this is accomplished through expounding mediative 
relationships with other materials in the work, rather than letting these features “stand” for 
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themselves – for understanding on their own, differentially divisible terms – as they did 
expositionally.354 
This is accomplished through dialectically exploring positions previously held as 
separable through their mutual differentiation. Three examples of this will be given. Firstly, 
the homophonic, stylistic material, connotative of a rhetorical device under tonality, is 
audibly mediated through the chromatic saturation of the clusters and atonal polyphony 
found elsewhere in the work. Secondly, “historically” encultured past associations are 
rediscovered as immediate, bodily, and gestural. Thirdly, the object of focus (the 
intervention figure), something divisible and graspable from the discursive flow, becomes 
experienced fluidly as part of an on-going process, rather than as an object situated outside 
of this process. Importantly, one aspect does not win over the other – this would only 
affirm differential discursive positioning – rather the one side of the opposition is shown 
to be inherent in the other, relationships previously repressed through what Jameson 
called above the ‘effacement of mediation’. 
The first example is readily perceivable: the rhetorical character of the stylistic 
intervention becomes infused with the pitch content of the saturated atonality that was 
held previously in counterposition to it. Intervention figures lose their ‘tonal’ associations 
(with A major and B-flat minor, as at figs. 2 and 6) and find themselves becoming 
chromatically saturated. For example, in contrast with the tonal associations of the figure’s 
first entry, an octatonic pitch collection forms corresponding material at fig. 21 (B, C, D, 
E-flat, F, F-sharp). At fig. 22, such saturation increases even more so. 
 
Ex. 33, Clusters 
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articulation. 
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However, this does not result in a synthesis of the identities of the “pseudo-tonal” 
and the chromatic materials; rather, discursive terms proliferate. Take, for instance, the 
fact that these clusters are not presented merely as clusters – they no longer conform to 
their established position in the discourse – but are refracted through the range and 
voicings found in an Other, the stylistic figures. In examining the content of the widely 
ranged chords at fig. 22, and three bars after 22 (Ex. 33), it can be observed that they relate 
to chromatic clusters in terms of pitch as much as they do to the homophonic figures 
rhetorically. This means that, despite the expositionally fixed character of the chordal 
figures towards the beginning of the movement, later these fixed positions – and this 
understanding – are brought into disarray. 
What is reified as historical and stylistic enters into dialectical play with the bodily 
and gestural, tropes of immediacy. This can be put in semiotic terms. The stylistic 
intervention, in its reified dimension, acts symbolically, representationally, almost 
linguistically. The chromatically saturated materials set in counterposition to this (at least at 
its first moment of intervention, fig. 2) suggest the opposite – the immediacy of a “pre-
linguistic” continuum in which gesture is favoured over representation, texture over 
(inter)textual meaning. Schnittke organises these as somewhat separable positions before 
drawing the historical through the immediate, the symbolic through the gestural. 
 
Ex. 34, Schnittke: String Quartet No. 4 ( i i ) , fig. 23 
 
4. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1989 by Universal Edition A.G. Wien/PH 532 
 
At fig. 23 (Ex. 34) the rhetorical content of what was historically evocative material 
is taken to an extreme, being pushed towards gestural violence. What began as a 
reasonably self-contained symbol loses its articulatory identity. Its boundaries become 
smudged, ensconced by the textures that surround it. Indeed, a similar maneuver has been 
identified by Alistair Williams in Wolfgang Rihm’s Klavierstück No. 7 – where historical 
material becomes seen through the lens of the gestural. He notes how in the work 
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obsessively repeated E-flat major chords lose their historical connotations, failing to 
provide ‘security and respite’, and, through ‘the sheer violence of the gestures’, move to 
suggest the contrary – purely somatic content.355 In both these cases, immediacy over 
history – the sound of symbolic utterances rather than their representational signification or 
historical connection – is brought to the fore. 
Without an overarching Whole, an affirmed, singular character of the movement 
(of the work too), and of the self, is denied. There is no synthesis between subject and 
object as in the ideal Hegelian synthesis of Beethoven’s Heroics. The object of 
understanding fails to articulate a singular self, and subjectivity and its object are put at 
odds. A similar situation is often recognised in Late Beethoven.356 However, Schnittke 
goes further than this. He marks the alienating effect of reifying subjectivity into objects 
and symbols in the first place. The chordal figures, as connotative of subjective expression 
without providing it, encapsulate this in microcosm. As objects of this musical world, 
through which, it is remembered, selfhood is constituted and articulated, they are 
sceptically perceived at a distance. These symbols are presented as inherently alien before 
they are reacted to dialectically. In this subsequent dialectic, Schnittke makes apparent 
connections between musical materials, allowing for ideas that were previously separable, 
solid, and “understood”, to interconnect fluidly. 
This brings us to the third and final example, implicit in the first two, namely the 
move from the divisible object of focus to the fluidity of discursive process. This dialectic 
can be observed in a series of “false returns” to the chordal material in the second half of 
the movement, each of which processually refigures the relationships between this figure 
and its surroundings. The original, expositionary presentation of this material was assured 
positionally through its purported fixity. It expressed homophonic rhythmic stability, was 
connotative of a closing figure in the tonal tradition, and was a moment in which all 
instruments found themselves in unity. The “returns” of this material (figs. 21, 22, 23, and 
28) bring this fixity into question, as it is increasingly disturbed by, but not synthesised 
with, the movement’s other materials. 
These false returns keep entering but never actually return us to a point of fixed 
stability. With no such true return, the falseness of these moments becomes problematic; 
when no true return is found, they retrospectively become progressive stages in dissolving 
this figure’s fixity, rather than deviations from a final goal. The dissolution of this material 
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– this object of understanding – means that no true return, no final understanding is 
affirmed. In Schmalfeldt’s terms, these returns are unable to become part of a larger formal 
scheme, as, given their eschewal of formal function, their ‘retrospective formal 
reinterpretation’ is not affirmed. 357 Said differently, there is no final stable point by which 
they may retrospectively be understood as parts of a larger Whole. Each attempt at return, 
or each attempt at finding stable closure in the fixity of this material, is thwarted. Rather 
than clarifying understanding, these returns suggest a dissolving of the fixity of 
objectification. The reified object is lost to a proliferation of connections between 
previously divisible, segmentable positions. 
 
Ex. 35, Schnittke: String Quartet No. 4 ( i i ) , six bars before figs. 28-29 
 
4. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1989 by Universal Edition A.G. Wien/PH 532 
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The changing role of the chordal material throughout the movement – from being 
external and opposed to other materials of the movement, to becoming mediated by them – 
is encapsulated in this passage of returns. At fig. 28 (see Ex. 35), the previously intrusive 
stylistic material is brought into the processual flow of the movement (rather than being 
counterpoised externally to it). This moment is climactic, being led into through increasing 
dynamic levels and register, and a quickening of rhythmic values. This climatic moment 
captures the dialectical contradiction of the figures that form the tensional basis of the 
movement – the static, historically connotative homophony against the moving, chromatic, 
and gestural polyphony. This moment is particularly important, as, in contrast with much 
of the rest of the movement, here this tension is expressed processually. One aspect (the 
polyphonic and gestural) quite literally leads into the other. This contrasts with the 
differential understanding heard previously, an understanding based around reference to 
two different, and seemingly pre-existent, positions. Nevertheless, this processual moment 
does not suggest synthesis as, despite this climax (fig. 28) being the goal of the process, no 
sense of resolution is provided. If anything, here the tension is at its highest. 
Through taking a discursive approach, it has been illustrated that, in a shift in the 
level of discourse, Schnittke’s Fourth Quartet plays critically with historically established 
indices of selfhood. Subject-object synthesis has been abandoned, replaced by a semiotics 
of self. Or, taken another way, the signification of self, which has always played a role, has 
now been brought audibly to the forefront of experience. Figures of closure, as 
metonymically marking a past, coherent self, have been crucial here. This music draws on 
complex, subtle relationships to the intertwined pasts of music and philosophy, pasts 
whose features are both still current and active (activated) in the musical present. Former 
contexts – ways of understanding the self and the world, for example – are inscribed 
textually into musical materials. Whilst not identical, musical processes and subjective 
processes bear close relations. And, in this sense, experiencing, identifying, and 
understanding music, in some dimension at least, performs our striving to do these things 
of ourselves (our Selves). 
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5. Dreaming Through Contemporary Music 
“…we are in it as we are in dream.” 
 
The dispute whether music can portray anything definite, or is only a 
play of sound-patterns in motion, no doubt misses the point. A far 
closer parallel is with dream, to the form of which, as Romanticism 
well knew, music is in many ways so close… While the music lasts we 
are in it as we are in dream. 
 
– Theodor Adorno358 
 
Music encompasses issues of both knowledge (discussed in the previous chapter) 
and desire (in the next), facilitating their articulation. It also provides spaces in which their 
intersection and mutual mediation may be critically reassessed, one in which, for example, 
moments from the past might find themselves invested with new significances in the 
present. This is a process that is prominently explored in Valentin Silvestrov’s String 
Quartet No. 1 (1974, revised 1990). Silvestrov himself pronounced this work to belong to 
his “weak style”359. But, as Levon Hakobian notes, ‘though simplistic on the surface, the 
“weak style” by Silvestrov, as every “retro” procedure, is in essence strongly “sentimental”, 
not “naïve”.’360 
Before turning to this work in detail I should first outline some points of contact 
between the critical, philosophical approach pursued so far and the psychoanalytic-
theoretical themes that are to be developed throughout this chapter. This discussion can 
begin from one of Adorno’s weighty suggestions – that musical works entertain a form of 
conceptless cognition. Max Paddison summarises this idea: ‘musical works are themselves 
highly structured and thus constitute a mode of cognition, albeit – and importantly, in case 
we mistake music for language in any literal sense – non-conceptual’.361 Extending this idea, 
one might, in Silvestrov’s First Quartet – as a space in which legacies of subjectivity and 
interiority are faced – see the evocation of psychical processes as bringing about points of musical 
and aesthetic significance. I develop this idea through appealing to a psychoanalytically-
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157 
inclined understanding of discourse – as these processes are epitomised in theories of 
dreaming. 
A well-established tenet of musical modernism is its confrontation of, or reaction 
to, the traditions that preceded it – established styles, past musical languages, and ways of 
creating aesthetic experience. This presents a particular challenge for semiotics, which – in 
the tradition that follows on from the semiology of Ferdinand de Saussure at least – has 
been concerned with finding the ways in which symbols establish themselves and 
communicate messages or concrete meanings. Modernist music, as well as relating to 
preceding traditions, disturbs the codes that enable messages and meanings. Frameworks 
of normativity become suspect, with conventions and fragments of historical allusion 
often finding themselves brought into new relationships, as well as providing regulative 
frameworks for the mediation of meaning.  My appeal to psychoanalytic thinking responds 
to this situation. It can be read as an attempt to infuse musical semiotics with the fluid 
dynamism that is heard in critical, modernist musics. 
As I have argued above, Beethoven-Hegelian dialectics, and post-Hegelian 
developments (Adorno, Kristeva), are still pertinent to questions surrounding subjectivity 
in late modern musical works. This view is now to be supplemented with some explicitly 
psychoanalytic-theoretical observations regarding subjectivity. Noting Hegel and Freud’s 
impact upon both Adorno and Kristeva – and that my readings of the former have 
generally been mediated by the latter – this move should not be seen as much as a change 
of direction but as a development of a potential direction only touched upon earlier. 
Part II has so far revolved around the idea that subject and object are in mutual 
relation. I have already discussed at length how this is characterised in post-Hegelian terms. 
The question now is how this is to be formulated in psychoanalytic terms. Two umbrella 
terms for various mental processes are important here: internalisation (which includes and 
overlaps with the processes of identification, introjection, and incorporation) and 
externalisation (as seen in projection). Following Joseph Sandler and Meir Perlow’s 
interpretation, internalisation can be summarised as the “taking in” of features of external 
objects or relationships between objects into oneself.362 (I discussed aspects of this – under 
the guise of identification – in chapter 3, with regard to its coincidence with philosophical-
historical legacies such as the culture-nature duality.) Externalisation works in the opposite 
direction: perceiving aspects of the self, or relationships internal to the self, as playing out 
into the external world363. Even without explicating the full complexities of these two 
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processes, it should be immediately clear that the mind is not something static, and is 
situated within, shaped by, and incorporates within it a world of objects and, furthermore, 
that the boundary between these internal and external worlds is without self-evident 
demarcation. 
As will become apparent, the psychoanalytically-inclined ideas pursued here differ 
markedly from earlier psychoanalytic readings of music. Firstly, my discursive method 
treats works as provisional texts (or intertexts) to be analysed. It is the slippage of text into 
intertext, inside to outside – the coindences and correspondences at a thetic level, identity 
and non-identity – that are important to meaning. This “dynamic” method contrasts with 
seeing works through the lenses of psychoanalytic schemata: for example, of the Oedipal 
phantasy of overturning the fathers of tradition, the past masters, as seen in the now 
classic case of Harold Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence364, which has left its mark within 
musicology, most notably in Joseph Straus’s Remaking the Past365; or through Lacanian 
scaffolds of meaning, around which dimensions of subjectivity are constructed, as in Sarah 
Reichardt’s recent Composing the Modern Subject366. 
Secondly, my methodology – being set on the intersubjective stage of semiotics, of 
discourses inscribed philosophical-historically – tends towards the broad level of “the 
societal” rather than of the individual, with these philosophical-historical conditions being 
performed “within” the musical text. Crucially, the text provisionally under discussion (the 
discourse, the work, the object) is examined as mediative of knowledge and desire. This 
contrasts with seeing it as a product of the sublimation of an individual’s drives and 
libidinal energies. 
This latter view, labelled “psychobiography” by some, attempts to understand the 
artist behind the artwork.367 Freud’s own position on art reflected an early attempt at such 
an approach, as can be seen in his 1910 essay on ‘Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His 
Childhood’ in which ‘Freud leads us from the enigmatic smiles of his Mona Lisa and Virgin 
Marys to posit in the artist a memory regarding his long-lost mother’368. Heinz Kohut, 
writing in 1957, expressed this position when he wrote that ‘the weaker the aesthetic 
disguise of… rhythmic experiences, the less artistic becomes the music, as for example, in 
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some forms of jazz’369. Rhythmic energy, for Kohut, connoted the unmediated instinctual 
drive energies of the Unconscious.370  This earlier view was orthodoxly Freudian. In 
Kohut’s view, the aesthetic disguising of unconscious drives is the social; through it the 
individual’s energies must be articulated. Here, the individual is filtered by, rather than 
constructed through, the social. For this reason, for Kohut, the more energies that show 
through, the weaker (and, by implication, less developed) that social filtering is. Of course, 
this also speaks to the political end of denigrating jazz (it is a less developed, less artistic 
filter, as it fails to disguise the rawness of the Unconscious, unlike more “developed” 
music which sublimates it effectively). In contrast, I focus upon mediations of desire and 
knowledge on the intersubjective, musical stage. 
However, something further must be underlined: desires never fully stand in for 
that which they are meant to – instead they defer to other socially mediated desires, just as 
in language a word takes on meaning through its deference to others.  For this reason, the 
structure of the symbolisation of desires (for example, in works of music) does not 
homologously map onto the structure of what is desired. One cannot consequently read 
these symbolisations hermeneutically in terms of a one-to-one correlation, saying “X in the 
music means Y”. This relationship is always “non-identical.” Thus, I am not saying that a 
work is something singular symbolized in sound – Silvestrov’s quartet does not “mean” 
something – it is rather a meeting point of partial past articulations of desire as they have 
already been taken into inherited musical materials. 
“Residues” of the Past 
Historical reminiscences are immediately apparent from the very beginning of 
Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 1 (Ex. 36). Suspensions (see bar 7-8), are heard in a 
(broadly conceived) “tonal” context of G major. Harmonic changes help articulate 
relatively regular phrases. The tonal framework of this opening passage even permits a 
sensitive treatment of the cadence from V to I (first inversion) at the beginning of bar 9, 
following a prolongation of V in the bass from bar 4 (that itself falls to IV, in bar 6, before 
returning to V in 7). I will show how the materials that make up this historically evocative 
soundworld – which seems unproblematic at first – are brought into new 
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interrelationships so as to become newly significant. Like in a dream, familiar materials 
become sources of significance that go beyond their established functions or meanings, yet 
still must be understood as related to them.  
 
Ex. 36, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, opening 
 
© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
I will illustrate this in three complementary stages. This means, in the first, 
showing how historical materials become significant in new settings that are nonetheless 
connected with their former ones. The development of the suspension figure from the 
quartet’s opening in a later passage, and the sustained 2nds and 4ths that are associated with 
it, is cited as an exceptional example of this process. The second stage concerns an 
otherworldly passage in the Lydian mode from the middle of the work.  With reference to 
the psychoanalytic concept of displacement, I show how fragmentary material found here is 
unconsciously invested with significance from materials found earlier in the work. Third, I 
turn towards the coda of the work in discussing the role of condensation, where materials 
from across the work are brought together so as to negotiate (incompletely) the desires for 
closure that are sought by each of them. 
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This discussion begins by reconsidering how the historically reminiscent materials 
of the opening passage may later be drawn on as (freshly) significant. Centrally, I suggest 
that to read these materials simply as “historical reminiscences” – imagistically so – would 
be to skip over the processes by which they are felt to be affective and, more importantly, to 
fail to understand how they develop in bringing significance to textual connections within 
the work.  
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Sigmund Freud gives a note of caution about the 
imagery found in dreams: ‘we would obviously be misled if we were to read these signs 
according to their pictorial value and not according to their referentiality as signs.’371 An 
apple seen in a dream, whilst symbolic of something – of some wish to be fulfilled, 
perhaps – probably does not mean that this wish is to eat an apple. Instead, the apple may 
be there in place of features of some other object or person – and it is the apple’s 
relationship with these other things that is important, not the fact that it is an apple. Very 
broadly speaking, through either metaphor or metonymy the apple would stand in the 
place of a thing or multiple things that are repressed. As a recent “residue” of the past, 
maybe a memory from the day just passed, it is easily recalled. This ease of recall makes it 
perfect to disguise some deeper, repressed meaning. Importantly, the way in which the 
apple is affectively significant in the dream – the way in which it is felt to be meaningful, even 
if we cannot say exactly what it means – is very different from waking life. 
It is important to understand why images (like the apple) are chosen for 
incorporation into a dream – and what this means for the pictorial (imagistic) value and 
referentiality of signs in a late 20th-century musical context372. Joseph Sandler (et al.) write 
that such imagery is most often based in recent experience; dream-thoughts are often 
expressed through “residues” of the day just passed. These residues are ‘incorporated into 
the dream in some form either because of a connection between such impressions and 
unconscious thoughts or wishes, or because their content rendered them suitable for the 
purposes of symbolic representation’373. This means that imagery which is easy to recall – 
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of recent memory – is often the most likely to be called upon in the disguised expression 
of latent dream thoughts.374 
A musical parallel is found at the opening of Silvestrov’s Quartet, where residues 
of the past form the basis of the opening. Archetypical, “historical” musical imagery is 
drawn on, figures available for easy recall by those familiar with the art music tradition, 
material stemming from a collectively experienced past which is still present in 
contemporary listening habits (due to current concert programing, their familiarity due to 
recordings, and so on). The “suspension figure” which closes the first phrase is an 
exceptional example of this (bar 8), as are the first violin’s ornamental triplets in the 
second bar. 
The introduction of this kind of imagery into the work (especially at the opening 
of the work) sets it up – “in mind” – as a point of attention375, something that may be 
looked out for as the work unfolds as marked with intensity through reference back to this 
point. (This ties-in with the idea of setting up of discursive positions at the opening of a 
work, “expositionally”, a strategy observed in Schnittke’s String Quartet No. 4 in the 
previous chapter.) Similarly, as with dream symbolism, the suspension figure and the 
ornamental triplet figures, whilst they may suggest “pictorial” connotations through their 
“day-to-day” contextual associations with musical styles of the past, go beyond these, 
towards referential significance. They are brought forward in the mind so as to be later 
referred to again as meaningful textual components within the work. In this sense then, 
two pasts play a role in shaping the experience of what comes later: (1.) the “historical” 
past outside the work (from which these mnestic traces are drawn) and (2.) recent memory 
of past material “internal” to the work as this has unfolded so far, which may later be 
reformulated or transformed376. This is to begin talking about what Freud called their 
‘referentiality as signs’. 
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Ex. 37, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bars 76-88 
 
© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
This opening material is drawn on and modified in the passage from bars 76-87 
(figure 5 onwards) and the significance of these elements is transformed from their earlier, 
                                                                                                                                         
musical sequence ‘instead of having to comprehend and retain two melodic units, the listener need 
actively grasp only the first’ (SABBETH 1990: 52). 
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“day-to-day” usage. This is a passage based principally on the material of the ornamental 
figure of bar 2 and the suspension in bar 8, as well as being echoed in the unresolved 2nds 
as found in bar 3. In these terms, the series of quartal harmonies found in this later 
passage can be heard as a chain of 4ths, attempting to resolve on the surface (see the 
momentary resolution in the viola at the end of bar 78, which is undercut by the cello’s 
pitch right away). 
 
Ex. 38, Silvestrov String Quartet No. 1, bars 75-87 (reduction of progression in bass) 
 
A reduction of the progression in the bass shows that whilst there are allusions to 
tonal centres on the surface, these provisional points fail to stabilise. In short, the 
background follows a whole-tone descent, rather than a teleologically driven tonal 
sequence like, to cite a historical paradigm, a circle of fifths underpinning the chain of 
suspensions found on the surface. This lack of a tonally functioning background makes an 
authentic resolution of the suspended 4ths impossible. The goal-directed tonal function of 
the suspension and the whole-tone (i.e. non-tonal) harmonic context find themselves to be 
at odds with one another. This disparity between the non-tonal background and the 
tonally figurative surface allusions detaches these residues from their “day-to-day” setting 
as presented at the work’s opening.377 Indeed, one could say that the historically inclined 
function of the suspension figure is itself relocated to a deeper structural level in these 
bars; through a background lacking teleological drive, the temporal unfolding of the work 
is temporarily held back, this direction being provisionally “suspended”. 
Despite the whole-tone background in this episode, and the lack of goal-directed 
closure, the underlying descent in the bass does suggest some level of cohesion in this 
section. It is based on a process that unifies it at an underlying level, one that is, 
nonetheless, contradicted at the surface through quartal harmonies that fail to coincide 
harmonically with the pitches of the whole-tone background. A descent from the B-flat in 
bar 76 (established at the close of the last section) to the G in bar 87 occurs in the bass. 
The descent proceeds by whole-tones until the A-flat to G of bars 86-87, a semitone 
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marked in that it steps outside of the whole-tone sequence of the bass, and articulates a 
(relative) point of arrival. The E in the bass in bar 83 also suggests a temporary point of 
arrival through a change in the descent’s direction, as well as a change in the overlying 
harmonies from being quartal to being based around thirds. This is retrospectively 
undercut in bar 85 with the C in the bass reasserting the sequential descent. A marked 
semitone (a movement from A-flat to G-natural in the bass) articulates a relative point of 
arrival and a point of structural change at bar 87. 
Displacement 
It has been noted that the dreamer’s apple might signify something else 
metaphorically or metonymically. More accurately, in the context of dreaming we should 
say that the apple relates to something else through either condensation or displacement.378 
Condensation brings together various features of things into a single object or activity. It is 
thus aligned with metaphor and the paradigmatic plane. Displacement works through 
taking the affectivity or emotional energy linked with one thing and transferring it to 
another. The dream image would be tangentially associated with, adjacent with, or contain 
aspects of the thing for which it stood in. It is therefore aligned with metonymy and the 
syntagm. Such correspondences have been widely noted (for example, by Jacques Lacan379, 
Roman Jakobson380, and Kaja Silverman381). The work of both processes can be recognised 
in Silvestrov’s quartet, in both forms of memory discussed above – in the connection of 
the work’s materials to what is outside (at the level of “historical”, intertextual memory) 
and in intratextual connections and transformations of materials within the work (recent 
memories of the work as it has so-far unfolded). 
Regarding displacement, Freud noted that the “dreamwork makes use of a 
displacement of psychical intensities to the point of a transvaluation of psychical values”.382 This 
idea of the transfer of “psychical intensity”, I suggest, may help us to develop an analytical 
understanding of the significance of moments in the music despite their lacking clear 
representational content. An excellent example of such a moment appears at bar 72 (Ex. 
39), at the point when a single A-natural in the first violin appears in the context of an A-
flat Lydian section in the middle of the work. Here it must be recalled that Freud noted 
                                                
378 SILVERMAN 1983: 62 
379 See Ian Parker’s discussion of Lacan’s thinking in PARKER, IAN 1997: Psychoanalytic Culture: 
Psychoanalytic Discourse in Western Society, London: Sage, 193-196 
380 As Craig Ayrey summarises: ‘Jakobson equates metaphor with the paradigmatic and metonymy with 
the syntagmatic plane, since they comprise relations of similarity and contiguity respectively.’ AYREY, 
CRAIG 1994: ‘Debussy’s Signification Connections: Metaphor and Metonymy in Analytical Method’ in 
Theory Analysis & Meaning in Music (ed. Anthony Pople), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136  
381 SILVERMAN 1983: 87 
382 Freud cited in SILVERMAN 1983: 61, emphasis in the original 
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that what is important is referential rather than pictorial content. This moment should 
therefore be investigated as referentially connected with other musical materials in the 
work, themselves resonating as residues of historical material. Furthermore, as a residue, 
this moment takes on wider and more profound affective significances than a simple 
“pictorial” understanding would at first suggest, with this referential connection working 
around a displacement of psychical intensities. 
 
Ex. 39, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bar 72 
 
© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
This A-natural is not much to look at pictorially. It has little or no “meaning” 
when talked about in this way, yet it is affectively rich in referential terms. Whilst we 
cannot directly map affectivity, we can trace formal connections in the music, through 
examining the chain of metonymic relationships through which displacement functions. 
Paradigmatic analysis can be adapted towards this end (Ex. 40). 
 
Ex. 40, Metonymic chain 
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The first statement referentially significant to the A-natural of 72 is the “flourish 
figure” seen in the viola (Ex. 41) in bars 18-19 (although this itself is a derivation of earlier 
material). One may ask why, given that the A-natural is a single note – and, as such, 
suggests many, many correspondences to other materials – I selected only these elements 
for inclusion into this table. The rationale behind the selection of elements found in this 
table is exemplified by the first choice. Both it and the final A-natural have similar 
affective energy – although with the last acting as a concentrated version of the first. 
Crucially, they both act as “extraterritorial” components – foreign things coming from 
outside the music, as dissonant to it. (This evokes the Kristevian idea of ‘rupture and/or 
boundary’ as explored at the opening of Part II, something I go on to focus on below as 
this plays out in Silvestrov’s quartet.) In both cases this comes through harmonic 
dissonance: the viola plays a marked E-natural against its overriding E-flat context of bars 
18-19, and the first violin analogously plays an A-natural against the A-flat Lydian context 
of bar 72. The other moments in the table encapsulate stages of transformation between 
the two statements, although this is by no means an exhaustive list. 
 
Ex. 41, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bars 15-21 
 
© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
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The viola’s material is developed in various directions in the work, but the 
resulting development that concerns us here can be seen in bar 67. Through a process of 
interversion – whereby the statement’s internal content is reordered – the first violin states 
a figure derived from the viola’s. Instead of the viola’s previous E-flat, D-flat (a major-2nd) 
then G to E (a minor-3rd), we hear the 3rd and then the 2nd – D-sharp, F-sharp, B, A. This 
reordering, and the resulting similarity of their constituent parts, links the two statements 
together. In bar 72, this continual reduction of the figure leaves it with us in microcosm 
only – as a single A in the first violin (played as a harmonic). Transformations lead to a 
displacement of affective value through distortion and connection, a developmental 
connection that is marked by the two statements’ possessing “extraterritorial” 
characteristics (through both being “foreign” to their contexts, with regard to their 
respective pitch-spaces). As such, there are two aspects to the relationship between the 
earlier and the later materials: firstly, there is a transformative aspect, where the motif is 
developed and distilled into a single note which can act as to stand in as a residue of earlier 
material, and, secondly, there is a contextual aspect – both the original E-natural and the 
later A-natural share an “extraterritorial” function within their respective contexts, 
something that links them through affinity. In this sense, the connections between the two 
are both deferred (material transforms in reference to what came before) and direct (based 
on the affinity of these materials’ relationships to their respective contexts, as this is 
affectively significant). 
The transformation of musical statements above is a strand of the role of 
displacement, of transferring intensity from one element to the next through these 
elements’ connections. Put in the context of a metonymic chain – of referentiality – the 
significance of this moment as it connects with wider textural and intertextual (historical) 
processes becomes better appreciated. This process of transferring significance through 
the transformation of elements of the musical discourse again emphasises how referential 
process is central to the question of affective significance, rather than it being based in the 
mere presentation of pictorial – i.e. symbolically codifiable – musical content.383 
                                                
383 Indeed, Stuart Feder writes that ‘there is a fluidity and flexibility in mental function which is well 
known clinically such that every aspect of mentation can potentially articulate with every other aspect. As 
a result one thing can readily come to represent another. This is perhaps clearest in the dream but 
certainly not confined to it. Put another way, mental representations are infinitely displaceable. Thus, whatever 
the discrete element identifiable in mental life, what can become represented in one form can assume 
another, and yet another form ad infinitum.’ FEDER, STUART 1993: ‘“Promissory Notes”: Method in 
Music and Applied Psychoanalysis’ in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music: Second Series (eds. Stuart Feder, 
Richard L. Karmel & George H. Pollock), Madison: International Universities Press, 15, emphasis in 
original. 
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In addition to the fluid role played by displacement through textual metonymies, 
displacement also makes fluid the movement of significances between context and text. In 
this sense, the concept of displacement helps account for affectivities and meaningful 
significances flowing over the imagined boundaries of the work – context flowing into the 
text, so as to be experienced through it. In this regard, something can be said of the 
suspension figures already discussed at the opening of the quartet. They shift in function 
throughout the work – most evidentially from their “day-to-day” usage at the opening, to 
their detached usage in bars 76-84 – but this change of treatment is only part of their chain 
of displacing affective significances. This metonymy extends to a historical level also. 
Much like a topic or trope in the Classical repertory, these figures are included in the fabric 
of the work as metonymic fragments of past musical styles. These figures thus stand as a 
textual metonymy of a former historical context.384 There is, however, an important 
difference from the figures in Silvestrov’s quartet to the topics of Classicism. Without a 
clear stylistic context within which Silvestrov’s figures now sit – a clear code through 
which we may “decode” them – their meaning becomes unclear. Any signifier-signified 
relationship they might suggest is less clear than, say, the drones and rhythms signifying 
the pastoral topic as found in Classicism. As a result, in this sense, these figures “stand for 
history” – they are symbols markedly of the past that may enter into new, playful 
relationships – but this is a history in the abstract, an idea of history, not the concrete 
history of a given time and place that is being signified. 
Condensation 
Alongside displacement Freud talks also of the process of condensation. Kaja 
Silverman writes that ‘condensation involves the compression into a single feature of 
qualities belonging to two or more. Although that compression can take many forms, it 
always requires that there be points of affinity between the elements it conjoins’385 . 
Condensation is closely related to the idea of multiple function, as it brings together many 
qualities and conflicts. Robert Waelder wrote that, according to this principle of multiple 
function, “every attempt to solve a task is necessarily, at the same time, an attempt to solve 
other tasks, even if incompletely”386.  
                                                
384 This idea of textual metonymies of former contexts playing a role in discourse has already been 
touched upon, although in a very different context, in my discussion of Alfred Schnittke’s String Quartet 
No. 4, above. In this case it was of a “figure of closure” as evocative of past ways of articulating the 
autonomy of both musical work and self. 
385 SILVERMAN 1983: 62, emphasis added 
386 Robert Waelder cited in FEDER 1993: 14 
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Silvestrov ends the work with a coda that brings together – in part – various 
aspects of musical material already outlined. Specifically, this final section operates through 
a process of condensation. Multiple aspects of diverse and previously developed materials 
find closure in a passage that multiply functions through negotiating new points of affinity 
between them. This can be seen as an attempt to attend to various tasks, to attend to 
different types of closure, brought together at the end. Notably, these concepts of 
condensation and multiple function enable the conception of a distinctly modernist – non-
synthetic – closure, one that combines and mixes elements, without affirming a dialectical 
synthesis or the singularity of a Whole.387  
The coda draws together materials, multiply functioning through modifying them 
in light of compromises demanded by each of the others. The texture is sparse at the 
ending of the work. Form is not clearly “articulated” (in the sense used above). Despite 
this, I suggest that the coda begins at approximately bar 229, from rehearsal mark 13 to 
the end, as this supplements a final return of the opening material at bar 198388. The 
materials negotiated include: 1) the whole-tone structural background of bars 76-87, 2) 
extraterritorial material derived from the flourish motif, and 3) an earlier section of the 
work based around an A-flat-centred Lydian mode (bars 66-75). This last, modal section 
included the “extraterritorial” A-natural harmonic discussed earlier. As in a dream, 
compromises between many surface materials and the desires for closure, something 
deeper, are negotiated at several simultaneous levels. 
Firstly, the concept of a whole-tone structural background, as presented in bars 76-
87, is addressed principally thorough a progression in the bass in the coda. The cello’s 
three final bass notes – C-natural, E-natural, and A-flat – spell out an augmented triad in 
the structural background (Ex. 42), echoing the whole-tone structural background of the 
earlier section. However, these are now presented in the opposite direction: not from the 
A-flat down to the low C but the other way around. 
 
Ex. 42: Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, 229-244, reduction of bass 
 
                                                
387 It should be noted that, however, closure is not the same as condensation in general, but it does allow 
Silvestrov to bring together musical materials in this work in particular. 
388 This return of the opening material, which the coda supplements, is discussed in the next chapter 
(under the subheading ‘…traces of the means of closure (i)’). 
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Secondly, material derived from the extraterritorial flourish motif, which originally 
appeared in the first violin in bars 18-19, is also accounted for. This takes the form of a 
short figure (see the end of the bottom line in Ex. 43), a tone moving quickly upwards, 
derived from the major-2nd in lines that themselves find relation to the original flourish 
motif. This is ultimately derived from the original “flourish” motif (compare the top two 
staffs of Ex. 43, below, and the third of Ex. 40, above). 
 
Ex. 43, Affinities between “extraterritorial” flourish-derived material and the short “tone 
figure” 
 
It is also worth noting that this tone figure itself becomes the principal material of 
a passage (bars 192-197) that precedes the return of material from the very opening (bar 
198). This passage is typified by the tone figure’s outlining of the pitches A-flat and B-flat, 
which tend to dominate the top of the texture. This material’s inclusion into the coda 
helps to incorporate not only this figure into the work as a whole but, by extension, the 
section based on the tone figure. In the coda, this motif stands in synecdochically – 
through displacement – for a section whose motivic content is otherwise left 
unincorporated.  
In the earlier section, this tone motif was counterpoised against the harmonic 
context. In the coda, it becomes incorporated within the harmony. In bars 238-240, with 
the bare 5th of E and B in the cello, the pitches G-sharp and A-sharp (i.e. enharmonically 
A-flat and B-flat) are played by the viola and second violin. These pitches’ distance in 
terms of their relative octaves and their pianissimo entries suggests a sonic blending with 
the cello’s dyad. In bar 240, however, the “real” identity of this tone motif is stated, 
although now within a context of no longer being foreign to its prevailing harmonic 
surroundings. The A-flat/B-flat motif is recontextualised as a major 3rd and augmented 4th 
of a mode based on E-natural. This brings us to the final crucial condensed element: the 
Lydian mode material mentioned above (the Lydian mode of course being identifiable 
through its augmented 4th scale degree). 
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Thirdly, similarly as with the suspension and the triplet ornamentation figures, the 
A-flat-centred Lydian section (bars 66-75) brings “the past” explicitly into the present – 
this modal identity is immediately historically evocative. This Lydian section is also drawn 
on in the coda. As noted already, the augmented 4th of the Lydian mode is echoed in the 
reharmonisation of the A-flat/B-flat tone motif over the cello’s bare 5th in bars 238-240. 
The modal A-flat centre is also given the final say in the coda, being the chord sounded at 
the end of the work (Ex. 44). Furthermore, this final A-flat centre, as noted above (under 
point 1.), helps to close the pitch-space. It appears after the previous pitch centres of C-
natural and E-natural. This echoes the major-3rd relations derived from the whole-tone 
structural background of bars 76-85, though brings completion to this sequence with an 
A-flat harmonic identity that has become referentially rich (structurally, as it relates to the 
A-flat Lydian section, and historically, as this section was itself historically evocative). The 
coda explores relative compromises between elements found throughout the work at 
various levels. Through the negotiation of new points of affinity, materials are condensed 
so as to perform common functions in the musical discourse.  
 
Ex. 44, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bars 234-245 
 
© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
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2nds as ‘Rupture and/or Boundary’ 
Kristeva’s concept of the thetic (see chapter 4) may also supplement this 
discussion, particularly in the capacity of better defining the articulation of discursive 
identities in moments which are nonetheless – as my appeal to dream theories have 
illustrated – relatively fluid. As I will show, 2nds (both major and minor) facilitate, at a basic 
level, articulations of various aspects of the discourse, acting as both discursive boundaries, 
yet also enabling moments of rupture that suggest something outside of this. Indeed, given 
many composers’ drawing on “pseudo-tonal” techniques in various works (not just by 
Silvestrov – by Wolfgang Rihm, for instance), my exploring of these techniques here has 
implications beyond shedding light on Silvestrov’s music alone. 
The minor 2nd: Given the “pseudo-tonal” context of Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 
1, the semitone exists as an atomic unit of the discourse, beyond which there is no 
possibility of further discursive terms. This is a boundary constituted by the discourse yet, 
paradoxically, also one constitutive of it. However, this significance “as boundary” goes 
beyond formal immanence. Through flirting with tonality, the semitone is invested with a 
particular historical resonance and, furthermore, is significant as the farthest point to 
which discursive identities may bend before breaking.389 
Major 2nds, as well as quartal harmonies, appear throughout much of the music, 
giving discursive elements of it articulatory shape. These find their earliest expression at 
the opening of the work, in the suspension figures that, as it has been shown, become of 
importance later. A few examples are given in Ex. 45. As will become clear, both minor 
and major 2nds (and quartal harmonies) become worked together. 
Ex. 45, a selection of motivic elements derived from 2nds and 4ths 
 
                                                
389 Put in other terms, the semitone is not a necessary boundary for discursive terms – I am not 
prescribing a general ontology of what-musical-discourse-is and what-musical-discourse-is-not, simply 
discussing what gives this discourse its particular philosophical identity, immanently (formally) and 
through its extrinsic (philosophical-historical) investments.  
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The 2nd – specifically, the minor 2nd – facilitates rupture as much as it appears as 
boundary, which come though at the important “extraterritorial” moments that were 
discussed above. The original such moment occurs in bar 15, in which a flourish motif 
gives prominence to an E-natural in contrast with the prevailing harmonic context (that 
gives prominence to E-flat). As explored above, this is later, through a series of metonymic 
displacements, drawn upon in an extraterritorial A-natural appearing “outside of” its A-flat 
Lydian setting (bar 72). These points where materials appear a “semitone out” – where 
attrition between pitch centres is foregrounded – facilitate moments of rupture. 
 
Ex. 46 Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bars 127-128 
 
© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
 
This rupturing semitone duality is laid bare in bar 128 (Ex. 46), between B-natural 
and B-flat. This draws on the “semitone out” idea (i.e. the E-natural and E-flat duality 
introduced by the flourish material), but is also referentially connected to the earlier 
juxtaposition of B-natural and B-flat at bar 30. Indeed, the material in the second violin 
that suggests this extraterritoriality at bar 30 is itself derived from the viola’s flourish 
material of bars 18-19. This is derivation based in interversion. Instead of the viola’s 
previous E-flat, D-flat (a major-2nd) then G, E (a minor-3rd), as heard in bar 19, the second 
violin plays B-flat, D-flat (a major-6th, an inverted minor-3rd) followed by E-flat to F (a 
major-9th, a compound 2nd). 
The semitone and quartal harmonies – as rupture and/or boundary – in fact 
function in complicity with one another. This can be illustrated with reference to a 
175 
moment touched upon already: the foreign A-natural in the A-flat Lydian section (bar 72), 
in moments of condensation. Freud notes that the work of condensation includes the 
‘selection of elements occurring many times in the dream-thoughts [the unconscious 
thoughts underlying a dream’s manifest content]; its formation of new unities (collective 
figures, composite structures), and its production of mediating common factors’ 390 . The 
semitone duality idea seems to be one such ‘mediating common factor’ in the materials of 
the quartet.  
The A-natural harmonic of bar 72 (discussed above in relation to displacement), 
and the extraterritorial pitches which follow it, as well as deferring their significance 
backwards through displacement, also rely on condensation in effecting their significance; 
they also draw on the (many times occurring, “over-determined”) concept of “semitone-
clash-as-extraterritorial”. Like the B-natural/B-flat and the E-natural/E-flat dualities 
discussed already, this A-natural is counterpoised to an A-flat-centred Lydian context. 
Furthermore, the paradigmatic pitches that provide moments of extraterritoriality 
throughout the work – B-natural, E-natural, and A-natural – are presented syntagmatically 
in the Lydian passage (in bars 72-75), with these pitches spelled out one by one: A-natural 
(bar 72), E-natural (73), B-natural (74), and E-natural again (75). In addition to the mutual 
negotiation of all these elements, the octaves at which these pitches (B-E-A) are played in 
bars 72-75 suggests a stacking of 4ths (Ex. 47). Hence, a further ‘mediating common 
factor’ is drawn on – that of quartal harmonies. 
 
Ex. 47: “Extraterritorial” pitches, bars 72-75 
 
 
As such, these pitches in bars 72-75 derive significance through a wide range of 
hidden connections. They are metonymically derived from the extraterritorial flourish 
material, but also condense and shape other overdetermined elements of material 
(semitonal dualities and quartal relationships). Freud talks of “nodal points”391 in dreams 
around which many thoughts converge – that is, these points foreground content 
pertinent to thoughts which run throughout the dreamwork. In musical terms, this is 
echoed in nodal points where elements that run throughout the musical work are brought 
to the surface or drawn together. This happens in miniature in the A-flat-centred Lydian 
                                                
390 FREUD 1999: 226, emphasis added 
391 Freud cited in SILVERMAN 1983: 90 
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section, in particular in bars 72-75, where semitonal and quartal ideas are brought into 
fluid interrelation. 
Silvestrov’s modernist work is one that is open to questions of memory. It draws 
on history fluidly. Yet from this fluidity are created discursive boundaries that are concrete, 
that shape the work and give it form. Given the fluidity of these mechanisms at play, 
works such as Silvestrov’s are particularly well suited to psychoanalytically-inclined 
interpretations. Past materials are drawn on as historically allusive. However, at the same 
time, the discursive frameworks within which these materials are situated are themselves 
characterised by provisionality, instability, and drift. 
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6. Desiring Through Contemporary Music 
DESIRE, ABSENCE AND AFFIRMATION  
From Dream to Desire 
Late 20th- and early 21st-century music draws upon and reacts to legacies of 
subjectivity – ways of knowing Selves and Worlds – as inscribed into musical materials and 
practices. But, as Julia Kristeva points out, ‘the knowing subject is also a desiring subject, 
and the paths of desire ensnarl the paths of knowledge.’392 A discussion of subjectivity that 
eclipses desiring with knowing, and evades relationships between the two, misses 
something – even more so here, given this discussion is of subjectivities in music, a 
discourse, as it has often historically been conceived, of the passions and of the sensuality 
of desires par excellence. 
This move from knowledge to desire is mediated through my discussion of 
“dreaming through contemporary music” – for dreaming is a process exemplifying the 
roles of desire in the shaping and giving direction to discourses. The world becomes known 
through some symbolic capacity, symbols whose significance and interrelations are 
disturbed, de- and re-formed so as to express things as-yet unknown (conceptually, at a 
conscious level) through dream-like processes, swept forwards by desire. It is my intention 
to account more fully for the last of these here, an absent core of these processes which 
has until now been left open (hence, this can be read as attending to the desire for closure 
of this earlier absence, something pulling discussion forward, if you will). 
Continuing to expound past-present relations means characterising strategies of 
desire in Western art music as these are confronted by recent composers. But, a word of 
caution before this characterisation begins. What desire “is” is not self-evident. Despite 
this, I will not characterise it in any single way, define it, measuring later examples against a 
singular pre-established yardstick (like the Lacanian conceptualisations of desire that are 
burgeoning at the moment393). I follow Susan McClary’s suggestion here, that the 
	  
                                                
392 KRISTEVA, 1982: 81, emphasis in original 
393 I draw on aspects of Lacan’s thinking. However, I wish to avoid “applying” his framework as a model, 
as a whole. For examples of explicitly Lacanian approaches see SMITH, KENNETH 2011: ‘The Tonic Chord 
and Lacan’s Object a in Selected Songs by Charles Ives’ in Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Vol. 136, 
No. 2, (pp. 353-398), REICHARDT 2008, or ŽIŽEK, SLAVOJ & DOLAR MLADEN 2002: Opera’s Second Death, 
New York: Routledge, among many others. (In his article Smith provides a good summary of various 
Lacanian musicological approaches.) 
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twentieth century put… questions [surrounding desire and Self] in the 
foreground of psychoanalytic theory… But this recent history does not mean 
we must put a Lacanian trademark sign beside the word desire, for the 
problem of understanding desire and its varying solutions predated formal 
psychoanalysis by millennia.394 
 
And so, whilst I will draw upon psychoanalytic theory in part, it is through no singular 
conception that I characterise desire; it is by its very nature polymorphous, slipping 
beyond the psychoanalytic-theoretical and into the aesthetic and philosophical. 
Following my characterisation of musical materials so far, I will outline desire as 
operating musically in two dialectically interrelated ways. Firstly, strategies of desire find 
themselves distilled into musical language itself, into, for example, teleologies of closure as 
these are articulated in the harmonic background. Secondly, desire works around, through, 
or towards some foregrounded ‘Object’. Following Fredric Jameson’s warnings about 
“understanding” touched on in chapter 4, these aspects should not be seen as divisible 
from one another, and there is in fact movement between them. 
I explore both aspects in this chapter by revisiting works discussed so far, but now 
in light of issues of desire. As such, I also hope that this underlines the dialectic between 
desiring, discussed below, and “knowing”, explored above. After outlining the 
intermingling of desire and knowledge in music, I examine closure’s relationship with 
articulating desires in the tonal idiom, and note two different reactions to inherited traces 
of tonal closure in works by Silvestrov (his First Quartet) and Schnittke (his Fourth). The 
former draws on this idiom explicitly, although not unproblematically so. The latter, as was 
shown in chapter 4, takes a figure of closure as an object, thus shifting from desire as 
distilled into (“objective”) musical language towards desire as working around a distinct 
object. This section finishes by briefly looking back to Tiensuu’s Arsenic and Old Lace and 
Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10 as these works encompass issues of desire. Notably, in the 
latter, it is shown that “found” objects might act also as “sought” objects, hazy objects of 
desire from the past that pull forward musical discourse. As such, I hope to bring together 
the constellation of works and ideas foregrounded in Part II, whilst also reflecting the 
polymorphous nature of desire and its articulation of, coalescence around, and pulling 
towards (musical) objects. However, in order to proceed down this route – and also to 
understand how desire is articulated musically – I should first show how this connects 
with the subject of the previous chapter, the dream-like processes found in music, as 
desire itself has a place in dreaming.  
                                                
394 MCCLARY, SUSAN 2004: Modal Subjectivities: Self-Fashioning in the Italian Madrigal, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 57, emphasis in original 
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Dreams were, for Freud, principally a device of wish fulfilment395. Tensions within 
the mind of the dreamer found themselves coming forward in disguised forms, a form of 
compromise and self-censorship which allowed repressed or overtly unpleasant thoughts 
to surface and provisionally discharge themselves. Of course, this process plays out with 
reference to a social context – the dreamer has constructed a socially mediated framework 
of what is permissible, taking this context into him or herself, and hence also what is 
impermissible and must be repressed (for example, incestuous thoughts). However, it 
should be immediately clear that the symbolism within the dream (despite certain 
archetypical images appearing396) is specific to the individual dreamer – how the dream is 
experienced is pertinent to him or her as an individual. 
At this point a distinction needs to be made between drive and desire. Drives, often 
also translated from Freud as “instinct” (or instinctual drives), are never directly 
observable, but are rather the undercurrent of an Unconscious, with roots both in biology 
(physical needs, like consumption and excretion) and childhood. They are primarily sexual 
in nature; Freud goes so far as to claim that ‘sexual impulses also make contributions that 
must not be underestimated to the highest cultural, artistic and social creations of the 
human spirit’397. Desire can be thought of in some sense as the (necessarily partial) 
symbolisation of drive. That is, through the process of sublimation, drives may be 
temporarily discharged – although their thirst is never fully quenched – through being 
attached or directed towards some externalised object (“object” in this context is an 
extended concept, one which can include everyday objects, or people, places, and so on)398. 
                                                
395 Freud argues this throughout his Interpretation of Dreams. See also HOPKINS, JAMES 1992: ‘The 
Interpretation of Dreams’ in The Cambridge Companion to Freud (ed. Jerome Neu), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
396 These images are explored by Freud in his lecture on the ‘Symbolism in Dreams’ [orig. 1915-16] in 
1973 [orig. 1917]: Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, London: Penguin. Elizabeth Wright notes that at 
an extreme, this ‘interpretation of “typical symbols” has led to what has become known as “vulgar 
Freudian symbolism” (WRIGHT, ELIZABETH 1998: Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reappraisal (2nd Edition), 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 22).  
397 FREUD 1973: 47 
398 Whilst there are moments of overlap between such psychoanalytic “objects” and the “Objects” I explore 
– particularly, that both help articulate desires – they should not be confused as identical. My approach is 
discursive, taking a semiotic line – with different theoretical foundations from the object-relation theories 
most notably developed in the psychoanalytic schools of Melanie Klein and D.W. Winnicott. An 
exploration of object-relations theories and music would require a separate study in itself. For a 
fascinating Winnicottian study in the field of literature, see RUDNYTSKY, PETER (ed.) 1993: Transitional 
Objects and Potential Spaces: Literary Uses of D.W. Winnicott, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Georgina Born has paid some attention to the Kleinian concept of “part-objects” in her discussions of 
multiple musics’ surrounding cultures. See BORN, GEORGINA 1997: ‘Modernist Discourse, Psychic 
Forms, and Agency: Aesthetic Subjectivities at IRCAM’ in Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 4 (pp. 480-
501) and BORN, GEORGINA 1998: ‘Anthropology, Kleinian Psychoanalysis, and the Subject in Culture’ in 
American Anthropologist, Vol. 100, No. 2 (pp. 373-386). 
180 
Drive and desire are thus interrelated concepts, but neither identical nor oppositional with 
each other.  
Desires, being symbolically articulated, tend towards the social world. Music 
presents one social domain within this world, but an exemplary one in its ability to 
articulate tensions and social conflicts in a fluid space that draws on both the reified and 
the non-conceptualisable. Music mediates desires socially. I focus on this quality of 
mediation, as it has been sedimented into musical materials, rather than focussing on – as 
following psychobiography – music as expressing an individual’s drive energies 399 . 
Regarding this mediation, and the sedimentation of (past) desires into musical material, 
this is to understand desires as already present within the musical material being 
experienced. Here music is not seen as the expression of drive impulses of an individual, 
but as a social dreamwork caught in the net(work) of the sociality of desires. This accords 
with Tim Dean’s sketch of the contemporary psychoanalytic-critical terrain –  
 
Whereas traditional psychoanalytic criticism decoded the neurotic conflicts of 
individual artists (finding in writers’ and painters’ characters the surrogates of 
warring parts of their selves), contemporary psychoanalytic criticism 
demystifies the transindividual struggles (whether social or ideological) that 
the work of art is understood to encode.400 
 
When considered at this intersubjective level, desires, as sublimated through 
musical works, defer not to individuals’ drives but to other socially mediated desires, just 
as in language a word takes on meaning only through its deference to others. Here my 
method – in seeing desire as constructed almost linguistically – is much closer to Lacan’s 
than to Freud’s. This may seem odd given my reliance on Freud’s thinking elsewhere. 
However, given that here I am discussing artifacts already at a social level – musical works 
– rather than individuals’ pathologies, it makes sense to turn towards a socially, linguistically-
inclined characterisation of desire. Thus, it becomes the work of the psychoanalytic-
theoretically inclined musicologist not to “unveil” how a work pertains to an individual’s 
pathology, but rather how a work pertains to larger desires, anxieties, and wishes as they 
are mediated outside of the work. This “social” reading of desires as explored in music 
gets us past the problem that Adorno identified in the psychoanalytic interpretation of 
artworks, that  
 
                                                
399 See my discussion of Heinz Kohut’s comments in the previous chapter. 
400 DEAN, TIM 2002: ‘Art as Symptom: Žižek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism’ in Diacritics, Vol. 
32, No. 2 (pp. 21-41), 29 
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[in the psychoanalytical reading of artworks] artists whose work gave 
uncensored shape to the negativity of life are dismissed as neurotics… For 
psychoanalysis, artworks are daydreams; it confuses them with documents401. 
 
With my social, philosophical-historical caveat, Adorno’s statement becomes not a 
rejection of psychoanalytic interpretation as whole, but of a specific type – a warning 
against attempts to analyse the artist behind the work. In this sense, the artwork might be a 
‘daydream’, as per Adorno’s observation, but this is a process of day dreaming understood 
differently, as a collectively experienced daydream, and a ‘dream’ that is understood as part 
of the social world. Instead of existing as otherworldly alternative – as differently 
understood against “reality” – this dream provides a space in which the “real world” might 
become immanent transformed. 
In this discussion, music’s significance, in contrast to that of dreams, tends more 
towards the social than the individual. However, this does not mean that what can be 
learnt from Freud’s theories of dreaming is redundant in coming to terms with musical 
experience. Like the dream, the musical work may be seen to open itself as a space within 
which tensions may be worked through in disguised forms. For example, fears of “the Other” can be 
provisionally discharged, through the incorporation and mastering of images of exoticism 
and orientalism. Musical language itself can even take on this role of resolving social 
tensions through facilitating social-sonic phantasies; an example of this is provided by the 
immanent musical synthesis found in many works of the Classical era – a musical quality 
mirroring the Classical ideal of an ordered, rational society (within which the individual 
also has a harmonious place).402 
This returns us to the dialectic outlined at the opening of the chapter: that desires 
are sublimated into objects within musical language as well as into musical language itself. 
This echoes the duality between the representational (i.e. programmatic) aspect of music 
and its absolute dimension. (Although my conception of musical objects, as I have shown, 
goes beyond simple “representation”, being more adequately described in terms of 
“relation” or “referentiality”.) Legacies of both – and the dialectics of the two – are 
explored immanently within recent critical musical works (examples below). 
In the case of the first – objectification – fears may be mastered as objects that 
may be handled, grasped, and ultimately symbolically dominated. As Susan McClary has 
illustrated with reference to Bizet’s Carmen, categories of alterity – “Woman”, the 
“Oriental” (as erotic/exotic and hence dangerous things) – are mastered in this work when 
                                                
401 ADORNO 1997: 8 
402 I cite again the example of the Symphony as a space in which the dialectics of Part and Whole, 
individual and society, were negotiated (see chapter 1). See also, BONDS 2006: 63 
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stable order is (re)affirmed.403 She writes that ‘Carmen herself represents virtually all 
available categories of alterity: inscrutable “Oriental”, menacing worker, lawless criminal, 
femme fatale. And José, child of the Enlightenment bourgeoisie who surrenders his claims to 
racial, class and gender privilege because of her, must pay the consequences in the finale. 
Yet it is ultimately Carmen who pays – with her life – for José’s identity crisis and Bizet’s 
fantasies of alterity’404. This objectification is extended to the musical materials: drawing on 
a musical legacy, a way in which alterity has been and is objectified into material, in the 
course of the Opera’s prelude 
 
 a new motive emerges, a motive marked by the augmented second. This 
interval – defined as illicit in traditional counterpoint – has long been 
associated in Western music either with exotic Others (Jews, “Orientals,” 
gypsies) or (in, say, the works of Bach) with extreme affective states such as 
anguish… Bizet aligns [these dual connotations] with the “Oriental” femme 
fatale.405  
 
 During the first act, to the already-held connotations of this materials is ‘added to them 
the dimension of “Woman”’406. Social desires – the re-establishment of patriarchal (and 
occidental) authority (as well as correspondent, “cooked” discourses of power that are 
knotted together at this nodal point) – are deferred into the tensions in the work, and so 
desired to be resolved within the work as this reflects what is rooted outside. (McClary 
makes this explicit: ‘The urgency of Bizet’s music… invites us to desire Carmen’s 
death.’407) This first dimension is explored in greater detail below. I should prefigure this 
later discussion, however, by saying that the handling of objects in late modernist works, 
and their relationships to the concept of desire, differs from that of Bizet’s (to take him as 
an example of wider tendencies).  
The second dimension is found in music’s “absolute”, autonomous characteristic, 
the “second nature” through which desire is sublimated into the “musical language 
                                                
403 She writes: ‘The principal irony of the opera concerns a fatalism that engages with the most basic 
formal processes: the willful teleology of José’s actions results in the “necessary” return of materials 
announced before he even appeared’ (MCCLARY, SUSAN 1992: Georges Bizet, Carmen, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 110). However, she also points out that despite closure of formal processes, 
something lingers beyond the end of the work’s performance. This, I suggest, accords with an idea that I 
visit below: that objects of desire can never completely satisify the functions which they are called to 
serve. 
404 MCCLARY 1992: 43 
405 MCCLARY 1992: 65-66 
406 MCCLARY 1992: 73 
407 MCCLARY 1992: 110 
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itself”.408 This is undeniably connected with the first dimension.409 As I will show, this 
aspect impacts on the articulation of, among other things, certain ways of “opening” 
absences that are desired to be later “closed” (principally through “musical closure”). 
These legacies of articulating desire in musical language, I will suggest, are often 
approached as materials of significance in recent critical works. What follows is a 
discussion of the historicity and aesthetics of musically articulated desire, followed by 
revisiting of string quartets already discussed, in their “desiring” dimension. 
Desire in (Musical) Language 
The “immediacy” of music is, I suggest, philosophical-historically bound-up with 
questions of desire. Adorno attended to this aspect of immediacy as this was related to 
nature or, as it may be better put, the naturalisation of expressive immediacy. Max Paddison 
summarises Adorno’s position:  
 
In the case of music, as with nature, what is most striking is its immediacy... 
Music, especially if it is purely instrumental music without words, absolute 
music, appears to speak to us in a way we find difficult to conceptualize, 
because of its apparent intentionlessness – its lack of intention and lack of 
purposiveness beyond its immediate sphere.410  
 
This is where I bring desire into this discussion of immediacy: This lack, rather than 
limiting the sublimation of desire into music, does the opposite, enabling music to act as 
an exemplary locus of desires. Its naturalised “immediate” dimension – defined against 
representability – positions it as implying a lack that stands for absences at the core of the 
desiring process itself. It should be noted that this formulation itself posits music as absence to 
language’s presence, something standing on problematic foundations (i.e., a music-
language duality that, as we have seen, comes with its own problems). Despite these 
problems, this is nonetheless a significant philosophical-historical legacy and, as such, 
important to past-present relations. The supposed autonomy of music from the world 
                                                
408 Furthermore, the place of the first – object as Part to the second’s Whole – is doubly telling of desire: 
it allows for desires which conflict with the dominant logic (the supposed eroticism, exoticism, and 
alterity of “feminine sexuality”) to be enjoyed as objects facilitating and attending to these desires, whilst also 
desiring to resolve or dominate the object under this same logic, as Part of a larger Whole. 
409 A connection that can be observed in the already-cited use of the augmented second as conative of 
“alterity” or “anguish”; this is deployed as objectified alterity but part of a larger, naturalised tonal musical 
language. A further example is provided by McClary in Feminine Endings. In the introduction (to the 2002 
edition) McClary points to gendered aspects in traditional music theory: notably, notions of “masculine” 
and “feminine” cadences as these connote degrees of strength and finality (MCCLARY, SUSAN 2002 [orig. 
1991]: Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 9-17). 
410 PADDISON 2010b: 67, emphasis in original 
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itself also means that any incorporation of world(ly desires) into musical work occurs 
through a disguising process of sublimation.  
As a result, two complementary notions of lack in musical language are apparent: 
firstly, that musical language – in its historically alleged opposition with the 
representationality of “language proper” – is itself built around lack (lack of 
representationity, lack of signifiers/signifieds, lack of mediation). This first lack leads to a 
second one. Positioning music as a space of absence – as this has been done so historically 
– music provides a space in which desires might safely find articulation. Lack in the work, 
as exterior object – later affirmed, fulfilled, or closed – might help affirm, fulfil or close a 
lack perceived as interior to the subject. The apparently unmediated quality of musical 
language – its “first lack” – might be drawn on in achieving an effective sublimation from 
subjective interiority to an exterior object to this end. Within tonal musical language, this is 
expressed through (to give one example) Leonard Meyer’s “gap-fill” phenomenon – that, 
within a system, there is a desire to close gaps that are opened. As Meyer puts it, moves to 
completion and closure ‘function both within the framework of what is given in the style 
and within the terms established in the particular work’411. The system deals with lack by 
setting up ways of opening and closing – this is, in essence, a control of desire412.  
The concepts of internalisation and externalisation (as outlined above) are 
applicable here. The rise of the “autonomous work” mirrored the rise of the autonomous 
bourgeois individual, externalising the expression of the latter through its transplantation 
onto the former – something that can also be seen in the institutions surrounding these 
autonomous works, like the rise of ‘bourgeois concert life’413. Again it can be seen that 
desires explored in musical works defer backwards to other desires; desire for musical 
closure within a work defers to the desire for the autonomous work, this itself signifying 
the stabilising of the autonomy of the individual.  
Notably, this quality of deference chimes with one aspect of Jacques Lacan’s 
thinking: that desire acts metonymically. In desire, Elizabeth Wright notes, one may 
‘substitute one [associated, contiguous] signifier with another’.414 (This has an important 
connection the role of displacement, which also draws on metonymy, as explored in the 
                                                
411 MEYER, LEONARD B. 1956: Emotion and Meaning in Music, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 128 
412 It should be said that Meyer’s understanding of this process was psychological rather than 
psychoanalytic in nature. His focus was on the pleasure derived from closing gaps in the music, in 
reasserting “wholeness”. In contrast, I am not looking at the means for inducing cognitive pleasure, but 
rather ways of evoking desire – desire which cuts across what is interior and exterior to the work, rather 
than limited to within the work as cognitive construct. 
413 Dahlhaus notes that the rise of the autonomous work of art developed beside the rise of this institution 
DAHLHAUS, CARL 1997 [orig. 1977]: Foundations of Music History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
145. 
414 WRIGHT 1998: 102 
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previous chapter). This leads to ‘an incessant referral of the subject from one signifier to 
the next: the absence of one can only be replaced by another, equally marked with 
absence’415. An important point should be emphasised here. Desires, always satisfying only 
incompletely, are also always deferring non-identically. Desires do not identically stand in 
the place of other desires (desire for musical closure as taking the place of, mapping 
cleanly onto, the desire for autonomy of the individual). 
The level of success of this sublimation of anxieties and desires into supposedly 
autonomous cultural practices, like music, can be judged by the ability to say, “What 
happens in the work, stays in the work” – that it bears no resemblance to anything outside 
of itself. This is something echoed by Theodor Adorno when he noted that the 
 
ideological essence of music, its affirmative element, does not lie, as with 
other arts, in its specific content, or even in whether or not its form operates 
in terms of harmony. It lies merely in the fact that it is a voice lifted up, that it is 
music at all. Its language is magical in itself, and the transition to its isolated 
sphere has a priori a quality of transfiguration. The suspension of empirical 
reality and forming of a second reality sui generis seem to say in advance: all is 
well.416 
 
This “affirmative” aspect of music thus relates to the sociality of desire. Desires set in 
motion in the work, distilled into the very fabric of the musical discourse (like in my 
reading of Meyer) move to suggest self-evidence – that ‘all is well’, that tensions resolved 
in the work have no relation to tensions outside of the work. Here, music’s mediative 
function, of socially articulating and performing desires, is hidden. 
Returning to the tonal system as paradigmatic example, here it was noted that 
desire was sublimated within it. Lack sublimated within it (gaps, structural and stylistic 
dissonances, and so on) could, with reference to the system as a whole, be synthesised, 
closed, and put right. Unknowns were absences within the system, there (or, more 
accurately, not there) so as to be reconciled, to be mastered. These were unknowns for a 
subject that could anchor itself musically within a (tonal) frame of meaning. This past still 
informs and mediates contemporary musical subjectivities, something made possible 
through reference to fragments of this tonal past as made present. In the context of recent 
critical musical works, despite no such system or frame of closure as an 
(unproblematically) tonal one, traces of the means of closure – of dealing with gaps, lack, and as 
such, with desire in musical language – still exist as immanent to fragments of inherited 
musical materials. 
                                                
415 WRIGHT 1998: 103 
416 ADORNO 1998: 6-7, emphasis in original 
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…traces of the means of closure (i) 
Traces of desires in musical language – as found in acts of closure – can be 
observed in Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 1, a work focused on in detail in the previous 
chapter. My exploration of the workings of displacement and condensation in the musical 
discourse can be seen to be complemented by, and lay the groundwork for, the discussion 
that follows. Specifically, I outlined above how the coda supplemented closure through 
“multiply functioning” so as to draw together both ideational aspects (on the musical 
surface), and materials not resolved, or brought together, at deeper structural levels. 
However, I left the recapitulatory moment of return – the thing supplemented by the coda 
– out of the discussion (this work, like his Symphony No. 5, overwrites a palimpsest of 
sonata form). I address this omission here. Indeed, as I will show, this moment of return is 
problematic, deferring closure towards the coda (a closure that is never fully achieved). 
The opening material – as a returning, intentional object of focus – fails to satisfy, lacking 
internal cohesion and undercut by the conflicting materials around it. Nonetheless, this 
moment of return is musically-historically resonant in evoking past legacies of closure. 
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Ex. 48, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bars 196-217 (continued on the next page) 
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© 2009 M.P. Belaieff, Mainz – Germany. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. 
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Three central aspects should be outlined as important to the final section (before 
the coda). Firstly, at bar 198 (fig. 12) a return of original opening material can be heard 
(although it is altered, and set in opposition to “extraterritorial” material that is played 
simultaneously). Secondly, a momentary instant of apparent synthesis appears (in bar 217), 
with earlier material being revised in light of motivic working-out, yet this is a moment 
undermined by the surrounding harmonic context, as well as by that which appears after it. 
Thirdly, quartal material – which, as I have shown in the previous chapter, has its own 
important role in the work – comes forward as an element within the discourse, yet as also 
disruptive of its closure. These three aspects all promise closure but, in our drawing closer 
to them, swiftly defer this desire onto other objects. 
Harmonic processes reliant on markedly historical conventions play an important 
role here, and so do discursive materials that take on existence within the work. Objects 
promising satisfaction are set up in the discourse of the work, peculiar to this work as a 
constellation of objects, each with their own inscribed resonances and processually 
developing/developed significances. Owing to this, it is not only with reference to 
historical paradigms (sonata form as palimpsest, the tonal idiom) that closure is deferred 
but also – in a modernist sense – through the autonomy of the work and its elements that 
desire is articulated. 
At bar 198, the opening material returns, in the original key of G major (Ex. 48). 
Notably, this also occurs after a lengthy passage (bars 163-197) emphasising a D in the 
bass – recalling a dominant function. However, on returning, something is different. In an 
almost Schubertian manner, instead of an affirmative return, one creeps in pianississimo. 
Indeed, whilst making direct comparisons would be misleading, it may still be noted that 
there are echoes of Schubert’s last quartet (No. 15, D. 887) in Silvestrov’s. In G-major, a 
principally tonal centre of Silvestrov’s also, the first movement of Schubert’s quartet 
includes an understated recapitulatory return, and explores a duality of major and minor 
modes, marked, of course, by the duality B-natural/B-flat, which is also central to 
Silvestrov’s. The second movement of the Schubert work also suggests insistent material 
that sits “outside” the discourse proper, as exemplified in bars 53-55. In Silvestrov’s 
moment of return, the instrumentation is altered from its expositionary statement, with the 
bass G given by the cello to the viola (which is now double stopping). 
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Ex. 49, Silvestrov: String Quartet No. 1, bars 198-220, reduction 
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Crucially, extraterritorial material remains. The A-flat/B-flat “tone motif”, which 
dominated the top of the texture (being also its farthest reach) in the previous section (fig. 
11-fig. 12, 192-197), remains unsynthesised with its setting. As can be seen from the 
reduction (Ex. 49, in bars 198-211 in particular), this B-flat extreme – occasionally 
oscillating with E-flat material – remains outside of the return, its presence being 
disturbing. Furthermore, E-naturals also appear in this extraterritorial context – recalling 
the E-natural/E-flat duality, this time within the extraterritorial material itself. (The B-flat 
appears, as I illustrated in the previous chapter, a “semitone out” from the (major 3rd) B of 
G major’s primary chord, here present. The presence of the E-natural, I would suggest, 
gives extra emphasis to the extraterritoriality of the E-flat, which, in this context of neo-
Romantic tonality, is not necessarily “outside” to this harmonic context). In addition to 
this rupturing presence, the returning material, as an object itself, also fails to satisfy the 
desire for closure. Similarly as with its expositionary appearance, the I-IV-V movement in 
the bass prolongs V, finally dissolving in bar 220 onto C (IV) rather than leading to an 
authentic resolution (shown in the reduction). So, an object’s return – here, that of the 
opening material – fails to satisfy and, in fact, conflicts with materials that remain outside 
of it. 
The extraterritorial B-flat “tone motif”, hanging above the texture, finds some 
provisional closure in bar 217, when a B-natural (at the same octave) is markedly articulated. 
The B-flat – as an extreme of register – shifts upwards a semitone to this new limit. 
Nevertheless, this “inclusion” of the outside into the inside is only provisional, with the 
tone motif – even its A-flat/B-flat manifestation – again creeping in later (bars 227-230). 
This occurs before, as shown in the previous chapter, its final incorporation into the 
harmony, refracted through the lens of the Lydian mode, during the coda, when it finds 
true vertical inclusion in the harmonic background, rather than transitory inclusion into the 
linearity of the voice-leading on the surface. This B-natural also comes at an important 
moment in the flow of returning opening material, as the third scale degree in a descent 
from the fifth degree (D, bar 211). It is articulated through a leap upwards differing from 
the corresponding moment in the opening section. (Bar 217 corresponds with bar 15 of 
the opening. The first time a leap reaches the a G – this time the leap reaches beyond this 
to the B-natural.) 
Again, satisfaction is only transitory and is incomplete. The D pedal remains under 
the surface (as shown in the reduction). This prolongation is only articulated further by 
chromatic voice-leading in the bass which “gravitates” around this centre. Indeed, here 
something else must be said about the provisionality of desired objects: that the gravitation 
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towards these provisional centres grants them the status of provisional points that are 
desired – localised, momentary points of desire which, nonetheless, conflict with the 
overriding direction towards overall closure in an unproblematic tonic. This conflict helps 
“prolong” tension such that final satisfaction is only greater (although, in this work this is 
not supplied unproblematically). Furthermore, the descent from the fifth scale degree (bar 
211) continues beyond the provisional synthesis of the B-natural (the third scale degree, 
bar 217) continuing to and ending on the second  (A-natural, bar 218), which is left 
“hanging”.  
This second scale degree, the A-natural, becomes the locus – in dream-theoretical 
terms: a point of affinity and correspondence, a ‘mediating common factor’417 – through 
which another idea is turned to, quartal materials and their relationships. This is a point of 
negotiation, a condensation, a deformation, of materials in light of one another. As 
illustrated in the reduction, just behind the surface can clearly be heard a series of 
fourths/fifths in bars 218-220 (compare with the original passage, Ex. 48). This occurs 
doubly so, in fact, as quartal relationships unfold in two directions: from a central axis of 
F-sharp appears, in one (increasingly sharp) direction, a quartal sequence (the pitches A, E, 
B, F-sharp) and, in the other (increasingly flat) direction, another (A-flat, C-sharp, and F-
sharp). However, the inclusion of these quartal relationships within the flow of the music 
only leads to its disruption from within, and the further deference of closure. This quartal 
chain is broken through the shift of a (compound) tritone in bar 220, to a C, bringing us to 
the beginning of the coda as discussed in the previous chapter. (This C itself alludes to a 
proliferation of this earlier quartal motion – C in the cello (bar 220), F in the viola (221), 
and B-flat in the cello (222).) 
…traces of the means of closure (ii.) 
As noted above, “musical language” encompasses desires as sublimated within it. 
Historically, sounding-objects within this language also articulate desires – “cultural” 
objects connotative of (for example) otherness, femininity, exoticism, and/or eroticism. 
Flirting with these objects, but ultimately dominating them through their objectification, 
allows for enjoyment of them whilst, at the same time, protecting subjectivity’s claim to be 
divested of their inherent danger through elevating desire to – investing it into – the 
sphere of the aesthetic. (An exceptional example of this can be seen in the visual arts, in 
painting – the female nude.418) 
                                                
417 FREUD 1999: 226 
418 It is notable also that within this tradition this itself becomes immanently contested in works like 
Edouard Manet’s Olympia (1863-65) in which the nude is not only looked upon, but looks back at the 
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Whilst I would not contend that recent critical musics escape these functions – 
notions of musical immediacy (as lack, as opposing language’s “presence”), and traces of 
desires as sublimated into musical language are drawn upon – they often foreground a 
different treatment of objects and of desire’s relationship with objects. In Schnittke’s 
String Quartet No. 4 (in aspects of the second movement in particular, see chapter 4), for 
example, one hears a focus on musical language as mediating closure, on traces of the 
means of closure. However, this differs from Silvestrov’s treatment of closure discussed 
above. Whereas in Silvestrov’s quartet it is the naturalised immediacy of processes of closing 
that is of critical focus, in Schnittke’s it is material mediative of closure that is taken as an 
object of interpretation. 
Connections between desire, knowledge, and interpretation were the focus of Julia 
Kristeva’s 1982 paper, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Polis’ 419 . In it, she develops a 
poststructuralist notion of interpretive “delirium”. Specifically, Kristeva argues that whilst 
interpretation is often conceived of in such a way as to neutralise the radical and dramatic 
moments of thought, psychoanalytically-inclined approaches, like those she pursues, 
explore something different, exceptionally so in cases in which one sees the 
‘psychoanalytic decentering of the speaking subject to the very foundations of language.’420 
Crucially, Schnittke’s focus on the signification of selfhood, as elevated into musical 
material – in taking it as something objectified, as an interpretable object – can be seen as 
paralleling Kristeva’s psychoanalytic decentring. This is a decentring of subjectivity 
through focusing upon the processes and inherent lacks within signification, on the 
objectification of aspects of subjectivity as inscribed immanently to musical material. 
Rather than “interpreting” Schnittke’s quartet, the work is itself seen to perform an 
“interpretation” that begins from musical objects. 
This centres on Schnittke’s treatment of an object, the musical material related 
metonymically to closure and to the historicity of musical and subjective self-coherence 
(see chapter 4). Instead of temporal process pushing forwards the closure of the work as 
an object – a process driven by a desired goal of closure, “putting right” the work through 
its synthesis – one hears a marker of this now-passed temporal process appearing as a 
sound-object itself. Lived experience unfolding in time – in its reification as material – 
becomes an object from which one might begin interpretation.  
                                                                                                                                         
viewer. ‘While female nudes were traditional artistic subjects, the confrontational gaze of Manet’s model 
was unusually aggressive’, as Michelle Facos puts it. See FACOS, MICHELLE 2009: Symbolist Art in Context, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 20. 
419 KRISTEVA 1982 
420 KRISTEVA 1982: 78 
194 
Kristeva points out that interpretation, in its psychoanalytically-inclined form, has 
the advantage of 
 
being midway between a classic interpretive attitude – that of providing 
meaning through the connection of two terms from a stable place and theory 
– and the questioning of the subjective and theoretical stability of the 
interpretant which, in the act of interpretation itself, establishes the theory 
and the interpreter himself as interpretable objects.421 
 
Schnittke’s quartet performs something similar. Musical language is taken as a site of 
performing subjective concerns – in which materials and discursive positioning articulate 
subjective concerns – whilst the material through which these ends are reached itself 
becomes an interpretable object, as discernible objects in which moments of subjective 
articulation are their most visible (i.e. in the figures of closure). 
The rupturing sounding-objects of Schnittke’s quartet (in the second movement) 
recall figures of closure which – in unproblematic settings and unambiguous contexts – 
helped satisfy the desire for closure. However, in this work they do not provide this 
closure. Those aspects of the discourse that would have closed gaps with reference to the 
system as a whole (into which desire had been sublimated) become themselves seen to be 
lacking. They become heard as objects distant from the subject, themselves objectified 
subjectivity as a new object of focus. Rather than the sublimation of desire into the musical 
language – so that, as in the dream, meanings might be negotiated and compromises 
sought – there is a focus upon the incapacity of the object to articulate the desires for 
which it historically performed, i.e. closure. 
In this sense, and in taking these materials as objects, Schnittke dialectically puts in 
motion a process of interpretation that Kristeva would characterise as distinctly modern422, 
albeit now in a musical context. This centres on the dialectical relation of knowing and 
desiring. The object of knowledge, Kristeva writes, already contains a lack, an absence within 
it; ‘it shelters within its very being the nonsignifiable, the nonsymbolized’423. In what 
Kristeva describes as ‘theory’ – but in a critical outlook that I would say is performed in 
music (and in the arts more widely) – a supposedly unproblematic object is taken as a 
point of contestation, its own immanent lack brought forward as this object of knowing is 
confronted.424 In the sense of desire, an object of knowledge – what I characterised above 
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424 In the context of ‘theory’ (the kind of theory that is now often spelt with a capital ‘T’), Kristeva sees 
this move as a way of challenging established interpretive theories. As examples of ‘theory’ she notes 
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as an object of “understanding” – in this dimension is always incomplete. This 
incompleteness itself suggests a deferring from one object to another, to those to which it 
sits in relation, as we grapple to ‘know’ it – to bring knowledge and object into synthesis. 
The returning, fixed figure of closure, and its later fluidity in mediating other 
musical materials, accords with a process pursued by Kristeva’s modern interpreter (who 
‘avoids the presentness of subjects to themselves and to things’425). In “confronting” this 
object, its sublimative role, at least its previous sublimative role, is rendered inoperative; it 
may no-longer articulate desire effectively. As a figure of closure, it no longer performs the 
closure of gaps within the work and within an unproblematic system and framework of 
immediacy in which closure is possible. Instead, a gap is shown to exist between the 
subject and its object, the object through which closure was articulated. 
Desire, however, still pulls discourse forward, circling around this fundamental 
chasm of subject and object. Flowing forward, the work performs a distinctly “modern” 
interpretation of a musical object. In avoiding the ‘presentness’ of the subject through its 
object, things appear ‘strange’ and challenge the interpretational framework by which 
subject and object are related.426 ‘Breaking out of the enclosure of the presentness of 
meaning’, as Kristeva puts it, ‘the new “interpreter” no longer interprets: he speaks, he 
“associates” because there is no longer an object to interpret; there is, instead, the setting 
off of semantic, logical, phantasmatic, and indeterminable sequences.’427 What was known 
– the object of “understanding” – becomes the beginning for a play, development, and 
deformation of musical signifiers. In such a treatment of an object one sees a dialectic 
between its capacities as an object of knowledge (to be known, as well as for facilitating 
knowing) and as an object of desire (as articulating desire, as well as itself lacking). 
I will end this section by briefly mentioning the two works with which it opened – 
Jukka Tiensuu’s Arsenic and Old Lace, for microtonally tuned harpsichord and string quartet, 
and Wolfgang Rihm’s String Quartet No. 10. In both, the role desire plays entails 
relationships between past, present, and future. Looking backwards to the source, the 
object of desire/knowledge, in its revising, becomes retrospectively changed. Remembering it 
in light of an ever-changing present, and forwards toward potential futures, a multiplicity 
                                                                                                                                         
Marx’s revolution and Freud’s cure. These are attempts to break through a known conception of the object: 
‘Whatever object one selects (a patient's discourse, a literary or journalistic text, or certain sociopolitical 
behavior), its interpretation reaches its full power, so as to tip the object toward the unknown of the 
interpretive theory or, more simply, toward the theory's intentions, only when the interpreter confronts the 
interpretable object’ (KRISTEVA 1982: 79-80). 
425 KRISTEVA 1982: 80 
426 KRISTEVA 1982: 80 
427 KRISTEVA 1982: 80-81, emphasis in original 
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of prospective directions, absences and gaps newly open and through a proliferation of new 
discursive affinities/differences.  
In Tiensuu’s work, the improvisatory tone of the harpsichord’s part draws on the 
instrument’s past, allusively expanding out cadenza-like figures and ornamental materials. 
This leads to the negotiation of materials in the present, pointing prospectively in future 
directions. At the same time, these ideas undergo retrospective change, being 
recontextualised, their significance becoming transformed. We hear prescience in elements 
of the past.  
In Rihm’s quartet (the central movement), the use of the material of La Follia is 
noteworthy regarding desire and its retrospective/prospective dimensions. Whilst 
markedly of the past, this “found object” is actually an object pursued, only slowly 
becoming visible and articulated clearly. Consequently, the found object becomes a “sought” 
object; it is “found” only in the sense of a forward-driven seeking out. A distinct object – 
the La Follia model – slowly becomes apparent. Returning materials, heard in new settings, 
take on new significances as aspects or versions of this object, becoming retrospectively 
reinterpreted. ‘Desire, the discourse of desire, moves towards its object through a 
connection, by displacement and deformation’428, as Kristeva puts it. But, in seeking out 
this object, we also hear desire pushing forwards, towards a prospective goal.  
Retrospective and prospective here operate in dialectic with each other. It is only 
later, once the object of desire has become apparent, that we become aware that earlier 
versions, inadequate facsimiles standing in for it, were lacking. It seems the case that in 
this instance, lack – that which pushes forwards desiring through discourse – only 
retrospectively becomes audible. However, on the dialectical other hand, the standpoint 
from which this retrospective judgement may be made is only available through following 
the prospective line traced following an absence of which we were originally unaware. 
Regarding desire, musical objects can be said to be of the past in two senses: firstly, 
that they have inscribed into them objectified past desires; and, secondly, that the object 
might stand in (metonymically) for some aspect of the past, helping to articulate some 
desire in the present, and of the future, although never completely. In this sense, past and 
future can be said to be wrapped-up in the present, in the musical objects presently 
perceived, echoing what Hegel has referred to as “the immense privilege of the present”429. 
Hence, the confrontation of musical objects in the present also concerns a retrospective 
rereading of subjectivities of the past, objectified into these materials. Prospectively, it 
might also articulate, through these materials, desires that propel experience forwards, 
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which defers the experience of objects from one to the next, through a process of 
continual displacement, deformation, and development. 
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ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES: NEGATING DESIRE IN 
FELDMAN’S STRING QUARTET NO. 2 
	  
Eventlessness has no posts to drape duration on. 
 
– John Steinbeck, East of Eden430 
 
The music seems to float, doesn’t seem to go in any direction, one 
doesn’t know how it’s made, there doesn’t seem to be any type of 
dialectic, going alongside it, explaining it. They [the audience] are not 
told how to listen, that is the problem. Most music listens for the 
public. 
 
– Morton Feldman431 
 
Morton Feldman’s String Quartet No. 2 (1983) opens up and meditates upon 
fragments of musical material, distilling them so as to evacuate them of desire to unfold or 
move forward. This is taken to an extreme, culminating in a work assembling (as opposed 
to developing) musical fragments over a meditative five and a half hours. As objects, these 
fragments of past material are taken as the fixed (although minutely varying) focal points 
of each musical section. But, as explored above, desire concerns not only its immediate 
object but how objects unfold in discourse – how focus defers from one to the next, how 
closure is found, how they “should” relate, and so on. In Feldman’s quartet, there is no 
real formal development and no struggle for the affirmation of closure (affirmation through 
closure). In this sense, objects – or the fragmented moments of what is inherited – stand 
divided from a processual, desiring, teleological flow, neither articulating this nor 
participating in it. The idea that fragments of past materials are divided from their 
“normative” functions (the context in which they “should” participate/articulate) could be 
said of the works of many other composers also – Stravinsky would be an excellent 
example in that he also created static fields of musical material. However, Stravinsky’s neo-
classicist fragments, unlike Feldman’s, make explicit their rootedness in the past, that they 
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431 Morton Feldman in FELDMAN, MORTON & BROWN, EARLE & METZGER, HEINZ-KLAUS [online]: 
‘Morton Feldman, Earle Brown, Heinz-Klaus Metzger in Discussion.’ (1972) [website: 
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can be heard through the past, whereas Feldman’s obscure the role of this mediation, 
suggesting that the sounds are experienced for their own (nonetheless historically 
mediated) qualities. I argue this should be interpreted as a peculiar treatment of 
temporality and desire, insofar as these dimensions call forth and immanently articulate 
subjectivity experienced within the music. 
It has been argued above that desire moves through the dialectics immanent to a 
work as this responds fluidly to the needs of what is outside the work. It flows through the 
gaps of non-identity, of “absences” taken into musical material (and always present in 
signification and articulation through objects). It has also been noted that desire need not 
be seen as counterpoised to critical thought, and so may play a role in it, in shaping the 
subject’s relationships with its object. Instead of seeing desire as tending towards 
immediate and unreflective gratification, this is to see it as in dialectic with reified 
knowledge, and to recognise this relationship as possessing critical potential. 
There are, however, critical musical responses to the sociality of desires that do not 
encircle lack as their central – if absent – entity. Feldman’s String Quartet No. 2 typifies 
such a response. Such artworks step outside of the established dialectical frameworks of 
affirmation and negation, object and subject, and identity and non-identity. This is done 
through the act of shutting down the interplay of identity and non-identity: without 
reference to identity, there is no façade which may come to crumble and through whose 
cracks negativity may flow; without syntax and a sense of the interrelation of parts, a field 
of difference cannot form, and so identity cannot find affirmed articulation; without an 
imagined object of desire (the comportment of some symbolic articulation in the work – 
“Woman”, “Other”, “subjective struggle” – or the enunciation of alterity), there is neither 
purpose nor, more problematically for musical artworks, purposiveness, the sense of motion, 
direction, or chase – and as such no possibility of formally developing play around some 
veiled set of tensions at its core. 
It will be argued that Feldman’s String Quartet No. 2 offers an alternative strategy 
to the evocation of desire and, as implicit within this, the deference through desire of 
developmental musical processes. It has already been suggested that desire works through 
symbolically articulating underlying forces. This quartet, as we will see, is written against 
the grain of established modes of articulating musical forms. The celebrated failure of 
syntactic articulation is symbolised by Feldman’s distinction between “composition” and 
“assemblage”, the latter of which he designates this work to be: 
 
…the distinction between constructing a “composition” and that of 
assemblage, which is more what this quartet is about. A “composition” for 
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me forms sentence structures within a beginning, middle, and end. Very 
much the way Picasso uses a rectangle as a ready-made protagonist. With 
assemblage there is no continuity of fitting the parts together as words in a 
sentence of paragraph.432 
 
This principle of assemblage is at play in Ex. 50, in which elements of material, often 
single bars, repeat with minor alterations. Larger, static ‘fields’ of material result from the 
assemblages of these elements, and these fields appear beside one another – assemblages 
in a larger sense – as static states without a beginning, middle, or end. Like Heinz 
Knobeloch’s characterisation of another of Feldman’s late works, Neither (1977), instead of 
an unfolding, large-scale form, something happens more akin to turning the pages of a 
diary.433 
 
Ex. 50, Feldman: String Quartet No. 2, page 53, second system 
 
2. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1983 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., London/UE 17650 
 
There are dialectical forces at work in this quartet even if these are not immanent 
to the musical form; through the intense focus on the moment – in its geometrical 
expansion, on being over becoming – becoming results. This paradox results from the 
treatment of being. Being is focused upon yet it is not affirmed (as it is in unreflective 
thought). Rather, the quiet insistence on passivity suggests that the being becomes 
dialectically itself through our changing perceptions of it, often through stifled repetition 
drawing attention to previously imperceptible nuances in the material. Instead of being 
through becoming (as in, say, the Beethoven-Hegelian dialectic), becoming is experienced 
through being. This is a consequence of the work divesting itself of driving forces of 
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desire, so that all is left is drifting perception – the being of the works’ surface to be 
perceived. A dialectic opens up as a consequence of this focus on the role of the perception 
of being, rather than being as antecedent to the ‘to be’ of its being perceived. There is a 
point of correspondence here between Feldman’s aesthetic and Adorno’s thinking. Daniel 
Chua has recently characterised Adorno’s dialectics as ‘drifting’, arguing that that the 
immanence of Adorno’s critique highlights that ‘there is no vantage point from which to 
philosophize’, and that ‘to drift is to loose all bearings’, a move explored in critical music434.  
Put in Feldman’s terms, the ‘drifting’ perception elicited by his music can be contrasted 
with perception of music which, to repeat Feldman’s words, ‘listens for the public’, that 
tells them how to hear it. Furthermore, in eschewing a developed ‘Whole’, or moment of 
desired-for arrival, Feldman grants no privileged position or vantage point at which 
perception might become concretised, grasped, or “understood”. 
Desire, Temporality 
Desire’s relation to temporality is important here, as is temporality’s with the 
philosophical-historical context surrounding the work. Desire, as unfolding affirmatively 
via an established, teleological route or, alternatively, exploring the negativity of lack, of 
course takes place in time. This much is clear at least. My hope here is to focus upon 
desire, temporality, and Feldman’s String Quartet No. 2 – and in this triangulation locate 
the relationships between them as these are significant to the experience of the present as 
shaped by the past. This is to elucidate shifting conceptions of time and desire as these 
relate to each other and shape subjective experience.  
I have argued that desire can work affirmatively in circling around certain veiled 
ideological tensions which are desired to be reconciled (often through synthesis immanent 
to musical form). The teleology of struggle, the “overcoming” and mastering of social 
fears, provides an example of this – for instance, putting the second subject right in the 
context of the first, the feminine in heteronormative light of the masculine, as seen in 
classic sonata form. This conception of teleology is caught up in conceptions of time. As 
Karol Berger has shown, as musical modernity developed, a cyclical conception of time – 
both in music and in culture more widely – started to heed to a linear, directed model of 
time (“time’s arrow”)435. Berger illustrates that this directedness can be observed in musical 
forms as these are situated socio-historically. The linearity of the temporal dimension and 
the teleology of overcoming can here be seen to be in congruence. This could have much 
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to do with the classical alignment of time and interiority (as opposed to space with 
exteriority) that, as Fredric Jameson puts it, ‘time governs the realm of interiority, in which 
both subjectivity and logic, the private and the epistemological, self-consciousness and 
desire, are to be found.’436 Following this logic, a mastery through struggle in the temporal 
unfolding of the work can be seen as the mastery through struggle of the interior world of the 
autonomous bourgeois subject (i.e. Beethoven’s “Heroic” style). The dialectical unfolding 
of the struggle for affirmation in time and the alignment of this temporal development 
with subjective interiority437 both suggest that the treatment of temporality may come to 
impact upon the treatment of subjectivity and self in music (insofar as this is temporally 
articulated). 
Feldman’s rejection of a temporally disclosing logic suggests that the quartet 
disinvites a temporal hearing pertaining to subjective interiority. Instead, in the sense of 
exteriority, the work becomes a space within which subjectivity may become ensconced, 
listening “outwards” around it. This begs that we ask how a late modern experience of 
temporality is responded to musically in this work, as well as what relation this holds to 
teleology, directedness (and “purposiveness”), and, as such, to desire. Indeed, it should be 
noted that Jameson goes on to suggest that the pairing of time with interiority and space 
with exteriority is problematic; ‘such descriptions are clearly predicated on the operative 
dualism, the alleged historical existence, of the two alternatives’.438 This problematic is – in 
Feldman’s terms, the dialectics of spatiality and temporality, objects and an experiencing 
subject – the substance of musical critique in the Second Quartet. 
Fredric Jameson has diagnosed late capitalism’s treatment of time as a reduction of 
experience to bodily immediacy in the moment, an ‘End of Temporality’. 
 
This situation has been characterized as a dramatic and alarming shrinkage of 
existential time and the reduction to a present that hardly qualifies as such any 
longer, given the virtual effacement of that past and future that can alone 
define a present in the first place.439  
 
                                                
436 JAMESON 2003: 697  
437 For a discussion of space and time as these relate to objective exteriority and subjective interiority in 
Beethoven’s music see CHUA 2011, particularly 346-348. Indeed, Chua also argues that, throughout the 
Enlightenment, there is a move towards inwards towards the self, with truths coming to be located in 
selfhood: ‘the [pre-Enlightenment] music of the spheres, under the critical gaze of Enlightenment reason, 
collapsed into the subject and became the Song of the Self, shifting the meaning of music from the 
universe to the ego – or rather, the self became a singing cosmos’ (343-344). He later argues that this 
interiorisation of the self through music still plays a role in contemporary society: ‘Modernity, even in its 
postmodern form, has never quite outlived the spaces of the Romantic song and continues to shape who 
we are’ (345). 
438 JAMESON 2003: 697 
439 JAMESON 2003: 708 
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Feldman’s Second Quartet, as with much of Feldman’s music, explores ‘the moment’. But 
this is very different from the Jameson’s postmodern moment. In fact, the former can be 
seen as a reaction to the experiential-temporal conditions of the latter. 
What allows Feldman to achieve this is a mimesis of the surface, whilst also taking 
another step. By surface, I mean traces of past musical material as abstract form devoid of 
their inherited content, but also as a kind of musical analogue to the “flatness” Clement 
Greenberg famously identified in modernist painting, in his essay ‘Modernist Painting’440. 
This mimesis takes the form of an intense focus on traces of material –  could-almost-be-
tonal pitches collections, for example, or fragments of repeating motivic material. The 
additional step is one of  “unfixing” these mimetic traces from their established patterns of 
composition and hearing; ‘only by “unfixing” the elements traditionally used to construct a 
piece of music could the sounds exist in themselves – not as symbols, or memories which 
were memories of other music to begin with’, said Feldman in his essay on musical 
systems and indeterminacy441. 
Feldman’s strategy is not a postmodern reduction of experience to the moment 
(like that diagnosed by Jameson above in contemporary society in general), but quite the 
opposite, a (five and a half hour) meditation on the postmodern reduction of experience 
to the moment. The kind of experiential context found in the “throwaway” society of late-
capitalism – where the temporariness of consumer products seems itself to become an 
atemporal truth, a way things are, will be, and should be – is symbolically resisted in the 
creation of a sonic space antithetical to this type of thinking, one that eschews the 
dominance of administered experience through an unfixing of its objective, naturalised 
elements from their standardised arrangement. Indeed, this is a situation which itself 
makes visible the link between the experience of temporality and desire. Works like the 
Second Quartet, provide a space of refuge, a different timeframe – a different framing of 
time – outside of the prevailing temporal conditions of that hard-and-fast capitalism of 
1980s New York. A different type of listening is asked for within this frame. It is in this 
spirit that Heinz-Klaus Metzger, in discussion with the composer, told the Feldman that 
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441 FELDMAN 2000: 35, in the essay ‘Predeterminate/Indeterminate’ [orig. 1965]. 
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‘…there is a contradiction between your music and the world in which we live. The world 
is much louder.’442 
 
Ex. 51, Feldman: String Quartet No. 2, page 60, beginning of the second system 
 
2. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1983 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., London/UE 17650 
 
Mimesis of the surface comes through in the ‘degrees of stasis’ explored; unfixed 
elements are given a space and time in which to speak (although, given their “unfixing” 
from codified ways of hearing, we cannot be sure what they are saying). Writing two years 
before this quartet, in his essay on ‘Crippled Symmetry’, Feldman noted that he discovered 
this idea of stasis through painting. (This point also relates to the idea of “flatness”; stasis 
being in time, flatness being in space, but both mutually conducive in the aesthetic 
experience they can together bring about.) 
 
Stasis, as it is utilized in painting, is not traditionally part of the apparatus of 
music. Music can achieve aspects of immobility, or the illusion of it: the 
Magritte-like world Satie evokes, or the “floating sculpture” of Varèse. The 
degrees of stasis, found in Rothko or a Guston, were perhaps the most 
significant elements that I brought to my music from painting.443 
 
What impact does Feldman’s mimesis of the surface, the exploring of static states, and the 
intense focus upon “unfixed” musical elements, have on the idea of subjectivity in music 
in general and the dialectics of experience in particular? The short answer is that these 
aspects help to evacuate Feldman’s musical materials of conventionalised significance, 
both in terms of paradigms and their deviations, as well as how they (“should”) fit 
together syntagmatically. A result is that, unlike the processual unfolding of works that 
articulate themselves around some (albeit illusive) teleological objective, desire is not 
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evoked, neither in directed musical motion nor through a dialectical struggle for 
affirmation.  
Ex. 51 shows one instance when this unfixing of elements and focus on the 
surface is explored in explicitly temporal terms. In the most part, the same time signatures 
appear across all four instruments simultaneously, as they do conventionally. However, as 
this example illustrates, time is, at some times, conceived differently. Within this static field, 
each instrument takes its own time signature, though, given that each takes varying 
combinations of the same four time signatures, on completing the field they reconvene into 
a mutually held common time (a silent two-two bar). (A similar field, another assemblage 
of time signatures then follows this.) Note that in the score, despite the bars being of 
differing lengths, the spacing of the bar lines (and the notes within them) on the page do 
not reflect the sonic result produced, in which the players do not begin and end their bars 
at the same time. A sense of temporal depth in the score is lost as each bar, in each 
instrumental part, signifies a framing of time that is removed from the temporal flow at 
large. The “5/8” does not frame the temporal flow but rather exists in the space of this 
larger assemblage, this static field. Furthermore, in a “painterly” sense444 , the score 
becomes a surface written on, a surface on which temporal elements are unfixed and then 
distributed, rather than developed so as to unfold temporally.445 
With this focus on the static and unfixed surface the desire for some deeper goal is 
evaded. This is reflected in the non-developmental character of the quartet, in the static 
character of material which steps outside of articulating moments as Parts of a larger 
unfolding Whole – something which can be readily observed in there being no formal 
“opening” or “closing”. This can be formulated in terms of desire as discussed above. A 
subject which desires, in its dialectical dimension, requires an ‘Other’ by which desire, and 
subjectivity flowing through this, articulates itself. In the terms I have outlined above, this 
could be an Other both in terms of an object (e.g. “Woman”) or objectivity (e.g. “struggle” 
as immanent to music’s formal logic446), with the two dimensions articulating each other. 
Indeed, this other need not be specific – it is rather to say that the dialectics of perception 
require subject and object. Subject and object in this sense are in interrelation, as 
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subjectivity relies on Otherness to negate and hence affirm itself (Hegel prominently 
argued this). Philip Kain summarises these aspects of desire in writing that 
 
when I say, “I want that object”, the emphasis is on the “I want”, not on the 
object. My desire is what is important; the object is a means to its satisfaction. 
The object is subordinate, negative. The object is nothing but an object-of-
my-desire, an object-of-my-self-consciousness.447 
 
Desire requires the Otherness of the object in order to function; ‘desire desires the 
existence of the other as much as its negation’.448  
However, this seems at odds with Feldman’s music, where sitting in the moment 
dissolves the subject and object’s unfolding in mutual relation, with the object of 
experience removed from articulation via the/an Other. Feldman’s Second Quartet lacks 
the dialectics of desire as functioning around Otherness. In being static, becoming through 
musical motion is avoided, something echoed in the work’s exploration of assemblages 
rather than development through musical form. Through sitting on the surface, gaps 
showing through are covered up and left unexploited. By unfixing objects from their 
historical connotations and resonances, memory does not open up, with one thought 
leading to the next, this itself then deferring towards others. 
To recapitulate, Feldman explores the surface mimesis of musical materials and 
sound production whilst he divests them of their established affective contents. This 
divesting of content takes various forms, which I have surveyed above: there is no 
teleological drive, whereby there is something presented as to become affirmed through 
overcoming (a function of dialectics of Otherness). This comes through not only in the 
degrees of stasis Feldman presents but also, and connected with this, in the fact that 
assemblages of unfixed surface forms are favoured over unfolding formal development 
and the shaping of musical content.  
The articulation of subjectivity – in its dialectical relationship to affirmation and 
negation – is thus problematised. From a Hegelian standpoint it could be said that without 
“Otherness” there is no articulation of subjectivity, there is no becoming of it. It seems that 
nothing can be said of subjectivity, it finding no affirmed articulation through musical 
language. How do we go beyond this impasse? My answer to this would be to say that we 
need to modify the terms at play in the dialectic, shifting focus away from the object of 
perception, towards the perception of the object (without succumbing to unreflexive 
phenomenology).  
                                                
447 KAIN 2005: 45 
448 KAIN 2005: 46 
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Perception over Object 
The interrelation of past and present in this quartet is a curious one. Past musical 
materials and techniques of instrumental production sit far away from their temporal 
articulation in the experiential present. By this I mean that the listener is placed in the 
moment whilst, as part of an assemblage rather than form, this moment itself averts taking 
Part in a larger unfolding contextual Whole. Objects, being from the past, are taken into the 
work, whilst affirmative modes of becoming are rejected; the moment is ‘there’, for us to 
step into, but this moment itself eschews embeddedness within a temporal flow 
affirmatively becoming through formal process. 
This is not to say that becoming plays no role in the experience of the work as, 
dialectically, the contrary is also true – becoming is central, rather than the work simply 
“being there” outside of experience set in the interrelation between past and present. In 
this sense, perception itself becomes the object of focus. The mimesis of surface itself leads 
to a different type of becoming from one which finds affirmation as it is articulated 
determinately, through Otherness (as object or in the naturalised, immediate dimension of 
music). “Unfixed” elements, in their shifting repetition (in their ‘crippled symmetry’), are 
fixated upon. An exemplary instance of paradoxical fixation through unfixing, appears in a 
passage from page 21 of the score (see Ex. 52). In fact, this cannot really be even called a 
“passage”; passages, to evoke the architectural metaphors of chapter 1, take us from one 
place to another and this material, as non-developmental and non-teleological, does not 
take us anywhere. Here, the oscillation between two pitches is minutely varied timbrally 
through being doubling by and passed between the different players, or by briefly 
appearing ponticello, always requiring the intensely focused listening demanded by a 
quintuple-piano dynamic. The elemental materials of the work – the objects brought into 
its assemblages – are repeated and altered, standing apart from one another within their 
own static fields. Little (if any) emphasis is placed on development across the syntagmatic 
plane between these fields. This surface focus, in taking objects outside of established 
affective contexts or formally developmental relations, means that objects are divided 
from inherited “objective” contexts. 
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Ex. 52, Feldman: String Quartet No. 2, page 21, systems two and three 
 
2. Streichquartett|für Streichquartett © Copyright 1983 by Universal Edition (London) Ltd., London/UE 17650 
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Despite the lack of dialectical development of material, and the emphasis on being, 
I suggest that this leads to experiential implications that can be understood dialectically. In 
being repeated, and in asserting their being in this act, focus becomes fixated upon the 
elemental materials. Rather than Jameson’s diagnosis of postmodernism’s reduction of 
experience to the moment, Feldman expands experience from the moment. Through the 
intensity of the focus on being, being becomes a starting point for musical experience. This 
can be contrasted with becoming into being, where, through the negation of Otherness, 
being is to be affirmed as necessary goal as this unfolds temporally. Thus, through an 
emphasis on perception itself, being is not pursued through becoming, but becoming 
through being; we are asked to focus intently on being, such that, through intense 
perception, being’s certainty in-itself dissipates. 
__________ 
 
As noted in the discussion of Feldman’s String Quartet No. 2, the time/space 
duality has, historically, coincided with a duality of subjective interiority and objective 
exteriority. This might be problematised in critical works like Feldman’s. If Part II 
underlined issues of the psychical world of the subject, Part I emphasised music’s role in 
shaping the “exterior” world of nature and culture. These worlds mediate one another, of 
course, and do so musically. In critical music, the means by which one might become seen 
to be immanently shaped by the other becomes reformulated. Critical musical works 
provide spaces (temporalities) in which the transgression and intersection of experiencing 
subjectivities and the materialities of the world become audible. 
It is in the terms of the mind/body dialectic, as this has been a philosophically-
historically significant legacy, that this issue is of focus in Part III. The canon of musical 
works and the habits prescribed pedagogically discipline not only a “body of knowledge” 
that is kept “in mind”, reified conceptually, but also one that inscribes the body with 
knowledge, reified non-conceptualised practices and performativities. Indeed, this is a 
body that is always already inscribed, rather than existing as a blank slate “prior to” its 
becoming culturally, philosophically, and musically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III) Bodies of Knowledge: the Piano 
 
 
 
 
 
– Rebecca Horn, Concert for Anarchy (1990)449 
 
How do we reconceive the body no longer as a passive medium or 
instrument awaiting the enlivening capacity of a distinctly immaterial 
will? 
 
 – Judith Butler, Gender Trouble450 
                                                
449 [website: http://www.tate.org.uk/collection/T/T07/T07517_9.jpg, accessed 14th April, 2011] © 
DACS, 2002 
450 BUTLER, JUDITH 2007 [orig. 1990]: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London: 
Routledge, 12 
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7. Putting the Piano “Centre Stage”: 
Lachenmann’s Serynade 
 
Pianos and Bodies as Inherited Musical Materials 
 
Performance techniques, musical instruments, and performing spaces 
are also shrines to memory, as much and often more so than musical 
works in themselves. 
 
– Luciano Berio451 
 
A seemingly simple question: what is the Piano? The answer to this question has 
an obvious physical component – it is an object that can be felt, touched, played. However, 
“physicality” in this answer does not stop purely at delineating the piano’s physical 
boundaries. The piano is not simply a physical entity – eighty-eight keys and a lid – but 
everything that comes with and around this. These are the dimensions which shape our 
relationship to it; the way it is “meant” to be played, the canonic tradition that stands 
behind it as repertoire, and the normative expressive gestures that are “input” by the 
player and “output” sonically by the instrument. Hence, the piano does not exist merely as 
a lifeless piece of technology (although this is a dimension of it), it also exists in habit, in 
the fingers of pianists whose bodily relationships with their instruments are mediated 
historically and inscribed into the instrument. 
Lachenmann’s Serynade452 brings this idea to the fore through reshaping these 
relations, consequently altering embodied relationships with the piano.453 In Serynade, the 
place of the piano and the way in which it is played become central to expression in the 
work. Put another way, the piano is itself approached as a point of contention. Unlike in a 
classical piano sonata (for example), where the piano is a medium for the expression of 
meaning, in Serynade the medium itself becomes an object of focus. In doing this, 
Lachenmann pushes and pulls between the inherited idea of the piano as a medium for 
                                                
451 BERIO 2006: 62 
452 A note on the title of the work: The alteration of the word ‘serenade’ to include a ‘y’ is for the 
dedicatee of the work, the composer’s wife, the pianist Yukiko Sugawara. See, for a discussion of the 
concept of the serenade and its pertinence to this work, SERVICE, TOM & HODGES, NICHOLAS 2005: 
‘Expressivity and Critique in Lachenmann’s Serynade: Nicholas Hodges in Conversation with Tom Service’ 
in Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 24, Issue 1 (pp. 77-88). 
453 For reflections on the technical aspects of performing Serynade, see PACE, IAN 2005: ‘Lachenmann’s 
Serynade – Issues for Performer and Listener’ in Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (pp. 101-112) 
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expression and a present in which the medium of expression is itself rendered visible. The 
piano is explored as an inherited instrumental technology, though one now open to new 
experiential possibilities through the inherent openness of performance, that space in 
which one locates the relationships between players and instruments. This incorporates 
questions of pedagogy, with pedagogy representing the institutionalisation of the skills and 
capacities of operating the instrument. This means that one’s bodily relation to the 
instrument’s operation in the past – as historically habitualised – becomes something to be 
explored in the present. Through modifications within this space of pedagogical technique, 
of established ways of playing and hearing the piano, the relation of the body to music is 
itself modified. 
In recent years great emphasis has been put on the body as important to the 
creation and experiencing of meaning. To musicians and musicologists it has been of 
interest in particular as either a biological fact or as a site of identity politics. This means 
that this debate is generally set within the fields of empirical science454 or cultural theory455. 
This is not the course to be followed here; neither neuroscientific nor physiological 
methodologies will be drawn on in my discussion of the musical body. Instead, I hope to 
focus on the often forgotten aspect of studies of the body: that, as we deal with music, the 
question of the musical body is, in addition to being one of hard science, a question of 
aesthetics and philosophy. Nor will I focus on the body as something explicitly political (as 
seen in cultural theory or feminism, where the body may be taken as a site of identity)456. 
The focus here is one of incorporating the body into musico-historical discussions, one 
here centred on a late modernist work that itself calls into play (historically resonant) 
bodies. Serynade, through problematising the habituated body of the past, explores the 
dialectics of embodied phenomenology in the present. This is not to talk of the effect of 
music on the body (in the scientific sense) or on body-image (in the cultural-theoretical 
sense); instead I want to explore some directions for a musicology of the body brought into 
critical focus in Lachenmann’s Serynade. 
But whose body is this? This question has general and specific answers. Firstly, we 
can talk about “the body” in general – that our understanding of it and experience through 
                                                
454 Neuroscientific and cognitive psychological methods have been of increasing interest to many 
musicologists (see DELIÈGE & DAVIDSON (eds.) 2011). 
455 For example, SHEPHERD & WICKE 1997, William Echard’s (2006a) ‘Sensible Virtual Selves: Bodies, 
Instruments, and the Becoming-Concrete of Music’ (in Contemporary Music Review. Vol. 25, No. 1/2 (pp. 
7-16)). The body is also been introduced in much Lacanian-influenced musicology as a ‘pre-linguistic’ 
realm of experience, as in DAME 1998. Feminist work has also sought to understand the role of the body, 
and not uncritically so (see CUSICK, SUZANNE 1994: ‘Feminist Theory, Music Theory, and the 
Mind/Body Problem’ in Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 32, No. 1, (pp. 8-27)).  
456 In the next chapter, identity politics begin to creep in as significant to the conceptualisation of bodies, 
and the roles of bodies as conceived of distinctly from “minds”. 
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it are things shaped by history. Secondly, we may discuss the body by distinguishing two 
particulars: (1.) the musical performer’s body in-so-far as they act with and speak through 
their instruments, and (2.) the audience’s experience of music as visceral, being felt with 
immediacy, of music’s embodying of meaning and movement. Indeed, these particular 
bodies (of performer and of audience) and this rather more “general” understanding of 
bodily experience will be shown to be interlinked; to separate performer and audience too 
rigidly would be to deny that they meet within a socialised and intersubjective space. 
Embodiment is more than just experience of a body to be delineated (“music’s effect on 
the body”); it is perception through the body and the collapse of a clear mind-body 
distinction in musical experience. 
There are two ready criticisms of my sketch of musical bodies above: firstly, that 
due to today’s plural environment no longer can the idea of a unitary body be discussed – 
there is no ‘we’ whose body is to be modified; secondly, that the embodying of meaning 
and movement immanent to music is distinctly metaphorical, or imaginary, as contrasted 
with the “real” bodily relations found between player and instrument. Regarding the first 
critical point it should be said that a plural, decentred world does not mean that 
subjectivities are free from mediation and history. As I argue in earlier chapters, 
provisional centres might still be evoked, foregrounded as philosophical-historical points 
of significance. Serynade builds itself both upon and in response to a musical past, in a past 
rooted in the Western art music tradition – specifically, in the conventionalised ways of 
playing, hearing, and understanding piano music. I do not claim that Serynade is the 
expression of a single, unitary body. Instead, it articulates a critical tension between 
historically inherited, conventionalised embodied meanings, and contemporary settings in 
which normativity and conventions are themselves taken as problematic in the production 
of meaning. 
 
Ex. 53, Lachenmann: Serynade , bars 41-42, ‘hemidemisemiquaver figure’ 
 
(c) 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
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On the second point – that there is a difference between the “real” embodied 
relationships of player and instrument and the “imagined” embodied relationships 
immanent to the music – it should be said that there is a difference. However, and this 
must be underlined, this difference is relative not absolute. It is the “immediate” 
perceptibility of both – to those familiar with Western art music, as this is dialectically 
related to past traditions – that is the quality I focus upon here. To cite a ready example 
from Serynade, in the context of familiarity, the hemidemisemiquaver figure (Ex. 53) 
suggests a “downward” trajectory, a kind of movement that is immediately gestural. 
Indeed, as Patrick McCreless notes in his study of gesture, prototype gestures that 
developed in the Romantic piano repertoire still play out affectively in much modernist 
piano music. McCreless’s example of such a gesture was the ascent to a peak followed a 
quick descent to lowest notes of the piano before ‘bouncing’ upwards to a chord above 
them. This same gestural scheme forms the basis of the second of Pierre Boulez’s douze 
notations (1985)457. These kinds of gestures, I would contend, still play their role in much 
recent critical music. As Mine Doğantan-Dack puts it, ‘In the Western classical tradition, 
music needs to be understood as constituted both by abstract structures and performance 
movements, both by the score and by its performances… the abstract and the concrete are 
in continual interaction.’458 Lachenmann, in a musical-critical context, continues and brings 
forth this still-present legacy of interaction. The pertinent question seems to be: what is 
the nature of this “immediacy” that cuts across the “real” and the “imagined”? Indeed, this 
also regards the character of “immediacy” as itself perceived “bodily”, as contrasting with 
the “abstract” quality of the “mind” (as these distinctions have been philosophical-
historically inherited). 
The idea that bodily immediacy cuts across a clear distinction between the inside 
and outside of the work – between formal connections “within” the work and historical 
connections “beyond” it – can also be illustrated with a more general example, from topic 
theory. As Kofi Agawu illustrated in Playing With Signs, external meanings and internal 
connections draw upon and develop one another459. Developing this idea, it could be said 
                                                
457 MCCRELESS, PATRICK 2006: ‘Anatomy of a Gesture: From Davidovsky to Chopin and Back’ in 
Approaches to Musical Meaning (eds. Byron Almén & Edward Pearsall), Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 34-39 
458 DOĞANTAN-DACK, MINE 2011: ‘In the Beginning was Gesture: Piano Touch and the Phenomenology 
of the Performing Body’ in New Perspectives of Music and Gesture (eds. Anthony Gritten and Elaine King), 
Farnham: Ashgate, 248. Also see this chapter for a discussion of the duality of ‘a work-/score-based and a 
performance-based understanding of music’, and relevant tendencies as exhibited throughout musicology. 
459 He writes that ‘[i]ntroversive semiosis denotes internal, intramusical reference, both backward and 
forward, retrospective and prospective, whilst extroversive semiosis denotes external, extramusical, 
referential connection’. He notes, crucially, that this distinction, ‘as useful as it is for conceptualizing 
various aspects of meaning in Classic music’, is something of false dichotomy. (AGAWU 1991: 132-133) 
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that topics themselves suggest embodied content, made immanent to musical discourse – 
for example, the pastoral topic, evocative of nature, accords with stasis, whereas Sturm und 
Drang may suggest sharp and sudden changes in direction. To talk about the body in the 
sense of embodied relationships, as mediative of musical experience – rather than as “a 
body” acting as signified – allows a flow of connections between that which is embodied 
interior and exterior to the work.  
This should be put in the context of conventionalisation that, among other things, 
disciplines perceived connections between inside and outside (effectively conventionalising 
the inside/outside boundary). Where there is a clear style or mediative frame – when 
conventions are naturalised – the immanent musical content seems apparent and 
immediate even to those without any formalised training. As Howard Becker puts it in his 
classic Art Worlds: 
 
Conventions known to all well-socialized members of a society make possible 
some of the most basic characteristic of an art world. Most important, they 
allow people who have little or no formal acquaintance with or training in the 
art to participate as audience members – to listen to music, read books, attend 
films or plays, and get something from them.460 
 
Conventions, once established, recede into the background, operating as a medium for 
meaning, as a frame or space within which new configurations of meaning are made 
possible. This reaches its apex under the so called ‘relative autonomy’ of the artwork, 
where convention becomes naturalised as ‘second nature’, being no longer seen as 
explicitly social. Here, due to the regulatory frame of convention, expression – and 
embodied experience – seems inscribed as something interior to the music (rather than as 
exterior historical-material fact). The meaning and significance of gesture in music, within 
the “space” of the music, is shaped by a habitualised stylistic aesthetic or frame of 
conventions.461 Through the conventionalisation of embodied relationships with musical 
meaning, the body’s relation to experience becomes shifted from “outside” the music (as 
socio-historical context) to “within” it (as embodied immanently with the text). This is the 
‘immanence’ of musical meaning, or what William Echard characterises as ‘an apparently 
unmediated presence, such that the necessary backgrounds of competence and context, 
although operative, recede from awareness and it is as if we hear a property directly in the 
                                                
460 BECKER, HOWARD S. 2008 [orig. 1982]: Art Worlds, Berkeley: University of California Press, 46 
461 HATTEN 2004: 21-24 
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music’462. As hidden yet operative, style and intramusical conventions might themselves be 
considered as “technological”, as mediating one’s sense of embodiment. 
However, when conventions are broken apart or become unfamiliar – as in 
Serynade – traces of these historically inscribed somatic expressions still remain. McCreless 
goes so far as to suggest that ‘the physical experience of the gesture – for the pianist or for 
us, vicariously through the pianist – is as much a part of its musical meaning as the notes 
themselves’463. This is problematised in two senses in Serynade. Firstly, the piano – a 
conventionalised medium for the mediation of these gestures – is rendered as a visible 
point of focus for the work. Secondly, connected with this, in disturbing the naturalness of 
both the piano as medium and the medium of conventionalised musical space – in 
critically reassessing the normativity or regulative frame of guiding stylistic norms – the 
idea of embodied musical movement “within” the work becomes problematic. Crucially, 
material in Serynade still retains traces of historically inscribed movements and gestures, but 
as fragments brought into new positions, new relationships of organisation. This goes 
both for the “real” relationships between player and instrument and the “imagined” 
relationships between elements of the work, as somatically inscribed. 
In Serynade the relationships between instrument and instrumentalist are always 
transitory and in flux. The status of each in the eye of the other, is never taken for granted, 
but undergoes constant changes throughout the work’s seven sections. As I illustrate 
below, changing “real” relationships transform the sense of embodiment perceived 
(“imagined”) as immanent to the music. 464  Each section takes an idea, or a set of 
interrelated figures, as provisional centres around which various musical possibilities and 
combinations are explored. Section (A) sets out some of these ideas, and from the very 
opening of Serynade one hears a series of bold statements that seem to attempt a feeling of 
their way around the instrument, getting to know it afresh – as if the established 
relationships between player and instrument, whilst not having been abandoned, are not 
taken for granted. 
As may be observed of Ex. 54, from the opening well defined musical elements are 
brought into relation with one another – ‘the chord’, ‘the hemidemisemiquaver flourish’, 
and ‘the pedalling figure’, for example. Each element seems also to suggest certain gestural 
actions or embodied musical movements. The sections that follow this explores material 
                                                
462 ECHARD, WILLIAM 2006b: ‘“Plays Guitar Without Any Hands”: Musical Movement and Problems of 
Immanence’ in Music and Gesture (ed. Anthony Gritten & Elaine King), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 81, 
emphasis added 
463 MCCRELESS 2006: 19  
464 This is an idea that is also further developed in the next chapter, where the embodied motions of dance 
forms are heard to be sedimented, and transversed, within inherited musical material. 
217 
that is, in the most part, introduced in the first section. Each reflects on what has come 
before: section (B), calmly investigates low, pianissimo chords; (C), repeated 
hemidemisemiquaver notes and flourishes; (D), chords, resonances, and pedalling figures; 
(E), a focus on sustained resonances; (F), repeated notes, arching flourishes, and chordal 
figures; and finally (G), the most ‘synthetic section’, in which elements are worked together, 
like developmental transformations between fully sounded chordal material and 
sympathetic harmonic resonances. A discursive network of elements is set up, outlined 
syntagmatically. The work’s sectional construction allows Lachenmann to engage with 
different aspects of the musical material and conventionalised playing techniques, to build 
a musical discourse – and a new conception of the piano – from the pedagogical resources 
of history.  
 
Ex. 54, Lachenmann: Serynade ,  bars 57-63, interaction of figures 
 
(c) 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
 
Each of these figures seems to suggest something gestural. Moreover, each figure 
seems to derive from fragmentary moments of past styles and past articulation – the 
fantasy-type flourish in bar 62, for example. Practitioners of contemporary music have 
themselves commented on the chords as seeming to arise from past styles, without being 
limited within a given style, with Nicholas Hodges commenting of them that “they are 
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chords which are supremely well chosen because, while they are not tonal or triadic in an 
obvious way, they could easily happen as passing chords or incidental moments in 
Schumann”465. Conventional gestural moments appear as fragmented motions, set apart 
from any larger formal backdrop, a large-scale overriding stylistic schema. A result is that 
somatic play is pushed to the surface of the work, where we see fragmented changing 
directions between gestural figurations.  
I will now assess these connections between embodied experience, conventions, 
the piano as historical (technological) object, and its operation (pedagogy) with reference 
to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. Merleau-Ponty’s work is 
particularly useful in thinking about these issues as he foregrounds the body’s place in 
perception and living in the world. This is a body shaped by the world, by the habits of 
convention – in a musical context: of relationships between player and instrument, and the 
sense of bodily immediacy within the music. 
However, I adapt this phenomenological thinking as in Serynade conventions are 
fragmented – their “naturalness” is problematised. Historically resonant musical objects, 
such as the piano and distinctive entities within the musical discourse, are focused upon 
and denaturalised, being heard and experienced anew or performed with renewed and 
vitalised potency. This idea of denaturalisation calls us towards Vickor Shklovsky’s notion 
of ostranenie 466, where conventions are complicated and original aesthetic experiences 
elicited. This complements Ross Feller’s 467  and Piotr Grella-Możejko’s 468  Shklovskian 
interpretations of Lachenmann’s compositional aesthetic in a somatic dimension. 
Examining the processes of naturalisation allows me to interweave concerns of 
embodied space “within” the music as this is connected with bodies “outside” of it. Traces 
of these embodied spaces are drawn on in Serynade – prominently through the evocation of 
localised discursive centres from which provisional deviation is made possible, both in 
terms of the musical space and in the actions and their deviations as made by the 
performer. Indeed, there is an emphasis on the historicity of the instrument as this 
facilitates both. This is something I highlight through showing how extended techniques 
(like “sounded resonances”) are an integral part of a musical discourse that engages with a 
dialectic of naturalisation and denaturalisation. I end by situating this in the context of 
other works by Lachenmann as these engage with the dialectics of past and present.  
                                                
465 Nicholas Hodges in discussion. SERVICE & HODGES 2005: 80 
466 SHKLOVSKY, VICTOR 1965: ‘Art as Technique’ [orig. 1917] in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays 
(trans. Lee T. Lemon & Marion J. Reis), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 
467 FELLER 2002 
468 GRELLA-MOŻEJKO, PIOTR 2005: ‘Helmut Lachenmann – Style, Sound, Text’ in Contemporary Music 
Review, Vol. 24, Issue 1 (pp. 57-75) 
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Naturalisation 
In attempting to answer the seemingly simple question “What is the piano?”, I 
underlined that this object, this technology, is inherently entangled with pedagogy, the 
historically established relationships found between instrument and instrumentalist. This 
means that a change in the relationships between instrument and instrumentalist modifies 
both technology and pedagogy; each changes as a relation to its other. In order to better 
understand this mutually constitutive relationship, here a turn as is made towards the 
phenomenology of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)469.  
Merleau-Ponty’s work on embodiment has been influential recently in cultural 
studies (notably on the work of Judith Butler470) and on work on the influence of 
technology on experience (in that of Don Ihde471). Musicology has given little attention to 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology directly, generally being influenced second hand via 
another discipline or method472. This could be in part due to Merleau-Ponty’s own 
characterisation of music as, as he put it, “too beyond the world”, too “pure” to have 
worldly meaning473 – a transcendentalism which does not chime with current musicological 
thinking. Developing his ideas as enacted in practices like musical performance and 
reception, as something mediated historically and, in the case of musical performance, 
pedagogically, circumvents this problem.474 
For Merleau-Ponty, technology – be this musical-instrumental technology or any 
other kind – was always entangled with the ways it was used, and in the ways in which 
certain types of use became naturalised, habitualised, and automatic for the user (in music: 
pedagogy). Merleau-Ponty’s most famous example of this process of habitualisation was 
that of a blind person’s cane. In his Phenomenology of Perception he writes that,  
 
                                                
469 Cf. Anthony Gritten’s discussion of ‘Instrumental Technology’, in which he draws on Heideggerian 
thinking. See GRITTEN, ANTHONY 2011: ‘Instrumental Technology’ in The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy and Music (eds. Theodore Gracyk & Andrew Kania), New York: Routledge 
470 See, for discussion of this influence, STOLLER, SILVIA 2010: ‘Expressivity and Performativity: Merleau-
Ponty and Butler’ in Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (pp. 97-110) 
471 SELINGER, EVAN (ed.) 2006: Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde, Albany: State University of 
New York Press 
472 e.g. as influenced by musicology after Judith Butler’s “performativity”, or in empirical qualitative work 
like musicological applications of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). 
473 Merleau-Ponty cited in GOEHR, LYDIA 2005: ‘Understanding the Engaged Philosopher: On Politics, 
Philosophy, and Art’ in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty (ed. Taylor Carman & Mark B.N. 
Hansen), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 337 
474 Whilst I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, it should be noted that my philosophical and theoretical 
emphases differ subtly from his. The embodied phenomenological explored here is influenced by 
Merleau-Ponty’s work as retrospectively inflected by later developments – particularly, ideas of 
‘performativity’, that embodied experience is grounded in repeated, conventionalised (and 
conventionalising) practices. 
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the blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer 
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the 
scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight.475 
 
This habitualisation as such goes beyond the automatic, going so far as to make that piece 
of technology – momentarily at least – fade out of view.  
Merleau-Ponty explains this through the notion of ‘body-schema’. Body-schema 
are the organising principles which mediate experience through, and of, the body.476 This 
can be seen in the modification of the blind man’s body-schema to incorporate his stick as 
mediative of perception, no longer as an object external to him to be perceived. A musical 
and performative parallel can be found in the learning of the piano. The piano starts out as 
a foreign object but, as relationships between between player and instrument become 
increasingly habitualised, it becomes increasingly naturalised: fluency and immediacy take 
the place of struggle with the instrument.477 The bodily schema of the performer comes to 
incorporate this new object, and a space in which to explore new sets of relationships is 
opened up. Body-schema is thus a bodily space which is modifiable and within which are 
created new embodied, perceptive relationships. 
In musical-pedagogical terms, body-schema are naturalised conventions – at the most 
practical level, movements and practices ossified into pedagogy. As Taylor Carman puts it, 
body-schema are ‘the bundle of skills and capacities that constitute the body’s precognitive 
familiarity with itself and the world it inhabits.’478 As such, the institutionalisation of skills 
and capacities (pedagogy) can be seen as an establishment of a shared and collective 
familiar mode of relation with the body and the world around it (for example, with musical 
instruments). Another example of the incorporation of technology into body-schema can 
be given with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s comment on habitualisation of bodily action 
(in this case, use of a typewriter): 
 
The subject knows where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where 
one of our limbs is, through a knowledge bred of familiarity which does not 
give us a position in objective space. The movement of her fingers is not 
presented to the typist as a path through space which can be described, but 
                                                
475 MERLEAU-PONTY 2002: 165 
476 See CARMAN, TAYLOR 1999: ‘The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’ in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27, 
No. 2 (pp. 205-226) for an excellent introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘body-schema’. 
477 Chris Shilling discusses this as it plays a role in David Sudlow’s account of learning to play the jazz 
piano. SHILLING, CHRIS 2005: The Body in Culture, Technology & Society, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 
129-130 
478 CARMAN 1999: 220 
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merely as a certain adjustment of motility, physiognomically distinguishable 
from any other.479 
 
This example works equally well for the piano. The piano, whilst in ‘objective 
space’, is not known to the player in an absolute sense, and is instead operated through a 
phenomenologically distinct, though not objectively codifiable, ‘adjustment of motility’. 
The instrumentalist knows where the piano keys are as they know where their limbs are, 
something ‘bred of familiarity’. They enter into a performative relationship with the piano, 
through a bodily dimension, one of a fluid immediacy that transgresses the boundary 
between instrument and instrumentalist as this would appear in objective space. “The 
distinction between subject and object is blurred in my body”480, says Merleau-Ponty; as 
with using the typewriter, the boundaries between the instrumentalist and instrument 
begin to blur in the bodily experience of playing.  
To some degree, what has been said about what the instrument is – or rather what 
it does naturally, as this is habitualised – goes not just for how the performer experiences it, 
it also goes for the audience. For the audience, because of naturalised processes of playing 
the piano, the player’s inputs appear as becoming, rather than causing, sonic outcomes. 
‘[T]he role of the instrument’, writes Anthony Gritten, ‘is to facilitate the execution of the 
performer’s intentions unobtrusively… Using the instrument should be effortless for the 
player and transparent to the music.’481 Technology goes hand-in-hand with pedagogy – 
the piano is not only a physical “thing” but is mediated by the history of its operation. The 
piano, like the blind man’s stick, becomes an invisible medium through which experience, 
sensitivity, and expression are mediated. And both for player and audience, this is 
“immediately” perceptible, although this is an immediacy that is reliant on the past, on 
habitualisation and conventionalisation. This point brings us back to the issue of musical 
conventions, as a musical-historical dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s body-schema. 
Bodily Space, Musical Space 
Lachenmann engages with conventions dialectically, drawing on them but not 
unproblematically. Both the audience’s experience of the instrument as invisible medium 
of expression482, and the body-schema of the instrumentalist, are brought into focus – made 
                                                
479 MERLEAU-PONTY 2002: 166 
480 Merleau-Ponty cited in CARMAN 1999: 206 
481 GRITTEN 2011: 190 
482 Whilst it is often the case that technologies, in conventional usage, recede from view as objects of focus 
in their own right, it should be noted that this is not always the case – in displays of virtuosity in which the 
physical dimension of the players and instruments are underlined as an event in itself. However, 
Lachenmann’s treatment of the instrument-instrumentalist relation is particular in its “critical” emphasis. 
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visible – when previously habitualised relationships between the player and instrument are 
reorganised. The instrument, as a set of relationships between technology and pedagogy, is 
reconfigured. As Ian Pace puts it, the performer, in Serynade, ‘is able to project an artisan-
like demeanour in performance, methodically and calmly enacting the motions to produce 
the fantastical range of sounds that Lachenmann employs in full view of the audience.’483 
Perception of the instrument – perception of sonic events – is constructed in a way that 
draws on a tradition of instrumental playing whilst simultaneously distancing it. This seems 
in keeping with Lachenmann’s own thoughts on the new and old, when he says that, “the 
problem is not to search for new sounds, but for a new way of listening, of perception”484. 
Both the sense of embodiment “within” the music, and the formation of body-
schema, are founded in intersubjective and historical conventions. This move towards 
immanency of musical embodiment can be seen in the fragmentary figures of Serynade. 
What must be noted at this point is that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of embodiment is 
spatial by nature, that is, body-schema refer to our awareness of bodily positioning “in 
relation to the vertical, the horizontal, and certain other axes of important coordinates of 
its environment” 485 . In immanent, musical terms, the work – which incorporates 
conventionalised body-schema in its performance – in this dimension sets itself up as a 
space within which fragments of musical forms and somatic motions may be recombined, 
just as seen in the interplay of ideas in bars 57-63 (Ex. 54). The work’s quality as critical 
space, in which the spatialised body-schema may be reformed and modified, is further 
emphasised in its lacking of metric stability; spatiality, in the organised/organising and 
bodily dimension at least, becomes dominant over an organised and hierarchical temporal 
dimension. 
This link between space and the body is not something specific to Serynade 
(although, as will be shown, the way in which the relationship between the two is 
constructed in Serynade is particular to the work). The idea of musical works as having 
spatial/somatic elements is, as Robert Hatten argues in Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, 
and Tropes, important to much Western art music: ‘meter functions like a gravitational field 
that conditions our embodied sense of up versus down, the relative weighting of events, 
                                                                                                                                         
It modifies, reformulates, these relationships and their impact upon the mediation of experience, rather 
than simply – as in the case of the virtuoso – making visible physicality as a category mediative of 
experience. 
483 PACE 2005: 103. Pace also notes that, in working with the composer in preparation for a performance, 
he saw that Lachenmann himself valued a pragmatic view that avoided an ‘unwarranted level of theatrical 
tension’, that tended away from a display of virtuosity. (103-104) 
484 Lachenmann in interview in STEENHAUSEN, PAUL 2004: ‘Interview with Helmut Lachenmann – 
Toronto, 2003’ in Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 23, Issue 3/4 (pp. 9-14), 9 
485 Merleau-Ponty cited in SCHILLING 2005: 55 
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and the relative amount of energy needed to overcome “gravitational” constraints (as in an 
ascending melody).’ 486  Tonality also plays a role (in its relationship with metre) in 
mediating gestural and embodied space immanent to musical works, leading Hatten to 
conclude that ‘if meter and tonality each afford analogies to gravitation, or more broadly, 
vectoral space, together they enhance an experience of embodied motion, in that they provide 
the listener with dynamics and constraints comparable to those the body experiences in a 
natural environment, including its orientation as up or down.’487  
Serynade, in contrast with the tonal music of Hatten’s discussion, denies the tonal 
and metric frameworks which helped articulate the sense of space and motion that is 
within this earlier music. Hatten’s emphasis on the role of tonal space in articulating 
embodied motion should not be forgotten, however. We hear fragments of material, 
gestural figures that still bear traces of this past. Indeed, figures and motions derived from 
the piano, as technological and pedagogical object, become the focus of the work, as 
materials of the work’s discourse. Gestures and actions derived from habitualised body-
schema are brought from “outside” the work to its “inside”, as material constitutive of its 
discourse. Performance becomes not the delivery of the immanent embodiment held to be 
in the work; on the contrary, the sense of embodiment “within” the work’s discourse is 
derived from the historicity of performance, as this is itself constituted by relationships 
between piano (technology) and performer (pedagogy). Traces of the past appear: firstly, 
“inside” the musical space; secondly, in the space between a player and an instrument that 
is “outside” the work; and, thirdly, in the relationships of mediation these two aspects, 
between the inside and the outside. 
 With this in mind, it may be noted that allusions to tonal space appear in Serynade 
(within which embodied motion may be felt); metric instability does not completely 
preclude the possibility of gestural motion in the temporal dimension. In terms of pitch, 
provisional centres are set up within the work as fractured allusion to pitch space (without 
tonality). This can be observed in Ex. 55. Here, chordal identities provide a home from 
which deviation is made possible; this provisional centre becomes a structured lynchpin 
around which material may coalesce, and from which it may be said to deviate. 
Lachenmann colours the pitch-space through exploring different resonances “around” this 
chordal centre. 
One more dimension can be added to this characterisation of the historically 
mediated perception of this section of the work. Whilst the work’s allusions to embodied 
space is historical it is also lived – that is, whilst it draws on past notions like tonal relations, 
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224 
these only come through in their problematisation in the immediacy of the present – 
meaning that we become bound-up with historicity in the immediate. Each chord 
deviating from this centre, whilst experienced in discursive relations to the ‘tonal centre’, is 
doubly historical – it also finds itself connecting to moments in works beyond the one at 
hand, with all the historically inscribed somatic baggage which comes with this. This is to 
say that, in terms of past-present relations, these connections can be made both at the 
levels of text and “intertext”, with both impacting upon the comprehension of one 
another. 
 
Ex. 55, Lachenmann: Serynade ,  bars 145-159, provisional centre 
 
(c) 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
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Whilst a clear metrical frame may not be present in Serynade, figures are suggestive 
of gestural motions at a local level (through bearing traces of historically inscribed motion). 
This means that the work suggests itself as an embodied space that is heterogeneous rather 
than synthetically unified in somatic direction – these traces at the local level push and pull 
in multiple fragmentary directions. This quality of heterogeneity can be observed in the 
phenomenology of these chordal figures in bars 145-159 – that we seem to ‘move’ around 
them in a pitch-space. Quoting Nicholas Hodges again:  
 
[The effect of these chords in Seranyde] is like looking at a sculpture from 
several different angles at the same time. You hear a chord, you hear different 
kinds of resonances of that chord, maybe you get notes cutting off at 
different times, and these are all in a sense different facets of the same sound 
object. So in a sense he’s using those techniques to make each sound object 
multidimensional or multi-faceted.488 
 
This reverberates with Merleau-Ponty’s comments on the perception of (physical) 
objects in general – that observers build a Gestalt image of objects from all angles as they 
move around them, but also in the virtual aspects of these objects’ relations to and 
“viewing” by other objects around them489. Put in musical terms, entities of musical 
discourse suggest various simultaneous connections to other moments in the musical 
discourse, and indeed virtual, unexplored possibilities of correspondence and deviation. 
The exploration of the resonant pitch space around the chords as highlighted in bars 145-
159 expresses this idea, with this ‘moving’ around the chordal entity/entities suggesting 
simultaneous trajectories and affinities of historical and bodily relation, a shifting of 
perception around a musical object akin to ‘turning a log on the fire’490 in order to elicit 
new experiential aspects (to borrow a phrase from Victor Shklovsky, whose poetics are 
discussed below). Thus, whilst pitch-space and metric-space are conventionally mapped as 
being directional (pitch as vertical, metre as horizontal), the heterogeneity of 
phenomenological space in Serynade – directly linked-in with the role the body plays in 
expression – problematises any such mapping of conventional oppositions in this work. 
This history is, nonetheless, drawn on dialectically, through the persistence of its material 
and performative traces. 
                                                
488 Nicholas Hodges in discussion in SERVICE & HODGES 2005: 83 
489 See MERLEAU-PONTY 2002, especially page 79 
490 Victor Shklovsky cited in CRAWFORD, LAWRENCE 1984: ‘Viktor Shklovskij: Différance in 
Defamiliarization’ in Comparative Literature, Vol. 36, No. 3 (pp. 209-219), 210 
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Ex. 56, Lachenmann: Serynade ,  Bars 296-301 
 
(c) 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
 
The playing with traces of past conventions can also be seen in the approach to the 
piano itself as an object of history. This is it as a historically conventionalised piece of 
‘technology’. Technological conventions, in so being highlighted, may themselves become 
explored as crucial aspects of musical experience. Put another way, the processes of artistic 
production may be explored critically as the material embodies the artistic products 
(musical works, expression) of which they are mediative. Howard Becker again: 
 
When the equipment [of artistic production] embodies the conventions, the 
way a conventional thirty-five-millimetre camera embodies the conventions 
of contemporary photography, you learn the conventions as you learn to 
work the machinery… The same is true of many of the understandings 
associated with conventional music; you learn them as you learn to 
manipulate the instrument.491 
 
This is made explicit in Serynade where the technology of musical expression (as 
related to pedagogy) is subject to modification. This is evidenced by a simple example: that 
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a huge amount of the ‘content’ of the music seems to be absent from the score (see Ex. 56, 
bars 296-301), with the work being indebted to the exploration of musical dimensions that 
are not notatable in a traditional sense, yet require traditional and conventional resources 
in their production (for example, resonances that require a grand piano492). Instead of the 
score being the documentation of the content of ‘the work’, of the exploration of musical-
formal conventions – a message to be sent to the audience through the medium of the 
piano – the piano is engaged with as convention itself, as an object of the established 
musical past which nonetheless holds the potential for eliciting new and exciting musical 
experiences. The score itself becomes instructive of the manner of sound-production – of 
the mode of engaging with the equipment which embodies the musical tradition (the 
piano). In this sense, the piano is itself presented as a physical presence, as the content of 
the work to which the body bears relation; both literally and symbolically the piano is 
placed “centre stage”. 
 
Ex. 57, Lachenmann: Serynade ,  “Sounded resonances”, bars 316-319 
 
(c) 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
 
Whilst the piano is placed as central to the content of the work, formal musical 
material also plays a role in the discourse of the work, as has been shown above, with 
these more formal elements having their own connections with the body – particularly 
immanently embodied expression. Critical issues of performance develop in dialectic with 
intramusical developments. The use of so-called ‘extended techniques’ is an excellent case 
in point. They are not used as exotic devices493, but rather to bring out qualities from, and 
                                                
492 In the performance notes Lachenmann goes so far as to specify the use of a Steinway C or D. 
493 Pace contrasts this with the use of such techniques by ‘lesser composers’ – ‘In the hands of a lesser 
composer (e.g. George Crumb), these sorts of instrumental sonorities would be likely to function more as 
novel effects, akin to similar usage of exotic instruments and sounds in film scores. Lachenmann’s ability 
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to relate to, more conventionalised musical elements494. Sympathetic harmonic resonances 
– which are important elements of the work’s content – are heard as emerging from clusters 
of pitches that surround them. They are not presented as some extraneous device of 
‘otherness’, but instead emerge as inner qualities of the musical material. Indeed, this 
becomes all the more clear in bars 316-319, where ‘sounded resonances’ mediate between 
fully sounded pitches and the attenuated harmonics of silently depressed keys which occur 
throughout much of the rest of the work (Ex. 57). 
The piano chord in the uppermost staff blends into and colours the natural 
harmonics of the low fortississimo E-flat. The upper voice then gains strength, until it 
emerges from “within” these harmonics to become a fully sounded chord. In doing so, it 
draws explicit connection between resonances and sounded pitches as connected entities – 
as points on a spectrum or ‘scale’ rather than as distinct entities.495 Sympathetic resonances, 
an ‘extended technique’, is shown not to be something “outside” of and alien to the main 
content of the work, but as arising from it. In being synthesised as part of the work’s 
discourse, technique becomes ‘extended’ in extending outwards the inner qualities of the material, 
rather than as an extension of technique as an abstract category in-itself. This 
characterisation itself seems to fit into Lachenmann’s own aesthetics; he himself has 
suggested that “defamiliarisation of sound for its own sake represents no more than a sort 
of surreal, exotic, expressionistic affectation”496. Furthermore, the accented “scratching” 
sounds from bar 292 onwards (produced by the player pulling a finger rapidly from single 
strings inside the piano) are produced in the context of this focus on resonances. In their 
difference from what has come before they help organise a reflective passage pre-empting 
section (G), which begins in bar 309 (Ex. 57 is an excerpt from (G)). As Lachenmann 
writes in the preface to the score, these sounds ‘should give rise to a brightly resonating, 
complex mixture of overtones.’ They might express difference – which helps organise the 
musical discourse – but (and especially in light of Lachenmann’s prefatory comments) the 
focus on resonance also organises qualities of affinity between these ‘extended’ and other 
(more ‘conventional’) materials. In this dimension at least, both are brought within a 
common discursive boundary. 
                                                                                                                                         
to integrate them into a total musical narrative (while always omni-directional and operating dialectically 
between layers) and sense of timing and pacing both demonstrates a much more acute compositional craft 
and depth and ensures that the sounds and gestures he uses do not sound hackneyed when the initial 
novelty has worn off.’ PACE 2005: 106 
494 Ross Feller notes that extended techniques are not used as something special in Lachenmann’s music, 
but are central to his works’ materials (FELLER 2002: 252). 
495 This recalls my discussion of the articulation of discourse, and qualities of discursive consistency, as 
explored in chapter 4. 
496 Lachenmann in interview in RYAN, DAVID 1999: ‘Composer in Interview: Helmut Lachenmann’ in 
Tempo, No. 210 (pp. 20-24), 22 
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Lachenmann explored pianistic resonances in an earlier work, his piano concerto, 
Ausklang (1984/1985, revised 1986). The pianist Ian Pace points out that the soundworld 
of Serynade ‘is not so strange to those familiar with the piano concerto Ausklang’497. 
However, he points out that the compositional style in Serynade is ‘pared-down’ when 
compared to this earlier work.498 Lachenmann, in an interview with Abigail Heathcote, 
suggested that the concerto was initially conceived around a core concept – that of 
exploring the (familiar, i.e. naturalised) piano, and its relationship with an orchestra that 
could potentially recharacterise or transform experiences of the piano’s sound material. 
Resonance, and the decaying quality of the piano’s sound, was central to this: “…I began 
with the rather simple idea of the familiar piano integrated into or confronted with a sort 
of huge ‘meta-piano’ represented by an especially developed and gradually transformed 
orchestral sound.”499 The orchestra took on, sustained, and transformed the resonances 
produced by the piano. Its decaying sound was as such expanded outwards, recoloured 
and refigured.500 In the same interview, the composer gave a concrete example of what this 
core concept meant in practical terms:   
 
In my piano concerto Ausklang… the pitchless elements, just air from brass 
instruments, or the strings with the bow moving directly on the bridge 
avoiding any pitches, serve as a world of shadows – even when fortissimo – 
continuing the noisy resonances of the pedalled piano in the highest 
register.501 
 
I have discussed how, in Serynade, “extended techniques” are intricately bound up with the 
development of the work, rather than being placed in a position of exteriority. A similar 
compositional strategy is worked through in the concerto. In sustaining and transforming 
the naturally decaying sounds of the piano in the orchestral material (his “meta-piano”), 
the “drama” of the work is, in Lachenmann’s own words, ‘dependent on a procedural 
logic internal to the sound-material’502. In this aspect, Ausklang exists as a pianistic 
precursor to the ‘pared-down’ compositional logic of Serynade, in which Lachenmann 
endeavours to expand outward qualities of the piano’s sonic material, in ways that draw on 
the piano’s familiar, “natural” sound, yet that transform it. 
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499 Lachenmann in interview in HEATHCOTE, ABIGAIL 2010: ‘Sound Structures, Transformations, and 
Broken Magic: An Interview with Helmut Lachenmann’ in Contemporary Music: Theoretical and Philosophical 
Perspectives (ed. Max Paddison & Irène Deliège), Farnham: Ashgate, 345-346 
500 Lachenmann has himself talked of the ‘dynamic transformations’ of sound material that take place 
between the piano’s material and the orchestra in Ausklang. See RYAN 1999: 23. 
501 Lachenmann in interview in HEATHCOTE 2010: 333 
502 Lachenmann in interview in RYAN 1999: 23 
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Serynade explores the dialectics of body-schema and musically immanent embodied 
expression, something predominantly achieved through the problematisation of 
naturalised pedagogy and reception. Musical conventions are also engaged with, setting in 
motion heterogeneous perceptual possibilities. This is done on two interconnected fronts: 
firstly, in the play of musical-formal fragments, fragments which bear traces of gestural 
and somatic content, and in exploring immanently embodied musical space (in engaging 
with pitch-space and pitch-centres); and, secondly, in confronting the piano as 
technological convention, one which itself may traverse unexplored aspects of its own 
physicality in the processes of musical performance.  
In Serynade, typically peripheral aspects of the past (like the resonant pitches) are 
foregrounded as points of focus central to the experience of the present.503 This brings us 
to a juncture in this discussion – one that moves the discussion from the level of the 
general down to the focus on the particular. Questions surrounding naturalised body-
schema and immanently embodied musical space – things naturalised by their 
conventionalisation in pedagogy, technology, and reception – are now to be focused on in 
localised phenomena in the work. Theoretically speaking, this means a shift from Merleau-
Ponty’s all-embracing embodied phenomenology towards the incisive formal-analytic 
concerns brought on by Victor Shklovsky’s notion of ostranenie (translated as 
‘defamiliarisation’, sometime as ‘estrangement’ or even ‘enstrangement’ 504 ). Serynade 
explores the dialectic of naturalisation and defamiliarisation, and a counterpointing of 
Merleau-Ponty and Shklovsky’s concepts elucidates this process. If Merleau-Ponty’s body-
schema helps to conceal the pedagogical, technological, and formal faculties by which 
perception is mediated, Shklovsky’s defamiliarisation reveals, or at least complicates, these 
same processes. 
                                                
503 David Lesser has made a similar observation about the focus by Lachenmann on aspects which are 
typically peripheral to meaning (LESSER, DAVID 2004: ‘Dialectic and Form in the Music of Helmut 
Lachenmann’ in Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 23, Issues 3 & 4 (pp. 107-114)). I am in agreement with 
Lesser on this point, though I want to suggest that this should be understood primarily in terms of 
embodiment and perception as philosophically-historically mediated. 
504 See Benjamin’s Sher’s translator’s introduction to SHKLOVSKY, VICTOR 1990 [orig. 1929]: Theory of 
Prose (trans. Benjamin Sher), Elmwood Park: Dalkey Archive Press, especially page xix 
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Denaturalisation 
 
…the magnifying glass, amplifies certain microfeatures of the world, 
but only by reducing our field of vision. 
 
– Carl Mitchum, on embodied phenomenology.505 
 
The splinter in your eye is the best magnifying-glass. 
 
– Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia506 
	  
Carl Mitchum’s comment, followed closely by this aphorism from Adorno, 
potentially opens up an imagined dialogue between phenomenology and critical theory – 
one in which embodied experience is accounted for, not as something passive and 
uncritical (as epiphenomenon) but as something aware of the dialectics and historicity of 
perception. The place of technology, and our embodiment of the world as mediated 
through it – seen in something as simple as a magnifying glass, for example – means that, 
potentially, a conscious modification of these embodiment relations may refocus aesthetic 
perception. In a musical vein, the fracturing of the conventional image of an instrumental 
technology – the piano, for example – may ‘splinter’ perception, affording the experience 
of something new in the shards and fragments that remain.507 If the piano, and piano 
playing, are traditionally viewed as reducing the field of focus, so that particular musical 
ideas might be presented within this field, then, in Serynade, the intense focus on the 
embodiment technology itself, immanently splintered as a point of contention, develops a 
new mode of experience, educing new possibilities in musical vision.  
Ross Feller has called attention to the parallels in Lachemann’s compositional 
approach and the Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky’s theory of poetry, particularly the 
latter’s concept of ostranenie (most often translated as ‘defamiliarisation’). As Feller 
understands it, ostranenie is ‘making the familiar strange’508, according with Lachenmann’s 
                                                
505 Here, Mitchum is discussing the work of Don Ihde, the American “post-phenomenologist” who 
developed the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with regard to the experience of technology. MITCHAM, 
CARL 2006: ‘From Phenomenology to Pragmatism: Using Technology as an Instrument’ in 
Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde (ed. Evan Selinger), Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 29 
506 ADORNO, THEODOR 2005 [orig. 1951]: Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life, London: Verso, 
50 
507 Rebecca Horn’s Concert for Anarchy (1990), an image of which is reproduced at the opening of Part III, 
shows a more literal representation of this process. 
508 FELLER 2002: 254 
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defamiliarising of the musically familiar (performance techniques, musical conventions, 
and so on). Feller writes that Lachenmann’s compositional technique ‘involves the 
exclusion of unquestioned or habitual standards, brought into play through the use of 
devices such as fragmentation and masking’509. 
I want to augment this insight through relocating defamiliarising processes in the 
bodily, through the experience of the immediate, as this has been naturalised historically 
and, in light of this mediation, denaturalised in Serynade. This is to adapt Shklovsky’s concept 
slightly – to defamiliarise the concept of defamiliarisation – by regarding it in its bodily 
dimension. Indeed, this is also to promote a dialectical view in which the naturalised and 
the denaturalised are in constant interaction. This resonates perhaps more with Benjamin 
Sher’s reading of Shklovsky than Feller’s. Sher writes that defamiliarisation is not ‘a 
transition from the “familiar” to the “unknown”’. Instead, it ‘starts from the cognitively 
known’ and then ‘“complicates” our perceptual process in the rich use of metaphors, 
similes, and a host of other figures of speech.’510 It is a ‘complication’ rather than a 
transition, a process in which the original ‘known’ materials still show through but are 
distanced from themselves. I will also make points of comparison between the 
defamiliarisation/denaturalisation of material in Serynade, and similar processes in some of 
Lachemann’s earlier works. 
A key process in Lachenmann’s aesthetic, a compositional technique which, whilst 
no longer the core of his aesthetic, still leaves its imprint on his recent music, is his notion 
of musique concrète instrumentale. This method, as he puts it, 
 
signifies an extensive defamiliarisation of instrumental technique: the musical 
sound may be bowed, pressed, beaten, torn, maybe choked, rubbed, 
perforated and so on. At the same time the new sound must satisfy the 
requirements of the old familiar concert-hall sound which, in this context, 
loses any familiarity and becomes (once again) freshly illuminated, even ‘unknown’. Such a 
perspective demands changes in compositional technique, so that the classical 
base-parameters, such as pitch, duration, timbre, volume, and their derivatives 
retain their significance only as subordinate aspects of the compositional category which 
deals with the manifestation of energy.511  
                                                
509 FELLER 2002: 254, emphasis in original 
510 Benjamin Sher in the translator’s introduction to SHKLOVSKY 1990: xix 
511 Lachenmann in interview in RYAN 1999: 21, emphasis added. Notably, in this characterisation 
Lachenmann suggests that the familiar becomes “unknown”, in seemingly direct contradiction with Sher’s 
comment that defamiliarisation is not ‘a transition from the “familiar” to the “unknown”’. However, this is 
not as problematic as it might at first seem. As Lachenmann also suggests, this process must also relate to 
the inherited history of that being defamiliarised  (‘At the same time the new sound must satisfy the 
requirements of the old familiar concert-hall sound…’). This is a dialectical process of becoming, rather 
than a transition in a single direction – from familiar to the unknown; a becoming unknown that critically 
highlights the mediative role of “the known”. 
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This process can be well summarised through a studio-based analogy: inputs are 
reassigned in terms of their outputs. For example, the pedal no longer functions only as a 
sustaining device, but comes into focus as an audible element in itself. The use of the 
pedal takes on its own place and significance in the context of the work’s discourse.  With 
this “rerouting” of resources the established directness of gestural inputs and sonic 
outputs is severed. Circuits of relationships between player and instrument, between 
physical actions and musical expression, are rewritten. Handed-down playing techniques – 
physical and expressive actions historically inscribed with symbolic significance – are subject to a 
transforming perception, through a rerouting of the relationships found between player 
and instrument. 
The use of the pedal becomes an important component of the musical structure 
itself (see Ex. 58). This contrasts, of course, with the conventionalised use of the pedal as a 
sustaining or colouring device. What is of conventional focus is modified: this pedagogical 
and technological technique no longer merely facilitates the playing of musical content. 
Instead, pedagogy and technology become musical content themselves. The music is not 
seen to be something transmitted via the medium of the piano. Instead, the piano itself – as 
a series of relationships between elements of pedagogy and technology – becomes 
foregrounded as a central aspect of this aesthetic experience. 
 
Ex. 58, Lachenmann: Serynade : bars 233-236 
 
(c) 2002 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
 
Using the piano in such a way, altering it in terms of technological and pedagogical 
focus whilst still drawing upon tradition, enables Lachenmann to supply and explore a 
“fracture of the familiar”512. This is manifested, for example, in focused uses of the piano’s 
resonances (discussed above), and in the audible use of the piano’s pedals. They become 
newly posited, positional elements, playing a part in organising the work’s structure. They 
                                                
512 Lachenmann cited in FELLER 2002: 254 
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provide the means by which, and the substance of which, a musical discourse is 
constituted. A structure and level of discursive consistency “within” the work (as was 
explored in chapter 4) comes forth, though this is located in technological and pedagogical 
resources from “outside”. This strategy builds on earlier works in which playing 
techniques are reconceived (works like Pression (1969, rev. 2010), Guero (1969/88), Gran 
Torso (1971/76/88)). Serynade can, as such, be regarded as a dialectical study into the 
interpenetration of musical-formal content and the medium through which this presented 
(pedagogy/technology/convention). 
 
Ex. 59, Lachenmann: Ein Kindersp i e l ,  opening 
 
(c) 1982 by Breitkopf & Härtel, Wiesbaden  
 
Ein Kinderspiel (1980), a cycle of seven short pieces, provides a pianistic precursor 
to Serynade’s complication of inherited embodied relations (Ex. 59). In this work, as in 
Serynade, the use and modification of pianistic (technological and pedagogical) resources 
elicit the experience of new phenomenological significances, manifested concretely from 
the potentialities of inherited history. This process is less extreme than in Serynade, but 
what this earlier work does underline is Lachenmann’s interest in historical resources, and 
dialectic relationships with history rather than a disavowal of it, in favour of the “new”. It 
is in this spirit that Lachenmann recently characterised the approach taken in Ein 
Kinderspiel not as “playing the melody on the piano” but rather of “playing the piano on the 
melody”513. It is a defamiliarisation that is achieved dialectically, through a reformulation of 
the inherited relationships between material immanent to music (“the melody”) and the 
medium by which that immanence is expressed (“the piano”). 
This is a focusing, and Shklovskian ‘complication’, of the mutual mediation of the 
one by the other. In Lachenmann’s music, the ways in which this complication is 
manifested discursively takes different forms. Two major works from the late-70s, for 
instance, tackle historical material head on. The first, Accanto (1975-76), is written for solo 
                                                
513 Lachenmann said this at a pre-concert talk (an interview with Ivan Hewett) as part of the ‘Helmut 
Lanchenmann Weekend’ at the London Southbank Centre on 23rd October 2010. 
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clarinet and orchestra. It includes a mostly silent tape track of Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto 
that occasionally punctuates the otherwise modernist surface texture. This reflects the 
commodification and compartmentalisation of Mozart’s Concerto in contemporary 
society.514 The discourse of the work here reflected the larger cultural discourses in which 
the Concerto is situated. As Alastair Williams puts it, 
 
Accanto seeks not to recreate the past but to use the rubble of Mozart’s style 
to defamiliarize the present: it is not authentic Mozart we hear in Accanto, but 
a contemporary response to the discourses that envelope Mozart.515 
 
The second work, Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied (1979-80), is for string quartet and 
orchestra. In this work one finds the use of past material as a background ‘skeleton’516 
around which the body of the work is built – ‘folk music, the German national anthem, 
and J.S. Bach serve as a kind of naked frame on which to hang his idiosyncratic sound 
material’517. As such, in Accanto and Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied markedly historical material 
is held as something external to the works. In the former this takes the form of a ‘lifeless’ 
tape recording which imposes itself as a foreign body upon the orchestra’s material, 
rupturing over this discursive boundary. In the latter, historical material forms the framing 
device for the musical content, and as such, suggests an existence outside of it.  
In Serynade, though, something different happens. Instead of the externalisation of 
historical form from expressive content, fragments of historically inscribed material are 
internalised into the discourse518. The dialectic is refocused: it is not one defined by internal 
expression and external forms. Instead, attention is brought to the relationships between 
fractured gestures, each in themselves inscribed with historicity. Put another way, with 
neither clear historical references, nor some “external”’ force to which the discourse reacts 
(for example, quotation), a clear hermeneutic starting point is not provided. As a result, the 
listener relies on the implications – traces – of historicity within discursive elements, of 
implicit rather than explicit connections, in locating significance. Indeed, the immanent 
engaging with pedagogy, technology, and form in Serynade – the internalisation of the 
dialectics of convention – allows it to act as a space for their relative, mutual reformulation, 
                                                
514 See WILLIAMS 2012 and MOHAMMED 2004b. I discussed this work in chapter 2, as it (and its critique of 
commodity) is connected with the idea of objecthood. 
515 WILLIAMS 2012: 92 
516 LACHENMANN, HELMUT 2004b: ‘Philosophy of Composition – Is There Such a Thing?’ in Identity and 
Difference: Essays on Music, Language, and Time (ed. Jonathan Cross & Jonathan Harvey), Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 63 
517 FELLER 2002: 254 
518 Indeed, by the late 1980s Lachenmann himself claimed he was “less happy to employ ‘exterritorial’ 
sound material”. Cited in HOCKINGS 1995: 8 
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with each changing in relation to its other. Reference is made both to a sense of embodied 
musical space, and to the body-schematic space of pedagogy and technology. In their 
interrelationships they are shown to affect one another, and this forms an important basis 
for expression and significance in the work. 
The piano, in both its expressive and physical dimensions, goes beyond its own 
“literal” boundaries. Serynade critically explores this idea, approaching it with reference to 
conventionalised embodiment relations of pedagogy, technology, and material within the 
musical discourse. Merleau-Ponty’s body-schema (here historicised in relation to musical 
conventions) allowed for the development of a nuanced understanding of this process 
within bodily and musical space. In this playful dialectic – to borrow a phrase from 
Merleau-Ponty – ‘the body is essentially an expressive space’ 519. In a general point 
regarding the study of musical instruments, as they are indicative of wider concepts and 
practices, Kevin Dawe writes that they ‘can provide unique insights into the body-machine 
interface in their development, construction, and the ways in which they are played’520. 
Lachenmann focuses on this moment of ‘interface’. Drawing on Shklovsky’s ideas has 
allowed for the development of the idea of denaturalisation; a defamiliarisation goes 
beyond the formal, as evidenced in the physicality of embodiment relations as 
foregrounded in Serynade. This is a work suggestive of a (critical) phenomenological mode 
of enquiry, one which, like the work itself, puts the piano “centre stage” in the processes 
of experience. The apparent immediacy of experience turns back on itself, underlining its 
historicity and materiality, through complicating the processes of understanding and 
playing with the ‘naturalness’ of convention – ‘A crooked road, a road in which the foot 
feels acutely the stones beneath it, a road that turns back on itself – this is the road of 
art.’521 
                                                
519 MERLEAU-PONTY 2002: 169. It is telling that here Merleau-Ponty was originally referring to an 
organist practicing his instrument. 
520 DAWE 2003: 275 
521 SHKLOVSKY 1990: 15 
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8. Embodying the Body in Two 
Non-Danced Dances 
	  
I especially remember with great pleasure one evening when [Johann N. 
Hummel] improvised in so splendid a manner as I never since heard 
him whether in public or in private. The company were about to break 
up, when some ladies, who thought it too early, entreated Hummel 
[emphasis in original] to play a few more walzes [sic] for them. Obliging 
and gallant as he was to the ladies, he seated himself at the piano, and 
played the wished for walzes, to which the young folks in the adjoining 
room began to dance. I, and some other artists, attracted by his play, 
grouped ourselves round the instrument with our hats already in our 
hands, and listened attentively. Hummel no sooner observed this, than 
he converted his play into a free phantasia of improvisation, but which 
constantly preserved the walz-rhythm, so that the dancers were not 
disturbed. He then took from me and others who had executed their 
own compositions during the evening a few easily combined themes 
and figures, which he interwove into his walzes and varied them in 
every recurrence with a constantly increasing richness and piquancy of 
expression. Indeed, at length, he even made them serve as fuge-themes 
[sic], and let loose all his science in counterpoint without disturbing the 
walzers in their pleasures. Then he returned to the gallant style, and in 
conclusion passed into bravoura, such as from him even has seldom 
been heard. In this finale, the themes taken up were still constantly 
heard, so that the whole rounded off and terminated in real artistic 
style. The hearers were enraptured, and praised the young ladies’ love 
of dancing, that had conduced to so rich a feast of artistic excellence.522 
 
Louis Spohr 
– Louis Spohr’s Autobiography: Translated from the German (published in 
1865) 
 
I begin this last chapter with a 19th-century anecdote, one that I will return to in 
due course. This sets the tone for the following discussion of connections between dance, 
piano music, and the body in two musical works, Alfred Schnittke’s Piano Quintet (1972-
76) and Thomas Adès’s Mazurkas, Op. 27 (2009). It is also a story whose significance to 
this discussion should only later become fully apparent. 
                                                
522 SPOHR, LOUIS 1865: Louis Spohr’s Autobiography: Translated from the German (Copyright Edition), 
London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 191-192. My attention was drawn to this 
passage through its citation at length in CAREW, DEREK 2007: The Mechanical Muse: The Piano, Pianism and 
Piano Music, c. 1760-1850, Aldershot: Ashgate, 550 
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In the previous chapter it was observed that the piano is an object that mediates 
the body, and that this is underlined by or reframed in music that plays with the mediative 
dimensions of this object, the foremost being relationships between technology and 
pedagogy. But concerns regarding embodiment in piano music are not only limited to 
pedagogical-technological relationships. Another exceptional example of the immanence 
of the body in music – by which I mean that its mediation ‘within’ musical forms – is also 
underlined in the historic and continuing connections found between piano music and 
dance forms. Dance, and the sedimentation of aspects of it into music material, reminds us 
that the body and embodied relations are also core conditions of musical experience. 
Whilst pedagogical and technological relationships took centre stage in the 
previous chapter, with immanent musical space being related to this, in this final chapter 
primary focus is placed on this space, as well as the structuring functions this space works 
to achieve (in structuring relationships between minds and bodies). A musically immanent 
history of the body is shown to be drawn on and explored by recent works. The waltz is 
taken as a paradigmatic example of a dance form taken into and distinctively shaped by the 
pianistic repertoire, as a historically resonant mode of bodily mediation still drawn upon, 
and transformed, in late 20th-century music. This is discussed in the case of the waltz from 
Schnittke’s Piano Quintet. 
Having outlined these historical and bodily connections I then go on to discuss 
another reaction to these legacies, in Thomas Adès’s Mazurkas. Central here are 
connections with Fryderyk Chopin’s piano music and his shaping of bodily gesture. An 
intriguing, although by no means unique, situation emerges, in which “purely musical” 
allusion is made to earlier musical entities that were dance(d) forms. (Although, in Adès’s 
work, as in Schnittke’s too, dancers themselves are absent.) This disconnection of dance 
form from dancer is not peculiar to these late 20th- and early 21st-century works – 
undanced minuets are expected in Mozart’s symphonies, tempi too quick for dancing are 
found in many of Chopin’s Waltzes523, a ländler is often heard in Mahler’s symphonies, 
and Ravel’s La Valse (1919-20) was written not for dancers but in homage to Strauss and 
to “the wonderful rhythms of the Viennese Waltz”, as Ravel himself put it524. However, in 
these later works, whilst this literal disconnection continues, what is distinct in Schnittke’s 
waltz is a critical focus upon the treatment of musical aspects in the waltz connotative of body and 
                                                
523 For a discussion of this in Chopin’s music see YARAMAN, H. SEVIN 2002: Revolving Embrace: The Waltz as 
Sex, Steps, and Sound, Hillsdale: Pendragon Press, 73 
524 Ravel cited in YARAMAN 2002: 94 
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mind (the structuring of these, as related to one another) and, in Adès’s Mazurkas, the 
historicity of these dance forms as mediated specifically through their treatment in Chopin’s solo piano 
music. The musical and philosophical-historical issues central to my discussion of the first 
are drawn on in supplementing the direction of analytic musical concerns regarding the 
second. 
SCHNITTKE’S QUINTET – THE WALTZ 
 
The body is socially constituted in practices such as music. And, as I have noted in 
earlier chapters, this constitution often finds parallels to, and coincidences in, other 
domains, manifesting coincident articulation musically. This is made clear in an outlook 
sensitive to the interconnected histories of piano and dance. Whilst late 20th- and early 21st-
century music is our primary focus, the primacy of historicity to the method developed 
here means that looking back to the roles of piano and dance in the 19th century sharpens 
the interpretative lens of this focus. As Richard Leppert puts it, the 19th century was a time 
when the ‘the piano became the ubiquitous and unrivalled instrument of the bourgeois 
home’525. It provided, both physically and musically, a domestic space in which social 
performativities could be played out. I suggest that drawing these aspects out aids our 
understanding of later music with regard to mind, body, and the historicity of these things 
as articulated musically. 
The waltz from Schnittke’s Piano Quintet makes connections to the past through 
the use of this form. This work, as Alexander Ivashkin notes, is a milestone in Schnittke’s 
compositional development and offers a noteworthy case study. It is a work in which, 
unlike ‘the First Symphony or early serial compositions… [or f]rom the polystylistic 
surface of his earlier compositions[,] Schnittke goes deeper into the sphere of a new 
musical language in which all the various stylistic elements are combined into a single 
homogeneous whole.’526 The quintet uses material originally intended for his Requiem 
(1972-1975)527. Schnittke’s quintet is dedicated in memory of his mother, who was of 
Volga-German descent. In addition, Schnittke spent part of his childhood in Vienna, 
where his father was working, studying privately there from 1946-48. The explicit 
                                                
525 LEPPERT 1992: 111. Leppert goes even further, suggesting that it performed an already gendered 
function within its place in the home: ‘the piano served as an object to be looked at beyond being heard or 
played upon… [this] looking insistently gendered, driven by the instrument’s extramusical function 
within the home as the visual-sonoric simulacrum of family, wife, and mother.’ (LEPPERT 1992: 105) 
526 IVASHKIN 1996: 133 
527 WETTSTEIN, SHANNON L. 2000: Surviving the Soviet Era: An Analysis of Works by Shostakovich, Schnittke, 
Denisov, and Ustvolskaya, D.M.A Diss., University of California (San Diego): 43 and IVASHKIN 1996: 131. 
Note also that there is an orchestral version of the Quintet, entitled In Mermoriam (1978). 
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connections with Vienna (i.e. the waltz) in the quintet can accordingly be heard as a 
making links with the Austro-German musical tradition. 
The quintet is comprised of five movements. The first begins (and ends) with the 
solo piano and revolves around a short section of musical material, the piano’s interplay 
with the string quartet, and a passage of tense chromatic string writing accompanied by the 
insistent repetition of a high G-sharp in the piano part. The second – Tempo di Valse – 
begins without break from the last. A tense Andante follows this, before a reflective Lento. 
The work ends with a nostalgic pentatonic melody played by the piano over which, in the 
strings, are layered materials derived from throughout the quintet as a whole, in a 
movement marked Moderato Pastorale. 
Organising Bodies (and Minds) 
Listening (rather than dancing) to music provides the conditions for a turning 
inwards for the listener.528 In the 19th century, the motionless body of the listener afforded 
an experience of interiority within one’s private world par excellence, ideals of the time’s 
culminating bourgeois subjectivity. The contemplative listening of an autonomous music 
was mirrored in an autonomous listener, with his or her own distinctly interior experience. 
This was emphasised through another 19th-century development – the turning down of the 
house lights during performance. It is not my aim to contradict these interpretations 
regarding the disembodied interiority of listening practices by discussing the body’s role, 
but instead to augment to them. This is to say that it is not only the disembodied that 
mediate still-present legacies of this subjectivity. 
Issues of embodiment are underlined in dancing. Values inscribed in the listening 
act found themselves supplemented by dancing. As Derek Carew puts it, 
 
One dance… was to embody all the qualities which the bourgeoisie held dear 
and which characterised their social ascendency. The waltz was informal, with 
no prescribed steps or patterns, danced by couples in intimate bodily contact 
whirling in and out of a floorful of others similar.529 
 
Sevin H. Yaraman similarly stresses the connection between the waltz and bourgeois 
values in her Revolving Embrace. 
 
                                                
528 Dahlhaus traces this, in terms of concert listening practices, to the educative function played by music 
in the 19th century; ‘Education – Bildung – meant gaining an inner detachment from the “realm of 
necessity,” as the bourgeoisie regarded their everyday existence’ (DAHLHAUS 1989: 50). 
529 CAREW 2007: 546, emphasis in original 
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[T]he waltz required dancers of sufficient experience – not training – to 
withstand the constant whirling. This appealed to a nineteenth-century 
bourgeois’ desire for sophistication; and, indeed, the waltz became 
synonymous with the bourgeois life-style.530   
 
The waltz can therefore be understood in two connected ways. Firstly, it shaped and 
organised a certain embodied aspect of subjectivity that was culminating during the 19th 
century. And, secondly, in-so-doing, in sedimenting these practices through being their 
musical vehicle of mediation, it came to itself embody this embodiment. 
This should be put in the context of a process during the 19th century – and 
Chopin has been attributed a central place in this process531 – in which gestures of dance 
became increasingly sedimented into “purely musical” materials. This was a time when 
piano music was in many ways becoming disconnected from “real” dancing bodies but 
dancing nonetheless still shaped notions of the body in music, especially in its dance forms.  
Eric McKee, in his history of the waltz and the minuet, demonstrates how ‘Chopin 
translates physical motions into musical gestures and uses these musical gestures as 
compositional source material of a sort whose potential is developed on different levels of 
musical organization’ 532 . Carew suggests that Chopin ‘manages to transfer the 
choreographic gestures to the piano’533. Indeed, it is significant that he ends his history of 
the piano and its repertoire (c. 1760-1850) with a section on ‘The Dance’ in piano music, 
ending the book by suggesting that works like Chopin’s op. 70/1 (1833), which were ‘“too 
profound” for the salon [Chopin’s words], were also never meant for the ballroom: it 
remains to the pianist and piano itself to dance the music out, as indeed it does, in its way, 
the whole history of this period’534. 
This is where Schnittke re-enters the discussion. In his use of the Waltz – in its 
association with Viennese 19th-century life and embodying of a set of philosophical-
historical values – he draws on aspects historically mediative of subjectivity as sedimented 
into the musical music. The waltz as formal scheme, in its disembodied (rather than 
danced) character, plays a role, but so too does its bearing traces of past comportments of 
being – or, to put this into the language of Merleau-Ponty, of historically pertinent body-
schema. Schnittke’s waltz thus draws immanently on two complimentary legacies – mind 
                                                
530 YARAMAN 2002: 5 
531 See CAREW 2007 and MCKEE, ERIC 2012: Decorum of the Minuet, Delirium of the Waltz: a Study of Dance-
Music Relations in 3/4 Time, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
532 MCKEE 2012: 146 
533 CAREW 2007: 555 
534 CAREW 2007: 556, emphasis in original 
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and body, listening and dancing – of 19th-century experience, locating the latter, in being 
sedimented into listened-to musical materials, through the former. 
Noting some of the general characteristics of waltzes will focus the following 
discussion of Schnittke’s waltz in particular, as these are reaffirmed, deviated from, or 
negated. The waltz is characterised by its prominent accompaniment, the ‘more or less 
constant “um-cha-cha” pulse outlining the harmonic framework’ (and, owing to this 
background stability, the waltz provides an exceptional vehicle for melodic 
improvisation).535 This observation might appear obvious. However, these rhythmic and 
harmonic functions are crucial in that the accompaniment/melody dualism mirrors, in 
some respects, a body/mind one. This is underlined through recalling features of Spohr’s 
story from the very opening of this chapter. 
In the passage from Spohr’s autobiography, several interconnected philosophical 
themes that surround the waltz are crystallised – most centrally, a series of dualities of 
mind and body (coinciding with gendered issues). The ‘young folks’ and the ‘ladies’, who 
enjoy the bodily action of dancing, are spatially separated (‘in the adjoining room’) from 
the ‘artists’ and men (‘hats already in our hands’) that gather around the piano so as to 
enjoy the music (“the music” as removed from its danced dimension).  The pleasure of 
this dancing is also contrasted with the artistic appreciation of Hummel’s ‘science in 
counterpoint’. Differing experiences of temporality might also be inferred; in the musical 
experiences of the dancers, caught up in unfolding rhythms and in bodily movement, and 
of the ‘artists’, enjoying the abstract nature of musical themes’ fugal treatments. Hummel’s 
‘feast of artistic excellence’ is a balancing of the body and mind – dancing pleasure and 
aesthetic endeavour – an attending to both without disrupting one by the other. Spohr’s 
account underlines that both the waltz and the piano have historically mediated 
conceptions and practices of body and mind, his depiction of the event also structuring 
the relationships between the two.  
Often recognised in the waltz are qualities of circularity and repetition – ‘its 
intoxicating, repetitive circularity’, as Yaraman puts it.536 As Susan McClary has noted, 
dance’s place is often elided from discussions of (dance) music. She attributes this, in large 
part, to modernist aestheticians’ (especially Adorno’s) hostility to repetition, a central 
component of dance (in terms of both its rhythmic and formal organisation).537 Whilst 
repetition can be generally observed in dance musics, a characteristic ‘circularity’ is 
particular to the waltz – ‘[t]he valse à trois temps  is often described as a dance of circles: 
                                                
535 CAREW 2007: 50 
536 YARAMAN 2002: 73 
537 MCCLARY 2012: 193-195 
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small clockwise circles embedded within larger counterclockwise ones.’538 This is an action 
often mirrored in the musical schemes, following, for example, A.B. Marx’s advice that 
waltz composers must “at the very least… bring into prominence this basic motive of 
motion [the circle]… Each bar, or better, each two-bar segment, must correspond to the 
dance motive, marking… the swinging turn of the dance”.539 
Schnittke’s waltz creates repetitive circularity in both its phrasing and the 
reappearance of materials (and, having in-part affirmed this characteristic, it is often then 
deviated from or negated). As it is pervasive throughout much of the second movement, I 
will continue to attend to this aspect as the discussion of the movement unfolds. 
Tempo di Valse 
Ex. 60, Schnittke: Piano Quintet, ( i i )  Tempo d i  Valse ,  opening 
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
The basic quality of circularity comes through in other musical dimensions too, in 
ways that are less-than-waltz-orientated in their origins. This can be heard firstly, to 
mention a central feature of the work in passing now, in the use of the B-A-C-H 
monogram that forms the basis of the waltz’s melody, beginning the movement in the first 
violin (Ex. 60). (The Quintet begins with the strings only. The piano enters in bar 19.) This 
motif is repeated over and over, circling around a central pitch (in its original permutation, 
around B-flat). Repetition and circularity are also core to the work – in its non-waltz 
dimensions – in the recurrence of, and on-going insistence of, some materials within 
movements. Schnittke made has reference to these as ‘the Lebensuhr’, which, as Shannon 
L. Wettstein writes, concerns ‘the ticking away of life, where each moment is caught in a 
perpetual state of tension’.540 (She cites the repeated high G-sharp in the piano in the first 
                                                
538 MCKEE 2012: 148 
539 A.B. Marx cited in MCKEE 2012: 148 
540 WETTSTEIN 2000: 44 
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movement (starting at bar 41) as an excellent example of this541. This is also something that 
is expressed through the re-emergence of particular motifs and themes.) Despite the non-
waltz origins of these circularities, they nonetheless do – especially the use of the B-A-C-H 
motif – create a quality of circularity peculiar to Schnittke’s waltz movement. 
 
Ex. 61, Schnittke: Piano Quintet ( i i ) ,  bars 11-14 
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
A key feature of Schnittke’s waltz, and one that philosophically-historically relates 
to the issues raised in Spohr’s anecdote, is the interaction of counterpoint and the waltz’s 
incessant accompaniment figure (“um-cha-cha”). The former takes shape prominently 
through Schnittke’s use of canon.542 From bar 11 (Ex. 61), canonic entries at the unison 
are heard one bar after the next. This articulates the triple time of the waltz – on the 
vertical, rhythmic axis – but is also linear in dissonantly paying no heed to the harmonic 
content of the viola’s accompaniment. This is a canon which, harmonically at least, 
disrupts itself through dense chromatic circularity around a pitch centre (of B-flat, in a “G 
minor” context). This interplays with the Waltz accompaniment figure, whose gestural 
two-bar circularity is founded on a swaying between G and F-sharp (reminiscent of a 
back-and-fourth “I to V6” in G) heard at the bottom of the texture in the viola (originally 
heard in the cello, bar 2). Furthermore, early on in the movement focus is brought onto 
the linearity of the counterpoint at important structural moments through a prolonging of 
the circularity of the rhythmic accompaniment figure. This occurs in the bars preceding 
returns to the “B-A-C-H” melody (at bars 11 and 19) as well as in the bar before bar 39, at 
                                                
541 WETTSTEIN 2000: 46 
542 As noted in chapter 4 (on his Fourth Quartet), Schnittke often uses closely voiced canons to create ‘a 
texture continuously in motion’ (DURRANI 2005: 80). Richard Taruskin has also noted how, in his Fourth 
Symphony, Schnittke employs ‘perpetual canon at the almost-unison and the almost-octave’ (TARUSKIN 
1997: 103). 
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which point this melody extends its range upwards to as-yet-untouched peak. At these 
points single bars of four-four take the place of the three-four metre, acting as written-out 
ritardandos, so as to linger on a moment of unfolding counterpoint before (re)affirming 
the waltz-rhythm. 
 
Ex. 62, Schnittke: Piano Quintet ( i i ) ,  bars 19-25 (strings omitted) 
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
At bar 19 the piano enters the movement (Ex. 62). It takes the melody in the right 
hand, slightly adapted rhythmically through the use of quavers, and the accompaniment in 
the left. The affirmation of the waltz-rhythm at bar 19 centres the piano as the gestural, 
rhythmic core, before the strings enter in canon once again. The melody then develops, in 
terms of pitch content and gestural direction, for the first time, with, in bar 23, a 
movement upwards to an F-sharp and then G. The strings’ counterpoint adapts to follow 
this new pitch space, still in canon. This culminates in a motif derived from the original B-
A-C-H figure, one falling downwards onto an E-flat (the new motif: F-sharp, G, F-natural, 
E, E-flat). This E-flat, first in the piano part at bar 29, articulates a structural point of 
change, a movement towards a new pitch space that flirts with the subdominant of the 
original “G minor” – the E-flat acts as a third degree of a “C minor” space, harmonically 
analogous to the original B-flat linear centre as third degree of “G minor”. At bar 29, a C-
minor second inversion chord in the piano part confirms this move. Yet the G to F-sharp 
undulation continues in the bass. Indeed, here the waltz-rhythm complicates. The 
hemiolas introduced in the pianist’s left hand in the third bar of the piano’s original entry 
(i.e. in bars 21-22) continue. In bars 31-34, for example, three groups of four crotchets are 
heard (made up of four then four then two plus two). The piano on entering thus adopts a 
pseudo-improvisatory, developmental role. It reaffirms the waltz-rhythm but is also 
granted the freedom to complicate, to push-and-pull against, a stable concept of rhythm.543 
                                                
543 In addition to the different roles played by the piano and the strings, they are also often separated 
structurally. As is also found in Shostakovich’s Piano Quintet, lengthy sections appear for strings alone, 
and ‘both Russian quintets [Schnittke’s and Shostakovich’s] begin their first movements with extended 
passages for piano alone, and thus contribute further to a separation of the two “sides” of the ensemble.’ 
(SMALLMAN, BASIL 1996: The Piano Quartet and Quintet: Style, Structure, and Scoring, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 150) 
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This is important as it calls on yet also disturbs the clarity of the duality highlighted in 
Spohr’s anecdote: that of counterpoint and rhythm. 
Despite the reassertion of the waltz-rhythm by the piano at bar 39 – the bass of 
which spells out the B-A-C-H motif this time (centred on B-natural) – rhythmic 
disturbance continues in the strings. In this sense, and in rhythmic terms at least, the waltz 
returns to “business as usual”, working on the duality of a strong accompaniment that 
provides the foundation upon which more complex counterpoint might unfold. Again, 
this principally takes the form of a canon: the second violin’s hemiola figure and following 
descent is imitated by the first violin (down one semitone) two bars later (bar 41), and the 
viola two bars later and one semitone down again (43), and finally by the cello (45). 
Through canon, materials are circled around linearly in the context of a dense chromatic 
pitch-space. 
 
Ex. 63, Schnittke: Piano Quintet ( i i ) ,  bars 55-61 
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
This leads to a significant moment, at bar 57 (Ex. 63). Here, the piano does not 
continue to facilitate development of material. It instead becomes the means by which 
material from outside may be reintroduced – material from the very opening of the first 
movement. This alters the role of the waltz, as well as the significance of this returning 
material. The strings settle on a tense cluster made up of the intervallic content of the B-
A-C-H motif as starting on C – pitches D to B (and this “B-A-C-H cluster” is an element 
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that reappears later). The linearity of the counterpoint becomes static. Dancing action 
turns inward, towards memory, as body and mind audibly disturb one another. The piano 
here plays a role that could be described using the word ‘extraterrioriality’, as used in 
previous chapters – as bringing something to a discourse from outside, in this case, 
reintroducing it. A C major chord is played in the left hand (second inversion), a C-sharp 
appearing in the right – material derived closely from the opening of the quintet is heard. 
What was before a solo statement by the piano – an expressive and almost improvisatory 
passage that appeared not to follow rhythmic strictness – now appears superimposed over 
a pitch cluster with which there is no reconciliation.  
In this passage, the piano’s second chord (bar 61) draws together past and present 
explicitly. Within the second movement, it appears as a derivation of part of the waltz’s 
two-bar circular gesture – specifically, from the second chord of the two-bar waltz 
accompaniment figure (“V6”), heard for the first time at the opening of the movement 
(movement ii, bar 4; F-sharp, B-flat, and D-natural).  However, it is heard simultaneously – 
recontextualised through its proximity to the piano’s first chord in bar 57 – as derived also 
from the second chord of the original opening material of the first movement (Ex. 64). 
Past and present, the abstract nature of memory and the immediacy of the bodily waltzing 
gestures, become complicated in a moment entangling both. In referring back, in this 
evocation of the opening, memory is modified as to reflect the present waltz setting 
(though insufficiently in terms of providing a waltz-rhythm proper). They could even be 
considered objects, invested with significance, now becoming modified in their new 
discursive setting. 
 
Ex. 64, Schnittke: Piano Quintet, ( i )  Modera to  
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
This moment also marks a change in the role of bodily gesture, culminating in a 
passage characterised by dissolution and stasis before the body’s ultimate recovery. Indeed, 
from bar 76 onwards, no trace of the waltz-rhythm remains – solo entries are written 
across bar lines and there is a frequent use of dotted crotchets (also tied across bar lines). 
The first Violin’s solo quadruple-stopped chord, which announces a quarter-tone trill on 
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A-natural, is only occasionally punctuated by chords in the piano part. All rhythmic 
articulation seems abandoned. From 103, slow, triple-piano chords appear in the other 
strings (still revolving around the B-A-C-H motif). Fragments of material appear in the 
context of static chords in the strings.  
At bar 134, there is a movement towards the recovery of discursive, and gestural, 
articulation. This is done so viscerally, although through gestures very different from those 
of a waltzing body. Microtonal trills enter in canon in a gesture that complicates pitch 
identities. The trill, what might in Viennese classicism function at points of structural 
prolongation or even liminality – that space of “neither here nor there”, having “not yet 
arrived” at a new, affirmed identity – is extended outward as a large-scale gesture that 
disturbs affirmed discursive identities. The strings enter one at a time, one bar after the 
next, with trills that overlap the pitch spaces of each other. This leads to a downward 
collapse by all the string’s lines into another static “B-A-C-H cluster” (G-sharp to B) just 
in time for the piano to reenter. This point, as at the marked instance of remembering 
earlier material (in bar 57), provides a moment in which traces of the opening movement 
appear again as superimposed upon a new, chromatically dense backdrop. 
 
Ex. 65, Schnittke: Piano Quintet, ( i i )  Tempo d i  Valse ,  bars 158-162 
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
Articulation of the triple metre is reaffirmed after this passage, at bar 161 (Ex. 65). 
This is not a waltz exactly, but it bares traces of it. Rather than the return of the emphatic 
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“um-cha-cha”, the solo piano’s entry is triple-piano. Yet the bars’ first beats’ F-natural to E-
natural movement back and forth recalls the G-natural to F-sharp in the bass of the 
original waltz accompaniment. This prepares the ground for a new melody – itself derived 
from the B-A-C-H motif – before, as previously, the strings enter one-by-one in canon. In 
another move reflecting earlier large-scale gestures, this section’s (again, problematic) “F 
minor” centre lands next in the area of “B-flat minor” at bar 181, mirroring the earlier 
flirtations with the pitch centres of G moving to its subdominant-related C. Indeed, the 
most (relatively) affirmed key areas are G, C, F, and B-flat (all minor), a circle of fifths, 
attesting to this movement’s deeply ingrained references to the Austro-German musical 
tradition, taking these beyond surface signifiers thereof. 
 
Ex. 66, Schnittke: Piano Quintet ( i i ) , bars 197-200 (strings omitted) 
 
© Edition Peters 1976 
 
The surface reconfirms this connection at bar 197 (Ex. 66). Here begins a build 
towards the final, unresolved climax (bar 227) in a passage that, again, puts the piano at the 
centre of its rhythmic organisation, with the strings in dense polyphony above it (Spohr’s 
duality, again cited yet disturbed). From bar 197, the waltz-rhythm builds towards its most 
emphatic expression, with the pianist’s left hand’s parallel fifths and, in the right, 
pronounced tonal triads on the second and third beats, although these chords are out of 
kilter with the bass. The waltzing gesture is reimposed but at the cost of a further 
deviation from this gesture’s reliance on chords’ functional relationships (and their own 
self-consistency). This escalates slowly towards triple-forte – with increasingly tense, 
microtonal polyphony above it in the strings – until at bar 227, at this climax, the waltz-
gesture is broken off, as if unable to go further, and the strings’ collapse once more 
towards another B-A-C-H cluster (D-natural to F-natural) at bar 243. Through the 
violence of its gestures the waltzing body becomes self-negating. Indeed, this state of 
collapse becomes the final defining condition of the movement as, from here onwards, 
further microtonal fluctuations distil all the strings onto a unison E-flat (with the piano, in 
a memorial tone, providing fragments of previous waltz material and disconnected pitches 
in superimposition). 
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It should also be noted that the waltz material makes an explicit return in the last 
movement. It appears in a fragmentary form in a moment in which – as seen similarly in 
the case of a return of earlier material at bar 57 in the waltz movement – its now 
superimposed, “extraterritorial” context complicates categories of past and present. This 
occurs in the last movement at bar 77, with the waltz’s B-A-C-H-derived melody (circling 
around B-flat) entering after two further bars. Another expression of Schnittke’s 
Lebensuhr, at a macroscopic level, this material appears in the strings only, in “G minor” 
as in the waltz. Importantly, this occurs beside a simple and nostalgic D-flat pentatonic 
melody in the piano part, whose quiet repetition makes up the entirety of the piano’s 
material in this movement. The last movement ends with the solo piano “fading out” with 
this tune, a diminuendo towards a state (described by a performance note in the score as) 
‘without sound, almost only key noise’.  
Indeed, this is a moment that can be best understood with reference to an idea 
examined above: “distance”. Similarly to the moment referred to in my brief discussion of 
Schnittke’s Symphony No. 3 above (chapter 3), this is an instant characteristic of 
Schnittke’s “doubling” of distance in his deploying of historically resonant materials. 
Schnittke’s original use of the waltz (in movement two) positioned it as an object of focus 
– nonetheless, one that was historical by nature, belonging to a particular past (holding 
associations of classicism, Vienna, and so on). But, in this return in the last movement, it is 
not positioned centrally (though still of the past) as before, but rather situated behind the 
screen of a new and repeated level of discursive consistency – the piano’s continual, 
sentimental pentatonic tune. It is as such made doubly distant: in the first instance, as a 
gestural and social index sedimented with content from a bygone era (yet still the object of 
focus) and now – doubly so – as a distant world from the plane of nostalgic constancy that 
is the piano’s recurring melody. If, in the case of the first time, it is granted a presence that 
holds associations of the past, it is now, in its extraterritoriality, relegated to the status of a 
memory infracting into the nostalgic character of the present, apart from and entering into 
it. 
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THOMAS ADÈS – THE MAZURKA 
 
Thomas Adès’s (2009) Mazurkas for piano, op. 27, provide a more recent example 
of the use of dance forms in piano music, of an immanent engagement with the history of 
the body in music. Musical sedimentation of the memory of dance is underlined in Adès’s 
indebtedness to Chopin’s music; Adès is not so much playing with the Mazurka as a dance 
form, but with Chopin’s Mazurka, as a form now removed from its danced function. As a 
result, these works demonstrate a very particular relationship between mind and body. 
The role of metre and rhythmic emphases is a central feature of this and, as I will 
go on to demonstrate in detail, so are treatments of counterpoint and melody. What is 
striking from the start of Adès’s Mazurkas is the fluidity of rhythm, something owing in 
large-part to rubato often being written out. (It is notable that, as Charles Rosen points out, 
most of the instances in which Chopin himself wrote out rubato were in his Mazurkas.)544 
In addition, rhythmic values are sometimes decreased and bars cut short in accelerando-
like passages that push phrases forward. This is particularly pronounced in the First 
Mazurka. For example, in bars 25-28 we hear two bars of 3/4 move seamlessly into a bar 
of 2/4 + 3/16 and then one of 5/8, before returning to 3/4 (bar 29). The use of 2/4 bars 
in the First Mazurka, often in conjunction with a ritardando, is also noteworthy, given 
stories of Chopin’s rhythm freedom in the performance of his own Mazurkas. It was said 
by Sir Charles Hallé that, 
 
Chopin’s rhythmic freedom in the mazurkas seemed so natural that he was 
not even struck by it for years. In 1845 or 1846, however, Hallé remarked to 
Chopin that he played most of his mazurkas as if they were notated in 4/4 
and not 3/4. Chopin at first denied this energetically, but finally agreed when 
Hallé made him play a mazurka and counted aloud to him as he did so. 
Chopin then said, laughing, that the rhythm was the national character of the 
dance.545 
 
Rosen goes on to comment of this account that, even if Chopin’s performances were 
objectively measurable in two or four, the musical sense was still one of a triple metre.546 It 
is in this spirit of rhythmic flexibility that Adès writes, especially in his first two Mazurkas. 
                                                
544 ROSEN 1995: 413 
545 ROSEN 1995: 414 
546 ROSEN 1995: 414 
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Ex. 67, Adès: Third Mazurka, bars 1-8 
 
© Copyright 2010 by Faber Music Ltd, London. Reproduced by kind permission of the publishers. 
 
Ex. 68, Adès: Third Mazurka, bars 1-8, concealed counterpoint (octaves displaced for 
clarity) 
 
 
Adès often relies on very simple materials as bases of his works. The opening of 
the third Mazurka is a case in point. The opening eight bars (Ex. 67) serve to set up, unlike 
the character of the two Mazurkas preceding it, a framework of rhythmic clarity (though 
one later deviated from). But this basic frame conceals counterpoint within it 
(counterpoint, from the upbeat to bar 9, becomes a surface phenomenon). There are 
actually four lines at play, implying paired contrary motion with each other, although a 
motion that is made distant through constant octave displacements that disturb it. This is 
made clearer once the implied lines are arranged diagrammatically and brought to the same 
octave, as shown in Ex. 68. A single line in the diagram is a result of pitches selected from 
every other bar. The first stave is made up from the pitches of bars 1, 3, 5, and 7 that 
constitute the “top” voice of the texture, the two bottom staves noting each other pitch 
from the bass. 
The discussion of Schnittke’s waltz (and Spohr’s story) above should serve to 
underline that dance forms served historically to discipline relationships with and between 
bodies, and conceptual relationships between mind and body. Melody and counterpoint, 
and metre and rhythm were crucial in mediating these ideas musically. Indeed, as Eric 
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McKee argues, composers of the 19th century were aware (although perhaps not 
consciously so) of cultural associations of elements of forms as these mediated 
“extramusical” ideas, principally gender. (And, as noted in previous chapters, the 
construction of gender often finds coincident expression in the formulation of mind-body 
relations). He makes a case in the last chapter of his Decorum of the Minuet, Delirium of the 
Waltz that ‘Chopin’s adjustments of the Viennese [waltz] model may be read as a critique 
that, to some extent, was motivated by his own anxieties with regard to performing, 
composing, and publishing in a popular music genre so strongly associated with femininity 
and unmitigated sensual pleasure’547. Crucially, this comes through in Chopin’s approach to 
counterpoint (particularly in the later works). Notably, it is not only in the ‘rhythmic’ 
dimension of the Mazurka, as dance form, around which Adès develops his musical 
discourse; counterpoint and melody are central and, as I argue, they are so in an acutely 
Chopinesque manner. 
“Endless motivic unfolding” 
Ex. 69, Adès: Second Mazurka, bars 1-10 
 
© Copyright 2010 by Faber Music Ltd, London. Reproduced by kind permission of the publishers. 
 
Adès’s Mazurkas draw strongly on Chopin’s music in their treatment of phrasing. 
This is not only significant in that it opens points of allusion or historical connection but 
also because the notion of “phrasing” itself is one at which issues of melody, rhythm, and 
                                                
547 MCKEE 2012: 14 
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metre intersect, as well as coincident ideas about the relationships between mind and body. 
William Rothstein’s 1998 essay on ‘Phrase Rhythm in Chopin’s Nocturnes and 
Mazurkas’548 provides an excellent starting point for this discussion and will be drawn on 
as an on-going analytical reference point in my illustration of these concerns. 
Rothstein’s essay opens up a way of understanding Chopin’s – and, as I 
demonstrate, Adès’s – ability to write phrases beyond the confines of metric articulation 
(principally, the emphases of metre). In particular, this comes through in Chopin’s later 
writing, in his approach to melody. 
 
During the decade of the 1840s, both [Chopin and Wagner] were moving 
towards an increasingly seamless style of melodic writing, which in Wagner’s 
case has become famous under the name of “endless melody”.549 
 
This is an approach that it is drawn on particularly in the second of Adès’s Mazurkas, in 
which, to borrow the Wagnerian parlance, an “endless melody” develops on a number of 
levels: motivically, it charts a core idea that continually flows; and harmonically, it unfolds 
around (in the most part) a series of descending thirds in a slowly evolving modal context. 
This is all filtered through an approach to rhythm that is formally strict yet gives the sense 
of a freeing rubato that cuts across barlines and metric emphases. The basis of this process 
can be observed in the passage leading up to the first climax (bar 29, marked triple-forte). 
An analytical exploration of this passage, with regard to these features, forms the heart of 
the following discussion. 
In Adès’s early 21st-century work it might seem more appropriate to talk of motif 
rather than melody as of principal focus – and hence of something like “endless motivic 
unfolding” rather than “endless melody”. However, this idea is still drawn upon in the 
sequentially unfolding treatment of motif and in the “melodic” groupings that emerge 
through their phrasing.  
 
Ex. 70, Adès: Second Mazurka, motivic paradigm  
 
Ex. 70 shows a motif – or rather, a germ of a motivic contour – that is 
fundamental to the movement’s materials. These are the first notes of both the right hand 
                                                
548 ROTHSTEIN, WILLIAM 1998: ‘Phrase Rhythm in Chopin’s Nocturnes and Mazurkas’ in Chopin Studies 
(ed. Jim Samson), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
549 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 128 
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(“melody”) as well as its own accompaniment (in the left hand, in rhythmic canon of one 
note per crotchet an octave below). What should be kept in mind from the very beginning 
is that this music is modal, by which I mean that it employs at any given time a pitch-
collection and one that is often treated linearly (i.e. as a “scale”). (And, as shown below, 
Adès’s modes allude to tonal pitch-space.) The consequence of this modal context is that 
permutations of motivic contours do not retain their absolute interval values. To give a 
simple example, if the pitch collection (mode) C, D, E, and F were in play, if the contour 
C to E were taken “up a modal step” it would result in a movement from D to F. Instead 
of a major 3rd, as before, a minor third would result. The melodic contour, the gestural shape, 
is of primary importance. This is filtered through a rhythmic pattern, an alternation 
between two triplet-quavers and two straight quavers, that is sometimes momentarily 
deviated from (especially toward the ends of underlying groups of bars, as explored below). 
The first two bars of the Second Mazurka make up the first melodic phrase, with 
phrases beginning approximately every two bars. This I call a phrase as it repeatedly 
appears, in different modal permutations, as a gesture leapt up to that then descends from 
this highest peak. It is also developed through a sequence of modal permutations that 
pertain to this melodic phrase identity as Gestalt. This descent develops the motivic 
paradigm of Ex. 70 in which I label the principal germ a and its larger version b. Almost all 
material of the movement is derived from the first germ – gestures are generally 
constructed through combinations of modal steps (i.e. either a semitone or a tone) and 
thirds (minor or major). (And, as such, b can be heard as extension of a.) This makes up a 
longer sequence, which itself totals the first phrase. (C is a cell derived from the “step and 
third” contour but inverts it.)  
 
Ex. 71 Adès: Second Mazurka, first phrase, pitch sequence 
 
As can be seen in Ex. 71, contour b appears again and again, although in-so-doing 
continually overlaps beginnings and endings. The potential “endlessness” of this gesture is 
therefore visible in the movement’s most fundamental materials, although this is an 
endlessness which stems from internal repetition. Rothstein writes (of Chopin’s F-sharp 
Nocturne, op. 48, no. 2) that, ‘[i]t may seem paradoxical that a melody which contains so 
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much repetition could be thought of as “endless”.’550 However, he accepts this paradox as 
‘[t]he segments are always ending, but the larger thrust of the melody never allows them to 
end peacefully.’ 551  Similarly, Adès’s melodic phrases, whilst they suggest continual 
repetition, never resolve the larger unfolding sequence to which they belong. 
I define the “entry” of each melodic phrase as a jump upwards to this high point 
and its following descent. Including the moment of climax itself, which hits as its high 
point the highest note on the piano, there are fifteen such phrases in this opening 
passage.552 The pitch sequences of each melodic phrase are mapped out in Ex. 72. This 
form of presentation allows for a comparison of motivic derivations and the on-going 
transformations of the modes used. In this example I have placed slurs over the principal 
motivic gesture a and over modal steps downwards. Minor moments of development can 
be noted – for example, in the step movement found in phrase five that becomes extended 
to a in phrases six (shown by brackets) or in the ellipsis of a step-wise cell in phrase four. 
More significantly, at the end of phrase nine appears step-wise movement from A-flat to 
F-sharp (marked with an arrow and a “2”). This is repeated a further two semitones 
downwards (F-sharp to E-natural) at the opening of the next phrase. (This development is 
shown at the end of the line showing phrase nine, in a box). This is a marked move that 
confirms an almost entirely new modal space, also articulated by a fortissimo dynamic, at 
phrase ten. Like a DNA sequence, the gestural sequence replicates itself, often identically, 
but sometimes with small mutations that are carried forward. 
                                                
550 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 134 
551 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 134, emphasis in original 
552 The first, marked piano, bar 1 beat 1 (F); second, bar 3 beat 1 (D); third, bar 5 second triplet quaver 
(B-flat); fourth, marked mezzo piano bar 7 second triplet quaver (G); fifth, bar 8 last triplet quaver; sixth, 
bar 11 beat 1 (C); seventh, marked mezzo forte (then mezzo piano), bar 13 beat 1 (F); eighth, bar 15 beat 1 
(D-flat); ninth, bar 17 second quaver (B-flat); tenth, marked fortissimo, bar 19 beat 1 (F-sharp); eleventh, 
bar 21 second triplet quaver (D-natural); twelfth, bar 23 second quaver triplet (B-natural); thirteenth, bar 
25 third quaver triplet (G); fourteenth, bar 27 second quaver; and, fifteenth, marked triple-forte, bar 29 
beat 1 (C-natural, the highest note on the piano). 
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Ex. 72, Adès: Second Mazurka, gestural sequences in an evolving pitch-space, bars 1-30  
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Modal pitch spaces are outlined to the right of the double bar line, with the 
introduction of new pitches shown as diamond-headed. (The first appearances of these 
pitches are also marked out in the melodic phrases by small arrows.) Despite getting higher 
in pitch, there is a sense that the melody is falling, especially prior to phrase ten. This can 
be explained with reference to the modes’ transformations: to the original B-flat is added 
an E-flat, then an A-flat, then in quick succession D-flat and G-flat. This constitutes a 
“flattening” of the pitch-space that, despite the modal context, works its way around the 
circle of 5ths. (In anachronistic terms, these modes make use of the pitches of F major, 
then B-flat, E-flat, A-flat, and then D-flat.) The pitch space of tonality, that provided a 
framework enabling the ‘experience of embodied motion’ within music553, is remembered, if 
not enacted wholesale. A sense of embodied motion, within a musical space that still 
resonates with the echo of a tonal past, is articulated by always-unfolding gestural contours. 
Importantly, this development towards phrase ten also marks a shift in the 
opening contours of the phrases that follow, with the leaping up to each new phrase now 
reflecting this shape (of a modal step downwards). However, the internal contours of the 
melody lines remain the same (illustrated through arranging phrases above each other in 
Ex. 72), giving an inner consistency to the endless melody despite this development. The 
arrival of phrase fifteen can be heard to return to the identity of the melodic phrase before 
the lasting changes introduced by the development and extension of the motivic contours 
at the end of phrase ten, making this moment all-the-more climatic. Dialectically, this is 
both of a moment of development and return. 
Phrasing and Metre 
As Rothstein points out, there is an important difference between phrasing and 
metric groupings.554 Furthermore, the difference (i.e. the non-coincidence) between the 
two is a crucial part of “endless melody”; phrases pushing beyond metric guidelines. 
Rothstein shows how Chopin exploits such discrepancies in the context of the mazurka, a 
dance form, that ‘encourage[s] a phrase organisation in duple lengths – four, eight, sixteen, 
and thirty-two bars’555. Chopin does so through his use of, to give one example, a relatively 
simple background metric pattern (e.g. a sentence of 1 + 1 + 2 bars) that is elaborated 
with phrases and subphrases that overflow these edges.556  
                                                
553 HATTEN 2004: 115, emphasis in the original. This issue of immanent musical motion was discussed in 
greater depth above, in chapter 7. 
554 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 115 
555 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 118 
556 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 119-121 
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Whilst not duple in character, in Adès’s Second Mazurka a metric hierarchy 
nonetheless emerges, one upon which is heard a fluidity of phrasing arising from the 
“endless melody”. The basic phrase is approximately two bars in length, whilst not always 
coinciding with the metric background. This metric framework is itself is made up of clear 
grouping of bars: six bars four times and then four bars, themselves each made up of two 
bar units.557 Each six bars, and then after the last group of four, we hear a growth in the 
dynamic marking or a return to a dynamic level after a sudden decrease nestled within that 
group: piano (bar 1), mezzo piano (7), mezzo forte (13), fortissimo (19), fortissimo again (25), then 
fortississimo (29). The basic two-bar phrase shaping appears fluidly above these somewhat 
rigid metric structures, not always confirming it and often, in a rubato-like manner, 
appearing a little after each two-bar background unit.  
Rigorous compositional processes give shape to the work’s material: rhythmic and 
harmonic (modal) filters, and developing, linear contours. These could potentially be 
considered in some sense as “pre-compositional” materials, and following this abstract 
quality, as markers of a musical mind over a musical body. But the body and the mind are 
bound-up together: the rhythmic filters are informed by the body, by bodily gestures taken 
into (Chopin’s) piano music; the harmonic space resonates with tonally articulated 
embodiment; and, what might be understood as motivic development, emphasises 
gestures that spiral up and down within this space, privileging contour over absolute 
interval relationships. Furthermore, contrapuntal writing (Spohr’s/Hummel’s “science in 
counterpoint”) is filtered through, rather than structurally set against, rhythmic content.  
Rothstein notes a technique pertinent to our discussion through which Chopin 
connected phrases together at an underlying level, so as to transcend background metric 
groupings – the use of a ‘phrase overlap’558. A similar manoeuvre can be heard in Adès’s 
work, albeit in an early 21st-century context. A ‘phrase overlap’ is defined by Rothstein as 
the simultaneous functioning of the final note(s) of one phrase, or subphrase, as the first 
note(s) of the next.559 In Adès’s Mazurka, the octave displacements at the ends of the 
phrases (except for the first) repeated pitches at the end of one function also as the first of 
the next, an octave (or a number of octaves) higher. This anchors the end of one to the 
beginning of the next in the manner of a phrase overlap. The question, “Does each phrase 
begin with the (first) lower note of the octave leap of the highest note, the second?” can 
                                                
557 It should be noted that, whilst it was unusual, Chopin sometimes made use of six-bar phrase structures. 
For example, in the Mazurka op. 59 no. 1 in A minor (a late work, of 1845) (see Rothstein’s discussion, 
ROTHSTEIN 1998: 129-130). 
558 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 117 
559 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 117  
260 
therefore be answered both in the affirmative and negative as one phrase blends in the 
next through this anchoring via pitch. 
 
Ex. 73, Chopin: Mazurka, op. 24, no. 2, opening 
 
Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel (1879 edition) 
 
The historical dimension is also highly relevant to this question. In terms of 
allusion these octave leaps are extremely evocative of Chopin’s gestural language in 
suggesting gestural and phrasing similarities with, to give the most immediately apparent 
example, Chopin’s Mazurka op. 24, no. 2 in C major (Ex. 73), the first melody of which 
(bar 5) similarly leaps up the octave and then descends down a scale step (which is also 
elaborated, with a triplet auxiliary note in Chopin’s case) before further descent towards to 
the lower octave. Like Adès’s, Chopin’s melody is motivically defined by steps and thirds, 
and rhythmically by an alternation of quavers and triplet quavers. In Chopin’s work this 
gesture gives strength to the second beat (as following the Mazurka model). Through this 
lens of allusion to Chopin’s gestural language, Adès’s octave leap can be heard as the “first 
beat”, with the fall a modal-step serving to help place emphasis onto a “second beat”. This 
is readily apparent at the very opening of Adès’s Mazurka, with the octave leap literally 
falling on the first beat. However, at other times, it is the second, higher note of the octave 
leap that becomes the first pitch of each melodic phrase – for example, at the entry of the 
seventh melodic phrase (bar 13) in which there is suddenly a jump three octaves upwards 
to a new high point, one that coincides with a chord in the accompaniment, the first beat 
of the bar, and the first bar of a new bar-group. Adès therefore blends and shifts the 
beginnings and endings of phrases through both historical allusion and transforming the 
basic melodic contours (as outlined in Ex. 72). 
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Ex. 74, Adès: Second Mazurka, counterpoint (in the left hand) gestural sequences 
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In his late works, Chopin also developed his treatment of phrases, with regard to 
the pursuit of endless melody, through the avoidance of cadences and the increased use of 
counterpoint560. The latter of these plays an important role in Adès Second Mazurka. The 
counterpoint to the melody of the right hand is summarised in Ex. 74. At first, the 
gestures unfold in crotchets (on the beat). From the entry of phrase ten onwards they 
become mostly triplet-crotchets with the occasional duplet crotchet (which is why, even 
though it still totals six bars in length, the sequence from phrase ten contains more 
pitches). As demonstrated in the diagram, this contrapuntal line makes use of the contours 
of the melody (and in fact starts off in rhythmic canon at the octave with it). Further cells 
closely derived from the main line also make an appearance: d, which modally steps twice 
downwards; and b-, a derivation of b, which drops a modal-step, next a third, but then 
steps downwards and back (rather than upwards and back, as in b). A followed by an 
arrow (aà) indicates an extension of a (normally by another descending third/ascending 
sixth). Whilst these moments can be heard as an extension of the inner intervals of a, their 
straying from the discursive terms already outlined articulates points of scission between 
one line and the next – here, in the accompaniment line, segmentational boundaries appear. 
This counterpoint supports the upper part, adopting its “transpositions” in different 
modal spaces whilst also elaborating the melodic material itself through exploring new 
combinations of the basic gestural contours. These lines follow the six-bar grouping, with 
the left hand also punctuating these their beginnings with sustained chords beneath them. 
Whilst in many other of Adès works (for example, in his Five Elliot Landscapes, 1990) 
harmonies are produced from the superimposition of interval cycles,561 here gestural contours 
are paramount, unfolding within the context of a modal framework that colour these 
gestures with memories of the embodied pitch-space of tonality. The upper part, which, 
despite its appearance, is surprisingly strict in its gestural and rhythmic content, in the left-
hand’s part becomes the basis for freer musical development.  
Aspects of Chopin’s Mazurkas live on through Adès’s. In the second this means 
the appeal to melodic writing that transcends its own metric framework and a specific 
treatment of the “rhythmic body” vs. “science in counterpoint” dualism. The focus on 
gestural contour over rigid intervallic relationships is also noteworthy in providing hidden 
links with tonal treatments of musically embodied motion. Historical allusion mediates the 
hearing of this work, with Chopin’s Mazurka’s providing an auditory frame for Adès’s 
handing of musical gestures and counterpoint. 
                                                
560 ROTHSTEIN 1998: 129 
561 MARKOU, STELLA IOANNA 2010: A Poetic Synthesis and Theoretical Analysis of Thomas Adès’ Five Elliot 
Landscapes, D.M.A Diss., University of Arizona, 30-31 
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Schnittke’s waltz and Adès’s Mazurkas present two reactions to the historicity of 
dance forms as sedimentated into instrumental music. In the former, this regards allusion 
to the waltz as an exemplar of Austro-German music making and, in so doing, an 
immanent musical engagement with legacies of mind and body – abstract form and 
rhythmic, gestural immediacy, and past and present – as these dialectically mediate one 
another. In the latter, this is traced through the specific treatment of the historicity of a 
dance form, the Mazurka, as located through the Mazurkas of Chopin. The common 
element of both compositional, critical reactions – though one nonetheless accomplished 
differently in each – is a facing of the historicity of dance forms as these have been 
historically instructive ways of being, of the comportment of values beyond themselves: 
with the waltz, as embodying dimensions of bourgeois ideals and of Austro-German 
musical identity, and, in Adès’s Mazurkas, of embodied musical gestures, in the 
interactions between counterpoint, the unfolding harmonic space, rhythm, and metre. 
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CODA 
It would be misleading to conclude this project in a singular manner. Whilst 
conclusions have been made throughout, the often-decentred character of both the music 
focused upon and the philosophical lens(es) of focus make a synthesising of my on-going 
findings undesirable. It would be better to conceive of any conclusions in the manner of 
one of Valentin Silvestrov’s codas – take as example that from his String Quartet No. 1 
(see chapter 5). Like this coda, closure here is partial yet multidimensional. It, like mine, is 
non-synthetic, drawing together (musical/philosophical) themes that have been outlined 
and developed throughout. Both bring together new points of contact between materials 
so-far outlined – so that they might be heard and thought anew – whilst still maintaining 
these materials’ identities in difference and tension with each other, so as to deny the 
affirmation of some new, higher unity. Given that the body of issues has already been 
explored at length I will keep these comments brief. 
The way in which the presence of the past is explored in the works discussed can 
be understood, at a general level, as a dialectic between two tendencies (tendencies often 
simultaneously at play in a single work): firstly, that of locating the past as mediative of the 
present, and, secondly, that of attending to objects from the past as they persist and face 
us in the present. Looking back to Part I, Silvestrov’s Symphony No. 5 provides an 
excellent example of where the former tendency is favoured. It is a work in which, 
through the ruination of past symphonic structures, the present immediacy of musical 
material is brought into question, as something ghostly and fractured that might only be 
made sense of with reference to the past. In Kancheli’s Fifth Symphony, in contrast, the 
latter tendency comes through; an object markedly of the past is foregrounded (the 
harpsichord melody), insisting nostalgically on being present. Indeed, this use of an 
‘object’ provides an exceptional example of a tendency found in many recent musical 
works – where objects become the foci of experience, foregrounded over (an often 
naturalised) background that frames events while remaining hidden. 
In Part II this staging became the central topic of investigation. The dialectic here 
can be encapsulated in a chiasmus: here was an investigation of the nature of discourse (in 
the sense of discourse’s “essential” qualities, its identity, in these works) and the discourse 
of the natural (that discourse is always reliant on some degree of hidden, naturalised 
staging, upon which objects articulate their foregrounded identities). Through developing 
concepts from the poststructuralist poetics of Julia Kristeva, dimensions of subjectivity 
(particularly, those regarding philosophical “identity”) were shown to be embroiled 
through these discursive issues in their mutually constitutive processes. Under three 
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headings – knowing, dreaming, and desiring – I explored those dialectical tendencies from Part 
I: that, firstly, knowledge of the present is mediated by the past and, secondly, that the past 
also finds itself emerging in the present, as objectified. In a discussion of Wolfgang Rihm’s 
String Quartet No. 10, this dialectical co-emergence of one and the other was underlined: 
as objectified features of the past emerged, these elements began to organise a discourse 
which had hitherto expressed instability. These objects of the past came to audibly mediate 
the structuring of the present. The objectification of elements from the past took on a 
particular resonance in Schnittke’s String Quartet No. 4 through these elements’ 
associations with the closure of past musical works and past musical selves. This idea that 
past materials might find new significance in the present was developed in my discussion 
of Silvestrov’s String Quartet No. 1, with reference to theories of dreaming. Both music 
and dream are places in which knowledge and desire interpenetrate, and desire’s relation to 
mediation of the past by the present and the presence of the past (passed) object was the 
focus of the final chapter of Part II. 
The body’s relationship to mediation and to musical objects formed the core of 
Part III. This was something underlined through the role assumed by the piano in 
Lachenmann’s Serynade – the piano is both an object of the past, compositionally 
confronted by Lachenmann, and an object that mediates the present through its inscribed 
historicity. It is a technological object but one whose inherited pedagogy continues to 
mediate the present. The use of dance forms in Schnittke’s Piano Quintet and Thomas 
Adès’s Mazurkas provided examples of further reactions to bodies as sedimented into 
musical material. In the former, this meant taking the Waltz as an object that is associated 
with – indeed, embodies – certain bodily aspects of the Austro-German music tradition. In 
the latter, the use of Chopin’s Mazurkas as a past that continues to mediate the present, as 
a screen that frames aspects of contemporary piano writing, was the chief issue of focus. 
The concept of coincidence has been particularly valuable in making visible the 
hidden links between different philosophical-historical legacies, as these are immanent to 
inherited musical materials (coincidences, for example, between musical articulations of 
body/mind issues as these reflect a nature/culture dualism (see chapter 3, in particular)). 
Indeed, this concept is supplemented through the dream-theoretical approach to musical 
analysis pursued in chapter 5. In music, as in dreams, elements might “stand in” for 
something else (metonymically), or might take that structure of something else 
(metaphorically), in a fashion comparable to the metonymic and metaphoric coincidences 
between ideas across different conceptual domains – mind/body, culture/nature, 
masculine/feminine, and so on. This conceptual fluidity, and the continual deferring of 
philosophical-historical issues and concepts to each other, attests to the 
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multidimensionality of musical experience, and to the contemporary musico-historical 
condition in which any stable centre might be considered only provisional. 
It has been my aim to react appropriately to this multidimensionality through 
pursuing a method that has been in many ways anti-methodological or, at least, non-
schematic. Like the works under investigation, I have sought to shift positions around the 
object(s) being explored – pointing to the affinities, coincidences, and boundaries that 
shape their significance – rather than attempting to ascertain their “true” essence(s). This, I 
hope, is to make these philosophical investigations “musical” as much as this music is 
“philosophical”, in a way that is distinct to the music and philosophy of the late 20th 
century onwards. This distinctiveness comes through – as I argued in the introductory 
chapter – in the provisionality of interpretative centres found in both these musical works 
and in (my employing of) philosophies, provisionalities that are favoured over the pursuit 
of some higher closure within either music or philosophy, or indeed between the two. This 
quality of provisionality is reminiscent of what Sylviane Agacinski calls a modern quality of 
“passingness”. And, indeed, as she puts it, ‘if being stops being eternal and if passing 
acquires ontological dignity, then the images of a transitory world can themselves emerge 
from the shadow of nonbeing and become capable of truth.’562 This is to locate in 
provisionality the possibility of truthfulness, without recourse to the assuredness of 
universality. 
My attending to these issues has been dialectical (yet non-synthetic): working 
between reification and reaction, I have tried to maintain the relatively autonomous 
identity of the objects under discussion whilst, at the same time, “opening up” these 
objects to intersections by philosophical and historical discourses. Furthermore, the same 
may be said in an inverse form: philosophical ideas have been taken as objects that are 
intersected by musical discourses as these articulate concepts – and non-conceptualised 
performativities – of mind, body, culture, nature, and so on. The title of Part II – “Mind in 
Music, Music in Mind” – alludes to this situation in which music and philosophy mediate 
one another, that the object of one is simultaneously conditioned by a framework 
provided by its other. This means that music might act so as to reformulate the conditions 
by which it is experienced. 
I have discussed how past-present relations are approached with reference to 
objects. This attendance to objects in music is itself historically and philosophically 
significant. Following Fredric Jameson’s suggestions above, we saw how interiority and 
temporality found themselves aligned with subjectivity, and space with the exteriority of 
                                                
562 AGACINSKI, SYLVIANE 2003 [orig. 2000]: Time Passing: Modernity and Nostalgia (trans. Jody Gladding), 
New York: Columbia University Press, 15 
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the world (a world of objects)563. As the most quintessentially temporal of the arts, music’s 
attendance to objects can be seen to complicate this arrangement. Whilst respect is paid to 
the object as a concept derived from spatiality (e.g. as it exists within the “space” of a 
musical discourse), the object in many respects also becomes a category of temporal 
significance. The object is heard to be shaped in time (developing musical sound-objects 
within works) and/or to itself shape time (the sounding-object of the piano as colouring 
an unfolding temporality, and shaping subjectivities bound-up with this). In highlighting 
the objects’ temporal qualities, temporality is itself seen to be mediated by a material world 
of objects. Temporality, and music as a temporal art, ceases to remain defined by 
ephemerality, as opposed to the materiality of space. Indeed, this very duality is played-off 
– shown to stand on unstable foundations – with a transformation of the categories by 
which aesthetic experience is mediated as this process’s end. Whilst critical music faces the 
ephemerality of temporality (as this is a significant, established idea), it also confronts the 
material conditions that shape this temporal condition and the materialities that appear 
“within” temporality (i.e. “in time”). This is a critical attitude manifested principally in the 
attending to sound(ing)-“objects”, i.e. the “materiality of musical material”.  
However, the role of objects is not only something that shapes the immediacy of 
experience as this unfolds temporally. Relationships with objects, which nonetheless 
become apparent temporally, also shape conceptions of historical time564 – that is, a sense of 
time as abstracted from moment-to-moment temporal experience. Jameson suggests that 
postmodernism effaces historical time, and any sense of depth. A focus on the present, as 
the site of the experience, reflects this historical condition. But, taking this further, this 
focus on the present, as leading to a past located in the present – and in so giving the 
present historical (and expressive) depth – is to reflect this condition critically. Following 
this, if one common element can be located in the diverse works discussed, beyond areas 
of musical and philosophical overlap and points of cross-fertilisation, it is this 
preoccupation with the past that is located, dialectically, through a focus upon the present. 
In chapter 6, I touched on Jameson’s account of the ‘End of Temporality’, a key 
characteristic of which being a reduction of experience to the present. This, he sees as a 
symptom of our postmodern condition. The music discussed, in the manner of immanent 
                                                
563 JAMESON 2003: 697 
564 In addition, and I will mention this only briefly (at risk of inviting another project in itself), it is also 
significant that new notions of historical time are themselves developing, ones in which, in a time of 
Google, Wikipedia, Twitter, and “Cloud Computing”, materiality’s role in the sedimentation of historical 
memories is changing. We can only wait and see what critical musical reactions to these 
contemporaneously developing times and temporalities will bring. These developments are also reflected 
in philosophy in the recent rise of “object-oriented” philosophies and New Materialisms, which ascribe 
(new) objects new ways of being significant, and of “being” altogether.
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critique – to greater degrees in some, less in others – does not simply affirm or negate this 
condition. Instead, it dialectically works through it, through the contradictions within it. 
That is to say, in its critical dimension it does not merely reject the End of Temporality 
through, to imagine one response, the appeal to a supersensual realm beyond the 
presentness of experience (through turning back to aspects of Romanticism)565. It rather 
takes the reduction of experience to the present as a point of critical beginnings, locating, 
in this present, worlds shaped by the past. This function develops the critical role played 
by music as outlined by Adorno: music is dialectically both a part of, and apart from, 
society. However, this is achieved in a manner that – through the fact of its situatedness 
within ever-changing philosophical-historical conditions – was by its very nature 
unforeseeable to him. The music, in imitating the End of Temporality – in its sensitivity to 
this historical and philosophical condition – actually manages to take us beyond it.  
In a time when our metanarratives are “dead”, when “the past” is supposedly 
reduced to an imagistic surface without depth, the means by which critical music is critical 
is itself reformulated from earlier modernity. When the relationships between past and 
present are themselves core to social and political anxieties566, locating the present in the 
past and the past in the present becomes itself an inherently critical project. If, as Jameson 
suggests, postmodernist conditions mean the reduction of temporality to a persistent 
present, late modernist music’s criticality stems in-part from the contradictions immanent 
to this present – that it is the product of particular philosophical-historical conditions, that 
“within it” it contains the past, and that it itself sits within a frame mediated by the past. 
Historical material and sedimented conditions of musical experience, which have passed, 
are surpassed through this dialectic of past and present.  
I made a claim in my introduction, that “musical experience – and the 
conceptualisation of experience – is shaped by categories of thought and feeling (like mind 
and body, and culture and nature) that are themselves articulated musically”. I have 
illustrated that each of these terms may be “opened up” and (uncovered as) related to the 
others. In categories of “thought and feeling” – and in this very act of demarcation, of the 
“one” and “the other” – coincidences with ideas of mind (“thought”) and body (“feeling”), 
                                                
565 The case of Giya Kancheli’s Symphony No. 5 provides an interesting counterpoint to this in that it does 
make reference to a realm of nature beyond the present (see chapter 3), using this as a framing device for 
the staging and drama of a musical object. 
566 Present conceptions of (anxieties over) the state of historical time, of the present’s relationship with 
the past, has manifested various reactions. The rise of Historically Informed Performance provides a 
notable example; ‘“[h]istorical” performers’ use period instruments and practices, writes Richard 
Taruskin, ‘in a manner that says more about the values of the late twentieth century than about those of 
any earlier era’ (TARUSKIN, RICHARD 1995: Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 164). See his essay, ‘The Modern Sound of Early Music’. 
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culture and nature show through. I have also argued that “articulation” is a highly 
contested issue, one in which subjectivity – and the means by which it speaks through and of 
music – is at stake. Within “each” domain can be located a wider set of historically and 
philosophically established relationships. And to engage with any, so as to bring 
significance to musical experiences in the present, is to engage also with (critical) issues of 
historicity and philosophy. It is to confront these ideas as they have shaped musical 
experience and are consequently “taken into” music, as it both shapes the world and is 
also a part of it. As they shape music, as music is itself always an act of “doing” – a doing 
of subjectivities, pedagogies, instrumental technologies, performativities… – these ideas 
(these practices) are themselves forms of inherited musical material. 
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Mazurkas for Piano, op. 27 (2009), Harlow: Faber Music, 2011 (corrected impression) 
 
Beethoven, Ludwig van – 
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Arsenic and Old Lace (1990), Helsinki: Finnish Music Information Centre, 1992
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